

Passport

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review



Inside...

A Roundtable Discussion on Jay Sexton's *The Monroe Doctrine*
Wikileaks and the Past and Present of American Foreign Relations
Historians as Policymakers



...and much more!

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Keep off! The Monroe Doctrine must be respected. (1896).

Uncle Sam, as armed soldier, standing between European powers (Brit., France, Germany, Spain, and Portugal) and Nicaragua and Venezuela. Courtesy of the US Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.

Passport Editorial Office:

Peter Hahn, SHAFR Executive Director

Mershon Center for International Security Studies, 1501 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43201

passport@osu.edu

614-292-1681 (phone)

614-292-2407 (fax)

Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to *Passport* style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: <http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm>, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in *Passport* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR, of Brigham Young University, or of The Ohio State University.

The editors of *Passport* wish to acknowledge the generous financial and institutional support of Brigham Young University, the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, The Ohio State University, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

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Volume 43, Number 1, April 2012

In This Issue

- 4 Contributors
- 5 A Roundtable Discussion of Jay Sexton's *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*
Alan McPherson, Jeffrey Malanson, William Weeks, and Jay Sexton
- 14 Wikileaks, and the Past and Present of American Foreign Relations
Ryan Irwin
- 18 Historians as Policymakers
Jonathan R. Hunt
- 22 Stick to your Guns (And Don't Let Theirs Intimidate You):
Reflections on Standing Up for Your Scholarship, Twenty Years
After JFK, China, and the Bomb
Gordon H. Chang
- 24 Bay of Pigs Redux
Howard Jones
- 30 SHAFR on Teaching
Phyllis L. Soybel and Nicole M. Phelps
- 33 SHAFR Council Minutes
- 37 The Diplomatic Pouch
- 46 Dispatches
- 50 The Last Word: SHAFR and the Future of the Profession
Brian C. Etheridge

Contributors

Gordon H. Chang is Professor of History at Stanford University and is currently completing a long history of America-China relations. In his early career, he focused on high-level geopolitics but has now turned his attention to the social and cultural dimensions of trans-Pacific interaction.

Brian C. Etheridge is Associate Professor of History and Director of the Helen P. Denit Honors program at the University of Baltimore. He is the co-editor of *The United States and Public Diplomacy: The New International History Meets the New Cultural History* (2010), and is currently completing a book manuscript, *Nazis and Berliners: Germany's Story in Cold War America*. The former editor of the SHAFR web site from 2009-2011, he received SHAFR's Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize in 2009.

Jonathan R. Hunt is a doctoral candidate at the University of Texas at Austin. He is researching a book about multilateral nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War, *Power and Prohibition: The Ideological Origins and Diplomatic Making of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 1953-1970*.

Ryan Irwin teaches courses on foreign affairs and decolonization at Yale University, where he serves as the associate director of International Security Studies. His first book, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order*, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

Howard Jones is University Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama and the author of more than a dozen books. He is presently working on a book entitled, *Into the Heart of Darkness: My Lai*.

Jeffrey Malanson is Assistant Professor of History at Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne, where he teaches courses on early American history, U.S. diplomatic history, and the Atlantic World. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the diplomatic, political, and cultural uses of George Washington's Farewell Address in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Alan McPherson is Associate Professor of International and Area Studies and ConocoPhillips Petroelum Chair in Latin American Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of *Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations* and of *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945*.

Nicole M. Phelps is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Vermont, where she teaches courses in diplomatic history, American race relations, and historical methods. She is currently a finalist for the university's top award for excellence in teaching, received an honorable mention for SHAFR's Unterberger Dissertation Prize in 2009, and won the Austrian Cultural Forum Dissertation Prize in 2010. She currently serves on the SHAFR Teaching Committee.

Jay Sexton is University Lecturer and Tutorial Fellow in U.S. history at Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford. He is the author of *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (2011); *Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 1837-1873* (2005); and, co-edited with Richard Carwardine, *The Global Lincoln* (2011).

Phyllis L. Soybel is Professor of History and department chair at the College of Lake County. The author of *The Necessary Relationship: Anglo-American Cooperation in Naval Intelligence during World War II* (2005), she is currently working on a manuscript examining Anglo-American relations and Britain's changing position both before and during World War II. She also serves as a member of SHAFR's Teaching Committee and the North American book review editor for *Diplomacy and Statecraft*.

William Earl Weeks is Lecturer in History at San Diego State University. His new book, *Dimensions of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865*, will be published later this year as volume one of The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations.



A Roundtable Discussion of Jay Sexton's *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth- Century America*

Alan McPherson, Jeffrey Malanson, William Weeks, and Jay Sexton

The Uses of Monroe: Review of Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*

Alan McPherson

Why revisit the Monroe Doctrine? Dexter Perkins's *The Monroe Doctrine*, published three quarters of a century ago, was a masterful three-volume model of historical investigation that seemed to reveal everything about President James Monroe's 1823 statement to Congress regarding Latin American independence. Penned partly by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Monroe's admonition to Europe to stay out of the affairs of newly independent American republics—and his promise that the United States would reciprocate—was part of a plan to secure the Americas' independence from the Holy Alliance. (The British shared this goal and discussed a Monroe-type joint statement, but Adams convinced his president to go it alone.) More ambitious was a longer-term hegemonic project to overwhelm all Europeans as the dominant power in the Americas.

Since Perkins, other scholars have essentially extended this geopolitical analysis. For example, Gretchen Murphy may have appeared not to when she explored the cultural meanings of the doctrine in 2005. Her *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* explained how the doctrine helped create a separate national identity for the United States and the rest of the Americas by reflecting gender, race, and other markers. Yet the narrative movement was projected outward from the nation's identity rather than inward to embrace domestic goals.

Jay Sexton attempts something different: a long-term review of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Essentially he asks why it took so long for the 1823 speech to become a "doctrine." It was not until 1853 that the word was used, and it was another half-century before the doctrine was transformed from a defensive to an offensive policy. He answers this question in terms that are largely domestic. The Holy Alliance barely threatened the Western Hemisphere, even in the 1820s. "A remarkable feature of the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century is that Americans most often invoked it against one another" (12).

The argument is fascinating on its face, but the book's first two chapters offer little but the well-known story of the U.S. desire for independence from Britain and the difficulty of holding the nation together in the face of westward expansion. The author is not altogether convincing when he argues that the debate between Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and Adams over whether or not to ally with the British in sending a message to the Holy Alliance reflected a larger debate

about "American systems." He believes Adams's call for federal development as a defense against British encroachments suggests that it did. He is also unable to demonstrate some of his assertions about the 1823 message itself that make up the heart of these chapters: namely, that its authors "sidestepped the most contentious issues" or "avoided an explicit statement on the important issue of territorial expansion" (60, 61). The evidence shows no deliberate sidestepping or avoidance. He admits at times the lack of contemporary references to Monroe's message, and in one instance offers the rather weak explanation that Andrew Jackson probably "saw no need to enforce the 1823 message" (82).

Sexton establishes several themes early on, although their ties to the Monroe Doctrine are indirect. One is that anticolonialism and imperial expansion—seemingly contradictory policies—were actually interdependent. The young republic was anticolonial in that it opposed the extension of European colonies in the new world, and specifically the direct or indirect extension of British power in its thirteen former colonies. This argument picks up steam in chapter 3, where "Monroe's declaration" or "Monroe's doctrine" truly entered the lexicon of U.S. political leaders in the run-up to the Mexican War. In the 1840s, proslavery administrations revived the 1823 message and the European threat it embodied in the midst of campaigns to expand the U.S. empire through the institution of slavery. Sexton plainly states, for instance, that the Tyler administration "exaggerated the British threat in Texas" (90). The only solution to this nonexistent threat was the annexation of that slave state. One South Carolinian saw this move not as hypocrisy but rather "a precedent & noble model" for battling the abolitionist British (91).

James Polk himself directly invoked Monroe's warning about British aggression against the New World in an 1845 message to Congress when he advocated annexing California, and again in 1848 when he addressed the secession of the Yucatán Peninsula from Mexico. Calhoun rejected Polk's call for intervening in Mexico and, ever the loyal South Carolinian, again brought the debate into domestic politics by making the proslavery argument and warning that failing to protect Texas and Cuba from emancipation might deliver them to Europe. Polk, a champion of slavery who "cared little about Latin America," thus ended up using the Monroe Doctrine to great effect, but on domestic issues that had little to do with securing the independence of new Latin American republics (105). Sexton notes that Polk's invocation of Monroe also contradicted the intent of the 1823 message to promote republicanism and economic liberalism. There are many such examples of irony in the uses of

the Monroe Doctrine in the decades that followed its enunciation.

President Zachary Taylor and the Whigs also twisted the meaning of the doctrine for political ends. They justified the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, in which Washington and London each agreed not to build a canal in Central America without the other's consent, on the theory that they had prevented British expansionism in Latin America. Sexton rightly points out that the deal recalled the rejected 1823 British offer of a joint declaration.

As the Civil War approached, Stephen Douglas, as astute a Democrat as any, condemned Clayton-Bulwer as a Whig "negation and repudiation" of the Monroe Doctrine because it forestalled U.S. expansion, which was the only true defense of republicanism against European encroachment (127). Countering Douglas, William Henry Seward argued that the United States had largely beaten back British advances in the Great Lakes, Texas, Oregon, and California, again focusing the debate outside of what U.S. citizens at the time considered to be "Latin America." Seward instead used Monroe to advance his vision of internal economic development, which would aid in the global competition with European commerce. The disagreement over interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine deepened the rift between the sections in the 1850s.

During the Civil War itself, critics of Abraham Lincoln and Seward, now secretary of state, focused on their inability to resist British chumminess with the South and their avoidance of confrontation with the French, who took over Mexico. Radical Republicans joined in, moved by their absolute opposition to European monarchical encroachments. Again, however, there were politics involved. An 1863 pamphlet titled *The Monroe Doctrine* was published with the aim of promoting the presidential bid of Republican Salmon Chase. For the first time, writes Sexton, the phrase "Monroe Doctrine" "became a nationalist symbol, a permanent feature of the political and diplomatic landscape, during the Civil War" (153).

Between the Civil War and the War of 1898, U.S. citizens gradually shed much of their remaining anticolonialism and embraced "a powerful cultural internationalism," including a hunger for colonies beyond the territory they had already acquired in the West (161). Here Sexton fails to distinguish clearly between what he calls a "liberal" internationalism and "an assertive and nationalist foreign policy" or to explain how liberals embraced the Monroe Doctrine (162). Nevertheless, the movement from a defensive to an offensive doctrine accelerated.

Ulysses S. Grant made a particularly Machiavellian use of the fear of European power when he argued that if the United States did not annex the Dominican Republic, some other great power would. Grant called his (ultimately unsuccessful) plan "an adherence to the 'Monroe doctrine'" (165), clearly foreshadowing Teddy Roosevelt's justification in 1904 for what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the doctrine. By invoking the specter of European intervention, however, interventionists such as Secretary of State Hamilton Fish could keep claiming that the doctrine was "not a policy of aggression . . . it does not contemplate forcible intervention in any legitimate contest" (168). Thus U.S. political leaders could continue to have their imperialist cake and eat it too, claiming that their offense was still really defensive.

Secretary of State James G. Blaine was subtler about his use of the Monroe Doctrine. To an extent, he like his predecessors held up the hobgoblin of military

intervention from Europe. The War of the Pacific, which endangered British railroad and mining interests in South America, produced the lingering possibility of British gunboats appearing in the Pacific. But Blaine saw the Monroe Doctrine primarily as a symbol allowing him to construct an informal U.S. version of imperialism, in which commerce would stand in for colonialism as a way to ward off the still-powerful commercial clout of Europe in Latin America. Neither British investment nor the French-planned Isthmian Canal counted as threats to the republicanism of the hemisphere as Adams and Monroe envisaged it in 1823. But no matter: the doctrine now had a long history of being revived to serve not ideals but concrete U.S. interests, and Blaine's ability to reinterpret it once again spoke to its versatility.

In one of the too few instances in which Sexton uses Latin American voices to underscore the shifts in interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, he quotes *Le Courier* of Buenos Aires as saying that "the famous Monroe Doctrine will be enlarged." That paper saw through Blaine's scheming to redefine hemispheric diplomacy: "It is not a question of the nonintervention of Europe in the affairs of the American continent, but of the preponderance . . . of the United States" (191).

The better-known invocations of the Monroe Doctrine—Secretary of State Richard Olney's 1895 "declaration" against the British in Venezuela and the Roosevelt Corollary—end the volume and appear as anticlimactic rather than dramatic reappearances of the doctrine as they do in most narratives of nineteenth-century U.S. foreign relations or U.S.–Latin American relations. Sexton recounts not only the international politics behind these two events but also the ever-present partisanship. For example, Olney's "twenty-inch gun" volley was in part directed at opponents of the Grover Cleveland administration (203). Olney's wing of the Democratic Party, normally cautious on foreign policy, faced Anglophobia from some of its own populists and an aggressive naval building zeal from Republicans. The declaration against British advances on Venezuela thus served to shore up the Democrats' national security credentials. That the U.S. Navy was gaining quickly on the British by then also made the statement that the United States was "practically sovereign" in the Americas more palatable to the British.

Details also illuminate the context of the Roosevelt Corollary. Announcing it to the Congress in December 1904, the president chose not to call his statement a "doctrine" but rather to link it to a well-respected tradition. That caution reflected the domestic political troubles caused by his brash statements in favor of intervention. For that reason he waited until after his election to unveil his policy. As a result, the Monroe Doctrine was now fully predicated on a view of "civilized" versus "uncivilized" peoples and posited a proactive, even preventive justification for intervention against often imagined European threats. The distance traveled since 1823 had been far and tortuous.

A few caveats are in order. The book will be of less relevance to historians of Latin America or U.S.–Latin American relations than to those of the nineteenth-century United States or of U.S. foreign relations more broadly conceived. It is also not for a U.S. foreign policy history constituency that is used to daring archival or conceptual work. Its sources are rather traditional in nature, mostly correspondence between U.S. statesmen taken from published memoirs and papers. Apart from some analysis of racism, there is little about culture or

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even national identity. There are also few assessments of the Monroe Doctrine by foreigners, which is unfortunate because some of the few statements Sexton cites from British and Latin American observers uncover more directly the hypocrisy of U.S. policymakers.

All in all, Sexton makes a valiant effort to pull from the historical record instances in which key internal debates about investment or expansion invoked, if not the very words of the Monroe Doctrine, at least its arguments or its logic. At times the author seems to be stretching the argument and looking for any U.S. discussion of European expansionism as an expression of Monroeism without concrete evidence that Monroe was on the minds of the discussants. There also appears to be a frustrating unwillingness to plainly state that U.S. policymakers were hypocritical in their application of the doctrine. Instead, Sexton calls the obvious contradiction between the clearly defensive statement of 1823 and the growing interventionism of the nineteenth century a mere “uneasy relationship” (199). Overall, the book is a valuable addition to the literature on a topic whose evolution in the century after 1823 remains mysterious to many.

Monroe's Doctrine or Monroe Doctrines? A Review of Jay Sexton's *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*

Jeffrey Malanson

In *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*, Jay Sexton offers a vital reexamination of the creation, evolution, and many deployments of James Monroe's 1823 declaration of American foreign policy principles. The book covers a lot of ground, beginning with American independence and concluding with some reflections on World War I, but Sexton has balanced a thought-provoking discussion of the pertinent issues surrounding the Monroe Doctrine in its various iterations with a compelling and forward moving narrative.

Historians have typically viewed the history of the Monroe Doctrine as a series of marked and sudden shifts in interpretation and utilization, but Sexton masterfully teases out the consistent factors that make the Doctrine's history much more one of evolution rather than abrupt change. He points to “three interrelated processes central to nineteenth-century America” that the Monroe Doctrine illuminates: “the ongoing struggle to consolidate independence from Britain, the forging of a new nation, and the emergence of the American empire” (13). Sexton's great contribution here lies in the larger analytical framework within which he evaluates these processes and the changing Doctrine through time. Four themes within this framework stand out as meriting special consideration and will be the focus of this review: the relationship between international relations and domestic politics; the specific framing of the Monroe Doctrine by policymakers throughout the nineteenth century; the connection between America's anticolonialism and its developing empire; and the gap between perception and reality in Americans' conceptions of foreign threats. It is through his exploration of these themes (among others) that Sexton is able to successfully and convincingly situate the Monroe Doctrine as an integral aspect of the development of the United States in the nineteenth century.

Sexton is not the first historian to point to the important connections between America's domestic politics and its foreign policies, but he filters the history of the Monroe Doctrine through this lens in a new way. Perhaps the

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best example of this novel approach is to be found in his treatment of the decades before the Doctrine was issued, when public pronouncements about U.S. foreign policy were as much concerned with preserving and strengthening the union as they were with America's relationships with other countries. Sexton presents George Washington's call in his Farewell Address to avoid foreign alliances as stemming from his desire to minimize the exposure of American weakness to a hostile world; it was a “means” of national self-preservation and “not an end in itself” (28). While Sexton could have done more to explore the long-term impact of the Farewell Address on American conceptions of foreign policy (Washington may have been primarily concerned with union, but several generations of Americans looked to it as a statement of guiding foreign policy principles), especially in instances when it conflicted with the Monroe Doctrine, his analysis is an important demonstration of how discussions of foreign policy could be used to address domestic concerns in substantive ways.

The same concerns for union at the heart of the Farewell Address also directly influenced the final shape and message of the Monroe Doctrine. The threat of European intervention in Latin America did not just mean the potential loss of territory in the Western Hemisphere, but also represented a direct threat to the American union and way of life. As a result, the United States' warning to Europe to leave the new Spanish American republics alone was as much an act of self-defense as it was a statement of genuine concern for the fate of its southern neighbors. Efforts to use foreign policy to address concerns about the fragility of the union faded over time. James K. Polk's transformation of the Monroe Doctrine in late 1845 “from a cautious and reactive statement of national security requirements into a proactive call for territorial expansion” helped to bring about the Mexican War and succeeded in inflaming sectional tensions rather than tamping them down (102).

The real strength of Sexton's analysis of the uses of the Monroe Doctrine in domestic politics lies in how he applies it to the period from the Civil War to the dawn of American empire in the mid-1890s. In this period, policymakers frequently discussed the Doctrine domestically but rarely utilized it as a real tool in diplomacy. During the Civil War, the Doctrine became “a nationalist symbol, a permanent feature of the political and diplomatic landscape,” and the “domestic politicking” surrounding it “shaped how Americans came to understand their nation's role in international affairs” (153, 156). As a result of its new symbolic status, the Doctrine could easily be held up by politicians and policymakers to justify their actions as an attempt to defend Monroe's principles. In many cases that defense took the form of a reinterpretation of those principles to meet modern needs and priorities. Sexton's focus on the malleable meanings and the political evolution of the Monroe Doctrine in this period—when foreign policy concerns tended not to be at the center of American lives—helps to clarify what seemed at first to be a dramatic shift in the meaning and utilization of the Doctrine during the imperial boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

That the Monroe Doctrine could so easily and repeatedly be reinterpreted by generations of Americans resulted from the way it was originally presented in 1823. Sexton makes the point several times that the core components of President James Monroe's message, the doctrine of two spheres and the non-colonization principle, were framed in “negative terms: they stated what European powers could not do, but dodged the question of what the United States would do” (60-61). The Doctrine was a statement of American ideals and not a promise of American action.

Given the wide mix of domestic and international concerns it was meant to meet, the framing was understandable; but this ambiguity made it easy for later policymakers to read what they wanted to into it.

As early as 1826, President John Quincy Adams tried to give the Doctrine more specific meaning through U.S. participation in the Congress of Panama. He saw the international meeting of the independent republics of the Americas as a chance to convince them to adopt the non-colonization principle as their own and as an opportunity to give the Doctrine a lasting legacy. If Adams had succeeded at Panama, the Doctrine would have meant defending sovereign national territory against European encroachment. The more problematic warning contained in the doctrine of two spheres would have been set aside as a foreign policy pronouncement issued to meet a specific international challenge that had since passed.¹ According to Sexton, Adams attempted to provide a “proactive complement to the negatively framed message of 1823” (74). The problem, of course, was that he did not succeed. Congress delayed its decision to approve the mission to Panama for so long that the United States was unable to participate in the congress. Sexton wisely points to this failure as an important and problematic development in U.S. relations with Latin America, but he does not go far enough in discussing how thoroughly the Doctrine was set aside by the American people in the aftermath of the Panama debate. By the beginning of Andrew Jackson’s presidency most Americans saw Monroe’s Doctrine as a dangerous violation of the principles expressed in Washington’s Farewell Address.

It was Polk who resurrected the Monroe Doctrine and gave it a second life as a bolder statement of American interests. He took advantage of the Doctrine’s negative framing to justify an expansionist foreign policy, and many of those that followed him in the White House and State Department made similar use of its ambiguity to meet their own needs. It was not until the onset of American empire, though, that policymakers began actively reframing the Doctrine’s negative principles into strictures for positive action. The best demonstration of this was Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which “explicitly transformed the negatively framed and non-interventionist message of 1823 into a proactive call for intervention” (229). Roosevelt followed the example set by his predecessors, but he went further than anyone else in broadening the nature and scope of American action under the Doctrine’s auspices. The United States’ newly acquired global power and empire made this proactive foreign policy unsurprising, but it bore little resemblance to Monroe’s declaration of 1823.

Sexton’s most important analysis deals with two seeming contradictions. The first was a foreign policy declaration aimed at preventing European colonization of the Western Hemisphere being used to justify American overseas empire. The second was a statement of principles opposed to European intervention in Latin America being used as the foundation for U.S. interventionism in the same place. As Sexton concisely phrases it in his introduction, one of the most amazing features of the Monroe Doctrine was the “simultaneity and interdependence of anticolonialism and imperialism” in its evolution (5). Given their country’s revolutionary origins, Americans looked sympathetically on peoples around the world struggling to break free from despotism and monarchy in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One of the greatest challenges the government faced was restraining the people in their

desire to provide aid to their revolutionary brethren in places like France in the 1790s and Spanish America in the 1810s. While the government’s official policy was always neutrality, this anticolonial thinking did shape certain policies, most notably the No-Transfer Principle of 1811 and the Monroe Doctrine itself.

Even westward expansion revealed the depths of America’s anticolonialism. Whenever new territory was incorporated into the union as a new state, it entered on an equal basis with those that had preceded it—a process Sexton describes as “anticolonial colonization” (32). The term is quite fitting. When Europeans sought to expand their reach and control they had to look beyond their existing borders to the wider unexplored and uncivilized world and to colonization. When the United States wanted to expand, it simply had to look west to lands that were already claimed as European colonies. For the first sixty years of American independence this anticolonial colonization worked because there was enough open land (especially with the addition of the Louisiana Purchase) and there were no imminent threats to continued expansion. By the time of Polk’s presidency, though, the United States saw potential British intervention in places like Texas and

California and felt the need to take steps to prevent it. The anticolonial Monroe Doctrine was the justification. As Sexton frames it, in reasserting the Doctrine in the first year of his presidency “Polk made the case for an imperialist foreign policy on the hardheaded grounds of preemptive expansion justified by national security” (99). The result was the annexation of the southwest quarter of the United States and the eventual incorporation of that territory through anticolonial colonization.

The Civil War was a turning point for the Monroe Doctrine’s status as an anticolonial document. With the federal government resorting to forceful intervention in the affairs of its own states, many began to question why it should

not intervene in the affairs of other countries to block European intervention. This idea of pursuing intervention to uphold the principle of non-intervention was first raised by Polk in 1848 over the Mexican province of Yucatan and again by Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth during his 1851–2 tour of the United States; however, in both cases it had been rejected by the American people. The Civil War experience forever changed the American perspective on the question. It would take several decades for Americans to embrace fully the idea, or for American power to match American ideals, but the strange linking of anticolonialism and interventionism—and eventually imperialism—began to take concrete shape in this period. Whether it was President Ulysses S. Grant’s call for the annexation of the Dominican Republic in 1870 in an attempt to “mobilize anticolonial sentiment on behalf of an imperialist venture,” or the Republicans’ “creative rereading” of the Doctrine to prevent European “commercial interference” in Latin America in the 1880s, the Doctrine was increasingly being mobilized in ways that were antithetical to its original intent (165, 180). With the arrival of America’s imperial future in 1898 with the Spanish-American War, the Doctrine had been transformed: it “continued to represent a prohibition on European intervention, but it also became increasingly associated with new and proactive policies within the hemisphere” (185).

The conclusion of the Spanish-American War witnessed the “wedding of nationalism and internationalism,” which only served to broaden “the appeal of the Monroe Doctrine” (217). This long process culminated in 1904 with the

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Roosevelt Corollary, which established the United States as a police power in the Western Hemisphere. In declaring such a role for his country, Roosevelt had “explicitly transformed the negatively framed and non-interventionist message of 1823 into a proactive call for intervention” and “used an anticolonial symbol to extend legitimacy to an interventionist foreign policy” (229, 239). Herein lay the “great paradox of the Monroe Doctrine: its anticolonialism and idealism—its enlightened call for a new world order premised upon nonintervention, republican self-government, and an open world economy—justified and empowered an imperialist role for the United States in international affairs” (248). Such a conclusion seems too contradictory to be true, but it was the natural outgrowth of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine and American foreign policy.

The Doctrine in all its forms was premised on the idea of a European threat to the United States or to the American System. Some of Sexton’s most persuasive evidence examines the gap between perception and reality in Americans’ conceptions of these foreign threats. This problem of perception was ingrained into America’s sense of self from the moment the country declared its independence. Sexton rightfully notes that “American statesmen viewed international affairs through an ideological lens that presupposed rivalry between republics and monarchies” and set the United States perpetually at odds with the powers of Europe (11). Given how frequently the United States bounced back and forth between hostilities with Great Britain and France until the end of the War of 1812, the perception of an almost constant European threat was understandable.

The extended period of peace that followed the war did not diminish American sensitivities, though. A reading of John Quincy Adams’s diary in the month leading up to the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine makes it clear that multiple members of the cabinet (most notably Secretary of War John C. Calhoun) were entirely motivated by their tremendous fears of European intervention and of Britain’s naval power. Adams’s pragmatic assessment of the largely non-existent European threat won the day and led to the publication of a declaration of American principles that was carefully crafted and moderate in tone, but it did nothing to curb future overreactions. The view of the British abolitionist and colonization threat in Texas and California in the 1830s and 1840s is a prime example of this problem of threat perception at work. The fear that Britain would take action in the West or that that action would dramatically undermine the United States was overstated, but it enabled Polk to assert the Monroe Doctrine to justify a preemptive foreign policy. Sexton stresses that this was not simply a case of overreaction, but that “fixed policy objectives,” in this case the acquisition of California, “dictated [Polk’s] threat perception” (101). Polk wanted California, and any rumblings that Britain might also have its eye on the region signified a grave threat to American interests and security. “It was in this context that Polk invented ‘Monroe’s Doctrine’ in late 1845” (102).

The overstated British threat lingered throughout the nineteenth century, but starting in the 1880s American policymakers “developed a newly heightened perception of threat.” They feared that the ongoing scramble for Africa would “spill over into Latin America and the Caribbean” and also worried that the “rising nations of Latin America” could pose a threat to U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere (176). These concerns persisted in the last quarter of the century even as administrations and policies changed. Sexton does a nice job of highlighting

how much U.S. policymakers struggled with negotiating relations with Latin America in this period. By the dawn of the twentieth century the British threat had been replaced by a German one that was not completely unfounded but was also significantly overstated. Teddy Roosevelt’s response to this new threat was a much more proactive foreign policy. As Sexton phrases it, a “cocktail of threat perception and international ambition laid the foundation for the Roosevelt Corollary” (226). Issued in response to this new European threat, the Corollary “was a statement of a self-confident nation concerned more with the great game of imperial rivalry than with the internal dynamics of its once fragile union of states” (239). The nation’s and Roosevelt’s proverbial “big stick” only grew bigger as the nation matured and as its ambitions and conception of foreign threats expanded.

The overstatement of foreign threats from Polk through Roosevelt was often born out of strategic utility. This idea serves as a fitting way to make sense of the place that the Doctrine holds in the history of American foreign policy. John Quincy Adams saw the international situation at the end of 1823 as the ideal time to declare American principles to the world, but he and Monroe did so without clearly stating what the United States would do if those principles were violated. This negative frame enabled subsequent generations of policymakers to uphold the Monroe Doctrine as a vital statement of American principles while simultaneously utilizing it in the ways that best fit their needs. Whether that was as a political tool, as a defense against foreign threats, or as a justification for imperialist action, over the course of the nineteenth century the Doctrine became a one-size-fits-all pronouncement of foreign policy ideals. Sexton is spot-on in his conclusion that “there were as many Monroe Doctrines as there were perspectives on nineteenth-century statecraft” (246). In the final analysis, Jay Sexton’s *The Monroe Doctrine* is an extremely valuable and necessary reconsideration of the Monroe Doctrine and its impact on nineteenth-century America.

Notes:

1. The best and most easily accessible evidence of Adams’s intentions at Panama is Secretary of State Henry Clay’s mission instructions, which can be found in *The Papers of Henry Clay*, ed. James F. Hopkins, 10 vols. (Lexington, KY, 1959-91), 5:313-44.

Roundtable comment on Jay Sexton’s *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America*

William Earl Weeks

Jay Sexton is a young historian who has already produced an impressive body of work on the still-neglected field of nineteenth-century American foreign relations. His current offering, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America*, takes a fresh look at the Monroe Doctrine as a key ideological foundation stone in the construction of an American global empire. As the title suggests, the book posits an organic connection between the American nation and the American Empire, framing them as mutually reinforcing phenomenon that evolved in parallel even as each was fiercely contested. Construction of an expansionist American Empire was both a precondition and *raison d’être* for the construction of an American nation, and “Monroe’s Doctrine” as President Polk first termed it, appeared to function as a point of consensus: all Americans, whatever

their section or party, could agree that future foreign intervention and colonization in the Western Hemisphere was a no-no. Over time politicians competed to show who had the greatest fidelity to these bedrock principles, using their presumed stronger adherence to them as a club to beat down political opponents.

Sexton narrates the evolution of Monroe's principles from a lightly regarded statement in the president's annual message to Congress to the status of a commandment in the church of American nationalism in a series of artfully constructed chapters, the last of which deals with Teddy Roosevelt's Corollary of 1904. The author's strong grasp of the history of the entire century, combined with a clear and confident writing style, makes for an enjoyable and intellectually stimulating read. Each chapter stands on its own as a perceptive analysis of the period with which it deals. The contested nature of the meaning and application of the Doctrine is the unifying thread: "There were as many Monroe Doctrines as there were perspectives on nineteenth-century statecraft" (246). The division between pro-slavery and anti-slavery versions of the Monroe Doctrine was perhaps the most significant political fault line in this regard. Yet in spite of the diversity of opinions on its meaning and application, a solid majority of Americans backed its implicit claim to hemispheric dominance. "Premised upon a curious mixture of imperial ambitions and perceptions of internal vulnerability, the national security of the United States required more than just the safety of its borders—it required an entire hemispheric system conducive to its political system and economic practices" (60).

In this reader's view, the strongest chapter is on the 1860s, appropriately entitled "Civil Wars." Sexton places the war in the context of the "dual crises" of the decade in the United States and Mexico, as both nations sought to resolve internal conflicts without precipitating foreign intervention, unsuccessfully in the case of Mexico. He emphasizes that an independent Confederate States of America represented the ultimate threat to the Monroe Doctrine. The Confederacy schemed to ally itself with a European power even as the crisis it had spawned diverted American attention from France's incursion into Mexico. Although the term "Monroe Doctrine" was never publicly used by the Lincoln administration, which was wary of incurring criticism for failing to apply it stringently enough, by the 1860s the Doctrine had "attained the status of national dogma" and the term and the principles it symbolized had become "entrenched in the American vocabulary, appearing for the first time without the possessive and often as a proper noun with both words capitalized" (123-24). Indeed, the conquest of the South was as much about crushing a would-be hemispheric rival as it was about preserving the Union, an underappreciated fact that places the conflict in its rightful international frame as a foreign war. Lincoln's and Secretary of State Seward's vigorous assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in their conduct of the war is no less significant for being implicit rather than formally stated.

Sexton emphasizes "the simultaneity and interdependence of anticolonialism and imperialism" (5), with the British Empire paradoxically serving as a model to be feared as well as emulated. Even as Americans desperately sought to separate themselves ideologically from their former colonial masters, they were creating a new form of empire heavily reliant upon British commerce, investment, and military power. Certainly one of the great strengths of the book is that,

somewhat inadvertently, it elaborates the ways in which Anglo-American imperialism after 1823 was a single entity, at least when viewed from a certain perspective. Notwithstanding the high-profile controversies that marked U.S. relations with Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century, an emerging body of scholarship is sketching the outlines of a de facto imperial alliance between the two states. As Bernard Porter has observed, "most serious historians today, on both sides of the Atlantic, acknowledge America's 'imperialist' past, though they might not realize how precisely similar to Britain's many aspects of it were. In the earlier nineteenth century one can see British and American 'colonisation' following the same path almost exactly."¹ The correctness of this view traditionally has been obscured by the tendency to characterize the American conquest of a large part of the North American continent and the de facto colonization of the hemisphere as "not imperialism." The Monroe Doctrine in this respect functions as a first principle not subject to debate that enabled the United States to develop a "hands-on" policy for the Western Hemisphere, thereby obscuring its fundamentally imperial aspect. Perhaps what is needed now is an Anglo-American imperial school dedicated to revealing the commonalities between the two expansionist states, which scholars too often see in opposition to one another. In this regard Sexton notes "imperial influence in the nineteenth century was not unidirectional" (246).

I have two quibbles with Sexton's otherwise fine book. The first concerns his failure to incorporate the concept of union into his analysis of the relation between nation and empire. Union has long been a ubiquitous yet paradoxically near-invisible concept in American history

I have two quibbles with Sexton's otherwise fine book. The first concerns his failure to incorporate the concept of union into his analysis of the relation between nation and empire... My second quibble concerns the role of British and American military power in the making of the Monroe Doctrine.

generally and foreign relations history particularly. It is most often taken for granted and seen as synonymous with nation, even as everyone recognizes that the political union created in 1776 did not automatically result in the creation of a nation. That was a much more arduous project; Sexton suggests that it was complete by the end of the nineteenth century, while others might see it as incomplete even today. In any case, it is the concept of a durable, permanent political union that connects the pre-existing expansionist tendency to the voluble collectivity known as the nation. Sexton makes minimal mention of the distinct role of union, as evidenced by

the fact that while "nationalism" appears in the index, "union" does not. Indeed, the notion of a permanent union is itself a sort of internal Monroe Doctrine, a mostly unspoken first principle aimed at preventing the security threats of intervention and colonization from occurring domestically. It is in this respect that the dual nature of the Civil War as both an internal rebellion and foreign war is revealed. It was a war to save the Union as well as a war to assert the Monroe Doctrine.

My second quibble concerns the role of British and American military power in the making of the Monroe Doctrine. Sexton, like most historians of the topic, argues "the 1823 message itself accomplished nothing. It was British statecraft, not Monroe's message, that achieved the immediate objectives of 1823." He minimizes American military power as a meaningful factor in the hemispheric balance of power: "It was British naval power and diplomacy, combined with the power of the states of Latin America, that prevented the recolonization of territories in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century" (244). He dismisses John Quincy Adams's later claim that the Doctrine also functioned as a warning to Great Britain not

to intervene in the hemisphere as “akin to the hitchhiker dictating directions to the driver” (53).

While Sexton is echoing the scholarly consensus on this point, I believe it is off the mark. The genius of Adams’s statesmanship (mostly attributable to his talent and long experience as a judge of geo-strategic reality) resided in his correct assessment of the relative power, geographic position, and national interests of the United States vis à vis Great Britain and the other European powers. Certainly Adams recognized that in absolute terms, American military power was no match for Great Britain’s. Yet he also understood far sooner and more profoundly than anyone else how dramatically British policy had shifted from supporting the restoration of monarchy during the Napoleonic Era to espousing open markets and liberal capitalism. He had seen this evolution during the course of the post-1815 U.S. rapprochement with the British and alone among the American policy elite understood that a formal alliance would not be needed to get them to pursue their own self-interest in opposing further European intervention in the hemisphere. At the same time Adams, perhaps owing to his long years abroad as a diplomat, also understood that without British support the chance of a major European military intervention in the hemisphere was nil. Napoleon’s disastrous expedition to reconquer Sainte Domingue had proven that the New World could be a graveyard for Old World armies, even ones as capable as that of Napoleonic France. The Holy Allies, who I believe it is fair to say were more sentiment than substance as a unified force, lacked the capacity effectively to project power across the Atlantic Ocean and throughout the extensive landmass of the Americas. Adams made this point most famously when he said that he no more believed that the Holy Allies would “restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent than that Chimborazo will sink beneath the ocean” (52). That the Polignac Memorandum, in which Canning received a pledge from the other European states not to intervene in Spanish America, was made some months before Monroe issued his pronouncement merely confirms Adams’s insights. Secure in the knowledge of British interests and European impotence, Adams could argue for an independent American policy. The Monroe Doctrine did not need the support of British military power to be effective; it needed only the certainty that British power would not be deployed. This, to me, is a critical distinction. So Sexton is but half right when he concludes that “the course of action pursued by the Monroe administration advanced American interests and principles at minimal cost. The 1823 message shrewdly exposed British power, which Adams hedged would be deployed against the Holy Allies in the case of intervention, without signing up to the restrictive terms of Canning’s offer” (53). Adams did not count on British power being used to stop an invasion. Rather, he counted on the Holy Allies’ inability to mount an invasion without it.

The net result of the Monroe and Adams handiwork was a post-1823 world in which a de facto Anglo-American condominium had been established in the Western Hemisphere. The centuries-long multilateral European imperial competition for dominance in the region had effectively been reduced to two players, Great Britain and the United States, and the latter owed its existence in part to the expansionist impulse. The two states could now engage in what Sexton terms the “collaborative conquest” of Latin America, cooperating and competing as specific circumstances dictated.

Yet I believe Sexton underestimates U.S. military power in evaluating pre-Civil War Anglo-American relations. British military power was great and increasing after 1820, far surpassing the standing armies and navies of the

United States. But a one-to-one comparison ignores the huge role a favorable geographic position played for the United States in balancing British power, at least as far south as Panama. By the 1820s, no candid observer could doubt the Americans’ remarkable capacity, whatever the current state of preparedness of their forces, to successively take on the mightiest powers in the world. On the high seas, the American navy had bested the French in the Quasi-War of 1798 and had dueled the Royal Navy to a draw during the War of 1812. On land, the rag-tag American revolutionary forces had bested the British (with French help). Historians tend to view the War of 1812 as a draw, but in doing so they overlook the fact that the last three important engagements of the war—on Lake Champlain, at Baltimore, and at New Orleans—were major American victories. The fact that the victory at New Orleans occurred after the treaty had already been inked and thus in some sense was moot did not lessen its significance as a crushing defeat for a British New World invasion force.

The Anglo-American New World condominium erected in the 1820s did not function in a steady state. Over the course of the century, the United States slowly and steadily gained the upper hand in the relationship as a result of its rising economic and military strength, the advantages of a favorable geography, and the fact that while the Americas were but one part of an evolving British global empire, they constituted the United States’ “backyard,” the core of its foreign policy interest. When push literally threatened to come to shove, as in Oregon, the British consistently calculated that their interests in the region were too peripheral to warrant the risk of a third Anglo-American war. This calculation also prevailed in Texas, as Sexton acknowledges: “For all their interest in an independent, anti-slavery Texas, British statesmen never were prepared to risk provoking the United States through an interventionist policy aimed at that end” (91). By the 1850s the British were backpedaling in Central America as well, in spite of outrageous U.S. provocations such as the 1854 leveling of the village of Greytown by American naval vessels.

Sexton ends his work in the early twentieth century, the century in which the Monroe Doctrine would be applied reflexively and repeatedly. It then functioned as received wisdom for policymakers and critics, its nineteenth-century origins mostly obscured or forgotten. Sexton’s sure hand makes the reader eager to see a second volume dealing with the Doctrine’s twentieth-century evolution, for he has produced what is, in my view, the most perceptive assessment of the Monroe Doctrine’s early decades yet written. A second volume seems a logical step. But my hope is that he continues to apply his considerable skills as a historian to the long-fallow field of nineteenth-century American foreign relations.

Notes:

1. Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the World* (New Haven, 2006), 91.

Author’s Response

Jay Sexton

I would like to thank Jeffrey Malanson, Alan McPherson, and William Earl Weeks for their constructive comments in this exchange, and Andrew Johns for doing such a great job of bringing it to print. I am fortunate to have the opportunity to engage with these colleagues.

I chose to write about the Monroe Doctrine because it provides a fresh prism through which to view nineteenth-century U.S. statecraft. The story of the Doctrine’s evolution is not a linear one. The Doctrine was

a slippery and shape-shifting symbol whose meaning and application varied widely. Invocations of it reflected, as well as produced, domestic political conflict, not to mention diplomatic controversy. Changes in the Doctrine over time reveal not only the imperial march of the United States, but also the variety of perspectives regarding the international role of the American union that can be found in the nineteenth century. Most often invoked in domestic political contexts, the Doctrine forces us to consider together the domestic and foreign aspects of U.S. history, which we scholars are often too quick to treat separately. In the bigger picture, the Doctrine provides a means of thinking about the interrelated, geopolitical processes of nineteenth-century U.S. history: the ongoing struggle to consolidate independence from Britain, the contested and violent process of national consolidation within the union, and imperial expansion and the projection of U.S. power beyond its borders.

As the above paragraph no doubt makes clear, the very characteristics that make the Doctrine interesting are also the ones that make writing a coherent book about it difficult. I am thus very pleased that the reviewers, particularly Malanson and Weeks, are convinced by the overall argument and framework that ties the book together. Malanson's first paragraph neatly sums it up, more succinctly than I could do here. Most pleasing of all are the comments Weeks makes concerning the British angle that is so central to the book. I am glad that this part of my argument did not fall through the cracks. I could not agree more when Weeks makes the case for thinking about Anglo-American imperialism as a joint phenomenon. This is the direction in which scholars on this side of the Atlantic, in Britain, are moving. Indeed, with "American exceptionalism" now rightly in the dustbin, SHAFR scholars might find it useful to view nineteenth-century America in relation to a global economic and imperial system conditioned by British power.

The central challenge facing nineteenth-century U.S. statesmen was how to consolidate their decentralized union, which existed in what they imagined to be a hostile geopolitical environment. In the book I use the rather old-fashioned word "statecraft" because, unlike "foreign policy," it looks both inward and outward, as did the "statesmen" of the nineteenth century. American diplomacy, in other words, was inextricably intertwined with the internal politics of the union. The expanding conception of nineteenth-century U.S. national security derived more from perceptions of the internal fragility of the union than from calculations of the power of foreign rivals. The concept of union, in short, is central to my argument—and here I am picking up on the work of a number of scholars, including David Hendrickson, James Lewis, Peter Onuf, and Weeks himself, who cogently examines this theme in his various writings. Perhaps it is the very ubiquity of union that paradoxically explains its absence from the index.

The synergy between the internal dynamics of the union and the construction of foreign policy lies at the heart of the message of 1823, the textual basis for what became the Monroe Doctrine. McPherson has misunderstood my argument on the difference between Calhoun and Adams: I see their disagreement in 1823 as arising out of different conceptions of what most threatened the unity of the union. Calhoun feared that a European intervention in Latin America would trigger an ideological confrontation within the union. Adams, in contrast, feared that the bold foreign policy called for by Calhoun might result in a war with European powers that would

necessitate the concentration of federal power to such an extent that it could trigger a 1776-style, anti-imperial rebellion from *within* the union. The story of the drafting of the 1823 message is complex, not least because it was wrapped up with the issue of a potential alliance with the hated British, as Weeks rightly emphasizes. Drafting the 1823 message required compromise between the various perspectives offered by cabinet members. And the final draft of the message did reveal that the Monroe team postponed a decision on two key issues: first, what the United States would do if the Holy Allies ignored Monroe and intervened in Latin America; and, second, the administration's plans for Texas and Cuba, two territories coveted by expansionists like Adams. These issues

were discussed at length in November 1823, but the cabinet did not come to a resolution on them and avoided explicit discussion of them in the final draft of the 1823 message. Monroe's 1823 message thus can be said to have sidestepped these two issues.

One of the challenges in writing a history of the Monroe Doctrine is constructing a narrative of an ever-changing symbol that is difficult to pin down. Furthermore, as Malanson and McPherson rightly point out, there were

times—particularly in the 1830s—when Americans barely mentioned the Doctrine (or the 1823 message, as it then would have been called). Dexter Perkins, who wrote a masterful trilogy on the Doctrine in the early twentieth century, dealt with this problem, more or less, by fast-forwarding through the drought years to arrive at the next episode in which the Doctrine appeared. I chose the alternative of searching for connections in U.S. thought and policy across time, for what is most important in my view is not the narrowly defined history of the Doctrine, but the larger attitudes and policies Americans attached to it.

Thus, the book briefly examines Andrew Jackson's domestic, foreign, and Indian policies as a means of setting the stage for James K. Polk, whose creation of "Monroe's doctrine" in 1845 owed more to Old Hickory than it did to Monroe or Adams. McPherson is critical of the section on Jackson, but he flattens the argument that is offered in the book. There are three reasons Jackson did not speak of or invoke the 1823 message: first, it was then a symbol associated with his political enemies Adams and Clay; second, the Jackson administration saw commercial benefit in British control of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands; and, third, the policies associated with the 1823 message after the Panama Congress (namely, hemispheric cooperation) had little appeal to Jackson, whose agenda was the unilateral pursuit of North American hegemony.

Weeks raises an important point concerning the significance of U.S. military power in the pre-1861 era. I am keen to read more from him in the future on this issue. Though the book does not emphasize British perceptions of U.S. military power, it certainly acknowledges that Britain's gradual retreat from North and Central America owed much to the lessons of 1776 and 1812. There was little enthusiasm in Britain for pursuing costly policies that had little chance of containing American expansion. Fighting the Americans, a Victorian once said, would be like breaking your neighbor's windows with gold coins. It was better for the British to outsource the job of imperial expansion in North America and reap the economic benefits of an expanding United States without incurring the overhead costs of imperial wars and administration.

Yet Britain's gradual retreat from North America was not simply a reaction to U.S. military power but also reflected innovations in imperial thought and strategy.

The central challenge facing nineteenth-century U.S. statesmen was how to consolidate their decentralized union, which existed in what they imagined to be a hostile geopolitical environment.

One way to illustrate this point is to place Britain's U.S. policy in a broader context. A comparable process was at work, for example, in Britain's dealings with Argentina. The failed expeditions to colonize Río de la Plata in 1806-7 influenced Britain's Latin American policy in much the same way the War of 1812 affected its U.S. policy. The high costs and low rewards of a policy of all-out conquest highlighted the advantages of a program of "informal imperialism" involving commercial expansion and collaboration with local elites. This, of course, is the famous "informal if possible, formal if necessary" argument put forth by Robinson and Gallagher.¹ The comparison with Argentine policy, however, gives some grist to Weeks' mill: if the British felt able to seize the Malvinas/Falklands from Buenos Aires, they certainly did not feel able to wrest Texas away from the Americans a decade later. Again, I would agree that the potential military power of the United States—combined with the unpopularity of a costly third American war at home in Britain—was on the minds of British policymakers. But I would suggest that the issue of military power be incorporated into a broader interpretation of the evolution of British imperial strategy in the Americas in the early and mid-nineteenth century.

McPherson suggests that *The Monroe Doctrine* is of more value to those interested in U.S. foreign relations in general than to experts of U.S.–Latin American relations. He wants more on the hypocrisy of U.S. statesmen. This issue, however, is explicitly discussed in several places in the book.² But I agree with the bigger point that many more stories of Latin American resistance to the United States remain to be examined, as do a surprising number of counter-episodes in which mid-nineteenth-century Latin American liberals such as Sarmiento and Romero embraced what they viewed as the enlightened potential of the Monroe Doctrine.³ Like the tangle of Anglophobia/Anglophilia in nineteenth-century U.S. politics, images of the United States in Latin America ran the gamut from virulent Yankeephobia to a liberal embrace of North American institutions.⁴

If hemispheric responses to U.S. power are not the central theme of the book, a sub-theme running through it concerns how Latin Americans became increasingly adept at appropriating the Monroe Doctrine and exploiting Yankee insecurities in order to achieve their own objectives. One common strategy was to seek U.S. assistance during violations of the 1823 message, as Mexican liberals sought to do during the 1860s. In other instances, such as Yucatan in the 1840s, Latin American statesmen overstated the European threat or even invited foreign intervention as a means of coaxing the United States into certain actions. Toward the end of the century, Latin Americans such as Luis María Drago re-imagined the Monroe Doctrine as a symbol of non-intervention and hemispheric cooperation to advance an internationalist and legalistic agenda. The book argues that Latin Americans played a crucial role in the formation of the Monroe Doctrine.

A final challenge in writing about the Doctrine is the imperative of avoiding the anachronism that so easily slips into studies of nineteenth-century America. One must not project the twentieth-century Monroe Doctrine back into the nineteenth century. The factious nineteenth-century union was not the singular nation of later times; nor was the United States the hegemonic global power that it would become. The "Monroe Doctrine" did not even exist until the mid-nineteenth century, and even then it could not be said to have determined U.S. policy. Nor

would it have been recognized by most Latin Americans until the final decades of the nineteenth century. If we set out only to find the antecedents to twentieth-century anti-Americanism, we risk flattening the range of responses to the Doctrine that can be found in Latin America, Europe, and the wider world. In short, we must bear in mind that the Doctrine meant different things in the nineteenth-century world than in the subsequent "American century."

The Monroe Doctrine—and I am speaking of it now as the versatile political symbol imagined in the United States—helps us locate the origins of American imperialism in the internal dynamics and political culture of the nineteenth-century union. The book seeks to explain how an anticolonial symbol became the script for imperial expansion. The history of the Doctrine illuminates the internal origins of U.S. imperialism by casting light on a domestic political system and culture that, though anti-imperial in Anglophobic and anti-monarchical respects, nonetheless incubated a powerful nationalism that produced expansionist and imperialist foreign policies. The political scramble to claim the nationalist Monroe Doctrine at home narrowed the policy options available to statesmen in Washington as the nineteenth century progressed. The story of the rise of American imperialism in this period, of course, is also geopolitical: the ongoing competition against the British, combined with the union-building project at home, led U.S. statesmen to pursue outward-looking and assertive policies. This is the synergy between anticolonialism and imperialism that William Appleman Williams so rightly pointed to long ago.⁵

The Monroe Doctrine, in short, helps us see nineteenth-century U.S. statecraft and imperialism in new ways. It tells us a story that is different from (although not incompatible with) the story that emerges when we look at Manifest Destiny, which highlights the racial and ideological origins of U.S. imperialism, or the Open Door, which illuminates its economic roots. The Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, the Open Door . . . all that remains to be discussed is the Farewell Address, which Malanson brings up. But I will leave that one to him, as tracing it over time would no doubt tell a different story still.

Notes:

1. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review*, Second series, Vol. VI, no. 1 (1953), 1-15.
2. Pages 72, 178, and 191 examine why Latin Americans saw "hypocrisy" in the words and actions of the United States. The theme is further explored elsewhere, albeit without using the specific word "hypocrisy."
3. Sarmiento and Romero are examined in Chapter 4. For Latin American resistance to U.S. invocations of the Monroe Doctrine, see pp. 69-73, 110-11, 170, 189-97, 209, 228, 235-7, 247.
4. My view here is shaped by the "Images of America" project at University College London, particularly the work of Nicola Miller and Natalia Bas.
5. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1972), pp. 18-58.

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Wikileaks, and the Past and Present of American Foreign Relations

Ryan Irwin

Editor's note: An earlier version of this essay originally appeared in Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, an e-journal published by The Ohio State University, in July 2011.

On April 5, 2008, a small coterie of Republican senators and diplomats—John Barrasso, Saxby Chambliss, Mitch McConnell, and James Risch, among others—held a quiet meeting with former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak at the Heliopolis Palace in Cairo. The setting was regal. Designed in the early twentieth century by a Belgian architect, the one-time luxury hotel had been remade as Mubarak's home and workplace in the 1980s. Blending Arabic, European, and Persian architectural styles, the complex purposefully embodied Egypt's place at the crossroads of the pan-Islamic and pan-European worlds.

The conversation turned naturally to current events as the group settled down to talk. After a brief back-and-forth about Israel, Mubarak brought up Iraq. "My dear friends," he began, "democracy in Iraq equals killing. The nature of those people is completely different. They are tough and bloody, and they need a very tough leader. They will not be submissive to a democratic leader." Stability required an authoritarian fist. "As I told Secretary of Defense Gates last year," Mubarak continued, "the only solution [to America's desire to leave Iraq] is to strengthen the military and security forces, arm and train them, wait for the emergence of some generals, don't oppose them, then stay in your camps in the desert and don't interfere. The military will control Iraq like the ayatollahs control Iran." Twenty-eight years in power, and Mubarak's worldview amounted to a simple adage: never "mix democracy and tribalism."¹

The transcript drips with irony now. It was sent to the Department of State by U.S. Ambassador Margaret Scobey on April 8, 2008, and it comes to us via Private First Class Bradley Manning, who at present sits in isolation in a Marine Corps jail in Quantico, Virginia, awaiting trial for passing along 251,287 such cables—only 2,000 of which are available online currently—to the media organization known as Wikileaks. Manning's fate and the imbroglio surrounding Julian Assange, the controversial figure who shared the cables with the world, has faded somewhat from the headlines in recent months. Yet the Wikileaks communiqués reveal much about America's role in today's world. In the words of author Timothy Garton Ash, the documents are a "historian's dream" and a "diplomat's nightmare"—a spigot of information from the contact points of American power, where powerbrokers and diplomats go daily through the motions of statecraft.²

Leaks, Yesterday and Today

In the United States, politicians hyperventilated over the Wikileaks story after it broke in 2010. Despite the fact

that most foreign leaders quickly dismissed the material as insignificant, American leaders portrayed Assange and Manning as unambiguous enemies of the international community.³ Internal dissent—voiced notably by (now former) State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, who criticized the U.S. government's imprisonment of Manning—was cast as inexcusable and irresponsible.

However, the American ship of state has leaked since the republic's founding. George Washington reprimanded Alexander Hamilton for passing material to the British during the 1794 Jay Treaty negotiations, and James Madison once castigated his secretary of state for giving administration secrets to members of the opposing Federalist Party. Since then, there has been no shortage of leak-related precedents. In 1848, as the United States' war with Mexico drew to a close, Senate investigators placed a journalist under house arrest for the first time because he refused to disclose how he obtained details about the not-yet-complete peace treaty. At the height of the First World War, lawmakers considered making it illegal to leak state information to the public, but changed their minds because of first amendment concerns, opting instead for legislation that criminalized the act of relaying defense secrets to the enemy during wartime.

The most notorious leak in U.S. history came in the early 1970s, when Daniel Ellsberg, a Princeton-educated analyst who worked for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the 1960s, delivered a seven-thousand-page Pentagon report to the *New York Times*, and later the *Washington Post*. Unprecedented in scope, the collection of top-secret materials revealed that Lyndon Johnson's White House had lied systematically to the public about the rationale behind America's involvement in Vietnam. Richard Nixon tried to use an injunction to stop the material's publication in 1971, setting another historical precedent in the process, but failed at the Supreme Court.

The ethics of leaking have never been straightforward. Nixon's own contradictions were on full display as he and his advisors formulated their response to Ellsberg:

Nixon: "Let's get the son of a bitch into jail."

Henry Kissinger: "We've got to get him."

Nixon: "We've got to get him. . . . Don't worry about his trial. Just get everything out. Try him in the press. . . . Everything . . . that there is on the investigation, get it out, *leak it out*."

Such conviction, of course, facilitated Nixon's undoing, but the implications were clear and the sentiment was probably felt widely among American elites: leaking was bad when it violated the interests of power. Or, as columnist David Corn said once, there are leaks "that serve the truth, and those that serve the leaker."⁴

The second Bush administration blurred this line frequently. White House staff members gave the identity

of CIA agent Valerie Plame to columnist Robert Novak after her husband, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, criticized the rationale for the 2003 Iraq invasion, and Bush himself passed along (selectively chosen) top-secret documents to reporter Bob Woodward for the 2002 book, *Bush at War*.

Wheat from the Chaff

Each of these leaks tells a different historical story. The Plame affair underscored the politicization of information in our fractured age, when partisans compete with cynical glee to mold Washington's weekly narrative. Ellsberg's papers exposed the contradictions of an earlier epoch, highlighting the tenuous underpinnings of the global Cold War, particularly in Southeast Asia. Controversies from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—often sharpened by war and codified through law—offer windows into the rise of the modern state and highlight how the U.S. government came to police its inner correspondence. And the experiences of the founding fathers hint at an era when leaders navigated questions of secrecy with little consideration of bureaucratic power.

So given this long leaky history, what makes the Wikileaks material so interesting? Size matters (there is a lot of information in the 251,287 cables), but these documents are also different. For one thing, they draw on unusual source material. Unlike Ellsberg, Manning did not have access to top-secret reports. Most of the information he downloaded from his desk at a military base in Iraq never reached the Oval Office. It is likely that few of his cables even made their way to the seventh floor of the U.S. State Department, where America's top statesmen manage the daily business of U.S. foreign relations. Moreover, the documents do not lend themselves to a Plame or Ellsberg-like controversy. There are embarrassing tidbits here and there (mostly gossipy assessments of foreign leaders) and heart-wrenching details from the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. But for the most part Washington's foreign officers come across as professionals. As commentator Fareed Zakaria opined, "Washington's secret diplomacy is actually remarkably consistent with its public diplomacy" this time around, unlike during the Vietnam War, and U.S. diplomats are undeniably "sharp, well informed, and lucid."⁵

What emerges from the Wikileaks material is a story that features not the great men and women of Washington but the mid-level officials who work in U.S. outposts around the world. These are the individuals who conduct American diplomacy on the ground. Their correspondence is dominated neither by turf battles nor policy debates but rather by a continual effort to collect accurate information, analyze trends, and advance U.S. interests in the world. Looking through the eyes of such individuals reveals much about U.S. foreign relations, especially in that zone of exchange at the outskirts of Washington's political influence. The Wikileaks documents showcase the common priorities of the officials who enact American policy in this region, and they tell scholars something about the challenges of U.S. foreign affairs in the early twenty-first century. Things have certainly changed since the end of the Cold War, but they haven't changed as much as one might expect.

Small States, Big Allies

Washington's global influence today is deeply contested. To a degree that might surprise both boosters and detractors of America's foreign policy, negotiation is the motif of the Wikileaks documents. Whether dealing with special friends or political afterthoughts, U.S. diplomats rarely dictate the terms of international exchange. They're

caught instead in a continual two-way conversation that often obfuscates the asymmetrical nature of Washington's military and economic resources.

The examples are almost endless. Consider Yemen. Residing at the outskirts of the Arab world with a harsh climate and a small population, the country should not possess any leverage over the U.S. policymaking establishment. Unlike Saudi Arabia, it has neither oil reserves nor regional clout—only the strategic port city of Aden, which provides access to the waters between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. But the Wikileaks material shows how Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, pushed Washington to take a greater interest in his country in recent years. "If you don't help, [Yemen] will become worse than Somalia," he told America's ambassador in September 2009. The threat proved remarkably effective. Between 2009 and 2011, the United States tripled aid to Yemen, providing over \$300 million in military equipment and security assistance.

U.S. diplomats on the ground acknowledged that Saleh was using these funds for personal reasons. His principal aim, quite logically, was to strengthen his government's position vis-à-vis rebels in the north and secessionists in the south. (Yemen's borders have long been contested, and religious and ethnic tensions have simmered since the country took its current form in 1990.) However, Washington was willing to overlook Saleh's diversion of funds as long as he remained an ally in the fight against terrorism.

The resulting situation has been rife with contradictions. The Wikileaks material proves that the U.S. military attained almost unfettered access to Yemeni territory after 2009. Until last year, American warships and aircraft were bombarding training facilities linked to foreign groups such as al-Qaeda, and U.S. advisors were working in various capacities with local military and police forces. However, Saleh shaped the trajectory of these interventions. In a 2010 meeting with General David Petraeus, the president proposed to "continue saying the [U.S.] bombs are ours, not yours" as long as American officials promised not to punish him personally for future terrorist acts and recognized his domestic enemies as terrorist sympathizers. Such statements would be bound to anger Yemenis, to whom U.S. actions must feel suspiciously like old-fashioned imperialism.

According to the U.S. ambassador, Saleh understood exactly what he was doing. "The net effect" of the arrangement, "and one we strongly suspect Saleh has calculated," was an "iron fist" approach toward the president's enemies at home and interlopers from abroad. Moreover, by capitalizing on Washington's anxieties, Saleh buttressed his defense budget while outsourcing counterterrorist operations to the United States, effectively giving him the political space and financial resources to address his real problem: anti-government unrest. Although Saleh fled to Saudi Arabia to receive treatment for injuries he sustained during an attack on his compound in June 2011, he returned to his country in September. His hold on power is tenuous.

Perusing the Wikileaks material, one can unearth situations similar to that of Yemen elsewhere in the Middle East and throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Small states, or at least the politicians who sit at the interface of the international community and Third World conflict zones, influence how the U.S. government engages the world.⁶ Washington's military might is unquestioned and often omnipresent, but this power functions through intermediaries on the ground and these individuals rarely possess the same agenda as official Washington. In fact, they often turn U.S. strategic interests to their advantage.

Irony of Strategy

This state of affairs should come as no surprise. A similar dynamic defined America's stance abroad during the Cold War. Although the containment strategy no longer governs the rhetoric and practice of U.S. foreign relations, it allowed small states to influence the form that American power took in the world. Originally promulgated by George Kennan in the late 1940s, containment defined America's foreign engagements throughout the second half of the twentieth century, at least theoretically. Europe—Germany in particular—initially anchored the idea. Moscow's desire to prevent a Fourth Reich clashed fundamentally with Washington's plan to reintegrate Germany into the newly formed United Nations. For Kennan and others, containment enabled America to address this dispute without losing sight of the postwar world's true pivots—Western Europe and Japan. These were the places where Moscow's influence had to be denied.

How then did containment become a global doctrine? Some scholars blame overly aggressive Washingtonians, but context and external actors mattered tremendously. America's European and Japanese allies relied on markets and raw materials in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia—regions outside the traditional scope of U.S. power. As communists began establishing areas of influence beyond Europe, with Mao Zedong's Communist Party taking control of China and Josef Stalin exploding an atomic bomb in Central Asia, fear pushed containment beyond Western Europe and Japan—fear that communists would gain further footholds in the Third World and fear that Washington's allies would tire of the benefits of U.S. patronage. Politicians abroad understood the possibilities of this new mindset. As colonial rule collapsed, Europeans and non-Europeans alike began to court the United States, often with guile and sophistication, trading friendship and local resources for money and military equipment.

Consider the case of Pakistan. Washington's 1954 decision to give security support to Islamabad rather than New Delhi makes little sense against the backdrop of India's regional clout. Yet the United States found itself persuaded by Pakistan's threats of Soviet incursions and strident assurances that it would be an unwavering bulwark against communism in Asia. The result was a slow-moving Cold War debacle, with U.S. diplomats dragged inexorably into a series of countervailing commitments that alienated India and frustrated Pakistan while draining American coffers and arming opponents in South Asia.

Or consider the Philippines. Whereas U.S. planners hoped to remake the country in the image of liberal capitalism in the 1950s, the Philippine government sought, first and foremost, to use U.S. aid to build client relationships at the local level. Whenever Washington threatened to withdraw aid, Manila raised the specter of communist insurrection. By the time Ferdinand Marcos came to power in 1965, the status quo was set: the United States maintained access to its military bases and the Philippines retained control of its crony capitalist system.

The quagmire in Vietnam also dramatized the influence of external actors on U.S. foreign relations. American diplomats had little interest in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the Cold War, and most officials recognized the region as unimportant to U.S. interests. Nonetheless, London and Paris managed to pull Washington down the slippery slope of economic and military aid during the late 1940s and 1950s by actively policing information about Ho Chi Minh and exaggerating the menace of communism. The result was a self-fulfilling prophecy, with the Viet Minh radicalized by resurgent French colonialism and America committed to the invented nation of South

Vietnam—a commitment that culminated, of course, in the Second Indochina War.

Containment both rationalized and justified Washington's growing engagements abroad. But foreign actors—not only Washington policymakers—dictated how, when, and where containment was applied. Cognizant of the benefits of U.S. aid, local elites tapped into American anxieties purposefully, pushing the United States in particular directions while pursuing goals that diverged from Washington's own aims. Their actions do not absolve the U.S. government of responsibility for its actions. Once committed to a country and its leaders, the United States frequently pursued goals with Manichean zeal, and its actions in Guatemala, Iran, and Chile should not be excused. Nor do those actions call into question the importance of rhetoric. Once employed, containment's logic morphed invariably in unexpected directions, and foreign suitors rarely walked away satisfied from their engagements with the United States.

From Communism to Terrorism

But the basic point remains: today's situation is not unique. Saleh is merely the latest in a long line of astute intermediaries who have pulled Washington closer to the periphery by exchanging friendship for money. Perhaps the true story of Wikileaks, then, is one of historical continuity. The Cold War is over, but the processes that shaped American foreign relations in the early twentieth century are remarkably familiar. What is unique today is the way that counterterrorism frames the discursive landscape of U.S. diplomacy. The second Bush administration made no secret of its desire to recast America's grand strategy around the war on terror after September 11, and Barack Obama's White House—while opposed ardently to unilateral intervention—has done little to alter the fundamental logic of these efforts. The effect has not been the rise of a new world order but the amplification and acceleration of older trends.

Whether summarizing the state of U.S.–Macedonia relations or surveying events in Russia, U.S. embassy officials fixate daily on information about terrorist behavior, reiterating rumors passed along invariably by liaisons on the ground.⁷ Containment gave U.S. diplomats an opponent in the Soviet Union, but this new fight against terror is without political direction. The reports speak for themselves. In October 2008, a vehicle with Iranian license plates parked outside the U.S. embassy in Azerbaijan for nearly an hour, driving off only when a man entered the car; a few days later an individual stood on a street corner near the American Institute in Taiwan, videotaping numerous buildings in the area before departing abruptly on a motor scooter.⁸ The disconnected scenes flow to Washington every day, like a twenty-first-century retelling of J.M. Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians* (1982). And no country—no person, for that matter—appears too obscure for Washington's watchful eye. Writing from the sleepy archipelago of the Maldives in 2008, U.S. officials relayed that local police had given the embassy the name of a young man who might have recently met with a Waziristan group with unspecified links to al-Qaeda. Little was known of the man beyond the fact that he had visited a website associated with radical Islam—but his name was entered dutifully into a terrorist database, along with a solemn rejoinder about the potential dangers of Maldives-based, Waziristan-trained extremists.⁹

How is it possible to police the line between America's vital and peripheral interests in such a world? Everything and everyone matters to Washington in the twenty-first century. The story of Wikileaks is defined by continuity—and it hints at how the American geopolitical tradition

has arced further downward since the end of the Cold War. Although the material leaked by Manning tells us relatively little about the top-level debates in the Bush and Obama administrations, the cables convey neither a sense of proportion nor humility. Nowhere was there an awareness of how distance and terrain affect international affairs in different ways around the world—or a cognizance that Yemen (and regions like it) simply do not matter to the United States.

Saying No

Today, as in the past, small states appropriate American rhetoric. They lay claim to the language of U.S. foreign affairs and push U.S. powerbrokers in particular directions by conflating their own goals with America's stated strategic priorities. Those who insist that America has lost its "influence" around the world seem not to understand this history. Our world is interconnected in novel ways, and new technologies pose threats and opportunities that are at once terrifying and exhilarating. But old lessons are worth heeding. The most important of these: not every region matters equally. And the most important task of every great power, now and yesterday, is saying no. It is a lesson worth reflecting on, especially as diplomats and policymakers adjust to a political landscape without such mainstays as Hosni Mubarak.

Notes:

1. For documentation, see <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html#report/egypt-09CAIRO604>
2. Timothy Garton Ash, 'US embassy cables: A banquet of secrets,' see <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/28/wikileaks-diplomacy-us-media-war>
3. 'Worldwide Reaction to Wikileaks Drop,' *PBS NewsHour*, see <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/11/worldwide-reaction-to-wikileaks.html>

4. For interesting background information, see <http://hnn.us/articles/342.html>.
5. Fareed Zakaria, "Wikileaks Shows Skill of U.S. Diplomats," see <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2034508,00.html>
6. For documentation, see <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html#report/yemen-10SANAA317>
7. For documentation, see <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html#report/elmasri-06SKOPJE105> and <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html#report/litvinenko-06PARIS7755>.
8. For documentation, see <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html#report/security-08STATE116943>.
9. For documentation, see <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html#report/security-08STATE116943>.

CALL FOR PROPOSALS TO HOST THE 2013 SHAFR SUMMER INSTITUTE

The SHAFR Summer Institute Oversight Committee welcomes proposals to host the 2013 SHAFR Summer Institute.

The SHAFR Summer Institute (SI) takes place during the week prior to the annual SHAFR meetings in June. (In 2013, the SI should ideally run on June 14-19, preceding the annual meeting in Arlington VA, on June 20-22). The SI is intended to provide advanced graduate students and/or junior faculty with the chance to engage in intense discussion with senior scholars on topics and methodologies related to the study of foreign policy and/or international history. The Institute also serves as an opportunity for all participants, senior scholars included, to test ideas and themes related to their own research. To underwrite the Institute, SHAFR provides \$45,000, which includes a \$5,000 stipend for each of the two co-organizers; a small stipend, travel, and room expenses for the participants; and other costs. Organizers are encouraged to seek additional funding, either by subsidies or in-kind support, from their home institutions. Prior Institutes and their themes have been: "War and Foreign Policy: America's Conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical Perspective;" "Turning Points in the Cold War;" "Decisions and History;" "Freedom and Free Markets: The Histories of Globalization and Human Rights;" and "Does Culture Matter? The Emotions, the Senses, and Other New Approaches to the History of US Foreign/International Relations." Those interested in applying to host in 2013 should prepare a proposal including (1) title of the Institute they wish to conduct; (2) brief description (one paragraph) of the themes to be pursued during the Institute; (3) preferred audience (grad students or junior faculty); (4) a statement on funding secured from home institutions, if any; and (5) contact information and c.v. of the co-organizers. Proposals should be sent to shafr@osu.edu by

May 1, 2012. Questions can be directed to Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director, at Hahn.29@osu.edu.

Historians as Policymakers

Jonathan R. Hunt

In 2005, President George W. Bush read ninety-five books. Over half of them were non-fiction; the majority of those were histories and biographies. They included Doris Kearns Goodwin's *Team of Rivals* (also a favorite of President Barack Obama), Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's biography of Mao, and a reflection on why Reconstruction failed. The next year, Bush leafed through the lives of Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Carnegie, King Leopold, William Jennings Bryan, Huey Long, LBJ, Genghis Khan and Babe Ruth and delved into Andrew Robert's *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900* and Nathaniel Philbrick's *Mayflower*. His national security establishment regularly discussed history and its lessons for current affairs. Condoleezza Rice and President Bush traded notes on Robert Beisner's biography of Dean Acheson, believing that the origins of the national security state after World War II would prove instructive as they laid the groundwork for a national security infrastructure to fight terrorism after September 11. Bush even met with historians to solicit their views on foreign policy matters. This band of consulting historians included John Lewis Gaddis, David Kennedy, Wilfred McClay, Gertrude Himmelfarb, David Hackett Fischer, and Allen Guelzo. President Obama continued this practice, inviting a who's who of presidential biographers to dinner in his early presidency that included Michael Beschloss, Douglas Brinkley, Robert Dallek, Doris Kearns Goodwin, and H. W. Brands.

History has always played a vital role in American politics. Among the founders, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson were merely the most illustrious who considered themselves amateur historians and used historical principles, precedents, and Whiggish notions of progress when contemplating the compelling political, social, and constitutional issues of their age. George Washington's reading of the history of interstate affairs inspired him to warn against entangling alliances in his farewell speech. Throughout the Cold War, a large and distinguished group of U.S. statesmen and wise men cited the perceived failure of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement at Munich to justify hardline policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Our collective memory of historical events and their imagined lessons have exerted a constant influence on U.S. foreign policy. In this article, I would like to explore the bond between history and public policy by expanding on a quotation by the French historian of philosophy Étienne Gilson: "History is the only laboratory we have in which to test the consequences of thought." By describing how international historians can use our theoretical lab equipment to peer into subjects related to foreign policymaking and international affairs, I also hope to encourage a frank and constructive dialogue about the prospects of those trained by our discipline to thrive beyond the walls of academia.

International History and the Job Crisis

There has always been a tension between scholarly objectivity and public activism in the attitude of

U.S. foreign policy historians toward the making of U.S. foreign policy. The crux of the dilemma lies in the difference between the historical subject, which remains indelibly past, and historical analysis, which is inextricably bound to the present. Whether through education or advocacy, historians have always tried to bend the arc of history. A strong humanistic impulse imbues the discipline with an abiding faith in history's capacity to educate its students on social, economic, and political subjects, as well as questions of race, gender, ethnicity, culture, and the environment. Nevertheless, our appreciation for the ways in which historical analysis can inform public institutions and policymaking is far from clear. The rise of international, transnational, and global history as more inclusive modes of evaluation of how humans have historically interacted across national lines challenges us to ask how our knowledge and skills can improve the foreign policymaking process. However, it is the ongoing job crisis in academic history that compels us to ask what students of international history can offer beyond the Ivory Tower's crenellated walls, and how we should convey the merits of our sub-discipline.

There is a litany of reasons why international history should play a more prominent role in foreign affairs, security policy, and even corporate strategy. First, those who have been trained as academic historians bring a unique and needed skill set to the analysis of complex phenomena like policymaking. Historians are trained to view subject matter on its own terms, analyzing it in light of its context, complexity, and changeability. This catholic, impartial, and long-range perspective can complement the partisan and parsimonious tendencies of politicians, policymakers, and social scientists, helping to yield better policy outcomes.

As Abraham Lincoln once noted, "a capacity and taste for reading gives access to whatever has already been discovered by others." Though no amount of scholarship can replace the wisdom gained through experience, a historical education affords young men and women the practical knowledge and clear-eyed outlook needed to be good policymakers. Preparing historians for such work may entail supplemental instruction in economics, sociology, or statistics. But a trained historian already has strong proficiencies in research, analysis, writing, editing, public speaking, and managing large projects. These talents make them strong candidates for positions that require the ability to design well-reasoned and robust strategies and then convey them clearly and forcefully to various audiences.

Meanwhile, the fiscal crisis and its toll on higher education budgets have shown that funding flows to disciplines that can best defend their benefits to students and society. These benefits are normally quantified in terms of employment and economic yield. It is easy to bemoan the influence of pecuniary interests on free inquiry, but, sadly, the days of university budgets swollen by baby-boomers and the flush years of the 1990s have ended. History departments across the country have been quick to adapt themselves to these changing circumstances. The University of Texas at

Austin and George Mason University have launched new websites, *Not Even Past* and the *History News Network*, to display the work being done by faculty and students, bringing scholastic history into the digital mainstream. Faculty members are meanwhile being coaxed to think of themselves as public thinkers instead of reclusive intellectuals.

The public turn has numerous upsides. Publicizing our work beyond the pages of obscure academic journals brings attention to the field. More important, historians' engagement in civil discourse brings conceptual clarity and argumentative depth to important debates. The fracas last year over AHA President-elect William Cronon's blog posts critical of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker's campaign against public-sector unions displayed the risks that historians take when they join the fray. But it also demonstrated how important it is for historians to take part in these debates and how enlivening and enriching their participation can be. Such historians as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Richard Hofstadter, and William Appleman Williams were lions of political discourse in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Ceding the field to partisan firebrands, think tanks, and corporate media has needlessly impoverished our civil discourse.

Finally, the unattainable target of matching every doctorate in history with a tenure-track position ought to compel department heads, junior and senior faculty, and graduate students to consider how to pursue jobs outside of academia. Robert B. Townsend, the AHA's assistant director for research and publications, has outlined in *Perspectives on History* the need to expand our notions of successful job placements for history doctorates in light of today's academic job crisis. In the 2008/09 fiscal year, the difference between the number of jobs advertised and the number of applicants was nearly 400, or about 33 percent of job seekers. Though history doctorates are unlikely to find compensation commensurate to the king's ransom that Newt Gingrich earned as a "historical consultant" for Freddie Mac, job opportunities do exist in the public and private sectors. Townsend pinpoints jobs in public history as the chief alternative. International historians and those who study policy-relevant topics, however, are well poised to transition from history into public policy, NGO, and consultant work. Expanding the opportunities in these fields, however, will require historians to explore and articulate more precisely what skills and expertise they bring to the table.

History and Policy

U.S. diplomatic and political historians have previously examined how history and policy relate. They have noted that public officials frequently invoke the lessons of history when choosing among an array of policy options. Generally, these lessons are drawn from epochal moments when matters of war and peace were being settled: during Europe's descent into war after Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria's assassination in June 1914, for instance, or between 1937 and 1939, when Neville Chamberlain pursued his ill-starred policy of appeasement. Ernest May, in his 1973 classic *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (still required reading in many policy courses), highlights the use of historical analogies in foreign policymaking. He demonstrates how Roosevelt's wartime strategy of "unconditional surrender" sprung from his conviction that Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points failed to end World War I on a satisfactory basis. May's overarching thesis makes three claims. First, policymakers make regular use of historical analogies. Second, they tend to choose the wrong one, settling on the most obvious rather than the most instructive. Finally, they need to learn to make better use of history or employ

trained historians to help them do so.

May went on to collaborate with another Harvard scholar with considerable experience in federal policymaking, Richard Neustadt. Together they wrote *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (1986), based on courses they team-taught for mid-career professionals. In the book they consider a set of historical episodes, including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Skybolt Affair, and assess how and to what effect history was used to justify a decision. From these case studies they extract a number of lessons "about how to use experience, whether remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today about the prospect of tomorrow." Many maxims, they admit, are common sense. Don't do something just for the sake of doing anything. Regularly question your assumptions. Avoid stereotypes and know the history of the policy or institution in question. Clearly they are not aiming for originality; they instead wanted to underscore how often policymakers lack good judgment.

May and Neustadt do make two more creative proposals, however. First, they believe policymakers ought to imagine time as a constant stream in which the present flows from the past and into the future as part of a continuum. This principle aims to compensate for policymakers' tendency to focus on short-term goals by encouraging them to view choices as elements of a protracted process with a real past. The second point is provocative. History, they write, is a singular discipline that combines the rigor of logical argumentation with the creativity of narrative exposition. Reflecting on the effects of a character playing his part a little differently entails an act of imagination. May and Neustadt reckon that historians are therefore adept at thinking "outside the box" (to use the management term), a knack they believe is too often absent from the making of public policy.

Now, if students of international history are to seek jobs in public policy and related fields, their skill sets and expertise need to be sold to prospective employers. First, however, there is the question of what positions they can viably fill in government agencies, NGOs, and consulting firms. We are accustomed to hearing that history students are trained to be critical thinkers. Alas, this claim lacks specificity and has been elevated into a cliché by waves of students from the liberal arts looking for work. We need to convey better what our methods of analysis and argumentation can offer that pure social sciences cannot, along with how a trained historian can preserve and exploit an organization's "corporate memory."

Historians are capable of applying a rigorous and fine-grained attention to detail and significance to any subject under the sun. Accordingly, they can flourish as analysts in a variety of domains—public policy, finance, consultancy, journalism, and security. The postgraduates with whom they would compete generally have degrees in sociology, economics, area studies, political science, or public policy. These disciplines have their merits, however, they tend not to prepare their students to take on longitudinal studies of a given subject synthesizing a variety of causal factors, nor to convey the resulting data in a cogent and compelling form. A large organization can also benefit from having historians chronicle and interpret data about its past operations. This is particularly true of institutions such as federal agencies and multinational corporations, which must be quick to react to social, economic, cultural, and political developments, and which often fail to compare their current plans to prior actions. In addition, there is an urgent need for federal agencies to evaluate the success of earlier and continuing programs. Historians can work out how a particular policy has unfolded, establish whether that policy has proven effective, or thereby help to decide if a policy should be

maintained or modified.

International historians have further advantages as they prepare for a career in foreign policy and kindred ventures. Their subject expertise in international economics, relations, and law, as well as transnational phenomena such as nongovernmental organizations, cultural exchange, social networks, commodity chains, and human migration rise in value as the world becomes ever more of a global village. After all, international issues define our time. Whether it is the global recession, financial turmoil in Europe, the Arab Spring and its aftermath, global climate change, the spread of markets, or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, public agencies and private institutions must be aware of and responsive to events on distant continents. Faculty advisers would do well to urge their students to keep in mind how an expertise in a subject area relevant to contemporary world affairs could prove a professional godsend if their dreams of a tenure-track job come to naught.

International History in Action

While I was writing an article on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the historic Reykjavik summit for the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, I began to think about how international historians can contribute to the foreign policymaking process. I believe that the history of Cold War-era nuclear diplomacy can illuminate what U.S. foreign policy can do to address the conjoined issues of nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and strategy today. A thoroughgoing study of the people, organizations, events, forces, and policies that shaped the present state of affairs and policy track is vital to identifying the next steps that policymakers should take. I think that policymakers would profit from greater reliance on such findings.

When I began graduate school, we were taught the five C's of historical analysis: context, contingency, complexity, continuity, and change over time. A sixth C (culture) is arguably a new addition. This repertoire is fundamental to historical inquiry and should be stressed as our discipline advertises itself. However, there are other methods that a historian can employ to improve how policy is conceptualized and constructed. My thinking on this subject has been molded by historians working in public policy at the University of Texas at Austin where a new multidisciplinary program in History, Strategy, and Statecraft has been founded, including Francis J. Gavin, Mark Atwood Lawrence, Jeremi Suri, William Inboden, and H. W. Brands. Of course, pondering how historians can actively and fruitfully engage the non-academic world should not lessen the rigor with which we approach our work. A precise, methodical, and objective methodology in which explanation and argument are preferred to polemic and politicization defines sound historical work. In fact, it is precisely the historian's drive to seek clarity of argument while staying faithful to his sources and acknowledging the existence of discrepant facts that creates his value as an analyst.

The first method that a historian can bring to policy analysis is charting the operations of causality and agency over time. This diagnostic practice is the historian's bread and butter, employed to deduce how and why events occur and what factors or combinations of factors cause events. The evaluation of sequence and its implications for what causes and agents were significant to a certain

outcome seems straightforward. However, as readers of *Passport* can attest, sophisticated historical analysis goes beyond the obvious and proximate to identify the deeper forces at play and the concatenation of happenings that produces a result. Moreover, they recognize that correlation does not equal causation. These caveats suggest three insights. First, a policy and the intelligence on which that policy is based ought always to be subject to revision. Next, a policy's implementation seldom brings about change by itself and will necessarily give rise to unforeseen consequences. And finally, the ramifications of

a policy choice in foreign affairs reach past the relevant issues and states into the financial, economic, social, and cultural tapestry of global affairs.

A historical toolset is thus useful for thinking strategically about foreign policy. One instrument that historians make use of, as May points out, is the use of analogy, or, to be more precise, the search for the apt analogy. The case of Reykjavik is instructive. Members of the U.S. security establishment under Reagan, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle, NSC staff expert on Soviet affairs Richard Pipes, and CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates, failed to grasp the meaning of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union because they chose the wrong analogy. Such failures are usually the result of an inability to appreciate how circumstances evolve over time. They

mistakenly believed that Gorbachev would resemble the staid Brezhnev rather than the dynamic Khrushchev and that communist ideology rather than Gorbachev's personality and the USSR's dreadful finances would govern Soviet behavior. Meanwhile, the confrontational stance taken by the Reagan administration failed to destabilize the Kremlin by goading it into an arms race and instead spurred a push for arms control in Gorbachev's foreign policy. When disarmament talks at Reykjavik collapsed, the results were equally surprising. Instead of triggering a new era of Soviet-American rivalry, the mutual understanding fostered by Reagan and Gorbachev laid the groundwork for the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1991 START Treaty, and the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern Europe.

In a 2007 article for the *International Journal* entitled "History and Policy," Francis J. Gavin calls the fine-grained analysis of agency, sequence, and causation "vertical history." He goes on to describe a second method of historical analysis that he terms "horizontal history." If vertical history is the x-axis of a line chart against which the chronology of events is charted, horizontal history is the y-axis, or *spatial-depth* line, whereby phenomena are linked geographically and relationally. Horizontal history enables us to look beyond the immediately evident to make logical arguments about the significance of seemingly second-order or independent phenomena. For example, conventional thinking on nuclear strategy and arms control in the late Cold War emphasized force postures, strategic parity, a second-strike capability, and technological advances. Analysts paid relatively little attention to how state finances or a nuclear disaster might impinge on nuclear diplomacy. Yet the parlous financial situation of the USSR, along with the Chernobyl meltdown, were arguably what prompted Gorbachev's embrace of nuclear disarmament after 1985. A historian looking at the subject from a more panoramic vantage might have looked past military affairs to foresee the

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crucial linkages between nuclear policy, economic trends, and environmental fears.

Vertical and horizontal history can supply insights on contemporary issues by employing a comparative method as well. People who discuss foreign policy in Washington, D.C., tend to react overmuch to daily headlines and to drink too deeply from the fount of conventional wisdom. These blinders are known to those engaged in policy work as the “Washington bubble” and “inside-the-Beltway thinking.” Nuclear disarmament and even substantial arms reductions, for example, are now seen as dead letters in U.S. foreign policy. Though events have run apace since the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, comparing and contrasting today’s state of affairs with that of yesteryear shows what limits and opportunities face policymakers. The security establishment and national media were shocked when Reagan and Gorbachev raised the prospect of incremental nuclear disarmament in Iceland. Although the proliferation of nuclear weapons to India, Pakistan, North Korea, and (potentially) Iran has made the calculus of nuclear arms control multivariable, the nuclear threats of today pale in comparison to those of the Cold War. There are marked continuities running between the global contexts of 1986 and 2012 as well. Economic troubles in the USSR were a major catalyst for arms cuts in the late 1980s. The ongoing financial crisis has Congress and the Department of Defense considering reductions in the next ten years to the U.S. defense budget on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars. The likelihood of such cuts affords a comparable chance to limit U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence by shrinking the overgrown U.S. nuclear arsenal. Doing so would lend impetus to nuclear arms control and could be complemented by the long-delayed congressional ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a determined push for a Fissile-Material Cutoff Treaty by the State Department.

Meanwhile, the recent nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan should remind those working in nuclear energy and policy of the inherent dangers in nuclear power. Reykjavik’s outcome should also teach U.S. diplomats that engaging a regime on nuclear arms control need not empower it or excuse its roguish behavior. The Soviet Union crumbled in 1991 in part because the United States worked with Gorbachev, whose reforms eventually brought about the end of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and, two years later, the Soviet Union itself. Someone with an appreciation for the contingent nature of historical change might advise U.S. diplomats that bringing the Islamic Republic of Iran to the negotiating table would likely as not lead to a positive outcome for U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Conclusion

International historians have concerned themselves for decades with the mainsprings of foreign policy. Yet our discussion of the ways in which history and historians can contribute to public policy and related fields is sadly underdeveloped. As the jobs crisis compels us to explore professional domains beyond the university, our nomenclature must be honed to better communicate our worth as analysts, policymakers, and even leaders. To return to the quotation from Gilson, historians must develop ways to explain to non-historians how techniques and apparatuses designed to peer into the past can be used to make better policy in the present. The first order of business is to make it clear that history is omnipresent. There is a tacit belief that history has an event horizon—either at the beginning of one’s own lifetime or at the edges of archival discovery. As scholars, we prefer that time passes so as to give us the perspective necessary

to be dispassionate. In reality, however, history, like the universe, is constantly expanding. Our eyes may not peer as far, but the lenses our discipline has honed can allow us to see roughly where we might go. Rigorous historical work can inform and even improve the foreign policymaking process in ways that go beyond a president’s bookshelf. The benefits to the historical community in an age of austerity ought to prove just as prodigious.

In the next issue of *Passport*:

- A roundtable on Hiroshi Kitamura, *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan*
- A roundtable discussion of the nexus of military and diplomatic history
- Daniel Immerwahr on the historiography of modernization

And much more!

Stick to your Guns (And Don't Let Theirs Intimidate You):

Reflections on Standing Up for Your Scholarship, Twenty Years After JFK, China, and the Bomb

Gordon H. Chang

Twenty years ago, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations awarded the Bernath Book Award to my *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, 1990). Although the book studied more than two decades of history over several administrations, one chapter in particular attracted special attention from reviewers. The controversial chapter revealed that President John F. Kennedy, fearful of China's imminent development of nuclear weapons capability, seriously explored ways to destroy China's weapons facilities before the Chinese could develop an operational device. Perhaps the most startling idea that he considered was to have the United States and the Soviet Union possibly work together in a joint preemptive air strike against the facilities. Among the evidence presented for this accusation were several cables sent under the president's signature to Averell Harriman when he was in Moscow in 1963 as the president's special envoy to negotiate what became known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The cables directed him to approach Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev with the preemption idea. Harriman attempted to raise the provocative plan during at least two conversations but was rebuffed by the Soviet leader.

The evidence on Kennedy's initiative was clear: the cable traffic between Harriman and the White House, as well as other documentation, showed that the prospect of China's nuclear capacity alarmed Kennedy and that he wanted to find a way, even if it meant including the Soviets, to "take out" China's nuclear program.

The article's revelation raised the ire of the defenders of the reputation of Kennedy as a man of peace and reason. His defenders used their prestige and eminence to dismiss the charge and suggested that the author was just a simple-minded, wet-behind-the-ears academic who didn't know the difference between presidential musings, contingency planning, and serious action.

James C. Thomson Jr., who had written good books on Chinese history and U.S.-China relations and had been an advisor to Kennedy on East Asian affairs, damned my charge in his review for the *New York Times*. "Mr. Chang is wrong," Thomson wrote, "in ascribing to Kennedy and his advisers some secret plan for a United States-Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike against China." Thomson granted that JFK did have a "China obsession," that he might have entertained such a "scheme," and that "this sort of stuff was suggested in contingency planning papers by brainstormers" at the time. "But plans and briefing papers sold the waterfront," Thomson wrote, and presidents seldom read these papers and "very

rarely" act on them. "Mr. Chang pushes his claim eagerly but never proves it."¹

Thomson used his prestige as a former "insider" to assert that the historical record didn't tell the whole story and that he knew what really happened, or rather, what didn't happen. Intending to diminish my claim (and inadvertently providing further corroboration for it), he wrote that he "attended a number of lunches where such thoughts were tossed around." Yet he was in fact at best a mid-level official, removed from the highest levels of decision-making. In his long review he never refuted any of the specific evidence in the essay, nor did he concede that he had only limited access to the president and could not have known what JFK was discussing with his closest advisers.

At the highest level was JFK's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. In his *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, published a couple of years after the appearance of my book, he too dismissed the idea

that Kennedy actively pursued efforts to destroy China's nuclear capability. Bundy, following Thomson's line, wrote that while there had been "talk" in Washington about possible "preemptive action," there was no "serious planning or real intent."²

Several academic reviewers chimed in with the Kennedy defenders, echoing the charge that I didn't know the difference between breezy contingency planning and the way real power worked. In all this there was condescension and insult. Thomson conceded that I was a "lucid writer and prodigious researcher" but at the same time accused me of being a "revisionist" historian (obviously a term of disparagement in his vocabulary) who misled readers and offered "breathless" arguments. I also failed to understand political "realities" about Kennedy's politics. Thomson played on the public's assumption that the power elite, among whom he counted himself, really couldn't be so misguided or militant.

Well, they were all wrong.

Either Thomson was duped, or he was well out of the loop, or he simply lied in the *New York Times* review. Perhaps he was so wedded to the Kennedy mystique and his privileged insider status that he couldn't accept the documented truth. However, the documents clearly show that Bundy lied. There is no other way to put it. I suppose this shouldn't be a surprise; Bundy lied to the American public for years about the Vietnam War. (It should be said, on the other hand, that other former Kennedy officials were quite candid and forthcoming: Carl Kaysen, who was Deputy Special Assistant for National Security

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Affairs just beneath Bundy, was one). It is also possible, I suppose, that these former officials thought there were still sensitive national security issues in the 1990s that required them to publicly mislead people. If they believed politics required obfuscation, however, they could have hedged or offered more finessed responses, but they did not. Now that they are gone, we can't ask them why they wrote as they did.

The historical documentation that has been released over the last twenty years incontrovertibly supports the story of Kennedy's obsession with China's nuclear plans and his efforts to try to do something about them.

In the winter of 2000/01, William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, senior analysts at the National Security Archive, George Washington University, published an extraordinarily well documented study that showed that "Kennedy and his advisers did more than talk" about taking out China's nukes. Burr and Richelson show that the "Kennedy administration initiated a massive intelligence effort, including U-2 flights and satellite reconnaissance programs," that "the U. S. had approached Khrushchev with overtures for joint action against the Chinese program," and that "U.S. officials explored military action without the Soviets."³

Burr and Richelson also state that the new documentation they used "corroborates Gordon Chang's portrait of Kennedy's militancy and shows that Bundy was in fact the point man in countering the Chinese nuclear effort." In contrast to the reception my work received, the response to this essay was positive; Burr reports that no academic or government researchers disputed his findings.⁴ The National Security Archive website now has a dedicated "book" entitled "The United States, China, and the Bomb" that publishes recently declassified documents on "U.S. policy toward the Chinese nuclear weapons program."⁵ Scholarly work about Kennedy and China now routinely accepts the view that Bundy and Thomson disparaged publicly in their comments in the 1990s.⁶ Political scientists use the Kennedy episode as a case study to discuss presidential temptations to use preventive war against nuclear proliferation.⁷

The change in attitude toward JFK, China, and the bomb is certainly gratifying to someone who was attacked for first raising the issue, but more important, it serves to remind us of the value of historical documentation and the dispassionate and persistent search for the truth. It also reminds us that former officials, including intellectuals

such as Bundy (he was the former dean of the Harvard faculty), are sometimes hostile to historical research. We need only look at the conflicting accounts coming from the Bush presidency for more recent evidence. Former officials offer versions of history that can vary from being completely reliable to being patently false. It is not always true that they deliberately prevaricate; sometimes they simply misremember or privilege their own limited experience with a president. It is easy to fool oneself and claim one knew what the chief executive was really thinking. But it is too bad that it took more than a dozen years of documentation release and years of scholarly work to conclusively demolish Thomson's and Bundy's falsehoods about Kennedy, China, and the bomb.

Notes:

1. James C. Thomson Jr., "Whose Side Were They On?" *New York Times*, July 29, 1990, *Sunday Book Review*, 25.
2. McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, (New York, 1988), 532. See also Noam Kochavi, *A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years* (Westport, CT, 2002), 216-25.
3. "William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01), 54-99.
4. Email message, Burr to Chang, Jan. 10, 2011.
5. See <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>.
6. See for example, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, fifth ed. (New York, 2010), 210; Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally'* (New York, 2005), 26-28; Matthew Jones, *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965* (New York, 2010), 418-19; and Kochavi, *Conflict Perpetuated*, 217-25.
7. See the ongoing work of political scientists Francis J. Gavin, University of Texas, Austin, and Mira Rapp-Hooper, Columbia University.

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Bay of Pigs Redux

An Assessment of Jack B. Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, vol. 1: *Air Operations, March 1960–April 1961*; vol. 2: *Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*; vol. 3: *Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959–January 1961*; vol. 4: *The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs*

Howard Jones

“And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free.”

—Marble engraving on wall, CIA foyer, Langley, Virginia

As author of *The Bay of Pigs* (2008), I welcomed the CIA's August 2011 release of this huge batch of materials—albeit, I confess, with no small measure of trepidation. Would this newly published information confirm or undermine my findings already in print? Jack Pfeiffer, the agency's in-house historian, drew from previously undisclosed records and numerous interviews of CIA figures in writing this five-volume *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation* (the last volume of which remains classified but under appeal through the Freedom of Information Act), and his massive work of nearly 1,600 pages of narrative and accompanying documents promised to be eye-opening.¹ So, when Andrew Johns, the editor of *Passport*, invited me to write an essay on what was new in this collection, I accepted the task with the expectation of having to express more than one *mea culpa*. Much to my relief, however, I found that the documents in this collection did not markedly change the story I had put together based on CIA and other resources available before 2008.

However, when I read articles on these newly released records, I was struck by the number of people who were not familiar with the literature on the subject and erroneously called old news new news. *Newsweek* published an essay by historian Robert Dallek entitled “The Untold Story of the Bay of Pigs” in which he highlights four supposed revelations in this treasure trove: an instance of “friendly fire” during the Cuban invasion, the CIA's approval of funding for the Mafia's attempt to bring about Fidel Castro's assassination, Vice President Richard M. Nixon's active promotion of the overthrow of the Cuban leader, and the CIA's early warning that the invasion could not succeed without American military support. Indeed, Dallek asserts that the recent disclosure of these papers has now fleshed out a story hidden in the agency's archives for fifty years.

Dallek was not alone in such assertions. Other articles pointing to some or all of the same claims appeared in the *Miami Herald*, *USA Today*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Huffington Post*, *Fox News Latino*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Navy Times*, the *Atlantic Wire*, and a host of Associated Press versions of the story, both inside and outside the United States (see, for example, the *Taiwan News*). In addition, *USA Today*, the *Boston Globe*, and *Fox News Latino* added a fifth so-called revelation: U.S. authorization of the use of napalm in the bombing assaults on Cuba.²

Support for these claims came from Peter Kornbluh, senior analyst at the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., who was centrally involved in securing the release of these materials and remains adamant about “prying” out the fifth and last volume in a process he terms “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.” In his post on the NSA website focusing on the “revelations,” he echoes all five assertions and adds four others that actually are new: the proposed use (rejected by the State Department as “too obviously U.S.”) of sonic booms over Havana in coordination with the planned air assault on April 14, 1961, to cause “confusion” and distract Castro; the CIA's failed attempt in April 1961 to convince Cuba's foreign minister, Raul Roa, to defect while in New York at the UN; the use of Grand Cayman Island's airstrip, with what Pfeiffer calls the British government's “unofficial blessing,” for at least three emergency landings of Cuban brigade B-26s returning from assaults on Cuba (an action that could leave the impression that the British had collaborated in the overthrow); and, taking up an entire volume, the problems in getting Nicaragua and Guatemala to cooperate in providing an airstrip and training facilities for the project.³

Yet none of the five most-often mentioned revelations are new. Kornbluh notes in his NSA post that three of these assertions—the CIA-Mafia connection, Nixon's attempt to help shape the planning of the invasion, and the warning about the need for direct U.S. military help—rest on CIA documents found in volume 3 of Pfeiffer's *Official History*, which was declassified in 1998 in accordance with the Kennedy Assassination Records Act and made public in 2005 when it was posted on Villanova University's website by political science professor David Barrett. Thus the recent release of this volume does not mark the initial disclosure of these three claims. Barrett's posting admittedly lacks the splash of a publication or a news release, but it has been available for six years to readers interested in the Bay of Pigs. Furthermore, in 1998 Kornbluh himself, in his book *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, drew on previously released CIA documents in referring to the Mafia connection as an “explicit component” of the Bay of Pigs program, financially underwritten by the CIA.⁴

The Mafia link stirred great interest long before this collection came on the scene in 2011. News of the agency's collaboration with the underworld has appeared in earlier publications, including my book, books by Peter Wyden, Don Bohning, and others, and, most notably, two compilations of documents, one by Congress and the other by the State Department. In 1976 W. W. Norton and Company in New York published the Senate

findings of the Church Committee Assassination Report, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders; Interim Report," which amassed considerable evidence establishing the CIA-Mafia conspiracy to kill Castro. Two decades later and still fifteen years before the recent release of these CIA materials, Ocean Press in Australia published the CIA inspector general's "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro" of May 1967, which provided further evidence of the CIA-Mafia plot. Prepared at the request of CIA director Richard Helms and declassified in 1994, the inspector general's report appeared in print two years later. The following year, in 1997, the Department of State published a *Foreign Relations* volume on Cuba that contains a May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" by the director of the CIA's Office of Security, Sheffield Edwards, in which he noted the agency's agreement to pay \$150,000 to the Mafia on the assassination of Castro. Further evidence of the Mafia's role came to light in 2007, when the CIA released the "family jewels" and for the first time specifically declared that its director, Allen Dulles, "gave his approval" of the "gangster-type action" to assassinate Castro. According to Edwards, Dulles "merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval." Richard Bissell, the CIA's deputy director of plans in charge of the overthrow project, regarded Castro's assassination as the prelude to the landing. "Assassination was intended to reinforce the plan," he told Dulles.⁵

Nor are the other two so-called revelations regarding friendly fire and the use of napalm new. My 2008 book refers to the episode in which CIA operative Grayston L. Lynch opened fire from the *Blagar* onto two friendly Cuban brigade planes he mistakenly thought were part of Castro's air force. Lynch told this story in his "After Action Report" of May 4, 1961, published by the State Department in 1997, and in his book that appeared the following year. Lynch's account also belies the assertion in an Associated Press article in *Fox News Latino* that "it was not clear . . . if anyone was hurt." Lynch later learned that the antiaircraft barrage missed the planes—a friendly B-26 escorting a C-46 transport—but slightly wounded two paratroopers who made their jumps anyway. And as for the authorization of napalm, my book refers to its use, based on post-Bay of Pigs interviews of participants by a White House investigatory committee headed by General Maxwell Taylor. Those findings were published in 1981.⁶

Although the information is not new, it is still disconcerting to read in volume 3 of the *Official History* that five months before the invasion the notes of a CIA meeting recorded the belief that there was no chance the operation would succeed without direct U.S. military aid. Perhaps equally disturbing is the claim that no one warned the White House. On November 15, 1960, according to this claim, the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA (WH/4), established to direct Castro's overthrow, met to prepare Bissell to help Dulles bring President-elect Kennedy up to speed on planning for Cuban operations. WH/4 put together a brief that tried to emphasize that the "original concept" of a covert program dependent on guerrilla infiltration leading to "internal unrest" was "unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted." Furthermore, the "second concept" of a force of between 1500 and 3000 securing a beach with an airstrip was also "unachievable, except as a joint Agency/ DOD [Department of Defense] action." Pfeiffer then notes that "what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961." Not only

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was the actual invasion force smaller, but neither Bissell nor anyone else shared this information with Kennedy when they met on November 18.⁷

Quotations can impart a misleading meaning if taken out of context, as they are in this instance. The meeting notes by themselves leave the dark impression that as early as November 15, 1960, the CIA recognized the futility of the program, but it went ahead anyway without alerting Kennedy of the danger. Yet when we examine this charge within the broad discussions then underway, we learn that the key question before the agency's senior planners—including Bissell and Jacob Esterline, guerrilla specialist in World War II and now head of the CIA Task Force on Cuba—was whether to pursue a CIA-controlled paramilitary program or a joint military effort with the Department of Defense. It became clear to these strategists almost two weeks before this controversial memo of mid-November that the "small team concept" was all but dead; indeed, on November

4, headquarters in Washington cabled the infantry training base in Guatemala with instructions to plan on developing a larger Cuban brigade for what Pfeiffer termed a "conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1,500 infantrymen." Dulles and Bissell would tell President-elect Kennedy on November 18 that one 600-man force would hit the Cuban shore and quickly move inland to establish "a safe area in a mountain fastness," while an equivalent force might possibly land in another area. Both units would then ally with anti-Castro groups on the island. All would be supported by a stream of new recruits along with supplies dropped from planes arriving from Nicaragua. The hope, it appeared, was that the United States and other nations would recognize and aid the new "Provisional Government of Cuba."⁸ The CIA did not present a dire prognosis of failure to President-elect Kennedy because that was not the sense of the WH/4 meeting of November 15.

Only after Pfeiffer shows the invasion plan to be stable enough to present to the president-elect does he refer to the note forecasting defeat. Indeed, Pfeiffer seems taken aback by what he called this "strange and contradictory note" coming out of the November 15 WH/4 staff meeting.⁹ Admittedly someone in the minority—and perhaps more than one person—expressed concern that the invasion would fail without direct U.S. military help. And yet it is clear from the preceding discussion in the meeting that the consensus among the advisers was that they had found a middle ground between guerrilla tactics of infiltration and American military measures. Pfeiffer, however, leaves the wrongful impression that the CIA decided early on that defeat was a certainty without U.S. military force, and then he does not venture a guess as to why the agency did not inform the president that the program was fatally flawed. One suspects that his determination to absolve the CIA of all blame for the Bay of Pigs fiasco led him to place more emphasis on the apprehension expressed in this note than it deserved.

The only time two of the chief CIA planners of the operation—Esterline and Marine colonel Jack Hawkins—wanted to stop the overthrow effort came when Kennedy as president became so deeply concerned about plausible deniability that he decided to reduce the D-2 bombings of April 15, 1961, by half. Ironically, it was Bissell who talked the two military figures out of resigning by assuring them he would try to persuade the president to restore the full complement of planes for the D-2 strikes. Evidence now establishes that Bissell crafted the reductions to placate the

president's concern about plausible deniability and keep him from terminating the entire operation.¹⁰

Two revelations escaped the attention of earlier writers and deserve special mention, not only because they are new but also because Bissell shared neither of them with President Kennedy. First, Esterline and Hawkins realized that when the president shifted the invasion site from Trinidad to Zapata, it became virtually impossible for the brigade to escape into the mountains should the invasion fail; and second, they were well aware of the danger posed by Castro's potential arming of the T-33 trainer jets.¹¹ Esterline was a long-time CIA operative who had been deeply involved in engineering Jacobo Arbenz's overthrow in Guatemala in 1954. Hawkins was the paramilitary expert of the Cuba Task Force. Like Esterline a veteran of World War II, Hawkins fought at Bataan, Corregidor (where he was taken prisoner and escaped), and Okinawa, and in the Korean War he commanded a battalion at Inchon. Various writers, myself included, accepted the widespread criticisms of the CIA for failing to see that Zapata offered no mountain refuge and of both the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for mistakenly dismissing Castro's jets as inconsequential. But these new records demonstrate that Esterline and Hawkins realized that Trinidad abutted the Escambray Mountains and that Zapata sat eighty miles away, surrounded by treacherous swamps. Once the invasion force hit the beaches, it could not escape into the mountains and it could not go back. They also recognized the danger of jet attacks and therefore emphasized the critical importance of the D-2, D-1, and D-Day bombings. Failure to destroy Castro's air power in the preemptive air strikes and then provide air cover on the day of the invasion would doom the project—not a lack of direct U.S. military support that Esterline and Hawkins never expected anyway. President Kennedy knew nothing of these realities when he moved the invasion site to Zapata, reduced the D-2 air strikes, and canceled those flights scheduled for D-1 and D-Day itself.

Despite Pfeiffer's attempt to exonerate the CIA for the failure at the Bay of Pigs, the story he provides clearly though unintentionally places major blame on Bissell—and hence the agency. The playing out of events revealed a critical disconnect between those ground-level strategists who most intimately knew the workings of the plan but lacked the authority to implement it and their superiors in Washington who had the authority to implement the plan but lacked knowledge of its workings and yet made drastic alterations that seriously undercut the program. Pfeiffer points to this disconnect but nonetheless attributes the failure to President Kennedy and his top advisers, who all chose to override the CIA strategists. Plausible deniability became the White House mantra as the president searched for every means possible to hide American involvement by maintaining the fig leaf of secrecy.

In a project of this magnitude, the chief architect must bridge the gap between the low-level planners and the high-level implementers. It was Bissell's responsibility to bridge that gap, and he failed. Whether he felt a need to impress the president by masterminding the overthrow of Castro in order to fulfill his ambition to become CIA director after Dulles's imminent retirement, or he simply did not understand the practical requirements of laying the logistical groundwork vital to such a venture, Bissell decided against stopping an effort that his strategists insisted could not succeed without the D-2, D-1 and D-Day air strikes that would destroy Castro's air capacity. Believing he could not scuttle the program, Bissell

surmised that either Castro would be dead by the time of the invasion or the president would send military forces as a last resort to prevent defeat. He therefore surged ahead with a faulty program that seriously damaged the prestige of the presidency, heightened the Cold War by encouraging the Russians to demand a U.S. exit from Berlin and to place missiles in Cuba, and, along the way, resulted in his resignation as well as that of Dulles and threatened the very existence of the CIA.

These recently released CIA files, both old and new, have reinforced the importance of the Bay of Pigs episode in demonstrating the perils of a foreign policy that seeks regime change through intervention.

These recently released CIA files, both old and new, have reinforced the importance of the Bay of Pigs episode in demonstrating the perils of a foreign policy that seeks regime change through intervention.

Notes:

1. Volume 5 of the *Official History* is Pfeiffer's rebuttal of "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," written in 1961 by CIA officer Lyman Kirkpatrick. Declassified in 1998, the IG survey blames the agency for the invasion's failure. Peter Kornbluh edited and published the survey as *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York, 1998). Howard Jones's study, *The Bay of Pigs* (New York, 2008), is in the *Pivotal Moments in American History* series and was the Featured Selection of the Book of the Month Club and BOMC 2 and an Alternate Selection of the History Book Club and Military Book Club. It has also been translated and published in the Czech Republic. He is writing a book for Oxford University Press entitled *Into the Heart of Darkness: My Lai*.

2. Robert Dallek, "The Untold Story of the Bay of Pigs," *Newsweek*, Aug. 14, 2011, 26, 28. References to friendly fire appear in Mimi Whitefield, "CIA declassifies more Bay of Pigs documents," *Miami Herald*, Aug. 15, 2011; Laura Wides-Munoz, "More declassified Bay of Pigs docs released," AP, *Navy Times*, Aug. 15, 2011; "U.S. Releases CIA Documents on Bay of Pigs Invasion," in *Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 15, 2011; "U.S. Releases CIA Documents on Bay of Pigs Invasion," *Huffington Post*, Aug. 15, 2011; and "U.S. Releases CIA Documents on Bay of Pigs Invasion," *Taiwan News*, AP, Aug. 16, 2011. References to friendly fire, assassination, and napalm appear in Michael Winter, "Bay of Pigs Files Show CIA Bombers Hit by 'Friendly Fire,'" *USA Today*, Aug. 15, 2011. References to friendly fire and napalm appear in "Bay of Pigs; CIA Fired at Friendly Pilots; Authorized Use of Napalm," AP, *Fox News Latino*, Aug. 16, 2011; and "Records Show Errors by Bay of Pigs Unit," AP, *Boston Globe*, Aug. 16, 2011. References to friendly fire and the Mafia appear in Rebecca Greenfield, "Declassified CIA Documents Reveal Details of Bay of Pigs Invasion," *Atlantic Wire* (website associated with *The Atlantic* magazine), Aug. 15, 2011. For the friendly fire incident in the CIA documents see Pfeiffer, *Official History* 1: 330. For CIA financing of the Mafia see *ibid.*, 3: 279. For Nixon see *ibid.*, 243-44, 263, 271, 274-75, 294. For the need for U.S. military assistance see *ibid.*, 149-50. On napalm use see *ibid.*, 4: 57, 87, 124, 154, 201, 277.

3. Quote in Peter Kornbluh, "History Held Hostage," *Newsweek*, Aug. 14, 2011; Peter Kornbluh post, "Top Secret CIA 'Official History' of the Bay of Pigs: Revelations" (Aug. 15, 2011), at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/index.htm>. On sonic booms see Pfeiffer, *Official History* 1: 205-06. On Roa see *ibid.*, 239. On Grand Cayman landings see *ibid.*, 148 (Pfeiffer quote), 209, 220, 310, 318, 321, 336. On Nicaragua and Guatemala see *Official History* 2. The use of sonic booms would have been similar to the ploy used in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.

4. Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 9.

5. Sheffield Edwards, "Memorandum for the Record," May 14, 1962, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume X: Cuba, 1961-1962* (Washington, DC, 1997), 807-09; Richard M. Bissell Jr., *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (New Haven, 1996), 18, 20, 23, 157; Bissell testimony, June 11, pp. 26-27, July 22, 1975, pp. 53-56, U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Re-

cord Group 46, Church Committee Hearings (National Archives, Washington, DC); Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 10, 264-65; Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York, 1979), 40-45, 109-10; Don Bohning, *The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965* (Washington, DC, 2005), 25-27. For the CIA-Mafia connection in the Senate report see Church Committee Assassination Report, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders; Interim Report* (New York, 1976), 74-82. For the IG report see *CIA Targets Fidel: Secret 1967 CIA Inspector General's Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro* (Melbourne, 1996), 23-27, 34-36. For the CIA-Mafia collaboration see Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 21-29, 137-39. The 703 pages making up the "family jewels" are on the NSA website. Idaho Democrat Frank Church headed a Senate committee in the mid-1970s investigating—and confirming—several charges against the CIA of attempting to assassinate foreign state leaders in the previous decade.

6. Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 103; Grayston Lynch, "After Action Report on Operation," May 4, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume X: Cuba, 1961-1962*, 241; "Bay of Pigs," *Fox News Latino*, Aug. 16, 2011; Grayston L. Lynch, *Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs* (Dulles, VA, 1998), 107-08. On friendly fire occurrences see Wyden's 1979 report in *Bay of Pigs*, 234-35, and Pfeiffer, *Official History* 1: 330. References to napalm appear in Pfeiffer, *Official History* 4: 44, 74, 111, 141, 188, 264; Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 80, 114, 115; "Narrative of Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata, June 13,

1961," in Luis Aguilar, *Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs*, (Frederick, MD, 1981), 26-27; memo of conversation between General Maxwell Taylor and unidentified air commander, May 6, 1961, *ibid.*, 128, 234; José Pérez (Pepe) San Román (captain and leader of Cuban Brigade) testimony in sixteenth meeting of Green Study Group, May 17, 1961, *ibid.*, 292; and Armando Lopez Estrada (Cuban Brigade's 1st Airborne Battalion) testimony in sixteenth meeting of Green Study Group, May 17, 1961, *ibid.*, 296. See also Wyden's references to napalm in *Bay of Pigs*, 237, 238. The other members of General Taylor's investigatory committee were Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, CIA director Allen Dulles, and the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

7. Pfeiffer, *Official History* 3: 149-50.

8. *Ibid.*, 145-49. See also Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 44.

9. Pfeiffer, *Official History* 3: 149.

10. Pfeiffer, *Official History* 1: 283-84; Jones, *Bay of Pigs*, 33, 76-78, 84-88; "Memo of first meeting of Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations, April 22, 1961," in Aguilar, *Operation Zapata*, 59-60.

11. On Zapata see Pfeiffer, *Official History* 4: 172-73. On trainer jets see Pfeiffer, *Official History* 1: 87-90, 198-99, 214-15, 301. Other CIA advisers aware of the T-33's potential included George Gaines and Gar Thorsrud.

THANKS

SHAFR and *Passport* wish to thank

Ed Goedeken

of the Iowa State University Library System for his many years of hard work on behalf of SHAFR members.

Ed has compiled the annual list of dissertations relevant to diplomatic history, which ran in the newsletter for many years. The list now appears on the SHAFR website, rather than in print, and can be accessed at:

<http://www.shafr.org/publications/annual-dissertation-list/>

The 2011 list is now available!



Fed Up with Washington's Endless Wars and Political Gridlock?

Then come to SHAFR 2012 in Hartford, Connecticut, June 28-30, 2012! The conference itself will take place in the downtown Hartford Marriott, which abuts the CT Convention Center and the Connecticut River. Adjacent to the hotel is a new walkway and park along the river.

Getting around Hartford is easy. A free bus service, the Star Shuttle, runs every 15 minutes to 11 pm. It stops at the Marriott and at 14 other stops in a downtown loop that passes by restaurants and other attractions. CT Transit (www.cttransit.com) offers the 30-Bradley Flyer route, an hourly semi-express bus service from Bradley (Hartford-Springfield) airport to the Marriott, with a one-way fare of only \$1.25. A major art museum, the Wadsworth Atheneum (<http://www.thewadsworth.org>), and the Bushnell Theater (<http://www.bushnell.org/>) are both just a few blocks from the Marriott. Also accessible by city bus are the Mark Twain House and Museum and the Harriet Beecher Stowe Center.

While most of the conference will be in the Marriott, the Thursday evening reception and plenary session will take place on the campus of the University of Connecticut in Storrs. Free bus service will be available from the Marriott to UConn and for the return. The post-conference reception will be held in the Supreme Court meeting room of the Old State House, site of the Hartford Convention of 1814.

Major archival collections for our field are located at Yale (an hour from Hartford); at Harvard and at the John F. Kennedy Library (2 hours distant); and at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (2.5 hours away). In addition, the American Antiquarian Society in Worcester (an hour away) boasts the second largest collection of pre-1876 printed matter in North America, and there are archival materials at the Connecticut Historical Society and the libraries of the Five Colleges around Northampton/Amherst. Finally, Mystic Seaport, the Mystic Aquarium, and the Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun casinos are all about an hour's drive from Hartford.

The conference will feature 62 panel sessions over the three days in addition to two evening plenary sessions. Thursday's session at the University of Connecticut will discuss "Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations: Reflecting on the 1991 and 2004 Editions While Looking Forward." Friday evening's session is on "Journalism and the End of Diplomatic History," with featured speaker Fred Kaplan of Slate.

SHAFR President Tom Zeiler will deliver his presidential address, "Requiem for the Common Man" at Friday's luncheon. John Lewis Gaddis is the keynote luncheon speaker on Saturday, and will discuss "George F. Kennan: The Promises – and Pitfalls – of Authorized Biography."

For more information, including hotel rates and reservation information, please visit the conference website at <http://www.shaf.org/conferences/annual/2012-annual-meeting/> or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Jennifer Walton, the Conference Coordinator, at conference@shaf.org.



RESTAURANTS NEAR THE SHAFR CONFERENCE HOTEL

IN THE HOTEL LOBBY:

Starbuck's: Monday-Saturday, 6 am – 4 pm; Sunday 7 am – 3 pm

***VIVO Seasonal Trattoria:** upscale, Mediterranean influenced; breakfast, lunch, dinner \$\$-\$\$\$\$

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FIVE-TO-FIFTEEN MINUTE WALK/STAR SHUTTLE ROUTE:

***MOOYAH,** 10 State House Square, 860-241-9600; fast casual; lunch only, weekdays only, \$
Food Court at State House Square; Mega Wraps, Bangkok Fast Food, Dunkin Donuts, etc.;
weekdays only, \$

Au Bon Pain, 185 Asylum St. (at Trumbull, City Place building); café/bakery; 6:30 am – 6:00 pm
Monday-Friday, \$

Church and Main Deli, 20 Church St. (at Main, Star Shuttle #11); pizza, pastas, salads,
sandwiches; breakfast and lunch weekdays only, \$

Cornerstone Deli, 592 Main St. (btw. Arch and Gold, across from City Hall); breakfast and
lunch weekdays only, \$

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and dinner, \$-\$\$

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late-night, \$-\$\$

Vaughan's Public House, 59 Pratt St., 860-882-1560; Irish pub; lunch, dinner, late-night, \$-\$\$

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weekend brunch, \$-\$\$

***Black-eyed Sally's,** 350 Asylum St. (Star Shuttle #7), 860-278-7427; BBQ and Cajun; lunch and
dinner, \$-\$\$

City Steam Brewery Café, 942 Main St. (at Church, Star Shuttle #11), 860-525-1600; upscale
casual in a very cool Romanesque building; lunch and dinner, \$\$

The Tavern Downtown, 100 Allyn St. (Star Shuttle #9), 860-524-9990; gastro-pub fare; lunch and
dinner, late-night, \$-\$\$\$

Zula Bar and Restaurant, 901 Main St. (at Pratt, Star Shuttle #11), 860-244-9852; American/
Italian/tapas; lunch and dinner, \$-\$\$\$

Burger Baby, 283 Asylum Street (btw. Ann and High, Star Shuttle #6 or #7), 860-728-7437,
upscale burger joint/comfort food, lunch weekdays, dinner Monday-Saturday, \$\$-\$\$\$

***Trumbull Kitchen,** 150 Trumbull St. (btw. Pearl and Asylum), 860-493-7412; globally eclectic;
lunch and dinner, \$\$-\$\$\$

Feng Asian Bistro, 93 Asylum St. (btw. Main and Trumbull), 860-549-3364; elegant Pacific Rim
cuisine in a hip urban atmosphere; lunch Monday-Friday, dinner 7 days, late-night, \$\$-\$\$\$

Vito's by the Park, 26 Trumbull St. (Star Shuttle #3), 860-244-2200; traditional Italian with a view
of Bushnell Park; lunch weekdays, dinner 7 days, \$\$-\$\$\$

DISH Bar & Grill, 900 Main St. (at Pratt, Star Shuttle #11), 860-249-3474; upscale comfort food,
live music; lunch, dinner, late-night, \$\$-\$\$\$\$

ON20, 400 Columbus Blvd., 860-722-5161; local, organic, farm-to-table; lunch weekdays, dinner
Fri. only, \$\$\$-\$\$\$\$

Max Downtown, 185 Asylum St. (Star Shuttle #5), 860-522-2530; upscale contemporary
American; lunch weekdays, dinner 7 days, tavern menu, \$\$\$-\$\$\$\$

Morton's Steakhouse, 30 State House Square, 860-724-0044; dinner only, \$\$\$\$

** kids' menu available*

SHAFR on Teaching

Phyllis L. Soybel and Nicole M. Phelps

Editor's note: The essays from Phyllis Soybel and Nicole Phelps were part of a panel sponsored by the SHAFR Teaching Committee at the June 2011 SHAFR conference in Alexandria, Virginia. As part of SHAFR's continuing commitment to enhancing the teaching of U.S. foreign relations, Passport regularly publishes essays dealing with pedagogical issues and related topics. In addition, the Teaching Committee will sponsor both a Thursday panel and a Friday morning breakfast discussion on teaching at the June 2012 conference in Hartford, Connecticut.

The Manchurian Incident of 1931: Using Anniversaries of "Minor" Events to Teach Important Ideas and Themes in Diplomatic History

Phyllis L. Soybel

In September 1931, a group of junior officers in the Japanese Imperial Army overthrew the local government officials in the Chinese state of Manchuria. Originally given orders to only go after Chinese who damaged or destroyed Japanese property in the province, the Japanese troops were retaliating for an apparent attack on the South Manchurian Railway line. The Japanese Army disposed of the ostensible perpetrators and then expanded their offensive and took most of Manchuria rather easily.

The rail line attack may well have been orchestrated, as the response seemed calculated and almost too well organized to be impromptu. It would appear that the Japanese officers intended to make *de jure* the *de facto* Japanese control of the Chinese province. Although neither the officers' military superiors nor the civilian authorities supported the coup (or so it seemed), the Japanese government accepted its results, and in 1933 the province, renamed Manchukuo, was declared independent, with the Chinese emperor Pi Yu as its head of state. In truth, the coup was not only accepted, but also in many ways celebrated, and it clearly showed that the military was ascendant in Japanese politics. In the end, Japan's control of the resource-rich province gave it much-needed industrial resources it did not have in the home islands. Some have even argued that part of the justification for the takeover was the increase in American tariffs following the onset of the Great Depression.

The year 2011 marked the eightieth anniversary of the Manchurian incident. For historians of the period, the incident is an odd bird. It is often mentioned as a precursor to the Asian theater of World War II, but because of the time constraints many instructors have in their Western Civilization, U.S. History, and American Diplomatic History classes, it is often given short shrift, like many such "minor" incidents in history. However, some minor incidents have significant implications for recent events, and Manchuria is one of them.

I am not proposing that Manchuria be front and center every semester (although my research suggests that we need to pay more attention to it to showcase the global rather than European nature of the militarism of the era and the origins of WWII). But anniversaries of important

incidents can become a way both to highlight certain themes and to teach a broader range of them. They also enable us to individualize a semester by using the anniversaries that lie within it. Although a semester is too short to really focus on many topics other than the events we always claim are critical, what we choose to add can help make the semester a bit more interesting for our students and can offer us new and different ways to look at major topics. We can also add new sources for students to read that can still be used in the lectures we have been using for years.

By October 1931, Manchuria had become a Japanese possession in all but name. It had been a *de facto* part of the empire of the rising sun since 1895, and the Japanese had fought a war with Russia in 1904–5 to ensure that the Tsar's government recognized Japan's claim to a sphere of influence in the region. While many countries were shocked at Japan's victory over Russia (no one was entirely surprised that China had lost to them), the empire had been accepted as a member of the international community, and Britain had signed a treaty of friendship with Japan in 1902. During WWI, Japan had been allowed to occupy German ports and would end up retaining them and the German islands in the Pacific. However, European powers blocked Japan's attempt to gain a series of additional concessions from China in 1915 (referred to as the Twenty-One Demands). The Japanese seemed to think that with the Europeans fixated on the war in Europe, they might be able to create a larger sphere of influence in a region they considered their natural backyard. They thought wrong. The United States, as well as those European countries with definite Pacific interests, had no intention of allowing Japan to take advantage of the European situation.

Japan and the United States had had a strained relationship ever since Commodore Perry sailed the U.S. fleet into Yokohama harbor in 1854. Japan had wished to remain sufficiently isolated to control the spread of Western ideas and culture within the empire. Once Japan embarked on what seemed like a crash course in industrialization and began to look beyond its shores for the resources it needed, the country would again see competition with the West, but in particular with Britain and the United States. The former already had concessions in China; the latter was as interested in the Chinese markets as their Japanese rivals. Neither the United States nor Japan thought a great deal of each other culturally or politically, but they recognized each other's economic strength. They may not have liked each other, but one could argue that each accorded the other a grudging respect. There is little doubt, however, that the two saw each other as opponents no matter how often they talked about friendship.

After the Great War, Japan was seen as both friend and competitor by many countries, in part because of the Twenty-One Demands. However, all was forgiven. Japan was one of the victorious powers despite not having really been a part of the fighting. The empire was at the table in Versailles and received a number of Pacific Island groups formerly held by the Germans, including the

Carolines, the Gilberts and the Marshalls, as well as the German concession port of Qingdao. In 1921, Japan was part of the major powers discussing naval disarmament in Washington. To diminish what it perceived as a threat from a serious competitor in the Far East, the United States sought to ensure that Japan's naval fleet could not rival the American navy and used intelligence gained from code-breaking to keep Japan's naval strength to only three-fifths that of the American or British navies. It could be argued that once the Japanese learned of American intelligence efforts, relations swiftly deteriorated.

In Japan, the 1920s saw concerted efforts to establish a civilian-led government. In many ways, it appeared that those efforts were successful. By 1929, it seemed as if representative government was on a sound footing. Although a major earthquake had dealt the country a severe economic blow in 1923, it received an outpouring of aid from many parts of the world, including substantial funds from the United States. However, Japan's political and economic progress was arrested after the American stock market crashed. The move into Manchuria was a way to gain a solid grip on resources and a secure market. There were also many in the Japanese Imperial Army who were not pleased with the move towards democracy, which they saw as un-Japanese. Manchuria represented in some ways a resurgence of the military in both foreign and domestic policy.

By examining the Manchurian incident in this way we can show students Japan's movement away from constitutional authority toward the militarism that became prevalent in many parts of the world in this era. Looking at the movement towards militarism also provides us with a way to teach about the growing hyper-nationalism that became so noticeable in both Europe and Asia. We can use Manchuria to talk about the nationalistic fervor within Japanese schools, which taught a racism as virulent as any taught in Nazi Germany (a racism, to be fair, also exhibited to some degree toward minorities in the United States). In examining the repercussions of the Japanese occupation and takeover, we can discuss the aggressive suppression of local language, religion, customs and education.

The Manchurian incident also offers us the opportunity to explore topics such as economic mercantilism, appeasement, and the international politics of the 1930s. The Manchurian crisis showcased, to paraphrase a line from *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*, the inherent weakness we see in the international system. First, not every nation was a member. Traditionally we emphasize Wilson's willingness to concede other points in order to get his League, but in the end the United States failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Second, the League's charter reflected very traditional lines of sovereignty. Each nation wanted to retain independence of action. The League itself was left without real means to enforce the economic penalties it was allowed to impose upon "rogue" nations.

In the 1920s, the League had some successes. It helped deal with the refugee problem brought about by the end of WWI and contributed to the resolution of several border disputes. But it had more dramatic failures than successes. Manchuria, I think, points to a major failure—a failure that revealed the League's flaws long before any European incident and led the way to more spectacular failures. When Japan seized Manchuria in order to prevent further attacks on Japanese companies and property holders, China went to the League of Nations and protested. The League responded by establishing a fact-finding mission, a move supported by the Japanese but seen as problematic by the Chinese, who knew the delay would only help the Japanese become more firmly entrenched. The members of the Lytton Commission were not appointed until January 1932 and did not go to Manchuria until April. By then, official Chinese resistance in the area had ceased.

The Manchurian incident is an example of the League's inability to deal effectively with an immediate crisis. Without taking an entire class period, we can use the incident to examine the League's problems in dealing with the aggression it was supposed to prevent.¹ For instance, students could look at the Japanese action (from both a military and a political standpoint) and at the Chinese response or lack thereof. They could then look at the League's response and discuss that institution's efficacy and what ramifications its response might have had.

We can also use the Manchurian incident to look at economics by considering why the United States hesitated to use sanctions to rein in the Japanese. Some scholars think that Stimson's rather timid initial response to the Manchurian incident was due in part to Hoover's belief that sanctions led to war. The Manchurian incident is relevant to the topic of imperialism, too: it can be seen as one example of the economic and prestige-related rationales for the imperialistic endeavors that were still a salient feature of the 1930s.

In sum, we need to consider using different examples to illustrate the traditional themes and topics covered in our surveys. Utilizing anniversaries of events such as the Manchurian incident is one of the ways in which we can liven up our lectures, breathe a bit of new life into them, and avoid burnout. This year, we will be commemorating the two-hundredth anniversary of the War of 1812. In April, we have the hundredth anniversary of the Titanic and the first of the Balkan Wars. The latter helps set the stage for studying the First World War. We can also point to the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China and the taking of Nanking. The Truman Doctrine is sixty-five years old, and the Cuban Missile Crisis is fifty, as is the declaration of Algerian Independence. The year 1972 marked the Munich Olympics and the beginning of modern terrorism. In 1986, the first real modern nuclear disaster occurred in Chernobyl, and Ferdinand Marcos was forced out in the Philippines. Think about what can be done with all those events!

Notes:

1. The year 2015 will mark the ninetieth anniversary of the Locarno Pact. Instructors could discuss Locarno's impact on the League's ability to promote a global blueprint for international policy. Locarno also showcases the League's problems in promoting collective security, as it was not involved in the negotiations that brought an end to Germany's position as a pariah nation and paved its way towards membership in the League.

Making the International Local

Nicole M. Phelps

When a major anniversary of a key event comes around—like the tenth anniversary of 9/11 or the Civil War sesquicentennial—instructors have a plethora of opportunities to capitalize on the public attention given to those events, and they can take advantage of public events and commemorations, retrospectives, and other anniversary-themed resources. The charge I was given when invited to participate in this forum was to talk about teaching with the ninetieth anniversary of the U.S. signing of bilateral peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Hungary to end World War I. This is not an event that garners significant public attention, especially since those who know of it are most apt to associate the treaties with the U.S. failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and participate in the League of Nations. I turned my thoughts instead to how instructors could make lesser anniversaries—like the 1921 treaties—into unique opportunities for students to use various

kinds of primary source research to examine international events in local context. Possibilities for more traditional forms of research and presentations certainly exist, but there are excellent possibilities for service learning and public history projects, too.

One relatively quick way to combine the international and the local is to have students find out how their members of Congress voted on a particular treaty or law and why. This information could come from widely available national sources—namely, the *Congressional Record*—but it could also come from or be supplemented by local sources. Press coverage certainly comes to mind, but colleges and universities are also typically the depositories for the papers of individual members of Congress, so there may be even more material available nearby.

Another relatively easy thing for students to do is to compare the newspaper coverage of an event presented in a national paper, such as the *New York Times*, with that presented in the local and college newspapers to determine what kind of information was available to the public. These newspaper sources might be fruitfully combined with declassified contemporary government documents to highlight the challenge of meeting demands for both national security and transparency. This kind of local newspaper exercise should help students understand people in the past more effectively, as they try and separate out the information available at the time from what we know in hindsight. It also lends itself well to talking about the role of everyday people in international relations: how deeply does the international affect the local, and vice versa? Did local people—or especially the college students—have meetings, stage protests, circulate petitions, or conduct a fundraising or charity drive? Why did they feel moved to act? What impact did their actions have?

Local newspapers can be an excellent gateway to other local sources. Which organizations sponsored or participated in events? Are they still around, and do they have records or other materials students could look at? Are participants still alive, and might students develop oral history skills by interviewing them? If there are sources available in the community, there will be opportunities for service learning or public history projects. Students might produce a document, Web site, or museum exhibit about an organization, an individual, or an event. Depending on the class size and the kinds of primary sources available, individual students or groups might each research a different person, organization, or event and then compare their findings.

Assigning projects that connect the local to the international means that the instructor must know what resources are locally available. Does the college's library have any archival collections? Is there a local, county, or state historical society nearby with relevant holdings? A public library? A museum? Finding out what these institutions have to offer takes time and can rarely be done at the last moment. Determining what sources are available to students and what outcomes are most beneficial also requires building relationships with librarians and archivists, among others. Budget plenty of time to plan, and investigate what resources the college has to support course development. Many colleges and universities offer grants for that purpose, with service learning courses being particularly popular targets for funding at the moment. Teachers should also think carefully about whether the students have the time and resources to undertake such projects, especially if they involve work at an off-campus location.

Working with locally available primary sources takes time, but the payoff for the students is considerable. A key part of being a historian is working with primary sources,

and when local ones are available, students are more likely to be able to touch the actual sources instead of reprinted or digital versions of them. We all know from our own research how powerful and exciting that can be. In most cases, locally available sources are also going to be unique and can thus yield original research (and reduce the opportunity for academic integrity violations). Students' written work might even be suitable for publication in a local or state historical society newsletter or journal. A web or digital project might be attached to or incorporated into an existing website at a library, museum, or historical society.

Working with local sources will promote critical reflection and analysis, as will working with anniversaries. But anniversaries tend to encourage us to think about what has changed and what has remained constant, while working with local sources related to international affairs encourages students to ponder their own personal role in international affairs and thereby helps them become more thoughtful citizens of the world. Working with local sources on the anniversary of an event—whether a major national commemoration or not—accomplishes both ends.

From the Editor:

Walking around the book exhibit at the January 2012 AHA conference in Chicago, I was struck yet again by the massive number of books being published in our field. Keeping current on the new literature—especially outside of our specific research fields—is certainly a daunting prospect, particularly when you factor in our teaching and citizenship responsibilities. How do we keep up? Which books (not to mention articles) should we pick up? Where do we even start?

Well, given that we are in the midst of an election year, I decided to let the readers of *Passport* help me answer those questions in the “First Completely Unscientific—But Hopefully Still Informative—*Passport* Poll.” The poll question is straightforward (if not simple): What are the 10-15 books in the history of U.S. foreign relations published since 2009 that you would recommend that every member of SHAFR should read?

Please send your responses to the poll question to shafr.passport.editor@gmail.com by **JUNE 1, 2012**. The results will be published in the September 2012 issue of *Passport*.



SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes

Friday, January 6, 2012

8:00 am-12:00 noon

Sheraton Chicago Hilton & Towers

Illinois Executive Board Room

Present: Matt Ambrose, Laura Belmonte, Mark Bradley, Carol Chin, Frank Costigliola, Christopher Dietrich, Mary Dudziak, David Engerman, Peter L. Hahn, Mitchell Lerner, Andrew Preston, Andrew Rotter, Marc Selverstone, Sarah Snyder, Annessa Stagner, Marilyn Young, Tom Zeiler (Presiding)

Business Items:

1) Announcements

Zeiler called the meeting to order at 8:05 AM, welcoming new members of the Council. Attendees introduced themselves.

2) Resolution of thanks

Zeiler introduced a resolution of thanks to departing SHAFR council members including Thomas Schwartz, Jeffrey Engel, Erin Mahan, and Jaideep Prabhu. The resolution was seconded and passed unanimously.

3) Recap of motions passed by e-mail votes

Hahn reviewed motions that had passed by e-mail vote since the last meeting.

By e-mail, Council had approved the minutes of the June 2011 Council meeting.

Second, Council had approved a motion to return the management of the website to the SHAFR Business Office and the return to static web content upon the resignation of the web editor on December 31, 2011. The motion had explained that because the *DH* editor foresaw online collaborations between the journal and its publisher beginning in 2013, it was recommended that the website return to the Business Office for the short term future. Dudziak expressed concern with reversing the digital presence that had been developed and suggested creating a task force to explore options with regard to the site and to report in June 2012. Belmonte agreed and indicated that social networking integration ought to be considered as well. Young moved to create a task force to report on the future of SHAFR on the internet at the June 2012 Council meeting. It was clarified that the task force would examine data on "hits" on the website. Dudziak seconded, and the motion passed unanimously. Selverstone, Dudziak, Stagner, and Belmonte volunteered for the task force.

4) 2011 financial report

Hahn presented oral and written reports on SHAFR's finances. He encouraged Council members to examine closely the written report and indicated that he would answer questions at any time. Hahn highlighted certain revenues and expenditures in 2011 and reviewed the projected budget for 2012. Overall operating revenue well exceeded operating costs this year. Hahn indicated that without a special, one-time source of revenue, SHAFR would have run a very small operating deficit.

Hahn reported that the endowment experienced healthy growth in 2011 and that the end of year value narrowly exceeded the previous all-time high (2007, just before the national financial retraction). Endowment plus cash total is the highest in SHAFR's history.

Hahn alerted Council to anticipate a curtailment in revenue in 2013 after one more year of revenue increases in 2012. Within the next year, Council will need to decide either to reduce spending or to spend endowment earnings.

Belmonte commented positively on the clarity of the financial reports and thanked Hahn. Belmonte also stated that waiting to decide how to approach the 2013 problem seems to be a choice to run a deficit. Zeiler concurred and suggested making it a point of discussion at the June 2012 meeting. Rotter concurred that talking sooner rather than later about strategic spending choices was preferable. Zeiler said that a broader discussion would be better informed after the Ways & Means Committee report and that there are existing commitments by the Membership Committee which need to be met. Zeiler also noted that the Diversity and International Travel Grants needed to be reauthorized and the Program Committee had yet to report. Hahn noted that in several grant programs money is being left unallocated, which might provide some leeway in future years. Costigliola moved to continue the Diversity and International Travel Grants at current level for another year. Young seconded. The motion passed unanimously. Rotter moved to accept the 2011 financial report, which was seconded passed unanimously.

5) Ways and Means Committee Report

Young, for the Ways & Means Committee, reported on a proposal from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for a SHAFR-sponsored internship payment to offset living expenses, proposed at \$5,000 per semester for 1 part-time research assistant. Dudziak asked if there were plans to limit eligibility to those who do not already live in the DC metro area or who are SHAFR members. Young confirmed that this was under consideration. Costigliola mentioned that this could add strain to the budget given the expected 2013 decline in cash flow. Snyder asked why such a well-

funded institution needs financial assistance. Zeiler said that this proposal is part of a broader move to support graduate research and fellowships as a way of increasing the visibility of SHAFR. Dudziak asked two questions: Should SHAFR give fellowships to grad students for living expenses while maintaining flexibility about what program the graduate students are involved in, because it aligns with SHAFR's objectives? Should SHAFR choose to partner with the Wilson Center, because such a partnership will accrue a benefit to SHAFR that could not be acquired otherwise? Dudziak expressed concern that the program was insufficiently reciprocal and that SHAFR should explore getting more out of it. Rotter stated that the proposal might be premature. Rotter recommended a discussion of broader spending strategy before getting to specific spending proposals. Rotter recommended that Council suspend discussion of the proposal until June 2012, when it would grasp how sharp the revenue contraction will be. Dietrich expressed general favorability to the proposal, provided it could be afforded. Zeiler asked if Council wanted a more general discussion about where SHAFR is heading in terms of new spending programs. Costigliola indicated he desired a discussion but no vote as of yet. Young recommended adding the proposal to the June agenda. Selverstone stated that SHAFR should focus on providing permanent funding opportunities so that such programs will not become instantly vulnerable to revenue fluctuations. Young moved to defer consideration to June 2012, Selverstone seconded, and the motion passed unanimously.

Young also reported for Ways & Means on SHAFR's involvement in the National History Center seminar series. NHC director Roger Louis asked SHAFR to double its existing support to \$10,000 per year, on the basis that SHAFR has been prominently featured in the program, many speakers have been SHAFR members, and all talks relating to SHAFR have included links to the SHAFR website. The increase would be designed to allow younger scholars to defray costs of attendance at the program. Young reported that many Ways & Means members thought that \$5,000 per annum was appropriate. Young favored increasing the level of support. Rotter pointed out that the AHA had absorbed the NHC. Maybe it would be opportune to tie our continued support to a broadening of administrative input and a higher profile of SHAFR members as speakers. Bradley recommended \$5,000 this year, with review of the situation next year, and noted that the NHC focused on issues of concern to SHAFR. Dudziak said that the transition could be an opportunity to increase SHAFR's involvement.

Young moved that SHAFR double the subsidy for the coming year. Costigliola seconded. The vote failed by a vote of 1 yes, 12 no, 0 abstentions. Young then moved to renew the subsidy at existing levels, and in communications with the NHC make clear that budget issues will require annual review and prevent a longer-term commitment, and that SHAFR must be included in the title of lectures relating to foreign relations in the seminar series. Lerner seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.

Hahn reported on changes to the roster of the Ways & Means Committee. He noted that Jeff Engel and Andrew Rotter were newly appointed members, and Emily Rosenberg was the Endowment Liaison. Following up on Council's decision in June 2011 to review the management of the Endowment, Rosenberg is now heading up a review of the present firm's management record and surveying alternative firms. Bradley and Dudziak recommended that in the review of endowment accounts, attention should be paid to the option of putting funds in socially-responsible accounts. Zeiler stated that Rosenberg will be scheduled to report at the June 2012 meeting.

6) SHAFR annual meeting reforms

Hahn, having consulted with conference consultant Jennifer Walton, presented a series of suggestions and recommendations on business practices associated with the annual meeting.

Council approved 2012 conference fees at the same level as 2011. Council recommended some souvenir (tee shirt or tote bag but without any corporate logo or name) and opposed allowing vendors to purchase access to the presidential luncheon table. Council approved continuing the subsidy of lunch tickets and the deep subsidy of student tickets, recommending that students should select which lunch to attend at reduced rate. Council approved the concept of package deals (table and ad combination at discount) for vendors. Council approved provision of AV as in past years (making it available to those who request by an early deadline so sessions needing AV can be concentrated). Council approved Walton setting up a Twitter account for the 2012 conference (and recommended that the task force on the website also reflect on this medium).

Hahn recommended a transition from Paypal to Visa/MasterCard/Discover for processing of electronic payments. He summarized the costs projected by the bank and estimated that a slight savings to SHAFR and convenience to SHAFR and guests would result. Costigliola made a motion authorizing the transition to credit cards; Young seconded the motion; and it passed unanimously.

7) Reforms to travel grants policy

Council approved recommendations from Hahn for reforms to the administration of travel grants:

- a) Diversity and International travel grants will be limited to coach airfare (or its equivalent in mileage) and three nights hotel.
- b) Travel grants will be reimbursed by Paypal or paper check only, per choice of traveller, with fees to be absorbed by traveller.
- c) Travellers have 90 days after completion of travel to submit receipts for reimbursement. Unclaimed allocations will be withdrawn after 90 days.
- d) The complimentary one-year membership awarded to Diversity and International travel grantees will be awarded for

the year in which the grant is awarded and will not be awarded to grantees who are currently members of SHAFR.

8) Motion on providing SHAFR conference travel to *Passport* editor

Lerner moved that Council allocate travel funds for the *Passport* editor to attend the SHAFR conference (on the same basis as Council members). Lerner stated that it is important that the editor brief Council annually and make other contacts at the conference. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

9) Book reviews in *Diplomatic History*/*Passport*/H-Diplo:

Zeiler reported that *Diplomatic History* struggled to find reviewers of some books because individuals were previously recruited to review for H-Diplo and/or *Passport*. Zeiler suggested more consultation between *Passport* and DH staff and recommended that *Passport* rely on unpublished reviewers (as DH recruits only published authors). Dudziak stated that H-Diplo was not a competitor but an important feature of diplomatic historians' web presence. Young stated that she did not see H-Diplo as competition. Belmonte and Selverstone indicated that H-Diplo often gets reviewers before books come out. Preston recommended that the DH book review editor be authorized to recruit reviewers at an earlier date. Zeiler indicated that some form of stream-lining along these lines will happen.

10) Discussion on selection of conference venues

Zeiler welcomed the input of Council on the selection of the venue for the 2014 annual meeting, noting that the Bylaws empowered Council to schedule annual meetings, that he had issued a call for proposals to host the meeting, and that three written proposals had been submitted.

Dudziak recommended that Council make decisions about the geographic distribution of meetings. Belmonte indicated that few other organizations are so bound to being close to archival centers. Young recommended more meetings on the West Coast in general. Costigliola recalled that a recent poll indicated that the "every other year in DC" approach was highly favored. Belmonte suggested rotating the region of the conference in non-DC years (following the AHA model). Costigliola said that universities' willingness to host will prove useful in lean times. Zeiler affirmed that Council will vote on the venue for future conferences. When Zeiler asked for comments on the "every other year in DC" tradition, a consensus emerged in favor given the appeal of archives in that area, especially for graduate students and overseas scholars. It was recognized that even if costs prohibit booking ideal locations (like a hotel on a Metro line), the metro DC area remained desirable.

Council reviewed the three proposals to host the 2014 annual meeting and encouraged Zeiler to solicit additional details, especially about financial subsidies. Zeiler indicated that he would follow up with all three and bring the matter back to Council for a decision. Hahn indicated that a decision by e-mail this spring, if possible, would be preferable to waiting for the June meeting as it would allow technical contract negotiations to open sooner.

Hahn indicated that a conference broker arranged the hotels at that the 2009, 2011, and 2013 conferences in DC, saving considerable expense. The broker has offered to negotiate non-DC venues as well. Dudziak asked about clauses in contracts regarding contingencies in the event of labor disputes, as both OAH and AHA have had to face that issue in the past. Zeiler and Hahn agreed to look into this matter.

Reports

11) 2012 Summer Institute

Rotter and Costigliola reported that the 2012 Summer Institute had been publicized on the SHAFR website, H-Diplo, and *Passport*. A meeting room has been donated and air-conditioned apartments made available for all the participants. Applications are due on February 1, 2012.

12) *Diplomatic History*

Zeiler alluded to the long written report distributed with the agenda and reported that the Editorial Board is involved in organizing and choosing all forums published in *DH*.

13) SHAFR *Guide*

Zeiler reported that over 500 new entries have been submitted this year. The updates continue to be posted every October 1 and April 1. Belmonte asked about usage rates for the electronic version. Zeiler noted that it might be time to reassess the utility of the *Guide*, perhaps through a poll of the membership.

14) Summer Institute Oversight Committee

Rotter and Dudziak recommended that Council advise the Summer Institute Oversight Committee to take a more active role in issuing a Call for Proposals for venues, on which they could follow up in June. Hahn noted that funding authority for the Institute expires in 2012. Costigliola moved authorizing the Summer Institute in 2013 at current funding level and reevaluating the program as part of the general financial discussion in June. Selverstone seconded, and the motion passed unanimously. Discussion ensued on whether to merge the Summer Institute Oversight Committee with the Ways and Means Committee. No decision was reached.

15) 2012 Annual Meeting

Engerman reported that the 2012 annual meeting would take place in Hartford on June 28-30. The Program Committee received 90 full-panel proposals, making this the most selective conference in the last five years with a 70% acceptance rate. The Program Committee decided on 62 final panels. The plenary session will feature Fred Kaplan, Marilyn Young, and an individual from the Historian's Office at the Department of State. The Program Committee will schedule more panels on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Submissions from non-Anglophone countries were up. The committee tried to work in individual paper proposals. There were 14 applicants for Diversity and International travel grants. Because A/V costs continue to soar, the Program Committee limited A/V panels to two per session and located them in common rooms. The electronic submissions system seems to be working well, with no major problems.

Rotter asked why there were fewer sessions than in recent years. Costigliola explained that SHAFR signed the contract before the popularity of the non-DC conferences exploded. SHAFR originally contracted for 46 sessions and was later able to increase that number to 62, the hotel's maximum.

Dudziak asked if there was collaboration between the Membership and Program Committees. Zeiler stated that Council should consider unifying the Program Committee's and Membership Committee's travel funding, especially for international scholars.

16) 2013 annual meeting

Hahn reported that Young had signed a contract to hold the 2013 annual meeting on June 20-22 at the Renaissance Arlington Capitol View in Arlington, Virginia.

17) Lesson Plans Initiative

Hahn alluded to the written report from John Tully that was distributed with the agenda. Hahn indicated that although the lesson plans initiative had exceeded its original three-year mandate, Tully remained committed to bringing it to fruition. Belmonte noted that the State Department is embarking on a very similar project and recommended that SHAFR scale back its efforts. Zeiler advised that the program could be absorbed by the Teaching Committee. Zeiler believed that programs focused on teaching are worthy and that SHAFR should continue to advance teaching.

18) Grad Students Grants and Fellowships

On behalf of the Grad Students Grants and Fellowships Committee, Hahn reported the following decisions:

Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant: Rebecca Herman
W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship: Alexander Noonan
Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship: Lauren F. Turek
Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants: Hannah Farber, Eric Gettig, Emily Merchant, Matthew Shannon, Brandon Byrd, Jonathan Hunt, Samantha Iyer, Nathan Kurz, Steven Mcgrail, Oliver Murphey, Tim Sayle, Christy Thornton, David Wight

19) Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

On behalf of the committee, Hahn reported that the 2012 William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants would be awarded to Bethany Keene and Michael Schmidli.

20) Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

On behalf of the committee, Hahn reported that the 2012 Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship would be awarded to Helen Pho.

Zeiler concluded the meeting by thanking Council members and others for attending. The meeting adjourned at 12:05 pm.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/ma



The Diplomatic Pouch

1. Personal and Professional Notes

George Herring (University of Kentucky), **Andrew Johns** (Brigham Young University), and **Kathryn Statler** (University of San Diego) will be the general editors of the *Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace* book series, published by the University Press of Kentucky. The series will focus on key moments of conflict, diplomacy, and peace from the 18th century to the present to explore their wider significance for the development of U.S. foreign relations.

Klaus Larres has been appointed as the Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor of History & International Affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

2. Research Notes

FRUS Series Now Available as e-Book

The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce the release of its *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series in a new e-book format that is readable on popular electronic devices such as the Amazon Kindle and Apple iPad. The e-book edition combines many of the benefits of print and web publications in a new form that is portable and extremely convenient. During the pilot phase of the *FRUS* e-book initiative, five selected *FRUS* volumes will be offered on the Office of the Historian's e-book homepage: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ebooks>.

The public is invited to download the new e-books and provide feedback to help improve the *FRUS* e-book edition. At the conclusion of the pilot phase later this year, the Office will work to offer e-book versions of many more *FRUS* volumes both through the Office website and on a wide array of e-bookstores. The Office will continue to expand and enhance its e-book offerings, as part of the ongoing *FRUS* digitization effort.

The *FRUS* e-book initiative is an outgrowth of the Office of the Historian's efforts to optimize the series for its website. Because the Office adopted the Text Encoding Initiative's open, robust XML-based file format (TEI), a single digital master TEI file can store an entire *FRUS* volume and can be transformed into either a set of web pages or an e-book. The free, open source eXist-db server that powers the entire Office of the Historian website also provides the tools needed to transform the *FRUS* TEI files into HTML and e-book formats.

For questions about the *FRUS* e-book initiative or feedback about the "beta" *FRUS* e-books released today, please contact history_ebooks@state.gov.

The 151-year-old *FRUS* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government.

3. Announcements

CFP: Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference *University College Cork, Ireland, July 9-12, 2012*

The Chairman of the TSA, Prof Alan Dobson (University of Dundee and St. Andrews University) and Professor David Ryan (UCC) would like to extend an invitation to the 2012 Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference.

Our outstanding 2012 plenary guests are:

Constance Post (Iowa State University) "Particles, Waves, and Fields: Momentum and the Transatlantic Turn in Literary and Cultural Studies" and **Fredrik Logevall** (Cornell University) "Same Bed, Different Dreams: France and America in Vietnam."

Panel proposals and individual papers are welcome for any of the general or sub-panels. A 300 word abstract of proposal and brief CV to panel leaders or to Alan Dobson (a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk) and David Ryan (david.ryan@ucc.ie) by May 30, 2012.

The general panels, subpanels and panel leaders for 2012 are:

1. Literature and Culture: Constance Post (cjpost@iastate.edu) and Louise Walsh (walsh.lou@gmail.com)

Sub-panels:

- a. Literature, Culture, and War: Constance Post (cjpost@iastate.edu) and Louise Walsh (walsh.lou@gmail.com)
- b. The War of 1812 and Transatlantic Affairs: A Two Hundred Year Commemoration in 2012, Simon Rofe (jsimon.rofe@soas.ac.uk), Constance Post (cjpost@iastate.edu), Michael Cullinane, (Michael.cullinane@northumbria.ac.uk)
- c. Economics: Fiona Venn (vennf@essex.ac.uk), Jeff Engel (jengel@bushschool.tamu.edu) and Joe McKinney (joe_mckinney@baylor.edu)
- d. History, Security Studies and IR: Alan Dobson (a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk) and David Ryan (david.ryan@ucc.ie)
- e. Democracy Promotion and Nation Building In and After the Cold War: The Transatlantic Experience: Annick Cizel (annick.cizel@univ-paris3.fr) and Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer (alexandra.dehoopscheffer@sciences-po.org)

2. NATO: Ellen Hallams (EHallams.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk), Luca Ratti (ratti@uniroma3.it), and Ben Zyla (ben.zyla@gmail.com)

3. Ethnicity and security in the transatlantic world: David Haglund (david.haglund@queensu.ca)

4. Diplomats at War: The American Experience: Simon Rofe (jsimon.rofe@soas.ac.uk)

5. Anglo-American Relations: Steve Marsh (marshsi@cardiff.ac.uk) and Charlie Whitham (cwhitham@uwic.ac.uk)

6. Transatlantic Relations during the Second World War: Tom Mills (t.c.mills@lancaster.ac.uk) and Gavin Bailey (g.j.bailey@dundee.ac.uk)

7. Crossing the Water: Maritime Trade, Warfare, and Politics: John Borgonovo (J.Borgonovo@ucc.ie)

8. Cultural and/or Diplomatic Transatlantic Relations: Gaynor Johnson (G.Johnson@salford.ac.uk)

9. Regional Conflicts and Transatlantic Relations from Vietnam to Libya: David Ryan (david.ryan@ucc.ie)

10. Planning, Regeneration and the Environment: Antonia Sagredo (asagredo@flog.uned.es) and Tony Jackson (a.a.jackson@dundee.ac.uk)



The Donald Cameron Watt Prize

To be awarded annually by the Transatlantic Studies Association for the best paper at its annual conference by an early career scholar. Judging will be based solely on the written versions of the papers submitted, which may not necessarily be the delivery versions. Entries should be submitted by April 30, preceding the annual conference in July. This is the final deadline and no late entries can be accepted. The full version of the paper must be submitted by this date. The delivery of the paper is not part of the assessment but candidates for the award must attend and deliver the paper at the conference.

The prize for the best paper will be awarded at the conference dinner. In addition, the paper will automatically be sent out for refereeing for publication in the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* providing that it has not been submitted elsewhere. Sum £250

Early career scholar is defined as: a PhD student; anyone within 3 years of having been awarded a PhD; anyone who has a full-time appointment at a recognised higher education institution, but has not held the post for more than 3 years and does not fall into the doctoral category.

Papers should be submitted to Tony McCulloch (tony.mcculloch@canterbury.ac.uk) on or before April 30, 2012 for the annual conference in July 2012.



Call for Papers: St Antony's International Review

Following successfully publishing wholly themed issues between 2005 and 2010, forthcoming issues of the *St Antony's International Review* (STAIR) will also include a General Section. STAIR therefore invites authors to submit original research manuscripts on topics of contemporary relevance in international affairs. Submissions from the fields of political science and international relations, philosophy, and international history will all be considered. Articles may take either a theoretical or policy-oriented approach. We caution, however, that STAIR has a broad readership and therefore prizes accessibility of language and content.

STAIR is the only peer-reviewed journal of international affairs at the University of Oxford. Set up by graduate students of St Antony's College in 2005, the *Review* has carved out a distinctive niche as a cross-disciplinary outlet for research on the most pressing contemporary global issues, providing a forum in which emerging scholars can publish their work alongside established academics and policymakers. Distinguished past contributors include John Baylis, Valerie J. Bunce, Robert O. Keohane, James N. Rosenau, and Alfred Stepan.

Please note that STAIR will continue to devote at least half of each issue to a special theme of contemporary significance. Authors should therefore refer to the themed Calls for Papers available at www.stair-journal.org to determine whether

their particular areas of interest are covered by upcoming special issues. All articles that do not fit with the upcoming special themes listed here should be submitted to the General Section.

STAIR will review manuscripts that contain original, previously unpublished material of up to 6,000 words (including footnotes with complete bibliographic information). Authors are asked to include a word count and an abstract of no more than 300 words. Submissions are sent to external reviewers for comment. Decisions can generally be expected within three months. For further information on manuscript preparation, referencing, and diction, please refer to the "Notes for Contributors" available at www.stair-journal.org.

Please send submissions to stair@sant.ox.ac.uk.



Call for Applications

The Smith Richardson Foundation's International Security and Foreign Policy Program is pleased to announce its annual grant competition to support junior faculty research on American foreign policy, international relations, international security, military policy, and diplomatic and military history. The Foundation will award at least three research grants of \$60,000 each to support tenure-track junior faculty engaged in the research and writing of a scholarly book on an issue or topic of interest to the policy community.

These grants are intended to buy-out up to one year of teaching time and to underwrite research costs (including research assistance and travel). Each grant will be paid directly to, and should be administered by, the academic institution at which the junior faculty member works. Projects in military and diplomatic history are especially encouraged. Group or collaborative projects will not be considered.

Procedure: An applicant must submit a research proposal, a maximum of ten pages, that includes the following five sections:

- a one-page executive summary;
- a brief description of the policy issue or the problem that the proposed book will examine;
- a description of the background and body of knowledge on the issue to be addressed by the book;
- a description of the personnel and methods (e.g., research questions, research strategy, analytical approach, tentative organization of the book, etc.); and
- a brief explanation of the implications of the prospective findings of the research for the policy community.

The applicant should also include a *curriculum vitae*, a detailed budget explaining how the grant would be used, and a work timetable with a start date. A template for a junior faculty proposal is available at the Foundation's website.

Proposal Evaluation Criteria: Proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria: the relevance of potential analysis and findings to current and future foreign and security policy issues; the potential of the project to innovate the field and to contribute to academic or policy literature on the chosen topic; the degree to which research questions and analytical methods are well defined; the degree to which the project will develop valuable new data or information through field work, archival work, or other methods; and the applicant's publication record.

Eligibility: An applicant must have a Ph.D., preferably in Political Science, Public Policy, Policy Analysis, International Political Economy, or History. He or she also must hold a position as a full-time tenure-track faculty member of a college or university in the United States. An applicant should explain how he or she meets all of these requirements in a cover letter to the proposal.

Deadline: The Foundation must receive all Junior Faculty Research Grant proposals postmarked by **June 15, 2012**. Applicants will be notified of the Foundation's decision by October 31, 2012.

Please e-mail your proposal to juniorfaculty@srf.org as a single document, ideally in PDF or Microsoft Word .doc/.docx format, or mail an unstapled hard copy to: Junior Faculty Research / International Program Smith Richardson Foundation 60 Jesup Road Westport, CT 06880.



4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material

and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Mark Atwood Lawrence, Department of History, University of Texas, GAR 3.220, Mailcode B7000, Austin, TX 78712. Books may be sent at any time during 2012, but must arrive by December 1, 2012.



Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$1000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$1,000 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*. To be considered for the 2013 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2013. Nominations should be sent to Professor Michelle Mart, Department of History, Pennsylvania State University-Berks, Tulpehocken Road, P.O. Box 7009, Reading, PA 19610 (e-mail: mam20@psu.edu).



Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. To nominate an article published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor Donna Alvah, Department of History, St. Lawrence University, 23 Romoda Drive, Canton, NY 13617. Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2013.



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send three copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Cary Fraser, Department of African and African-American Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, 133 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16801 (e-mail: cff2@psu.edu). Books may be sent at any time during 2011, but must arrive by December 15, 2012.

Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting. The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2013. Submit materials to Professor Marc Gallicchio, Department of History, Villanova University, 800 E. Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085 (e-mail: marc.gallicchio@villanova.edu)



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration. Directions for submission of dissertations for the 2013 Unterberger Dissertation Prize will be available in late 2012.



Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy.

The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Professor Cary Fraser, Department of African and African-American Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, 133 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16802 (e-mail: cff2@psu.edu). To be considered for the 2013 prize, nominations must be received by January 15, 2013.



SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of \$20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2011-12. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. SHAFR membership is required.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered

for publication in *Passport*, the society review.

The submission packet should include:

- A one page application letter describing the project's significance, the applicant's status, other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year
- A three page (750 word) statement of the research
- A curriculum vitae
- A letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor.

Applications should be sent by electronic mail to dissertation-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line should clearly indicate "Last Name: SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship.

The annual deadline for submissions is **April 1**. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.



Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to \$4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.



Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Gelfand-Rappaport grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafir.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Hogan Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to hogan-fellowships@shafir.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the *first research monograph*. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to williams-fellowships@shafir.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women.

The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of up to \$5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the

American Historical Association.

Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their PhDs. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The biannual deadline for applications is **October 1 of even years**. Submit materials to myrnabernath-committee@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



5. Recent Publications of Interest

- Absher, Kenneth Michael, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk. *Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board* (Kentucky, 2012).
- Bormann, Natalie. *Securing Outer Space: International Relations Theory and the Politics of Space* (Routledge, 2012).
- Cimbala, Stephen J. *Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century: The New Disorder* (Routledge, 2012).
- Combs, Jerald A. *The History of American Foreign Policy from 1895* (M.E. Sharpe, 2012).
- Davis, John Paton. *China Hand: An Autobiography* (Pennsylvania, 2012).
- Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. *Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East* (I.B. Tauris, 2012).
- Din, Gilbert C. *War on the Gulf Coast: The Spanish Fight Against William Augustus Bowles* (Florida, 2012).
- Eizenstat, Stuart L. *The Future of the Jews: How Global Forces are Impacting the Jewish People, Israel, and its Relationship with the United States* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2012).
- Fouskas, Vassilis K. and Bulent Gokay. *The Fall of the US Empire: Global Fault-Lines and the Shifting Imperial Order* (Pluto, 2012).
- Freedman, Robert O., ed. *Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations* (Westview, 2012).
- Friedman, Isaiah. *British Miscalculations: The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918-1925* (Transaction, 2012).
- Fulsom, Don. *Nixon's Darkest Secrets: The Inside Story of America's Most Troubled President* (Thomas Dunne, 2012).
- Gabaccia, Donna R. *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective* (Princeton, 2012).
- Grenville, J.A.S. *The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth and Twenty First Centuries: A History and Guide with Texts* (Routledge, 2012).
- Gordon, Joy. *Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions* (Harvard, 2012).
- Gould, Eliga H. *Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire* (Harvard, 2012).
- Guthrie-Shimizu, Sayuri. *Transpacific Field of Dreams: How Baseball Linked the United States and Japan in Peace and War* (North Carolina, 2012).
- Hanhimaki, Jussi, Benedikt Schoenborn, and Barbara Zanchetta. *Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2012).
- Harrington, Daniel F. *Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War* (Kentucky, 2012).
- Hill, Peter P. *Joel Barlow, American Diplomat and Nation Builder* (Potomac, 2012).
- Hopf, Ted. *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958* (Oxford, 2012).
- Hunt, Michael H. and Steven Levine. *Arc of Empire: America's Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam* (North Carolina, 2012).
- Innes, Michael A. *Making Sense of Proxy War: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force* (Potomac, 2012).
- Israeli, Raphael. *The Oslo Idea: The Euphoria of Failure* (Transaction, 2012).
- Jackson, David F. and Diana R. Reimanns, eds. *Training and Assistance of Foreign Police in U.S. Stability Efforts* (Nova, 2012).
- Jacobs, Seth. *The Universe Unraveling: American Foreign Policy in Cold War Laos* (Cornell, 2012).
- Katz, Mark N. *Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan* (Johns Hopkins, 2012).
- Katz, Yaakov and Yoaz Hendel. *Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War* (Potomac, 2012).
- Kennan, George F. and John J. Mearsheimer. *American Diplomacy: Sixtieth Anniversary Expanded Edition* (Chicago, 2012).
- Knott, Stephen F. *Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics* (Kansas, 2012).
- Latell, Brian. *Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Liebmann, George W. *The Last American Diplomat: John Negroponte and the Changing Face of US Diplomacy* (I.B. Tauris, 2012).

- Louis, William Roger and Avi Shlaim. *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Lukes, Igor. *On the Edge of the Cold War: American Diplomats and Spies in Postwar Prague* (Oxford, 2012).
- Lundestad, Geir. *The Rise and Decline of the American "Empire": Power and its Limits in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, 2012).
- Magra, Christopher P. *The Fisherman's Cause: Atlantic Commerce and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Marlo, Francis H. *Planning Reagan's War: Conservative Strategists and America's Cold War Victory* (Potomac, 2012).
- Matray, James I. *Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and Two Koreas* (Truman State, 2012).
- McVety, Amanda Kay. *Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy* (Oxford, 2012).
- Morris, Bernard S. *Authority and Control in International Communism, 1917-1967* (Aldine Transaction, 2012).
- Mouritzen, Hans and Anders Wivel. *Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the Russo-Georgian War* (Lynne Rienner, 2012).
- Nairn, Derry. *Viva la Revolution!: The Story of People Power in 30 Revolutions* (Elliott and Thompson, 2012).
- Newman, David and Joel Peters. *Routledge Handbook of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Routledge, 2012).
- Nichols, David A. *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis - Suez and the Brink of War* (Penguin, 2012).
- Pahl, John. *Empire of Sacrifice: The Religious Origins of American Violence* (NYU, 2012).
- Parmar, Inderjeet. *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, & Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (Columbia, 2012).
- Polsky, Andrew J. *Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War* (Oxford, 2012).
- Preston, Andrew. *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy*. (Knopf, 2012).
- Rachman, Gideon. *Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety* (Simon and Schuster, 2012).
- Roberts, Mary Priscilla. *Cuban Missile Crisis: The Essential Reference Guide* (ABC-CLIO, 2012).
- Rothstein, Hy and John Arquilla, eds. *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War* (Georgetown, 2012).
- Robinson, Jacqueline R. and Francis Miller, eds. *Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan: Controlling Costs and Reducing Risks* (Nova, 2012).
- Shalom, Zaki. *The Role of US Diplomacy in the Lead-Up to the Six Day War: Balancing Moral Commitments and National Interests* (Sussex, 2012).
- Sharp, David H. *The CIA's Greatest Covert Operation: Inside the Daring Mission to Recover a Nuclear-Armed Soviet Sub* (Kansas, 2012).
- Snyder, Sarah. *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge, 2011).
- Solingen, Etel. *Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Stokes, Henry Scott. *Black Ships: The American Fleet that Opened Japan to the West* (Overlook, 2012).
- Trachtenberg, Marc. *The Cold War and After: History, Theory and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton, 2012).
- Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. *The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s* (Columbia, 2012).
- Unger, David C. *The Emergency State: America's Pursuit of Absolute National Security at All Costs* (Penguin, 2012).
- Waite, James. *The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History* (Routledge, 2012).
- Wevill, Richard. *Britain and America After World War II: Bilateral Relations and the Beginnings of the Cold War* (I.B. Tauris, 2012).
- White, Philip. *Our Supreme Task: How Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech Defined the Cold War Alliance* (PublicAffairs, 2012).
- Yeager, Melissa and Charles Carter, eds. *Pacts and Alliances in History: Diplomatic Strategy and the Politics of Coalitions* (I.B. Tauris, 2012).
- Zelner, Thomas W. *Annihilation: A Global Military History of World War II* (Oxford, 2011).

Dispatches

29 November 2011

Dear Prof. Johns and Prof. Hahn,

In November 2010, SHAFR's Graduate Fellowship Committee honored me with a Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. I used the award to fund part of my research in Iran from January through May 2011 for my Ph.D. dissertation, "Loving and Hating America in Turkey and Iran: A Cold War Story of Alliance Politics and Authoritarian Modernization, 1945-1980."

My dissertation seeks to explain why pro-American sentiments in Turkey and Iran in the 1940s and 1950s turned into vicious anti-Americanism in the 1960s and 1970s. I argue that anti-Americanism in the two Middle Eastern countries was not an irrational reaction to U.S. power but a response to Washington's support for the Turkish and Iranian governments' policy of authoritarian modernization. Seeking to "contain" the Soviet Union, American officials encouraged economic and social reform in Turkey and Iran – building schools, hospitals, factories, dams, roads – but remained mostly silent on the question of democratization. That neglect undermined development efforts in the two countries because it left their economies to the whims of political leaders. As economic growth became more uneven, ordinary Turks and Iranians came to believe that, by supporting the policies of their governments, just like the "imperialists" of the past (i.e., Britain, France, and Russia), the United States wanted to keep their country backward.

During my four-month stay in Tehran, I worked at the National Archives, the National Library, and the Institute for Contemporary Historical Studies. I obtained the reports of Iranian diplomats who had worked in Turkey and the United States from the National Archives. Although limited to early Cold War years, these reports show how Iranian diplomats gauged their countries' situation vis-à-vis Turkey and the United States.

At the National Library, I had a vast range of sources at my disposal – contemporary newspapers, books, and government publications. Although I could not access many items (especially if they praised Mohammed Reza Shah too much), the ones that I did obtain greatly helped my research. The travelogues of Iranians who visited the United States in the early Cold War years spoke very highly of America. Interestingly, Iranians continued to relay their experiences in America quite positively in the 1960s even as anti-Americanism gained more ground in Iran. Nevertheless, Iranians who said good things about America as a country continued to criticize U.S. foreign policy around the world and toward Iran. That point shows how criticism of the U.S. government did not always mean outright hostility to the United States or the American people.

Other sources that I obtained from the National Library include documents on the oil nationalization crisis of 1951-1953; the speeches and writings of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and his allies, who led the Islamic Revolution of 1979; and the works of intellectuals such as Ali Shariati, Fakhreddin Shadman, and Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Many of those sources have not been translated into English and my ability to read them in Persian will help me to portray the complexity of pro- and anti-American sentiments in Iran during the Cold War.

At the Institute for Contemporary Historical Studies, I especially focused on the official studies on the Shah's modernization program. Although many of those studies border on propaganda, they enable me to picture the vast disconnect between the Shah's promises for an egalitarian, prosperous, and democratic Iran and what he actually delivered. I also had access to some of the publications of the Iranian Foreign Ministry from the 1960s and 1970s, which shed light on Iran's ties with the United States and Turkey during the Cold War.

An important handicap during my research was that I could not work at the Center for Documents and Diplomatic History, which is the archive and research library of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. While this center houses many of the documents of the Foreign Ministry, its holdings from the 1930s onward are still being catalogued (most of them will remain classified for some time). Therefore, its administrators could not grant me unrestricted access to their collections. Despite the setback, I established useful connections with the center's staff. I hope that such contacts will facilitate easier access in the next few years when I go back to turn my dissertation into a book.

Beyond the research, events inside Iran and the Arab Spring made my trip very memorable. In February, when the Iranian opposition held protests in parallel with the Arab Spring, I heeded the Turkish embassy's advice and stayed at home on certain days, which hindered my research. Nonetheless, witnessing Iranian reactions to the Arab Spring and other regional developments were a great learning experience. In the aftermath of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, it was very strange to see how some Iranian friends would bet on which country in the region would be next. Interestingly, and despite (or perhaps because of) the continuing protests in their country, my friends were sure that Iran would not experience a regime change any time soon.



The Libyan uprising and the death of Osama bin Laden gave me remarkable snapshots on present-day anti-Americanism in Iran as well. I could not tell you how often I heard ordinary Iranians complain about “the West” – especially the United States – gunning for Libyan oil and how President Obama has disappointed them with his failure to change the course of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, upon bin Laden’s death, many Iranians blamed America for not capturing him for nearly ten years; insinuating that Washington has used the threat of terrorism to control countries around Iran. It was one of those rare moments when the pro-government media actually echoed most Iranians’ sentiments.

That is not to say that anti-Americanism in Iran – public as well as governmental – worsened while I was there. In fact, I was surprised by something that pointed to the contrary. In mid-May, I went to see the former U.S. embassy with Levent İşyar, a fellow Turk and Ph.D. candidate in history, who was visiting Iran. “The corrupt den of spies,” as the Iranian regime likes to call it, is the site of the infamous 444-day hostage crisis that began in November 1979 and has poisoned U.S.-Iranian relations to this day.

When I had visited the site in 2008, I had not taken any pictures. But with Levent’s encouragement, I asked the security personnel in the compound for permission to capture some images, which they kindly gave. As we began photographing, I realized that many of the offensive murals on the walls around the embassy had been recently painted over with less offensive pictures and writings in Persian. “Death to America” seemed to have been replaced by the relatively innocuous “the best way to fight America is through serving Muslim people.” Also gone was the hand of the Grim Reaper with Israeli and American flags trying to strangle Iran; it is replaced with a beautiful flower standing in front of a foreboding lighting match springing out of an American satellite dish. (Of course, on another building in that neighborhood, an older mural still reads “Down with America” while the Persian version retains the caption “Death to America.”) I could not help but think if the writing on the embassy’s wall was meant to send a positive signal to Washington.

Alas, it does not matter anymore. Much has changed in the last six months. The rift between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the U.S. government’s allegations that Iran plotted to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on the Iranian nuclear program, rumors of a preemptive Israeli strike against Iran, and Iranian students storming the British embassy as I write these lines, do not bode well for the future.

Before I conclude my report, I would like to warn other SHAFR members who plan on conducting research in Iran that my experiences – especially my ability to travel to Iran freely – may or may not be useful. As a Turkish citizen, I do not need a travel visa for Iran, which is extremely rare for citizens of other countries. Therefore, prospective researchers would be well-advised to contact Iranian embassies in their countries (in the case of U.S. citizens, the Department of State and the Iranian interests section at the Pakistani embassy in Washington) before finalizing their travel plans.



In order to help with library and archival applications in Tehran, researchers should bring their institutional ID cards, a letter from their thesis adviser or department chairs (preferably in English as well as Persian), and another letter in Persian explaining their research and the sources that they would like to use at a particular institution.

Beyond the logistics, the single most important piece of advice that I can give to researchers who wish to go to Iran is that, if you run into hurdles, deal with the archivists, librarians, and pretty much all government employees with utmost respect and patience. It is important to bear in mind that government functionaries in Iran are doing their jobs under very difficult circumstances and it is simply impossible for them to honor requests that would otherwise seem normal in another country.

On that note, in order to win hearts and minds, researchers should consider giving small presents at the libraries and archives that they will be working. I personally found presenting small boxes of Turkish delight to the librarians and archivists to be excellent ice-breakers. Although Iranian hospitality dictates that they help visiting foreigners no matter what, librarians and archivists do go out of their way if researchers establish cordial relations with them.

My trip to Iran helped me to write my dissertation and contributed to my intellectual and personal development in unimaginable ways. I am grateful to SHAFR for giving me this wonderful opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

Barın Kayaoğlu
Ph.D. Candidate
Corcoran Department of History
University of Virginia



Dear Professor Hahn,

As a recipient of the SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship for the academic year 2010-2011, I am writing to report that I finished my dissertation and received my Ph.D. in August of 2011.

My dissertation, "Domino by Design: Thai-U.S. Relations during the Vietnam War," examines the cultural and political impact of the Thai-U.S. alliance during the war and is based on extensive use of Thai and U.S. sources. From the very beginning of my project, I received the financial support from SHAFR's Samuel F. Bemis Fellowships, which allowed me to travel to various repositories to conduct my research. During the writing stage, the SHAFR's Dissertation Completion Fellowship enabled me to devote full time to writing my dissertation by relieving me of teaching obligations. The fellowship gave me time to translate the Thai sources, many of which had not been studied by scholars in the U.S., into English and incorporate them into my dissertation. Currently, I am working on an article about the debates in Thailand regarding the perceived negative impact of the U.S. military presence on Thai society during the Vietnam War.

I would like to thank the SHAFR's Dissertation Completion Fellowship committee for giving me the great opportunity to focus on my work and finish the writing, which would have been much more difficult without the funding from the fellowship. Moreover, this prestigious award has been a source of encouragement for me as an international student. I am grateful to Professor Darlene Rivas, the chair of the committee, for answering my many questions and suggesting a successful solution to a potential conflict between my international student status and the terms of the award. Finally, I thank you, Professor Hahn, for all your help in administering the funds from all of the SHAFR's fellowships I have received.

I greatly appreciate the generous support from SHAFR, which helped make this project possible from start to finish, and I included SHAFR in the acknowledgements of my dissertation. I hope my work will contribute in some ways to the field of diplomatic history and look forward to sharing my research in future SHAFR conferences.

Sincerely yours,
Sudina Paungpetch



To the Editor:

Last week I was speaking with my father about his progress on applying for pastoral positions at churches throughout the country. He informed me that a search committee at a church in West Virginia had sent him a questionnaire about his belief system and his stance on the all too familiar, controversial issues of our day. My father, who has become more of a progressive preacher over the past few years, answered the first question with, "If religious leaders of all sects distance themselves from the internal, ideological debates about who is right and who is wrong, we might be able to return to the roots of our foundation, which are built on inclusion, acceptance, and unity." From there he committed himself to leaving the remaining questions blank.

In the January 2012 issue of *Passport*, Dr. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes referred to himself as "the man." So let me refer to myself as the "neo-man." I can say this with confidence as I am of the next generation of foreign policy historians who will inherit the SHAFR legacy. See, I am currently a 5th year undergraduate student (and hopefully, in the next couple of months, a doctoral student) who passionately follows every word that my mentors write in *Passport* and *Diplomatic History*. Hearing from my superiors that our field not only has a schism, but that foreign policy historians are seen as "the other," is distressing to a student preparing to enter the field as a graduate student in the upcoming year.

Even though, prior to January, I was unaware of this unfortunate conflict within our discipline, I remember encountering fleeting moments of the divide as an undergraduate. A couple of years ago I informed my mentor, Dr. Nick Cullather, that I wanted to be a diplomatic historian. He immediately corrected my terminology so as to circumvent the contentious nature surrounding the term "diplomatic historian." So I naively tailored my curriculum vitae to read "20th century U.S. foreign policy history" instead of "20th century diplomatic history," without asking any questions.

As I became more serious about graduate school, I thought it might be worthwhile to join a professional society. I perused the annals of the OAH and AHA, before joining SHAFR as an official member. It seemed odd that the journals associated with the OAH and AHA published so few articles on the issue of U.S. foreign policy. I thought it more logical to join a society that was advancing my own interests. Nonetheless, I often quipped to my friends and family how bizarre it seemed that foreign policy history was so marginalized by our professional associations. Perhaps this is because I formed an opinion while at Indiana University that foreign policy subjects fascinated students the most. Courses that discussed international relations, national security, intelligence, the Cold War, power figures, and the presidency were always courses that generated a lengthy waitlist each semester.

But there was, and still is, a hidden schism that younger history students are unable to see. The disparate gap expanding inside the field of history seems to be visible only to "insiders," yet the warning signs to incoming scholars are somewhat nonexistent. It was not until I read Dr. Thomas Zeiler and Dr. Sarantakes' work that I fully put together the bit of marginalization that I had felt for years as a student of U.S. foreign policy.

The most prominent intellectual suppression I felt as an undergrad was during a history course in which a lengthy paper was due. When I met with the professor to discuss my rough draft, I received some unexpected criticism. The first was that my analysis of presidential figures was "not enough" because "individual agency does not sufficiently explain history." It struck me as odd that the presidency could be thought of as not shaping history. But then again, as another

prominent professor had remarked, examining history through the eyes of one man is “bad history.” Furthermore, I was instructed to revise my work because “individual ideologies do not explain a person’s actions.” I now realize that I was being forced to take sides in the historical debate as an undergraduate. Would I side with my professor (who holds the power of the mighty red pen), or would I side with the “diplomatic” historians? It bothers me to know that professional historians may be taking the feud a bit too far by pressuring undergraduates to choose between a better grade driven by forced revision, or accept the consequences of choosing to be a student of U.S. foreign policy history.

Ever since I decided to apply to graduate school, I have been bombarded with negativity. I was told not to apply to doctoral programs, but instead apply to a masters program or law school; that flipping burgers might be more plausible than finding a job as an academic. But to find that historians view my specialization as “the other”, was most upsetting. That academics have created a divide in history with foreign policy specialists on one side and the rest of the historians on the other, is not only disappointing and discomfoting, but also stands against the point that my old man pointed out to the specialists in his own field.

We are only reinforcing the schism so long as we do not include, accept, and unify the academic field that we love so much. What does it matter if one historian wants to interpret history through the story of beer? Why should it matter if I believe that individual agency is a major component of causation, while you believe society to be the fundamental cause of change? We have to include all interpretations so as to build a more resilient discipline. We specialize because we are mesmerized by a particular facet of history. We need to accept that it is precisely our differences that permit our field to flourish. By writing our own version of history, we are composing the overarching work that forms the master narrative. Unification will create a lasting legacy that future historians will surely admire. Call me naïve, but history shows us that these are the keys to both cooperation and success.

As a future historian of U.S. foreign policy, I am glad to have this knowledge. I now know not to believe in the status quo of division, but to question it, challenge it, and change it. For only through awareness will we be able to include historians of all differences, accept all approaches to history, and unify the field so that those who inherit it from my generation will find it stronger than when we found it.

Cody J. Foster
Ronald E. McNair Scholar
Indiana University



The Last Word: SHAFR and the Future of the Profession

Brian C. Etheridge

After a decade of engagement in our organization and wide-ranging experiences at student-centered institutions, I have come to the conclusion that SHAFR badly needs to change. I say this not as a critique of the members or leaders of the organization, but rather as a critique of the milieu in which we all operate. As I see it, the evolving nature of higher education presents both a significant challenge and a unique opportunity for our organization. It presents a challenge because SHAFR, like other scholarly professional organizations, was designed and developed to support a narrow concept of the academy that is currently under fire from many quarters. It presents an opportunity because SHAFR, as a relatively small professional organization dedicated to the study of a clearly defined subject, could play a major role in helping chart a new path toward broadening the concept of the profession. Many people believe that changes are necessary, but entities such as universities, colleges, and departments have various disincentives for championing change and have therefore had a hard time doing so.

Let's start with the obvious: higher education is in a state of crisis. In the last several years, as state legislatures have slashed appropriations for higher education and institutions have seen their endowments struggle to return to their pre-recession values, colleges and universities have been forced to accelerate tuition and fee increases. At the same time, many students have graduated with staggering amounts of debt and dismal job prospects (for a highly vocal sample of this population, see the foot soldiers of the Occupy Wall Street movement). The perceived disconnect between the costs and benefits of higher education has led many to predict a higher education bubble; perhaps more important, it has empowered critics to challenge the sacred claim that institutions of higher education have had upon the training of a skilled workforce. To take but one example, the co-founder of PayPal, convinced of the folly of pursuing a college degree, (in)famously announced a competition in 2010 in which he offered 20 students under 20 years of age \$100,000 each to drop out of college and start a business. Although some of these problems can be blamed on the recession, scores of studies illustrate that the economic downturn has just exacerbated the tectonic shifts—the defunding of public institutions of higher education, transformative developments in technology, and changing student demographics, to name but a few—that are fundamentally altering the assumptions that have undergirded higher education.

It is important to note that the crisis in higher education has not affected all disciplines to the same degree. Scholars in STEM disciplines have fared best because of heightened public concerns about national competitiveness, security, and the effects of globalization



and because of their access to large grants that can help fund other parts of their institutions. Scholars in the humanities, because of their perceived esotericism, supposed left-wing politics, and alleged disdain for undergraduates, have become convenient punching bags. To the negative image of a humanities professor as a sinecure-holding, wine-swilling radical out of touch with the common people, add brutal job markets for both humanities Ph.D.

students and humanities majors, and many have wondered loudly about the value humanities scholars bring. Even general education, the longtime bulwark of the humanities, is eroding, as universities increasingly focus more on competencies than content in a sweeping general education reform movement.

In the face of these very real challenges, humanities scholars have persistently clung to the same models they have always pursued. Despite evidence that their scholarship is not finding a large audience (see Mark Bauerlein's December 2011 analysis in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*—"The Research Bust"—on the impact of scholarship in English literature, for example), many of them insist on pure research as the only scholarship worth pursuing. Despite evidence that they are not appropriately preparing their undergraduate and graduate students for the next stages of their lives, they insist upon undergraduate and graduate degree programs designed to replicate themselves and repopulate the professoriate. Most of them tell themselves that the solution to this crisis is greater funding and more faculty lines, despite the growing evidence that they are unlikely to see anything close to the level of funding for the humanities that previous generations have enjoyed.

Fortunately, a movement to challenge the traditional ways of understanding scholarship and the profession has been underway for some time. But unfortunately, it has been mostly associated with undergraduate education and has therefore largely escaped the notice of specialized scholarly organizations like SHAFR, where it could have a real impact. Much of this movement borrows its energy from the work of Ernest Boyer, whose pioneering *Scholarship Reconsidered* (1997), which was part of a much larger effort to refocus the academy on undergraduate learning, challenged higher education to broaden its definition of scholarship beyond original research (what he calls the scholarship of discovery) and include creative work in integration, application, teaching, and learning. Over the last few decades, the Boyer model of scholarship, as it is known, has served as the basis for discussions about liberal education in organizations such as the National Collegiate Honors Council, the Council on Undergraduate Research, the Association of American Colleges and Universities, and the International Society for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning. Gradually these issues have filtered into large scholarly

organizations like the AHA and MLA, but only because legions of unemployed but highly qualified Ph.D.s have highlighted the fact that the traditional, narrow views of scholarship and the profession make less sense now than they did before (if indeed they ever made much sense at all).

Because of their size and mission, small, nimble, tightly focused scholarly organizations like SHAFR could help shift how we understand scholarship and the profession. But unfortunately, they haven't. SHAFR and other organizations like it remain aligned with what is an increasingly unsustainable model of higher education. As a result, our conversations about how to strengthen SHAFR are often cast in terms that seem less relevant when viewed in the context of the shifting landscape of higher education. Financial resources are often allocated to support the scholarship of discovery, rewarding excellent articles and monographs and funding graduate students. Outreach is often talked about in the narrow context of, to use Boyer's terminology again, the scholarship of integration and the furtherance of interdisciplinary work. And while I would never suggest that we should not strive for more interdisciplinarity or that we should cut funding for the scholarship of discovery (indeed, I have benefited from SHAFR's largesse both as a graduate student and a faculty member), I think that when higher education itself is under assault we need to think more aggressively about how we can leverage our assets to strengthen not only ourselves but the academy, the profession, and the discipline. And for me, that doesn't mean doing more of the same.

Because of our resources, subject matter focus, and gravitas, SHAFR is well positioned to play an important role in broadening our view of scholarship and the profession. We have ample financial support, a stable of outstanding scholars and teachers, and subject matter intensely relevant to our contemporary circumstances. And as the primary society dedicated to the field, we play perhaps the most important role in defining what matters in terms of creative work in foreign relations history. In short, we can help redefine scholarship, which departments and universities are afraid to do on their own. Before I go any further, however, please let me reemphasize that I am in no way suggesting that we diminish the importance of original research. Rather, in what follows I suggest that we broaden what counts as scholarship, that we expand the definition of creative work in our discipline. The Boyer model could be a useful departure point for understanding how we could better use our assets in this endeavor. And so I would like to offer the following suggestions for ways that SHAFR could broaden its mandate, extend its reach, and strengthen us all:

- The scholarship of discovery. In addition to funding faculty and graduate student research, SHAFR should explore how it can support and encourage undergraduate research, either alone or in concert with organizations like the Council on Undergraduate Research and the National Collegiate Honors Council. Although these students may never go on to graduate school in diplomatic history, support for their projects would nurture lifelong interest in the field.

- The scholarship of integration. In addition to supporting the kind of outreach that the organization is currently conducting, SHAFR should be more deliberate in encouraging collaborative efforts with scholars in other disciplines that use the past to understand and solve contemporary international problems. A good place for this kind of collaboration could be professional and public policy schools such as the LBJ School of Public Affairs,

where matching funds for such initiatives might be available.

- The scholarship of teaching. In addition to putting greater resources into existing initiatives such as the secondary education initiative and the teaching committee's documents project, SHAFR should encourage more panels on teaching, reach out to teaching-centered organizations such as the Gilder Lehrman Institute and the International Society for Scholarship on Teaching and Learning, and publish (or support the publication of) essays on teaching foreign relations history on a regular basis. By valuing these efforts, SHAFR can help our institutions see them as important scholarly contributions and not as superfluous extracurricular activities.

- The scholarship of application. We have a more significant opportunity here than many other historical fields. SHAFR should place greater value on and therefore provide greater support for work in non-academic positions. Many of our members find their way into working for various branches of the federal government; we should offer explicit training and workshops for students and scholars interested in pursuing or working in these areas. Similarly, some of our members have developed, entirely on their own, an effective media presence. SHAFR should consider hiring a media consultant and holding workshops for members to work on how to bring our ideas and expertise to a broader audience. The organization should also follow up on the work it has done on its website in the last few years and make a real push to leverage its members' collective expertise to provide context for contemporary debates on foreign relations. The lessons of history, whatever they may be, should be defined, applied, qualified, and complicated by those of us who understand the full complexity of the history of U.S. foreign relations—not just by those who twist history for rhetorical purposes or dabble in antiquarianism

Fortunately, such broad views of the profession and scholarship are entirely consistent with our past. During a plenary session tellingly entitled "Did We Go Wrong?" at the most recent annual meeting of the AHA, Thomas Bender discussed how in the first half of the twentieth century history was seen as more than just an academic specialty; it was viewed as something essential to the fabric of civic life. Robert Townsend, deputy director of the AHA, pointed out that over the twentieth century "the Ph.D. was used as an entrée to a wide varied of jobs," and he argued that the expectation that all Ph.D. recipients could or should take residence in the academy never really fit the reality, except perhaps for a brief period during the 1950s. Even more to the point, a larger view of scholarship is implied in SHAFR's founding certificate of incorporation, which four decades ago defined the mission of the organization as the "study, advancement, and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations." We are people whose vocation centers on understanding history, and knowing that our predecessors viewed themselves and their work more broadly should help us realize that when we enlarge our sense of scholarship and the profession we not only ensure our future but remain true to our past.

Passport
Mershon Center
for International Security Studies
The Ohio State University
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
passport@osu.edu

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