

PASSPORT

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IN THIS ISSUE

The Historiography of U.S. Intelligence
A Roundtable on Brian C. Etheridge's *Enemies to Allies*
Approaches to International Experiential Learning

AND MORE...

PASSPORT

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW



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Passport Editorial Office:

Andrew Johns
Department of History
Brigham Young University
2161 JFSB, Provo, UT 84602
passport@shafir.org
801-422-8942 (phone)
801-422-0275 (fax)

SHAFR Business Office:

Amy Sayward, Executive Director
Department of History
Middle Tennessee State University
1301 East Main Street, Box 23
Murfreesboro, TN 37132
Amy.Sayward@mtsu.edu
615-898-2569

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CONTRIBUTORS

Stewart Anderson is Assistant Professor of History at Brigham Young University. His research interests include modern Germany, television history, and collective memory. He is the coeditor of *Modernization, Nation-Building, and Television History* (2015), and has published articles in *Memory Studies*, *Critical Studies in Television*, and the *Journal of European Television History and Culture*. His book, *Big Lessons from the Small Screen: Television Fiction and the Reinvention of Morality after the Nazi Catastrophe*, will be published by the University of Toronto Press.

Laura A. Belmonte is Department Head and Professor of History at Oklahoma State University. She is the author of *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (2008) and *Global Gay Rights* (forthcoming, 2017), and is completing a transnational U.S. history textbook. She is a member of the U.S. Department of State's Historical Advisory Committee on Diplomatic Documentation.

Michael Brenes teaches at Hunter College, CUNY. He received his Ph.D. in 2014 from the Graduate Center, City University of New York. The author of an article in the *Journal of Policy History* and a chapter in *A Companion to John F. Kennedy*, he is currently working on a book manuscript, *For Right and Might: The Militarization of the Cold War and the Remaking of American Democracy*.

Alison S. Burke is Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Oregon University. She received her Ph.D. in Criminology from Indiana University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of *Gender and Justice: An Examination of Policy and Practice Regarding Judicial Waiver* (2009), as well as articles in journals including the *Journal of Effective Teaching*, *Educational Review*, and the *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*.

Steven Casey is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. A specialist in U.S. foreign policy, his publications include *Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against Nazi Germany, 1941-1945* (2001); *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950-1953* (2008), which won both the Truman Book Award and the Neustadt Prize for best book in American Politics; and *When Soldiers Fall: How Americans have Debated Combat Casualties, from World War I to the War on Terror* (2014), which also won the Neustadt Prize. He is currently working on a book that explores how the American media reported the battles of World War II.

Lori Clune is Associate Professor of History at California State University, Fresno. Her book, *Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World*, was published in 2016 by Oxford University Press. She is also the author of several articles, reviews, and essays in a variety of books, journals, and online forums. She currently serves on the SHAFR Teaching Committee as Director of Secondary Education.

Elizabeth Cobbs is Professor and Melburn G. Glasscock Chair in American History at Texas A&M University. Her books include *American Umpire* (2013); *All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the 1960s* (1998); *The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller in Brazil* (1992), which received the 1993 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from SHAFR; and *Broken Promises: A Novel of the Civil War* (2011). She is currently producing a PBS documentary on U.S. foreign relations and writing a book on women in World War I, and her second novel, *The Hamilton Affair*, is forthcoming.

Jeffrey Crean is a doctoral candidate in history at Texas A&M University. His research interests include the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy as well as the interplay between war and public opinion. His dissertation will be entitled, "With Fear and Favor: A Rising China Threat and the Path to Normalization, 1954-1971." He has published articles in *Diplomacy & Statecraft* and *War & Society*.

Amanda C. Demmer is a doctoral candidate at the University of New Hampshire. Her dissertation will be entitled, "The Last Chapter of the Vietnam War: Normalization, Non-Governmental Actors, and the Politics of Human Rights, 1975-1995." Her article on the Jay Treaty was published in the *Journal of the Early American Republic* in 2015, and she currently serves on the SHAFR Council as a graduate student representative.

Brian C. Etheridge is Professor of History and Director of the Center for Teaching Excellence at Georgia Gwinnett College. He is the author of *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory* (2016), and the coeditor, with Kenneth Osgood, of *The United States and Public Diplomacy: The New International History Meets the New Cultural History* (2010). His 2008 article in *Diplomatic History*, "The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America," received the 2009 Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize from SHAFR.

Fabian Hilfrich is Senior Lecturer in American History at the University of Edinburgh. His research focuses on U.S. foreign relations in the 19th and 20th centuries with specific interest in culture and ideology, as well as the interdependence of bilateral and multilateral relations in the international arena. He is the author of *Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War* (2012), along with numerous articles and book chapters. His current research includes a project on transatlantic relations in the 1970s.

Adam M. Howard serves as the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series in the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State. A University of Florida Ph.D., he previously served as the Office of the Historian's chief of the Middle East and Asia division and compiled *The Jordan Crisis, September 1970*; *The Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-76*; and *The Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1977-78* volumes in the *FRUS* series.

Daniel Hummel is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University. He received his doctorate from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2016, where his dissertation examined the origins of the modern Christian Zionist movement from 1948-1980. He is currently working on a book manuscript, *Jealous for Zion: Evangelical Support for the State of Israel before the Religious Right*, and had an article published in *Religion & American Culture* in 2015.

Kenny Kolander is a historian of the twentieth century United States with a focus on foreign relations with the Middle East generally, and Israel specifically. He received his Ph.D. in May 2016 from West Virginia University, and will be a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of History at WVU during the 2016-2017 academic year. His current book project analyzes the role of Congress in the evolution of U.S.-Israel relations between the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Camp David Peace Accords. His research has been published in *Middle Eastern Studies*, and he has an article forthcoming in *Diplomatic History*.

Matthew Masur is Professor of History at Saint Anselm College. He teaches courses on American foreign relations, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and Asian history. His research focuses on U.S.-Vietnamese relations in the 1950s and 1960s.

Kenneth Osgood is Professor of Liberal Arts and International Studies and Director of the McBride Honors Program in Public Affairs at the Colorado School of Mines. He is the author of *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (2006), which received the Herbert Hoover Book Award in 2007; and the coeditor of four books, including most recently, *Winning While Losing?: Civil Rights, the Conservative Movement, and the Presidency from Nixon to Obama* (2014) with Derrick E. White.

Kimber Quinney is Assistant Professor of History at California State University, San Marcos. Her research focuses on the relationship between U.S. foreign policy toward Italy and the domestic policies toward Italian immigrants during World War II and the early Cold War. She currently serves as chair of the SHAFR Teaching Committee.

Lubna Z. Qureshi is a Lecturer at Stockholm University in Sweden. She completed her doctorate in History at the University of California, Berkeley in 2006, and her publications include her monograph, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (2009), and "U.S. Clandestine Operations in Chile, 1970-1973" in the *Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to the Present* (2014). She is also the coeditor of *H-Diplo's Journal Watch*.

Stephen P. Randolph serves as The Historian of the U.S. Department of State. Prior to his arrival at the Department in October 2011, he served at the National Defense University as professor, department chair, and associate dean. His tour at NDU culminated a twenty-seven year career in the Air Force. He is the author of *Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive* (2007).

Amy Sayward is Professor of History at Middle Tennessee State University. She is the author of *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965* (2006) and the coeditor, with Margaret Vandiver, of *Tennessee's New Abolitionists: The Fight to End the Death Penalty in the Volunteer State* (2010). She currently serves as the Executive Director of SHAFR.

David F. Schmitz is Robert Allen Skotheim Chair of History at Whitman College. He is the author most recently of *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century* (2014) and *Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam American Foreign Policy* (2011), along with eight other books. He is currently writing a one-volume history of Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy, and a study on the lasting impact of the Vietnam War on American foreign policy.

Adam R. Seipp is Professor of History at Texas A&M University. He is the author most recently of *Strangers in the Wild Place: Refugees, Americans, and a German Town, 1945-1952* (2013). Currently, he is at work on a social history of the American military presence in Germany during the Cold War.

Robert Shaffer is Professor of History at Shippensburg University. His publications on mid-20th century U.S.-Asia relations include essays in *Pacific Historical Review* (2000), *Peace & Change* (2003), *Journal of American Ethnic History* (2012), and *Journal of World History* (2013). He received his Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 2003, and his analysis of *The Christian Century's* critique of the Cold War is forthcoming in *Peace & Change*.

David J. Snyder is Faculty Principal of the Carolina International House at Maxcy College and Senior Instructor of History at the University of South Carolina. His most recent book is *Reasserting America in the 1970s: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Rebuilding of America's Image Abroad* (2016), coedited with Hallvard Notaker and Giles Scott-Smith.

Kathryn C. Statler is Professor of History at the University of San Diego. She is the author of *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (2009) and coeditor, with Andrew L. Johns, of *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (2006). She is currently working on a book manuscript on the history of Franco-American cultural diplomacy since 1776 titled, *Lafayette's Ghost: A History of Franco-American Cooperation and Conflict*. She is also general editor of the Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace book series with the University Press of Kentucky.

Dustin Walcher is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History and Political Science at Southern Oregon University. A specialist in international history, U.S. foreign relations, and inter-American affairs, he is currently revising a manuscript that examines the link between the failure of U.S. led economic initiatives and the rise of social revolution in Argentina during the 1950s and 1960s. He is also completing, with Jeffrey F. Taffet, a combined textbook and document reader on the history of U.S.-Latin American relations.

Joseph C. Wicentowski serves as Digital History Advisor in the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State. Besides performing research in modern Chinese history, he leads the Office's project to transform the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series and its other publications and datasets into a modern, free, and open digital archive for scholars and the public. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and is a coauthor of the forthcoming book, *XQuery for Digital Humanists*.

Hugh Wilford is Professor of United States History at California State University, Long Beach. A historian of twentieth-century U.S. culture and foreign relations, he has written or edited five books, including *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (2008). His most recent monograph, *America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (2013), won the Gold Medal, 2014 Washington Institute for Near East Policy Book Prize.

Salim Yaqub is Associate Professor of History and Director of the Center for Cold War Studies and International History at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the author of *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (2004) and *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (2016).

ATTENTION SHAFR MEMBERS

The 2016 SHAFR elections are upon us. For the first time, *Passport* is publishing copies of the candidates' biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the the candidates and to vote in the election.

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.”

Abraham Lincoln

Passport would like to remind the members of SHAFR that voting for the 2016 SHAFR elections will begin in early August and will close on October 31. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Barbara Keys (bkeys@unimelb.edu.au), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

“To vote is like the payment of a debt, a duty never to be neglected, if its performance is possible.”

Rutherford B. Hayes

In the 2015 SHAFR election, a near-record 598 members of SHAFR voted—nearly three times the average rate of participation from the previous thirteen elections. *Passport* would like to encourage the membership of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization’s self-governance once again in 2016. Unlike some political contests this year, SHAFR is fortunate to have exceptional candidates who are willing to serve the organization standing for election in each race.

“Every election is determined by the people who show up.”

Larry J. Sabato

2016 SHAFR ELECTION CANDIDATES

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SHAFR President**Mary Dudziak**

I teach at Emory Law School, where I am the Asa Griggs Candler Chair and am affiliated with the History and Political Science Departments. My PhD and JD are from Yale University, and my AB is from the University of California, Berkeley. I teach and write about the history of American war powers, foreign relations law, and other subjects. My scholarship includes *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2000), *Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey* (Oxford, 2008), *War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences* (Oxford, 2012), and two edited collections. My essay "Legal History as Foreign Relations History" is in the 3rd edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. My work has been supported by fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation; the School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton; the Kluge Center, Library of Congress, and others. I serve on the Historical Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of State.

My SHAFR service has included Council, Editorial Board for *Diplomatic History*, Web Committee Chair, and Development and Program Committees, and I currently serve as Vice President. I have decades of experience in other scholarly organizations, especially the American Society for Legal History.

I would support SHAFR members across generations, with a special focus on graduate students and underrepresented scholars. With an eye to extending SHAFR's reach, I would work to strengthen ties with other historical societies and the policy community, and continue to build SHAFR's online presence.

SHAFR Vice-President**Peter Hahn***Biographical Statement*

I am a specialist in U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Having earned my doctorate in 1987 at Vanderbilt under the direction of Melvyn P. Leffler, I joined the History faculty at Ohio State in 1991, earned promotion to professor in 2004, served as department chair in 2006-15, and became dean of Arts & Humanities in 2015.

I have published six books and dozens of articles, essays, and reviews. Based on extensive research in U.S., British, Israeli, and French archives (involving sources in English, Hebrew, and French), these publications have advanced the internationalization of our field. I have delivered scores of papers and lectures, speaking in ten countries. I have advised or co-advised 35 completed doctoral dissertations, taught thousands of undergraduates in formal courses, and led student and alumni education abroad programs in Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Japan.

I have dedicated a good portion of my career to SHAFR. After joining the society as a graduate student and becoming a life member in 1989, I served as associate editor of *Diplomatic History* in 1991-2001. As executive director in 2002-15, I managed SHAFR at a time of substantial growth in its missions and impact. Under my direction, SHAFR's annual operating budget grew six-fold and its endowment more than doubled. I launched *Passport* and the Summer Institute; established the Divine, Bemis, Williams, and Hogan fellowships and the two dissertation prizes; professionalized and expanded the annual conference; and collaborated with presidents and council members on numerous other initiatives.

Statement of Vice Presidential Candidate

If elected vice president, I would strive to advance the many goals of SHAFR. I would build on the initiatives I supported and launched during my time as executive director. In particular, I would work hard to develop more financial support for graduate students and young scholars—financial support to foster the study of foreign languages, expand research opportunities, and nurture intellectual dialogue in summer colloquia and seminars. I would strive to build upon the progress SHAFR has made attracting women, under-represented minorities, and foreign scholars into our ranks. This diversity has enormously enriched our organization in recent years.

In practical terms, I would promote initiatives and managerial practices that facilitate research, scholarship, teaching, and public education. I would favor maintaining the broad range of methodological approaches that have developed in the field over recent decades, from the more traditional approaches focusing on security and formal diplomacy to the newer approaches embracing gender, ethnicity, culture, and other thematic concerns. I would seek to contextualize the society's foundational focus on the U.S. experience in a sweeping international perspective. I would ensure that the journal, newsletter, and website remain top-tier publications. I would explore the possibilities of joint conferences or other endeavors with other professional and learned societies. I would support initiatives to advance excellence in teaching. I would demand efficient administrative practices including fiscal stability, clear and timely communications, proper governance, and robust opportunities for individual success.

Jeremi Suri*Biographical Statement*

I joined SHAFR as a new graduate student in 1994, and I have been an active member of the organization ever since. I have served on the SHAFR Council and the Membership Committee, co-directed (with Fredrik Logevall) the second SHAFR Summer Institute in 2009, and hosted the annual SHAFR conference in Madison, Wisconsin in 2010. I am also a frequent contributor to *Diplomatic History*, *Passport*, and the SHAFR website and blog.

I hold the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair at the University of Texas at Austin, where I am a professor in the Department of History and the LBJ School. I am the author and editor of eight books, most notably the prize-winning *Power and Protest; Henry Kissinger and the American Century*; and *Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama*. I have also published more than fifty articles, reviews, and essays in venues including: *Diplomatic History*, the *American Historical Review*, the *Journal of American History*, *Cold War History*, the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, and *International Security*. I have published numerous articles in newspapers and magazines, including: the *New York Times*, *Foreign Affairs*, the *Boston Globe*, and *Wired*. I also co-edit a book series for Princeton University Press, "America in the World."

My awards include recognition from the Smithsonian Institution, the OAH, *Princeton Review*, and Phi Alpha Theta. I am, however, most proud of

the six teaching awards I have received from two universities, and the three awards for outreach to veterans, teachers, and other groups.

Statement of Vice Presidential Candidate

When I joined SHAFR more than twenty years ago, many predicted the demise of foreign relations. To some, the field looked methodologically backwards; to others it was too American-centered. Departments around the country appeared unwilling to hire historians of foreign relations.

SHAFR helped renew our field. Attending annual meetings, serving on Council and various committees, and hosting the 2010 summer conference in Madison, I became part of a vibrant network of creative scholars and teachers. We did not have a single point of view or methodological bend. The ecumenism and experimentation of our work was what made it exciting. Any success that I have had as a scholar and teacher is due, in large part, to my education through SHAFR.

My hope is that SHAFR will do the same for the numerous scholars and teachers who are now entering our field. As a faculty advisor to more than a dozen Ph.D.s (many of whom are now assistant professors and SHAFR members), I recognize how much young academics need our organization. I would like to see SHAFR explore additional opportunities for helping members with publishing, innovative teaching, and public history work. Most of all, I want to help make SHAFR an even more ecumenical and collegial organization. That requires reaching out to academics from diverse backgrounds and methodologies, especially those based in international and non-traditional institutions. As I see it, SHAFR leadership should welcome new contributors and nurture opportunities for increased collaboration across the boundaries that too often divide us.

SHAFR Council, Race 1:

Matthew Connelly

I am a professor at Columbia University, and have been part of SHAFR for twenty years. In my two books, articles, and commentary I have advocated for more international, transnational, and global history. In the last decade SHAFR has made progress in internationalizing our membership, and our conferences and *Diplomatic History* reflect a broad array of approaches and high intellectual quality. We should continue working on the distinct but related issue of gender and ethnic diversity in our ranks, but we also face new challenges. I worry about the conditions for historical research going forward in light of the exponential growth in classified electronic records. How do we train the next generation of historians when the internet will become our archive? I have therefore shifted my energies to developing new resources for research and teaching, such as history-lab.org, and joining with librarians and archivists on new initiatives like the International Task Force on Email Archiving. If elected, I would ask SHAFR members to take the lead in advocating more funding for the National Archives, a more rational, risk-management approach to declassification, and more discussion of how we, as a profession, prepare for the age of “big data.”

Brian DeLay

I am associate professor at UC Berkeley, where I teach borderlands and transnational U.S. history. I'm the editor of *North American Borderlands* (2012), co-author of the textbook *Experience History*, and author of *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (Yale, 2008), which won prizes from several scholarly organizations. In 2008 SHAFR awarded me the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize. Since then I've published on conflict in the 19th and 21st century borderlands; guns and instability in Mexico; Lincoln and the French Intervention; violence and belonging on the Navajo-New Mexican frontier; the transnational context for the iconic painting *Watson and the Shark*; and, most recently in *Diplomatic History* on Indigenous polities and U.S. empire. “Shoot the State,” my current book project, uses the arms trade to illuminate power and inequality in the Americas before World War II. I've served on SHAFR's conference organizing committee (twice) and on the Bernath Lecture Prize committee. I've presented several times at the conference, and in 2015 had the honor of giving the keynote address. SHAFR has been wonderfully welcoming to me. If elected to council I will work systematically to extend that welcome to other 18th and 19th century historians.

SHAFR Council, Race 2:

Julia Irwin

As an Associate Professor of History at the University of South Florida, my research focuses on humanitarian aid in 20th century U.S. foreign relations and international history. I am the author of *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (Oxford University Press, 2013); the dissertation on which it is based won SHAFR's Betty M. Unterberger Prize in 2011. I am currently working on a second book-length project, *Catastrophic Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Responses to Global Natural Disaster*. My work has also appeared in such journals as *The Journal of American History*, *Diplomatic History*, *First World War Studies*, *The Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, and *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*. I regularly present, chair, and comment on panels at SHAFR meetings, and I have served on the Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize Committee, the SHAFR Program Committee, and as a mentor at the SHAFR Job Market Workshop. If elected to Council, I will work to improve SHAFR's gender, racial, ethnic, and international diversity, to expand SHAFR's membership in underrepresented chronological eras and subfields, and to uphold SHAFR's strong legacy of supporting graduate students and junior scholars.

Ryan Irwin

I write about American expansion and decolonization, and my scholarship straddles the field's new and old approaches. I'm working on a book about Dean Acheson, Felix Frankfurter, Harold Laski, and Walter Lippmann, which explores what the Free World meant to its architects. Oxford published my first book in 2012, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order*, and I've won a few awards from SHAFR, including the Bernath Article Prize and a Dissertation Completion Fellowship. I've also served the organization over the years, most recently on the conference program committee.

It's an honor to have a chance to run for Council. I love getting people engaged in each other's ideas. SHAFR's diversity is its greatest strength, in my opinion, and, if elected, I'd try to nurture that diversity while facilitating conversations about our shared research questions. I love the nuts and bolts of scholarly collaboration. Before I became an associate professor at the University at Albany, I was the associate director of International Security Studies at Yale, where I learned useful lessons about the importance of the “big tent” mindset. These lessons would orient my approach on the Council.



SHAFR Council, Race 3:**Kathryn Statler**

I am Professor of History at the University of San Diego and author of *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam*. I am also a co-editor of *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War*, contributor to numerous journals and compilations, member of the Editorial Board for *Diplomatic History*, and series editor of "Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace" for the University Press of Kentucky. A continuous member of SHAFR for the past 23 years, I served on the William A. Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants Committee, the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award Committee, and the Nominating Committee. Most recently I was the Local Arrangements Co-Chair for the 2016 SHAFR conference held at the University of San Diego and currently serve on the Ways and Means Committee. Given my extensive experience within SHAFR over the years, I have a long term perspective on our present and future. My vision is to ensure SHAFR's continued relevance to the world in terms of research, teaching, and outreach to larger domestic and international audiences, to promote our policy of inclusiveness, and to maintain our sound financial footing.

Hugh Wilford

I'm currently Professor of History at California State University, Long Beach, having worked previously in the UK university system. I've published the following books: *The New York Intellectuals: From Vanguard to Institution* (Manchester University Press, 1995); *The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (Frank Cass, 2003); *The U.S. Government, Citizen Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network*, ed., with Helen Laville (Routledge, 2006); *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Harvard University Press, 2008); and *America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (Basic Books, 2013). My books have attracted public as well as scholarly attention: *America's Great Game* was a *New York Times Book Review* Editors' Choice and won the Washington Institute 2014 Gold Medal Book Prize. Two of my articles have appeared in *Diplomatic History*. I have participated in nine panels at SHAFR meetings, helped launch a SHAFR-affiliated network of Southern Californian international historians, and taught on the 2016 SHAFR Summer Institute in the Netherlands. If elected, I would hope to participate in further efforts to internationalize SHAFR, guide graduate students, and reach out to the broad public audience interested in our field.

SHAFR Nominating Committee:**Laura Belmonte**

I am Department Head and Professor of History at Oklahoma State University. I am co-author of *Global Americans* (Cengage, 2017), author of *Selling the American Way* (Penn, 2008), and editor of *Speaking of America* (Cengage, 2nd edition, 2006). My next book *Global Gay Rights* synthesizes the history of the international LGBT rights movement (Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2017). I serve on the U.S. Department of State's Historical Advisory Committee.

I have been an active member of SHAFR since the early 1990s. I currently chair the Link-Kuehl Prize committee and have served on SHAFR Council, the editorial board of *Diplomatic History*, the Committee on the Status of Women, the Program Committee, and the web site task force.

If elected to the Nominating Committee, I will work to expand SHAFR's diversity along demographic and disciplinary lines and to preserve the organization's strong commitment to good governance and transparency.

Kimber Quinney

I have been a Lecturer in History at California State University, San Marcos, for thirteen years. In the fall, I will assume a new position as Assistant Professor. I have served on *Passport's* Editorial Advisory Board (2012–14) and am Chair of the SHAFR Teaching Committee (2015–present). I study U.S.-Italian relations, particularly efforts by Italian immigrants and refugees to shape U.S. ideology and policies toward Fascist and Cold War Italy. My masterpieces (and there are a few!) are my students. I am proud to call myself a teacher-scholar. I have taught over a dozen different courses, and I continually redesign and innovate my course content, always emphasizing how history is shaping our world. My vision for SHAFR is a collective impact of ideas: I am convinced that our collective expertise can and should have a profound influence on a much wider community and in a much more public fashion.



A Roundtable on Brian C. Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*

Kathryn C. Statler, Steven Casey, Adam R. Seipp, Stewart Anderson, and Brian C. Etheridge

Roundtable Introduction, Brian C. Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*

Kathryn C. Statler

Watching Germany's loss to France in the Euro 2016 semifinals, I was struck by sympathetic American comments about the Germans being "mortal" after all, as well as their sense of fair play, overall excellence, and calmness—a far cry from descriptions of the Germans during World War II. The current friendship between the two countries can only be understood by reflecting on their long and complicated relationship, which is the subject of Brian Etheridge's superb monograph, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*. In the roundtable that follows, the three reviewers—Stewart Anderson, Steven Casey, and Adam Seipp—find much to praise in Etheridge's absorbing account of how Americans evolved from thinking of Germany as an enemy during World War II to Germany as America's friend and key ally a mere decade later. These favorable reviews bode well for the book's staying power in appealing to a wide range of historians and scholars on both sides of the Atlantic, and especially as a point of departure for historians of U.S. foreign relations studying the idea of "memory diplomacy," a term conceived by Etheridge.

As Stewart Anderson notes, at its core the book is about American collective memory, in which "perceptions and representations of Germany played a foundational role in establishing the broader contours of American identity between the end of WWII and the late 1960s." Anderson, Casey, and Seipp all commend the conceptualization of the book, in which Etheridge outlines two competing narratives. First, the more fragile "World War" narrative embraced the belief that the German state could not be trusted and should be limited in the planning of postwar Europe. Second, the more enduring "Cold War" narrative painted the Germans as victims of the Nazi Party and as people who needed to play an essential role in combating post-war communism. The book's primary focus is on how official, semi-official, and private—mostly elite—groups successfully manipulated American memories of Germany after the second World War to promote the Cold War narrative.

In his review, Anderson commends Etheridge's historiographical breadth and willingness to engage with

reception studies, incorporating data from film screenings, surveys, television ratings, and letters to assess how Americans came to view the Germans as "good." Casey shares Anderson's enthusiasm, writing that Etheridge provides "a novel way of re-examining a well-known story" in "a wide ranging, theoretically rich, and highly nuanced account." The reviewers also appreciate Etheridge's longer time frame in studying German-American relations that dates back to the first waves of German settlement in the American colonial period, thus demonstrating the malleable nature of German identity in American public opinion in the *longue durée*. As Seipp writes, "the stereotype of Germans as militaristic and authoritarian developed fairly late."

Of course, all the reviewers find omissions and room for improvement as well. Anderson questions whether the use of the two narratives challenges us to rethink the place of Germany in American memory and laments the lack of serious discussion about East Germany. Anderson would also welcome more discussion of Etheridge's major claim that the 1960s were the critical turning point for raising mainstream awareness of the Holocaust in the United States rather than the 1978 NBC miniseries *Holocaust*. Casey adds to this point, noting the fragmentation of American memories of Germany during the 1960s, even though the Cold War narrative ultimately held. And Seipp refers to Etheridge's discussion of the Holocaust as "underdeveloped." Casey would also have liked to see more discussion of former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the U.S. Congress as important actors in determining American perceptions of Germany, as well as some reflection on the comparative ease of rehabilitating Germany versus Japan, especially given the lack of racism toward Germany. Moreover, Seipp points to the problematic lack of discussion in the book about the fifteen million American military personnel, civilians, and dependents in Germany between 1945 and 1995, who undoubtedly served as a formidable PR machine for the Cold War narrative upon their return to the United States.

In responding to the main points made by the reviewers and noting some of the areas of research that await future scholars, Etheridge advances the dialogue. He reiterates his commitment to his integrated approach of studying the aims of public diplomacy as well as the unpredictable reception of these attempts. He also continues to wrestle with some of the gaps in his story in terms of how American conceptions of "Germanness" evolved. Ultimately, his book

has left us with larger questions to ponder: for Anderson, the continued relevance of American perceptions of Germany; for Seipp, the fate of the German-American relationship now that the American presence in Germany is so greatly reduced; and, for Casey, how the American experience with Germany can potentially guide the United States in rehabilitating other adversaries in American public opinion. *Enemies to Allies* promises to promote much debate for a long time to come as we think about memory diplomacy in both shaping national identity and ensuring how nations become and remain friends.

Review of Brian C. Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*

Steven Casey

The basic story at the heart of Brian Etheridge's book is familiar to anyone with even a passing knowledge of Cold War history. Germany had been the United States' principal enemy during World War II, but by the 1950s, West Germany, revived with Marshall Plan aid, became one of Washington's key allies before emerging as a democratic state and member of NATO. Yet in this excellent book, Etheridge achieves what all first-rate historians should aim for. In a wide ranging, theoretically rich, and highly nuanced account, he has provided a novel way of re-examining a well-known story.

Etheridge begins by placing America's Cold War policy toward Germany in a longer time frame. Delving all the way back to the first waves of German settlement in the colonial era, he convincingly argues that the initial American images of Germany derived from the experience of German immigrants to the New World. Only when key events intervened—most notably, German unification in 1871 and the two world wars of the twentieth century—did the bulk of the country start to dwell on German actions. Etheridge then argues, in one of the book's recurring themes, that the American state played a crucial role in the emergence of the dominant American view of Germany. During both world wars, presidential leadership was particularly important, although Franklin Roosevelt's halting statements after Pearl Harbor bequeathed a suitably uncertain legacy.

Indeed, as Etheridge points out, the most striking thing about this "world war narrative, which stressed tales of the enduring power of Nazism and fascism in postwar Germany," was its fragility. Within a few years of the Third Reich's complete collapse, it had been superseded by a dominant "Cold War narrative, which focused on stories of German heroism in the face of Soviet totalitarianism" (57). This change from enemy to friend is the book's focus, and it is here that Etheridge's sophisticated methodology reaps rich dividends.

At one level, Etheridge is adept at showing how key events fueled the ascendancy of the Cold War narrative. Initially, the American tendency to view both the Nazi and Soviet threats in totalitarian terms provided the narrative's intellectual underpinning, for it not only eased the switch from the wartime indictment of the Nazi regime to the excoriation of the Stalinist state, it emphasized the guilt of just a small number of leading officials, thereby exonerating the bulk of the German population from what had happened during the Third Reich. By 1946, media images of "rubble women" scabbling for a living amid the squalor of bombed-out ruins added an emotional rationale for the narrative (125). And then came the Berlin Blockade. Throughout the book, Etheridge shows how Berlin had "a special appeal in the U.S." From Stalin's effort in 1948 to prevent Western access to its occupation zones through to the various crises of the 1950s and 1960s, Berlin became, in

American discourse, "a bipolar world in which light and darkness, goodness and evil, capitalism and communism battled for the souls of the German people" (85–7).

For Etheridge, though, this chronological trajectory is only a small part of the story. Far more important is the role of a number of key actors, with the American state leading the way. Imbued with prestige after winning the war, government officials wielded powerful tools. As well as aggressive information campaigns and behind-the-scenes attempts to influence the mass media, Etheridge shows how military authorities in the initial postwar era employed access and censorship to prevent journalists from writing about "the continued existence of Nazism in German society" (66). Even Drew Middleton of the *New York Times*, whose deep-seated loathing of Germany dated back to his time as a war correspondent covering the central battles against Hitler's Reich, found it difficult to persist with his "world war narrative" when he was the *Times'* chief German correspondent in the late 1940s.

But with propaganda still a dirty word to most Americans, the U.S. government also relied on other outlets to influence the Cold War narrative. Building on the work of those historians who have examined the activities of state-private networks, Etheridge explores the government's relationship with Hollywood, public intellectuals, and leading pressure groups. But what really stands out is his focus on a non-American actor. Keen not to be constricted by the concept of "collective memory," which "suggests an exclusively domestic focus," Etheridge shows the value of "prosthetic memory." "Any actor," he writes, "can fashion and promote a memory narrative in a society; there is no requirement that the actor or the narrative have an organic relationship" (4–5).

In practice, this approach translates into an analysis of the role played by the West German government in trying to ensure that the Cold War narrative remained dominant inside the United States. From the 1950s, German officials in Bonn kept an anxious eye on American popular attitudes. Crucially, they also recruited public-relations experts like Roy Bernard, who worked successfully to place favorable stories in a range of outlets, including *Woman's Day* and *Look*. In 1953, Bernard even helped *Time* write a story on Konrad Adenauer, which subsequently contributed to the West German chancellor being named the magazine's "Man of the Year."

While this impressive informal coalition worked hard to cement the Cold War narrative, those who sought to keep memories of the war alive faced a much tougher task. This was partly because the liberal and Jewish groups who tended to oppose the Cold War narrative were often divided among themselves. But they were also operating in an inclement political environment, where anyone who did not join the Cold War consensus ran the risk of being treated as a procommunist traitor.

Not until the 1960s did the situation begin to change. Again, events were partly responsible. Etheridge shows how the desecration of a synagogue in Cologne, the election of a former Nazi as German chancellor, and the Eichmann trial generated a growing sense of unease in the United States about Germany's past, especially among American Jewish groups. But the American government also played a role: both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were more inclined, at least in private, to dwell on "Germany's past aggression in framing current foreign policy subjects." And then there was William Shirer's best-selling book, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, which laid the blame for World War II crimes on much more than just a small Nazi elite, as well as the movie *Judgment at Nuremberg*, which likewise touched on the guilt of the entire German nation.

Etheridge's already-crowded cast of characters swells still further in the 1960s. The reason is simple. As the Cold War consensus fragmented, so did American memories

of Germany. Increasingly, the dominant narrative was challenged by the New Left and the Goldwater right. Additional problems were caused by the changing nature of the media, especially television, which, as Etheridge points out, was the outlet “that German officials seemed most worried about, given its extensive influence in American society” (210). Yet ultimately, the dominant narrative was never overturned. Germany, in the minds of most Americans, had become safe. It was a country with a polity like their own. It was rarely viewed “as an incomprehensible ‘other’” (280).

Etheridge gives due weight to the West German government’s role in the development of this trend during the 1970s and 1980s, crediting Helmut Kohl’s administration, in particular, with a continued sensitivity to American representations of wartime Germany. I think, though, that he could have made more of the Helmut Schmidt chancellorship, for that was when relations between the two sides threatened to reach their postwar nadir. Schmidt’s relations with Carter were worse even than Nixon’s with Brandt. It would have been interesting to know how much the West Germans worried about American reactions at a time when Schmidt—described in one recent book as a “world chancellor”—was playing an increasingly assertive role on the international stage.

Another main actor that could be said to be conspicuous by its absence is Congress. In a book that focuses on images of Germany, this is probably, to be sure, a legitimate oversight. The Marshall Plan was passed by consensus in 1948; there was a joint Democrat-Republican, executive-legislative agreement on the necessity of reviving Germany. Thereafter, presidential-congressional or partisan clashes tended to be more vicious and focused on non-European issues like China or Korea. Still, the complexity and sophistication of Etheridge’s work provides a timely reminder that historians not only need to explore the many non-state actors in order to understand how society remembers and conceives of foreign-policy issues; they also must remember that the United States is in some ways a weak state in which power is separated. As Etheridge makes clear, even at the height of the Cold War consensus, the U.S. government’s ability to make its case aggressively was restricted by Congress’s enactment of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948. On other issues, successive administrations often struggled to pass anything through Congress. Whenever an issue reached a committee or the floor, legislators had an important opening to develop their own narratives. Sometimes, in desperation, government officials oversold their arguments, distorting the debate. Congress, in short, is invariably yet another of those voices clamoring to be heard in the noise of an American debate, and often it is a powerful one.

One final observation is in order. Etheridge’s book looks at the specific reasons for Americans’ tendency to view Germany as a friend, not an enemy, so soon after World War II. To prove his point, he utilizes movies to good effect, from *The Desert Fox* to *The Battle of the Bulge*. While these films all reinforce his central point about how different American groups reacted to particular images of wartime Germany, I was reminded of another Cold War movie, *The Mouse that Roared*, in which Peter Sellers plays the Machiavellian prime minister of a tiny European duchy who decides to declare war on the United States and then surrender immediately, because he believed that Americans always rebuild the economy of a country they have just defeated.

What this classic 1959 British film suggests is that the switch from enemies to allies might be a common phenomenon. If so, Germany is perhaps an easy case: a nation that large numbers of Americans had emigrated from and that even during the depths of World War II had been depicted with a degree of ambiguity by propagandists,

who had focused on the regime, not the people, as the key enemy. Put another way, memories of the European war had none of the racial and emotional baggage that infused the Pacific conflict and had to be overcome before Americans could view Japan as an ally rather than an enemy.

In this excellent book, Etheridge has performed a valuable service by exploring American memories of Germany in great depth and sophistication. Still, it would be interesting to know whether there are also more general factors at work that might explain the broader process by which old enemies are rehabilitated. At a time when the U.S. government is making halting, stuttering efforts to view enemies like Cuba and Iran in a more positive light—efforts that are vigorously opposed by partisan opponents in Congress—this fine book ought to act as a spur to drive this larger question.

Review of Brian C. Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*

Adam R. Seipp

Paul Pokriefke, the narrator of Günter Grass’s 2002 novel *Crabwalk*, wearily concludes that the history of Germany’s twentieth century is much “like a clogged toilet. We flush and flush, but the sh*t keeps rising.” In this deftly written and often fascinating book, Brian Etheridge looks at how the American public and policymakers understood the German past, particularly Germany’s descent into dictatorship, war, and state-directed mass murder during the Third Reich. He catalogs the many ways that this history has influenced the attitudes of Americans toward Germany, the events of the seven decades since 1945 and, ultimately, Americans themselves. As he demonstrates, Germany played an outsized role in American discussions of what it meant to be American and how the United States should act in the world of the Cold War and beyond. His book is a valuable contribution to a more sophisticated understanding of transatlantic relations and to the study of the American role in the post-1945 world.

Etheridge frames an ambitious set of goals. He begins by outlining what he terms “memory diplomacy,” which he uses “to show how the *means* of public diplomacy can be used to carry out the *ends* of public memory work” (6). It strikes me that ends and means here are essentially interchangeable, and I think that there is a good deal of slippage between the two as the book goes on. This is not necessarily a problem for Etheridge’s main argument, but it does speak to the difficulty of finding space in the now very crowded field of memory studies.

With admirable clarity, Etheridge lays out the two narrative frameworks through which Americans understood Germany (here he means the Federal Republic of Germany; the German Democratic Republic is explicitly excluded). The first was the “Cold War narrative.” This was the story of a Federal Republic that yearned to be westernized and stood with the United States as a bulwark against the Soviet domination of Europe. Its proponents linked Soviet and Nazi tyranny and focused on Berlin as a symbol of plucky resistance to totalitarianism. The second was the “World War narrative,” which focused on German belligerency and racism. In this version, German revanchism and brutality lay just under the placid surface of the Federal Republic, waiting for a chance to re-emerge.

In his first chapter, Etheridge focuses on images of Germany and Germans before the Second World War. While this chapter is not terribly well integrated into the rest of the book, it makes some valuable points. Chief among them is that the stereotype of Germans as militaristic and authoritarian developed fairly late. In the nineteenth-century United States, migrants from German-speaking Europe were common and were subject

to a variety of prejudices. English-speaking Americans criticized these Germans *avant la lettre* for their perceived social backwardness and clannishness and doubted whether they were suited for democratic life. It was only after the creation of a German empire in 1871 that German-speakers became associated with a state and a successful and aggressive military. Even then, Germany was widely admired as a place of science, education, and philosophy. It was still the nation of poets and thinkers (*Dichter und Denker*) and not yet one of judges and hangmen (*Richter und Henker*).

This ambivalence, which even survived World War I in limited form, had real implications at the end of World War II that Etheridge might have explored in more depth. The Allied Control Council in 1947 took the remarkable step of abolishing the state of Prussia, which it held responsible for German militarism. This largely symbolic gesture highlighted the persistent idea that the German people had been misled by a bellicose ruling elite and made it much easier to envision the rehabilitation of a demilitarized and denazified Germany.

During the first decade and a half of the Cold War, the politics of anti-communist consensus gave the Cold War narrative a tremendous advantage. In the best part of the book, Etheridge provides a fascinating glimpse into the formal and informal networks of activists who promoted the Federal Republic's interests in the United States. These included, but were by no means limited to, the governments of the United States and West Germany. The tireless advocacy of transatlantic interlocutors like Christopher Emmet, one of the founders of the American Council on Germany, did much to counter fears about a resurgent German state. At the same time, the Adenauer government conducted sophisticated public relations work of its own. That included hiring a New York public relations firm, Roy Bernard, which had the additional advantage, from the German perspective, of being owned by American Jews (76). This part of the book, which draws heavily from German archives, is particularly compelling.

In the face of this coalition of interests, skeptical voices found very little purchase. The Society for the Prevention of World War III, a misbegotten effort headed by detective story writer Rex Stout, slipped into obscurity as its activities were reduced by the 1950s to dark warnings about future German-Soviet conspiracies. Etheridge also shows that American-Jewish groups, which might have played a more prominent role in these debates, were often cautious about appearing anti-American or showing any hint of sympathy for communism. Etheridge is sufficiently nuanced here, but he could have done more to discuss the private attitudes of American Jews, who might not have been demonstrative in their mistrust of German rehabilitation but who often elected not to visit or purchase products associated with the "Land of the Perpetrators."

Throughout the book, but particularly in this section, Etheridge makes generally effective use of film and other cultural products. He examines movies made about, and often in, the rubble of defeated Germany, like *The Search*, *A Foreign Affair*, and *The Big Lift*. For American audiences, Germany became a feminized entity, symbolized by "Rubble Women" (*Trümmerfrauen*) and in need of rescue by manly American power. *The Big Lift* might actually not be the best example of this phenomenon, since the captivating widow played by Cornell Borchers turns out to be an unrepentant Nazi who plans to betray one of the heroes.

The end of the age of consensus in the mid-1960s also meant a fracturing of American public discussion of Germany. Despite efforts by successive American administrations to link the freedom of West Berlin to the global campaign against communism in places like Indochina, the Kennedy and Johnson years saw far less support for German efforts to craft American public

perceptions of the country and its people. The Eichmann trial, increasing evidence of far-right activity in Germany, and the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union created space for a more critical, or at least nuanced, view of Germany in the United States.

The 1960s present an excellent opportunity to consider the transatlantic dimensions of this multifaceted debate, something that Etheridge might have done more of. As he notes, civil rights activists in the United States framed those who supported Jim Crow as fascists and Nazis and were aided enormously by the willingness of some of their opponents to behave thuggishly (204–5). In Germany a few years later, the nascent student movement used the Vietnam War as a rhetorical device to attack their parents' generation for what the students held to be the moral cowardice and complicity of German society during the Third Reich. The unrest of the 1960s on both sides of the Atlantic drew from an emerging vocabulary of critique derived from the Second World War. Activists, ideas, and tactics circulated within this Atlantic conversation, with profound implications for all states and societies involved.

As the book goes on, its focus starts to slip. The discussion of the Holocaust (266–78) is underdeveloped. Daniel Goldhagen's 1997 volume *Hitler's Willing Executioners* was, there is no doubt, a publishing sensation on both sides of the Atlantic. However, I would argue that Etheridge overestimates its importance in shaping American discussions of the causes of the Holocaust. Ironically, it was probably more influential in Germany, where its success was at least partially due to Goldhagen's suggestion that Germans suddenly and dramatically emerged from centuries of eliminationist anti-Semitism sometime in the spring of 1945.

There is a large donut hole in the middle of this study that certainly merits more consideration. Etheridge does not address the experiences of the more than fifteen million American service personnel, civilian employees, and dependents who spent time in the Federal Republic between 1945 and 1995. Many of the officers and career enlisted personnel stationed in Germany, particularly in the early years of the American presence, had fought the Germans during World War II and now found themselves living in the Federal Republic as a "protective power" (*Schutzmacht*) and ally. While it would be too simplistic to suggest that all of these Americans took full advantage of their time in Germany to form friendships and experience all that the country had to offer, many of them did. In addition, many of them brought home, along with their cuckoo clocks, mass-produced prints of half-timbered houses, and stories about Rhine River cruises, views of Germany that were often very difficult to reconcile with the narrative of Germans as humorless militarists. The accounts of German life that they shared with millions of Americans in the United States probably did as much as any public relations firm to shift American attitudes toward Germany and its people.

While much of this discussion is beyond the scope of Etheridge's book, it does raise a research agenda for the future. Because of range of factors, including the cultural affinities that Etheridge discusses, the geographic reach of the American presence in the Federal Republic, and the sheer durability of American military communities there, the degree of entanglement between Germans and Americans was, if not unique, certainly very rare in the history of foreign military basing. With the American footprint in the Berlin Republic now much reduced, what will the consequences be for grassroots cultural and political understanding between two states with a critical role to play in the transatlantic alliance?

I enjoyed reading this book. There are lots of valuable insights into the nature of the German-American relationship, the writing is judicious and economical, and

the argument is laid out with admirable clarity. Etheridge writes in his acknowledgments that the book has been “a long time coming” (283). He clearly used that time to develop a highly coherent argument and to dig up a remarkable range of sources that enhance our understanding of the history of foreign relations and diplomacy. *Enemies to Allies* is a really fine book, one that I think will benefit specialists in a range of subjects as well as students and interested readers who want to better understand the complex historical relationship between the United States and Germany.

Review of Brian C. Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*

Stewart Anderson

I received my copy of *Enemies to Allies* shortly before an early summer research trip to Berlin. A few days after my arrival, I placed the book in my backpack, intending to start reading it on my way to the archive. When I entered the subway car, however, my eyes were drawn to the “Berliner Fenster” television screens that for several years have graced the ceilings of most U-Bahn lines. The screens that day advertised a lecture entitled “Americans in Berlin” at the Landeszentrale für politische Bildung. The young German couple seated next to me noticed the ad as well and wondered aloud whether the lecturer would mention JFK’s famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech. A few minutes later, as I pulled out the book and started perusing the table of contents, it occurred to me that this brief episode neatly demonstrates the continued relevance of American perceptions of Germany; more than seventy years after the end of WWII, Germans (and, it should be added, the Americans who study them) are still fascinated by an American president’s rather mundane gesture of solidarity in the context of the Cold War.

Enemies to Allies does not center on German interpretations of American memories, of course, though Etheridge spends quite a bit of time examining that angle. At its core, the book is about American collective memory. Etheridge argues that perceptions and representations of Germany played a foundational role in establishing the broader contours of American identity between the end of WWII and the late 1960s. These depictions and understandings, he claims, fell into two general narratives. On the one hand, many Americans, including numerous politicians and artists, held to wartime notions that Germans could not be trusted with democracy and freedom. Following in the footsteps of the abandoned Morgenthau Plan, these voices clamored for protection from German aggression and for limiting Germans’ role in rebuilding postwar Europe. Etheridge dubs this the “World War” narrative. On the other hand, a powerful combination of political expediency, West German lobbying, and the ever-increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union gave rise to a Cold War narrative in which Germans were cast as hard-working victims of a Nazi cabal.

To historians of modern Germany, this basic taxonomy, as well as the ultimate victory of the Cold War narrative, will not come as a surprise. The well-worn touchstones of this era in the Federal Republic—Adenauer’s meteoric rise, the Berlin airlift, the economic miracle, and worldwide outrage at the erection of the Berlin Wall—presuppose a conciliatory postwar discourse among the Western allies. Nevertheless, *Enemies to Allies* is an innovative, even path-breaking monograph. It describes American understandings of Germany with nuance and specificity. Etheridge carefully considers each actor and organization within the intricate web of memorial contestation. Jewish interest groups, for instance, did not approach the question of how to represent or perceive Germans in lockstep, nor did they even split into two opposing camps. A multiplicity of positions emerged,

and Etheridge skillfully mines archival documents and newspapers to provide a rich overview of Jewish responses to Hollywood films, persistent anti-Semitism in Germany, the Adölf Eichmann trial, and other flashpoints. The book is a masterful combination of diplomatic and cultural history.

Enemies to Allies resolutely assumes that actors can manipulate a community’s memories and that the “authentic trappings” of a memory culture, as Etheridge puts it, are less important than the study of those who facilitate said memories. Since the cultural turn of the 1980s, historians have endlessly debated the appropriate relationship between collective memory and the writing of academic history. At the heart of the issue, as Kerwin Lee Klein pointed out more than a decade ago, is the sense that memory is organic and perhaps more real than historical inference. With this in mind, many historians have tried to infuse their work with a broader, more popular significance by adding a memory dimension. Following Alison Landsberg and her influential book, *Prosthetic Memory*, Etheridge rejects this angle, instead describing a memory discourse that has been carefully constructed and manipulated by elite actors.

This approach runs against the grain of most recent scholarship. Studying memory allows historians to find exciting spaces of contestation and resistance to an era’s dominant narrative. In spite of the unusual tack Etheridge takes, however, to my mind a charge of determinism is unwarranted. With a background in diplomatic history and public diplomacy, Etheridge differs radically in his entry point from the original practitioners of memory studies in the 1980s and 1990s. For them, oral histories and artistic representations offered a glimpse into history as a lived, cultural experience. For Etheridge, it is a way to delve deeper and more convincingly into the realm of public diplomacy. As he puts it, an “important part of the study of memory diplomacy is looking at how ‘communities of memory’ . . . formed around these narratives.”

Moreover, in spite of the somewhat ominous terms he employs in the introduction—“manipulate” and “facilitate,” for example—in the meat of the book Etheridge seems keenly aware of the ultimate unpredictability of the production of collective memory. His treatment of the 1961 film *Judgment at Nuremberg* neatly demonstrates this point. Released in the midst of a carefully manicured atmosphere of consensus and reconciliation, the film, with its blunt discussion of German guilt, raised serious concerns among both American and West German officials. Drawing on audience responses in San Francisco and Berlin, Etheridge explains that the public’s reaction to the film caught worried authorities (and the film’s producers) completely off guard. Rather than reinforcing negative perceptions of Germans, the film elicited a surprising variety of reactions from viewers. They applied their own interpretive lenses to what they saw, even drawing parallels between 1930s Germany and 1960s America. Other examples of the unpredictability of reception—particularly in relation to the unexpectedly rapid rise of television—also appear in the book’s pages.

Indeed, the book’s greatest strength is precisely this willingness to engage with reception studies. Etheridge investigates viewer data from film screenings, social scientific surveys, television ratings, and even letters to politicians in West Berlin to gauge Americans’ responses to the growing Cold War consensus about the “good Germans.” One can well imagine a successful book that does not go out of its way to include such extensive reactions; it would be perfectly reasonable, for example, for an author to conclude that the confluence of various artistic and political actors in constructing a defined narrative is sufficient in and of itself. But Etheridge insists on leaving this comfort zone, and he treats the reader to some enjoyable popular corroborations of these narratives. I particularly appreciated his inclusion of American letters to the mayors of Berlin. One correspondent went so far as to proudly proclaim that

she planned to name her dachshund “Willy Brandt.”

The scope of Etheridge’s accomplishment can also be seen in his decision, in the first chapter, to extend his consideration of American conceptions of Germans all the way back to the colonial period. Drawing on both primary and secondary sources, he looks first at the contradictory ways in which early colonists saw their German neighbors: they were at once industrious, frugal, immoral, ignorant, and deviant. It is an engrossing chapter (although one wonders whether, in a pre-Napoleonic era, the colonists really thought of their neighbors as “Germans” instead of “Dutchmen” or “Palatines”). Etheridge then quickly moves on to the nineteenth century. Here he can draw on a growing scholarly awareness of the cohesiveness and vibrancy of the German-American community before the catastrophe of the Great War. The discussion of these earlier stereotypes and representations serves an important purpose, setting the tone for what he describes throughout the rest of the book as the malleable nature of German identity.

In spite of its superb historiographical breadth and admirable attempt to grapple with reception, the book feels a bit flat in terms of its analytical categories. The dichotomy between the World War and the Cold War narratives doubtless reflects the source material Etheridge draws on, particularly at the highest diplomatic levels. But the use of these categories does not challenge the reader to rethink the place of Germany in American memory. Rather, it refines and solidifies what scholars have long known (or suspected) about the Cold War. Especially when viewed from the perspective of Thomas Lindenberger and Christoph Classen’s recent observations about the limits of the binary, oppositional model so often chosen by postwar historians, the Cold War narrative feels a bit limiting.

These self-imposed categorical limitations in part explain another shortcoming of *Allies to Enemies*: the lack of any extensive discussions about East Germany in American collective memory. Etheridge justifies this exclusion, noting that “the relationship of the past to the present in East Germany was not contested in the United States” (288). To be sure, there can be few qualms about focusing on the West. In American eyes, the GDR lacked legitimacy and thus could only ever be a poor reflection of postwar German-ness. Moreover, one can hardly fault Etheridge for failing to write what would amount to a book within a book. Nevertheless, in the wake of an abundance of scholarship on the common culture that existed across the border, in particular by Konrad Jarausch, Uta Poiger, and Peter Bender, the omission does seem a bit surprising. In one short section, Etheridge nicely encapsulates American responses to the 1953 uprisings; why not also consider, for example, the East German persecution of Protestants?

Finally, Etheridge asserts that the 1960s proved pivotal in the establishment of mainstream awareness of the Holocaust in the United States. He points to strong responses on the part of American Jewish organizations in the wake of the Eichmann trial and a series of newspaper articles on the subject as evidence of a burgeoning interest. More important, he claims that the 1978 NBC miniseries *Holocaust*, often cited as the major turning point in public consciousness of that event and the beginning of an entire memory industry, drew on a vocabulary established more than a decade earlier. He goes even further, arguing that “it was straightjacketed by the limited talents of the producers, the demands of television, and the gross intrusion of commercials” (271). This is a bold claim, one that in short

order upends decades’ worth of scholarly consensus about the pivotal nature of the broadcast (in America but more especially in West Germany). It is therefore somewhat puzzling that Etheridge promotes such a radical thesis within the context of a very short chapter, “Representations of Germany since the 1960s.” I do not think that he is necessarily wrong about the Holocaust; on the contrary, his unique perspective as a diplomatic historian seems a welcome counterpoint to long-held assumptions among media historians. Rather, one wonders why the subject is broached at all in the context of a monograph which, by design, treats events since the 1970s only in a cursory fashion.

On the whole, however, none of these deficiencies should be seen as particularly detrimental to the ambitious project Etheridge has undertaken here. As the author notes in his acknowledgments, this book had been germinating for a long time; given the disparate historiographical approaches one needs to harness to even attempt such a project, that is no surprise. To his immense credit, Etheridge demonstrates that he possesses the master’s touch of a seasoned, widely read academic. The book will appeal to historians of many different theoretical stripes and, significantly, to scholars working on both sides of the Atlantic.

Author’s Response

Brian C. Etheridge

It is a great honor and privilege to have the opportunity to engage with such thoughtful scholars about ideas that you have spent so long (perhaps too long) thinking about. What makes it even more enjoyable is the diverse range of perspectives that they bring to bear on the book (for which the editor of *Passport* is to be commended). All of the contributors are equipped to speak with authority on the issues that I address, but they all come at the subject from such different vantage points that it creates a kaleidoscope effect: Steven Casey turns the book one way and sees one thing, Adam Seipp turns it another and sees things a little differently, and Stewart Anderson twists it in yet a different direction and observes something different still. While I deeply appreciate the many kind things that they say, I am drawn more to the panoptic effect of their cumulative response. It is as if they have surveilled the research process from the beginning, watching me as I wrestled with each difficult decision. They raise so many good and challenging questions that it is tempting just to ignore them completely and quote the famous German scholar Hans Schultz: “I know nothing. I see nothing. I hear nothing.”

But that wouldn’t be any fun. Nor would it take advantage of what I see as the greatest contribution that these roundtables make to the broader conversation about their subjects: namely, a discussion of the messy, sausage-making process used in addressing the agonizing set of choices that ultimately shape the contours of the stories books tell. Accordingly, I would like to share the reasons for some of the decisions I made in putting this story together and in the process use these explanations as an opportunity to extend my participation in these important conversations a little further.

First, I would like to discuss the organizing framework for the book, which is what I call “memory diplomacy.” All of the contributors touch on my effort to formulate a way of understanding and connecting the sometimes seemingly disparate phenomena covered in the book. Casey and

Anderson are right to point out that my perspective in writing the book was driven more by the literature of public diplomacy and that the connection with public memory was more of a way to deepen my understanding of that practice in this particular context. In putting the framework together, I was trying to make sense of the evidence I was finding about both the aims of the public diplomacy initiatives (the identities of the actors and their explicit efforts to address the past) and the unpredictable reception of these initiatives (how the lived experiences of Americans often led to resistance or re-appropriation).

In that sense, I understand and acknowledge Seipp's concern that there could be a "good deal of slippage" between the posited "means of public diplomacy" and the "ends of public memory work." My hope, however, was to create more of an integrated concept that takes into account both the policymaking (which has been the focus of public diplomacy) and the meaning-making (which has been more the concern of public memory studies). I also wanted to craft a fused concept that would also allow the literatures associated with both public diplomacy and public memory studies (their questions, methods, etc.) to engage with and inform one another, again in the context of this specific study.

Using this lens, I wanted to show that the contestations (diplomatic, political, and cultural) over the meaning of Germanness in the early Cold War (defined here as 1945–1969) provided an enduring set of patterns and symbols that continued to reverberate over the rest of the century. To that end, I sought to consider the vast expanse of American engagement with Germans and Germany but spend the lion's share of my time in these crucial decades detailing what I saw as the most important actors, issues, and events related to answering this big question, the German Question. But even with this narrower focus and greater space allotment, an agonizing amount of relevant material was left on the cutting room floor, to say nothing of the fascinating and highly relevant issues that Casey, Seipp, and Anderson raise that I didn't even hazard to undertake in any systematic way. What of East Germany, asks Anderson? I didn't even try to address the German Democratic Republic, not only because it would threaten to explode an already bulging study, but also because I saw it as outside the scope of the central theme. The broadly shared understanding of the imposed nature of the East German communist regime meant that events there, to the extent that they were known, did not really impinge on the American understanding of Germanness. But I know that there is a fascinating story there.

Casey wonders about Congress. I do too. At times, I tiptoed into those waters and found some useful material. But again, for the story I was trying to tell, it didn't pay to dwell too long on that subject, although I think an excellent narrative remains to be told. Seipp points out a "donut hole" in the book—the story of American military personnel and their dependents and their influence on the American public. I agree that this is a fascinating subject. Again, I touch on it a few times in the narrative, but I couldn't do it justice in light of what I was attempting to explain. I look forward to reading his treatment of this topic. Over and over, when confronted with these lacunae (and others, including Jewish responses to the rehabilitation of Germany and the transatlantic protest movements in the 1960s), I found myself nodding my head vigorously, but ultimately, sullenly, coming back to why I had to say no in the first place.

Needless to say, the choices became even starker outside the main period of interest. If I flinched at occasionally having to shape and smooth out the unwieldy bumps in the early Cold War narrative for the sake of discerning and detailing the patterns related to my line of inquiry, then here I was almost tempted to cover my eyes when I found it necessary to flatten complex events for the sake of continuing the argument. The roundtable contributors noted that the chapter after the 1960s was particularly starched and ironed out. Seipp and Anderson thought more needed to be done with the Holocaust. Casey argued that Schmidt's chancellorship deserved more treatment. On these and other points, I agree. Again, in explaining my choices I would just say that I was attempting to ascertain if the ways of framing and understanding the German Question I had identified during the early Cold War continued into 1970s and beyond. And in these significant events and debates, I believe I found evidence that they had, although I readily admit and agree that these events may hold equal or even greater significance for other kinds of related inquiries. (For those interested in learning more about the fate of these kinds narratives during the post-sixties era, for example, I would suggest reading Jacob Eder's new book, *Holocaust Angst*.)

Finally, I think it is worthwhile to address Casey's last observation, because it brings up a completely different question. Most of my remarks here have addressed what I left out of my book in an effort to tell what I thought, at least, was a big story. But Casey poses a challenging query at the end that makes my big story seem rather small. "It would be interesting to know," he writes, "whether there are also more general factors at work that might explain the broader process by which old enemies are rehabilitated." This is an excellent comparative question. And I don't know the answer. All I can say is that the field of public diplomacy studies concerns itself precisely with these kinds of questions; and I hope that this study, and its use of a new concept, namely memory diplomacy, shows how messy attempts to answer such questions can get.

I would like to conclude on a personal note. Seipp and Anderson both comment on my remark that *Enemies to Allies* was a "long time coming." Both are generous in their interpretation of it, and there's no doubt that nary a day went by in the last decade or so that I didn't think about the subject. But life also intervened: I taught a lot, I took on more and more administrative responsibilities, we had three children, we moved three times—you get the drift. As a result, the end of the book seemed, maddeningly, always on the distant horizon, or worse, to get farther away at times. I say this because I have seen many colleagues, both those fortunate, like me, to find full-time employment in teaching-centered institutions, and those unable, often through no fault of their own, to snare an academic position, get caught up in the same trap, even though they have really important ideas and insights to share. For those in this predicament, I would like to stress that this enormously rewarding roundtable conversation proves, to me at least, that it was all worth it. In the end, as a wise mentor once taught me, the old admonition to "publish or perish" is not really referring to the fate of authors in a tenure system; instead, it is really about the viability of ideas. If the ideas are not shared, if they are not made public, then they perish. In this vein, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the editor and the contributors for giving me the opportunity to enliven these ideas a little longer through this engaging and stimulating dialogue.

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals on “Power, Publics, and the U.S. and the World” for its 2017 Annual Conference, to be held June 22-24 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, Virginia. Proposals must be submitted by **December 1, 2016**.

The production, exercise, and understanding of American power in the world takes many forms and touches myriad subjects. From exploring questions of strategy and statecraft to unpacking definitions of community, territory, and rights, scholars have illuminated the practice of American power and the many social and cultural processes that shape it. Members of various publics, domestic and foreign, also have commented on and constituted U.S. power. In policy and fiction, cultural production and political arrangement, scholars and their publics have worked—sometimes in tandem, sometimes at cross-purposes—to make meanings of the U.S. in the world.

SHAFR is dedicated to the study of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. This includes not only foreign relations, diplomacy, statecraft, and strategy but also other approaches to Americans’ relations with the wider world, including (but not limited to) global governance, transnational movements, religion, human rights, race, gender, trade and economics, immigration, borderlands, the environment, and empire. SHAFR welcomes those who study any time period from the colonial era to the present.

2017 Program

The conference will include a Thursday afternoon panel entitled, “Can Law Restrain War?” Participants will include:

Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor, Harvard Law School
Author of *The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration*

Helen M. Kinsella, Associate Professor in Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Author of *The Image Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between Combatant and Civilian*

John Fabian Witt, Allen H. Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Yale Law School
Author of *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History*

Moderator: **Mary L. Dudziak**, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University

The 2017 program will also host SHAFR’s fifth annual **Job Search Workshop** to help prepare our graduate student members for the job market. Students will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and CV’s from experienced faculty members. Those submitting proposals for the conference may indicate their interest in the workshop by checking a box on the online submission form. However, you do not have to be a panelist to participate. The Job Workshop is open to all current graduate students and newly minted Ph.D.’s. Priority will be given to first-time participants.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to holding as inclusive and diverse a conference as possible, and we encourage proposals from women, scholars of color, and historians residing outside of the United States, as well as scholars working in other disciplines (such as political science, anthropology, or American studies).

Graduate students, international scholars, and participants who expand the diversity of SHAFR are eligible to apply for fellowships to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see below and visit the Conference Online Application Gateway for the online application form. The deadline to apply for these fellowships is **December 1, 2016**.

The Program Committee especially welcomes panels that transcend conventional chronologies, challenge received categories, or otherwise offer innovative approaches and fresh thinking.

Panel sessions for the 2017 meeting will run one hour and forty-five minutes. A complete panel usually involves three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a roundtable discussion with a chair and three or four participants. The Committee is open to alternative formats, which should be described briefly in the proposal. Papers should be no longer than 20 minutes, or approximately 10 pages long. Papers must be shorter in situations where there are more than three paper presentations.

Applicants should note that a roundtable discussion differs from a panel session in that the former *necessarily* involves an expansive approach, with contributors exploring the historiographical or conceptual dimensions of a broadly defined theme, rather than delving into the details of more narrowly defined subjects.

Applicants are strongly encouraged to apply as part of a panel rather than submit individual paper proposals. Since complete panels with

Historians of American Foreign Relations and the United States in the World

coherent themes will be favored over single papers, those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the “panelists seeking panelists” forum or Tweet #SHAFR2017.

Policies

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via the procedures outlined at shafr.org. Applicants requiring alternative means to submit the proposal should contact the program co-chairs via e-mail at program-chair@shafr.org.

Proposals should list the papers in the order in which participants will present, as they will be printed in that order in the conference program and presented in that order during their session. Each participant may serve twice, each time in a different capacity. For example: you may serve once as a chair and once as a commentator; or once as panelist and once as chair or commentator. **No participant may appear on the program more than two times.**

AV requests, along with a brief explanation of how the equipment will be used, **must** be made at the time of application.

Any special **scheduling requests** (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) **must** be made at the time of application.

While membership in SHAFR is not required to submit panel or paper proposals, an annual membership for 2017 will be required for those who participate in the 2017 meeting. Enrollment instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

SHAFR and the media occasionally record conference sessions for use in broadcast and electronic media. Presenters who do not wish for their session to be recorded may opt out when submitting a proposal to the Program Committee. An audience member who wishes to audiotape or videotape must obtain written permission of panelists. SHAFR is not responsible for unauthorized recording. SHAFR reserves the right to revoke the registration of anyone who records sessions without appropriate permissions.

For more details about the conference hotel, the “panelists seeking panelists” forum, travel funding opportunities, and the Job Workshop, please visit the conference website.

We look forward to seeing you next June in Arlington!

SHAFR 2017 Program Committee

Robert Brigham (Vassar College) and Adriane Lentz-Smith (Duke University), co-chairs

Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants

In 2017, SHAFR will offer several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed \$300 per student; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make the decision regarding all awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications should consist of a concise letter from the prospective participant requesting funds and an accompanying letter from the graduate advisor confirming the unavailability of departmental funds to cover travel to the conference. These two items should be submitted via the on-line interface at the time the panel or paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s panel is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision. **Application deadline: December 1, 2016.**

SHAFR Global Scholars and Diversity Grants

SHAFR also offers competitive Global Scholars and Diversity Grants to help defray travel and lodging expenses for the 2017 annual meeting. The competition is aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting would add to the diversity of the Society. Preference will be given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. “Scholars” includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one- year membership in the organization, which includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*. Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short cv (2-page maximum) and a brief (2-3-paragraph) essay addressing the fellowship criteria (and including data on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received from SHAFR). Please submit your application via the on-line interface. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee’s decisions on panels, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s panel is accepted by the program committee in a separate decision.

Application deadline: December 1, 2016.

Still Missing: The Historiography of U.S. Intelligence

Hugh Wilford

In 1984, British historians Christopher Andrew and David Dilks declared intelligence the “missing dimension” of international history.¹ Fast forward thirty years, and UK intelligence history is thriving. Numerous history, politics, international relations, and American Studies departments offer courses on the subject. British government funding is available for major research projects, such as “Landscapes of Secrecy,” a recent four-year investigation into the history of the CIA by the Universities of Warwick and Nottingham that was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) to the tune of nearly half a million pounds. And the field is mature enough for younger specialists to be penning reflective historiographical essays about its development, often beginning with a fond invocation of Andrew and Dilks.²

Shift the focus across the Atlantic, however, and the scene looks very different. True, as is discussed below, individual scholars are producing work of great value, but intelligence history barely exists at U.S. universities, even as a subfield of the history of American foreign relations. Most scholarship about the subject is subsumed within “Intelligence Studies,” a discipline dominated by policy-oriented political scientists, including a number of former intelligence officers who are chiefly interested in improving the performance of the intelligence services—an important mission but not one necessarily shared by academic historians.³ Otherwise, intelligence history is largely the province of investigative journalists, whose research aims and methods have yielded many crucial revelations but again, are not those of professional scholars.⁴

If anything, the field has stepped backward in recent years: whereas the first edition of Michael Hogan’s landmark *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (1996) included an essay about intelligence (by John Ferris), the third edition, published in 2013, did not.⁵ This omission is forgivable, given that U.S. intelligence history does not really have a historiography in the sense of a conceptual debate between different schools of thought unfolding over time; rather, the literature on the subject is a diffuse collection of individual efforts united only by a common focus of attention.

The cause of this scholarly inattention to the covert dimensions of U.S. foreign relations history is not entirely clear. One obvious factor is the dearth of relevant, accessible official records and the often problematic nature of the declassified documents that are in the public realm. However, as the best work discussed below shows, it is possible to write sound intelligence history on the basis of other sources, such as documents in contiguous record groups or foreign government archives, personal papers, and oral history interviews. Other possible reasons for the sorry condition of the field include the reluctance of academic institutions and research funders to involve themselves in a subject shrouded by official secrecy. It is very difficult to imagine, say, the National Endowment for the Humanities—the U.S. equivalent of the AHRC—footing the bill for a major research network project about the history of the CIA. Then there is the vague air

of disreputability that seems to surround the subject in academic circles, perhaps the result of the simple fact that most professors do not much like the intelligence services and therefore are not inclined to encourage younger scholars to “go there” in their research.

Whatever its cause, this state of affairs seems, to me at least, extremely regrettable. The history of covert American foreign relations matters, profoundly. Granted, the jury is out on the question of whether intelligence in the narrow sense of the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of information about other nations has ever had much effect on U.S. foreign policy (see below), although one could surely argue that successive intelligence failures have been hugely consequential. However, the importance of intelligence, defined more broadly to include covert action, is so obvious as hardly to need stating. Throughout its existence, but especially during and after the Cold War, the American government used a variety of covert means to carry out its foreign policies, from paramilitary regime change to subtle ideological and cultural operations designed to win “hearts and minds.” If, as many scholars currently think, the United States was an empire, it was in large part a covert empire. Certainly, large numbers of foreigners came to perceive covert intervention as the most characteristic projection of American power in the world. Meanwhile, the secret state became a looming presence within U.S. society itself, both as a massive national security bureaucracy (according to one estimate, as many as four million people held top-secret security clearances in 2013) and as a nearly constant object of scrutiny, anxiety, and fantasy in American popular culture.⁶

In other words, the history of intelligence is too important for the field to be abandoned to political scientists and journalists. Historians of American foreign relations need to pay more attention to intelligence, and intelligence historians need to explain their subject in terms that will compel the attention and respect of their colleagues. A major aim of this article is to suggest some future directions for U.S. intelligence history that might help bring about these changes. To begin with, though, I will try to capture the current state of the field by surveying recent historical scholarship about intelligence, starting with general works on the subject and then focusing on the two main areas of intelligence operation: first, information gathering and analysis, and, second, covert action.

General works spanning the whole history of American intelligence are predictably thin on the ground, with the great majority of existing works focused on the years during and after World War II and on the premier U.S. intelligence organization, the CIA (which was not founded until 1947). Nonetheless, there are some exceptions. Christopher Andrew’s 1995 *For the President’s Eyes Only* surveys the relationship between intelligence and the U.S. presidency from the revolutionary era to the end of the Cold War (albeit with a bias toward the post-World War II era). Although a little dated now, it remains an excellent introductory text.

In *Cloak and Dollar* (2002), another eminent British

historian of American intelligence, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, provides a chronologically more even although somewhat episodic and often acerbic account of the evolution of both the foreign and domestic security services from the nation's founding through the 1990s. Here and elsewhere, Jeffreys-Jones argues that, contrary to the prevailing view of U.S. intelligence as only coming into existence in the 1940s, the product of the emergency conditions of that decade and British influence, in fact it had deep roots in American history.

While Jeffreys-Jones's take on this tradition is critical (in *Cloak and Dollar*, he refers to intelligence pioneers like Allan Pinkerton and John E. Wilkie as "confidence men"), some American scholars, writing from a political science or intelligence background, have spun it more positively. In their interpretation, evidence that successive U.S. presidents from Washington on used espionage and covert action as instruments of statecraft provides today's intelligence services with a legitimizing ancestry (see, for example, Stephen Knott's *Secret and Sanctioned*). Michael Warner is another intelligence insider; he served on the CIA's history staff and is now historian for the U.S. Cyber Command, but he achieves a neutral, thoughtful tone in *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence* (2014). An ambitious, sui generis effort to locate the U.S. secret services within a world historical context, Warner's book traces the evolution of intelligence from ancient origins through its modern institutionalization in national security bureaucracies to the digital revolution and the present-day erosion of the state intelligence monopoly.⁷

The supply of comprehensive histories of the CIA is more plentiful than the supply of general surveys of American intelligence, but it is still not abundant. For several years, the best such works were, again, by Britons: John Ranelagh's *The Agency* (1986) and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones's *The CIA and American Democracy* (1989, with a third edition published in 2003). The former is massive and impressively detailed, the second briefer but more scholarly; both still provide very valuable overviews of the CIA in the era of the Cold War.

In the last decade, these books have been joined by three other noteworthy narrative histories. *Safe For Democracy*, by John Prados, a prolific intelligence historian working out of the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, focuses on covert action as opposed to intelligence; it equals and sometimes surpasses Ranelagh's *The Agency* in its mastery of operational detail. Another hefty tome, *Legacy of Ashes*, by journalist Tim Weiner, won the 2007 National Book Award for Nonfiction and cornered the popular market in CIA history but drew critical responses from academic reviewers for its sensational style, its slighting of the Agency's intelligence mission despite its claims of comprehensiveness, and its relentlessly scornful attitude toward its subject.

Richard Immerman's 2014 *The Hidden Hand* offers a more balanced, scholarly interpretation. A former SHAFR president who served briefly in a senior analytical role in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Immerman gives equal time to intelligence and covert action in a concise but authoritative and well-referenced narrative. Adding to the interest of the book are the occasional redactions that appear in the text, testimony to Immerman's bruising encounter with the CIA prepublication review process following his stint with the ODNI (and a reminder of the secret state's interest in shaping the historical record about itself, which is a constant challenge to scholars in the field). *The Hidden Hand* originated in Immerman's contribution to *The Central Intelligence Agency*, a very useful reference work he edited along with several other leading U.S. intelligence historians in 2006. In addition to substantial essays by the editors on central themes in CIA history, this collection features an extensive annotated bibliography by veteran national security scholar Athan

Theoharis.⁸

Although general histories of the CIA tend to emphasize covert operations over intelligence gathering and analysis, there is a large specialist literature on the latter that is mainly though not exclusively the work of former intelligence analysts and journalists. What follows is a whistle-stop tour of the major works, broken down by method of intelligence collection (an expert synopsis of the subject itself is provided by John Prados in "A World of Secrets," his contribution to the edited volume *The Central Intelligence Agency*). Especially during the Cold War, aerial surveillance programs such as the U-2 spy plane and the CORONA satellite project were crucial to gauging enemy military and nuclear capabilities. Probably still the most useful single study of these and other forms of U.S. Cold War technological intelligence ("TECHINT") is *The Wizards of Langley*, a history of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology by National Security Archive fellow Jeffrey Richelson.

Another collection method, and a source of current political controversy, is signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications interception. Since 1952, the responsibility of the second most important U.S. foreign intelligence organization after the CIA, the National Security Agency, James Bamford, a former analyst-turned-journalist and proto-Edward Snowden, is the author of three big books on the NSA, but scholarly readers can also avail themselves of *The Secret Sentry*, a fairly comprehensive and well-researched single-volume work on the same subject by another ex-employee, Matthew Aid.

The oldest form of intelligence collection, human espionage or HUMINT, declined in importance during the Cold War but has enjoyed a revival since because of its importance in detecting terrorist threats. The world of spies, moles, and mole-hunters has long fascinated the public, and there is a vast journalistic literature on human intelligence and counter-intelligence, of greatly varying quality. Within this genre, the work of David Wise is outstanding, although Tom Mangold's biography of James Jesus Angleton remains the most detailed and readable biography of the CIA's legendary counter-intelligence chief.⁹

The analytical results of all this intelligence collection have been decidedly mixed. Some scholars, such as John Prados, are fairly positive in their evaluation of the U.S. intelligence services' performance during the Cold War. Despite some errors, such as its overestimation of Soviet stockpiles early in the superpower conflict, and its failure to predict (at least precisely) the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CIA got several important things right, in particular its detection of Soviet missiles on Cuba in 1962 (a success aided, incidentally, by human intelligence from Soviet defector Oleg Penkovsky).¹⁰ Prados and others have also made the point that the sometimes spectacular consequences of intelligence failure are by definition more obvious than the non-events that follow intelligence success. Nevertheless, few commentators would disagree that there have been too many spectacular failures since the end of the Cold War.¹¹

The efforts of political scientists and intelligence professionals to understand the causes of such failures have given rise to the most interesting debate in the field of Intelligence Studies. On one side are those who believe that the fault lies with politicians who either pressure the analysts into delivering estimates suited to preordained policy outcomes or cherry-pick existing intelligence—a practice known as "politicization."¹² According to Richard Immerman, such selectivity need not be deliberate. Borrowing from research in cognitive psychology, he argues that successive post-World War II presidents unconsciously filtered out intelligence that disconfirmed their existing beliefs about foreign policy.¹³

Some eminent political scientists have carried this sort of epistemological pessimism into the realm of intelligence

collection and analysis itself. Robert Jervis, for example, after examining two case studies of intelligence error, the CIA's failure to predict the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its mistaken claims about WMD in Iraq, concludes that problems inherent in the analytical process and institutional culture of the intelligence community make failure inevitable; Richard Betts takes a similar view, suggesting that attempts to reform intelligence only make matters worse.¹⁴ Some practitioners have held out against this rather tragic conception of intelligence, insisting that success can be achieved through a combination of good tactical-level analysis and open-minded policymakers, but such optimism seems to be rare at the moment.¹⁵

The convoluted bureaucratic process by which the CIA acquired peacetime powers of covert operation in the early years of the Cold War is clearly explained in the first chapter of Richard Immerman's *Hidden Hand*; readers wishing for a more detailed account may turn to Sarah-Jane Corke's *U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy*. Scholars are generally agreed that George Kennan was the key official pushing for the "inauguration of organized political warfare," to quote the title of a key memorandum he authored in May 1948; a recent *Diplomatic History* article by Scott Lucas and Kaeten Mistry explores his role in that effort, which he later came to regret. A number of works have attempted to recreate the aristocratic social milieu that shaped the first generation of CIA covert operatives. Based on extensive interviews and special access to still-classified Agency records, *The Very Best Men* by journalist Evan Thomas remains the richest evocation of this world. Although not focused on the Agency as such, Robert Dean's *Imperial Brotherhood* is a highly illuminating socio-cultural study of the Cold War foreign policy elite to which top CIA officials belonged.¹⁶

Not content merely with containing communism, Kennan and his colleagues planned to destroy the Soviet empire itself. Gregory Mitrovich's *Undermining the Kremlin*, which won the Bernath Book Prize, documents the strategic dimensions of this campaign; Stephen Long's 2014 *The CIA and the Soviet Bloc* has more operational detail. Of course, Kennan's plan failed disastrously and was eventually abandoned after the Hungarian uprising of 1956. One of the few bright spots in the anti-Soviet effort was the CIA's success in conducting psychological warfare behind the Iron Curtain via Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. There is a large, celebratory literature about Cold War radio stations by former employees (stimulated by official interest in the lessons they might have to teach today's counter-terrorism experts); the most valuable example is A. Ross Johnson's 2010 *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, which is based on previously unseen CIA files.¹⁷

At the same time that it was seeking to roll back communism, the U.S. government was conducting covert operations in western Europe to shore up the region's democratic institutions against communism. Italy was the scene of the most intense political warfare of the late 1940s, as ably shown by Kaeten Mistry in his recent monograph on the subject, but no European country was spared the attentions of the superpowers in the Cold War battle for hearts and minds. The Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA's chief weapon in its competition with the Soviet-controlled Cominform for cultural supremacy in Europe, takes center stage in Frances Stonor Saunders's controversial but revelatory *Who Paid the Piper?* (published in the United States as *The Cultural Cold War*); Giles Scott-Smith's *The Politics of Apolitical Culture* offers a less detailed but more nuanced interpretation. My own *The Mighty Wurlitzer* investigates the involvement of a wide array of U.S. citizen groups in other CIA "front" operations in both Europe and the Third World. Adopting the global perspective increasingly favored by Cold War historians, a new generation of scholars is undertaking ambitious

studies of the "Cultural Cold War" in non-European locales and emphasizing the agency of local participants. Patrick Iber's recent volume on Latin America is an outstanding example.¹⁸

Although such works are right to draw attention to the lesser-known cultural, "soft power" operations of the CIA, covert U.S. intervention in the Third World often assumed a more violent form, most conspicuously in efforts to overthrow governments deemed vulnerable to communist takeover. The 1953 coup in Iran that unseated the nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, and restored the power of the Shah is the subject of a large and growing scholarship and (unusually for intelligence history) has given rise to some clearly defined interpretive debates. Which was more important as a catalyst of the CIA operation against Mosaddeq: British or U.S. initiative? Was it economic (oil) or ideological (anti-communism) considerations that were uppermost in the minds of U.S. officials? And whose actions were more important in determining the final outcome: those of CIA operatives or local elites? Answers to some of these questions might become clearer when the long-delayed *FRUS* volume containing the relevant CIA records is eventually published. In the meantime, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, a collection of essays edited by U.S.-Middle East experts Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, is the single best scholarly source on the subject. Ali Rahnama's 2014 *Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran* is also useful.¹⁹

The removal of Mosaddeq spawned a cult of covert action in Washington and heralded a series of CIA interventions against other Third World leaders: in Guatemala, Indonesia, the Congo, Cuba, Iraq, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Brazil, and Chile, to name the best-known cases. Thanks in part to the unusual availability of CIA records on the subject, there is an outstanding monographic literature about the Agency's 1954 operation against Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz that echoes the scholarly debates about the Iranian coup of the previous year. A recent article in the *Journal of Cold War Studies* by Michelle Denise Getchell provides a helpful summary.²⁰

Eisenhower and Kennedy-era operations targeting Castro's Cuba are the subject of two recent books: Don Bohning's *The Castro Obsession* and Howard Jones's *The Bay of Pigs*. Both are well researched and written but reflect a common weakness among studies of CIA operations: neither takes sufficient account of Cuban agency. A better (and more tragic) sense of the local and regional context can be gained from the expert survey of Cold War U.S. interventions in Latin America by Stephen Rabe, *The Killing Zone*.²¹

Finally, the violent overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende in 1973 continues to inspire polarized interpretations. Some accounts emphasize the involvement of the Nixon administration and the CIA (for example, Lubna Qureshi's *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende*), while others deny a direct U.S. role (Kristian Gustafson's *Hostile Intent*). Tanya Harmer's sophisticated *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* de-centers the United States, focusing instead on the influence of other South American powers.²²

If the CIA was the U.S. government's preferred instrument for removing undesirable foreign leaders, it also served as an important tool for stabilizing or "coup-proofing" regimes deemed to be strategic assets. Perhaps surprisingly, the revolutionary government of Gamal Abdel Nasser benefited from covert U.S. assistance during the first years of its existence, until the Eisenhower administration decided "Nasserism" was a threat to U.S. interests. I discuss this rare instance of CIA support for Third World nationalism in my recent *America's Great Game*. More typical was covert backing for anti-nationalist, authoritarian regimes such as the Shah's in Iran. His cruelly repressive security service, SAVAK, was partly trained

by the CIA. Jeremy Kuzmarov furnishes the depressing detail in his 2012 monograph *Modernizing Repression*, which portrays U.S. police training as the most nakedly coercive manifestation of the nation-building impulse that has characterized American foreign relations since the turn of the twentieth century.

The CIA was also heavily involved in the most famous, or infamous, U.S. nation-building project prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: fortifying the anti-communist government of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. Jonathan Nashel's Edward Lansdale's *Cold War* is a fascinating, unorthodox biography of the CIA officer chiefly responsible for advising Diem's doomed government. *Vietnam Declassified* by former CIA officer Thomas Ahern provides a detailed account of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the Vietnamese countryside, based on still-closed Agency files. Later, as the benign façade of early U.S. involvement slipped, the CIA mounted the Phoenix Program against communist and Viet Cong officials, which was in effect a torture and assassination operation. The specialist literature on Phoenix veers between denunciation and attempts at vindication; scholars might be best advised to consult other works, such as Randall Woods's excellent biography of CIA director William Colby, *Shadow Warrior*.²³

During the 1970s, journalistic reports about CIA operations in Vietnam combined with the Watergate scandal and revelations about domestic surveillance and harassment of the antiwar movement to produce a widespread mood of revulsion against the U.S. security services. The resulting congressional investigations are chronicled in Kathryn Olmsted's still-valuable 1996 *Challenging the Secret Government*. John Prados's 2013 *The Family Jewels* links the abuses exposed in the seventies to the excesses of the post-9/11 "surveillance state." Frank Church, who chaired the Senate select committee on intelligence operations, famously likened the CIA to a "rogue elephant" operating outside presidential control. *Defenders of the Agency* responded by claiming that it had never acted without White House approval (a view shared, incidentally, by a majority of historians).²⁴

This tension in perceptions of U.S. intelligence has persisted ever since. Unleashed, some would say, by the Reagan administration in central America and Afghanistan, the CIA subsequently faced allegations of complicity and even drug trafficking in the "Iran-Contra" scandal. Malcolm Byrne's 2014 *Iran-Contra* has replaced Theodore Draper's 1991 *Very Thin Line* as the go-to study of what Byrne refers to as "Reagan's Scandal." It strongly emphasizes the personal culpability of the president. *Ghost Wars*, Steve Coll's impressively researched study of the Agency's support for the Afghan mujahideen and its calamitous aftermath, remains essential reading.²⁵

The years since 9/11 have seen a massive expansion and reorganization of the intelligence community, along with widespread condemnation of such practices as extraordinary rendition, enhanced interrogation, and targeted killings. Journalists and insiders have produced a shelfful of books about these developments. The most informative about recent U.S. covert operations is *New York Times* reporter Mark Mazzetti's *The Way of the Knife*, which documents the CIA's growing focus during the Obama presidency on counterterrorist man-hunting.²⁶ The best available scholarly account, reflecting its author's expertise in intelligence history and actual intelligence experience, is, again, Immerman's *Hidden Hand*.

That concludes my survey of recent intelligence history, a literature dominated as much by journalists and political scientists as historians, and generally marginal to the larger field of U.S. diplomatic history. So, where next for intelligence historians? It is customary at this point in state-of-the-field essays on the subject to lament the lack of scholarship about intelligence gathering and analysis as

opposed to covert action, and indeed it is clear that such subjects as cybersecurity, cyber-surveillance, and whistle-blowing warrant and will receive growing scholarly attention in the years to come. What I would like to suggest here, however, are some new conceptual directions that reflect recent developments in the broader field of the history of American foreign relations—the so-called cultural and global turns—and might yet help intelligence historians come in from the cold (to use an appropriately literary metaphor).

First, how might intelligence history stand to benefit from the cultural turn? Although, as noted above, several political scientists have used theories of cognitive psychology to better understand the "intelligence cycle," on the whole Intelligence Studies tends to approach intelligence on its own terms, as a closed hermeneutic system separate from the society that produced it. Yet the U.S. intelligence services have always been profoundly embedded in American culture in several different ways. As recent historical studies have shown, the CIA's mobilization of culture as a weapon of the Cold War—the Cultural Cold War—was not limited to its overseas operations. The Agency was also very interested in managing its own reputation domestically—hardly surprising, given its status as the first peacetime intelligence service in a society historically suspicious of foreign entanglement and government secrecy—and built secret relationships with American cultural producers, especially in the movie industry.²⁷ There is still much work to be done uncovering these state-private networks of influence within other cultural institutions. For that matter, although there has been quite a lot written about the Congress for Cultural Freedom, other CIA front operations abroad await intensive study. My own *Mighty Wurlitzer* was intended to be comprehensive but is far from exhaustive.²⁸

But the CIA did not just shape culture: culture shaped it. Intelligence historians have tended to be rather snooty about the vast body of spy fiction—novels, movies, and TV shows—that has grown up around the intelligence services, comparing it unfavorably with their own "factual" knowledge based on archival research or insider information.²⁹ Yet this dismissive attitude, which glosses over the highly problematic nature of the intelligence archive, ignores the very important cultural work that the "covert sphere," to borrow the title of a brilliant study by literary/cultural studies scholar Timothy Melley, has performed in U.S. society.³⁰ Among other things, this work includes influencing intelligence itself, a bureaucracy by now so vast and compartmentalized that even workers within it are compelled to resort to popular cultural representations of it to try and comprehend its entirety. As Melley and others have shown, spy fiction has even influenced a number of real-world intelligence practices, from Cold War-era Bond-like gadgets to specific covert operations such as the Iran coup of 1953 and interrogation techniques in the War on Terror.³¹ The relationship between intelligence and the "covert sphere" is an intimate and important one that requires further investigation.

Intelligence historians also need to consider the influence of culture defined more broadly, in an anthropological sense. In recent years, the study of overt American diplomacy has been transformed by new approaches that emphasize the influence of such previously unexamined factors as class, race, gender, emotions, and even the senses on the behavior of foreign relations actors. Thanks to the work of Evan Thomas, Robert Dean and others, we have a very good sense of the elite, male-only, WASPish environment inhabited by the first generation of CIA officers. But later periods like the Reagan era, when the hegemony of the "Georgetown set" was checked and, in the words of Steve Coll, "the tennis players were . . . replaced by the bowlers," lack such well-textured socio-

cultural analysis.³²

Regardless of period, intelligence historians have not paid anything like enough attention to such unconscious determinants of foreign relations as dominant constructions of masculinity and race. Memoirs by intelligence officers tend to be shot through with masculinist and Orientalist tropes that portray covert operations as manly adventures among docile or wily natives. All too often the secondary literature reproduces these tropes uncritically, without any reflection on how they might actually have structured the behavior of the individuals concerned and the institutions to which they belonged.³³

Second, just as intelligence history stands to gain from the cultural turn, another major conceptual development in the larger field of U.S. foreign relations—its adoption of a global perspective, summed up in the phrase “America in the World”—has much potential for illuminating the operations of the secret state. There are already some good studies of CIA liaisons with friendly intelligence services, most notably Richard Aldrich’s fine account of the sometimes conflicted Anglo-American intelligence alliance in *The Hidden Hand*, but there could and should be more.³⁴ “Compare, contrast, and connect” is the mantra of historians using the “America in the World” approach, and the history of U.S. intelligence is ripe for this kind of international and transnational contextualization.

The field also needs to pay more attention to the “view from the South.” A host of recent regional and national studies have explored the response of local actors to superpower interventions in the Cold War, from cooperation to resistance and appropriation, yet the conventional narrative of CIA operations remains that of a diabolically clever puppet master manipulating hapless Third World subjects. Accessing security service archives in the countries concerned is often a difficult if not impossible task, but intelligence historians need to do all they can, from lateral research in other records to oral history, to recover the perspective of those at the receiving end of covert American power. Recent research on the Iran coup of 1953, while far from settling the debate about the final responsibility for Mosaddeq’s ouster, has used such methods to provide an essential Iranian perspective on the subject.

Finally, given the importance of empire as a concept in much recent scholarship about “America in the World,” it might prove helpful to think about U.S. intelligence in an imperial history framework. If the modern United States is an empire, how has intelligence helped make it one? What similarities and differences are there between U.S. intelligence services and imperial secret services such as those of the British? Could the term “covert empire,” coined by Stanford historian Priya Satia to describe Britain’s informal regime of espionage and surveillance in the Middle East of the early 1900s, be applied to the global operations of U.S. intelligence since World War II?³⁵ As noted recently by British intelligence historian Paul McGarr in *Diplomatic History*, postcolonial Indians certainly perceived the CIA as inheriting the role of British intelligence within their society.³⁶ Postcolonial Studies has also displayed a strong interest in the ways in which empires shape metropolises as well as colonies, and a recent Bernath Prize-winning book by American Studies scholar Andrew Friedman shows how the U.S. intelligence agencies, their employees, and immigrant communities of Cold War political refugees helped build a new, imperial “Covert Capital” in the Dulles corridor outside Washington, DC.³⁷ The U.S. empire of the Cold War era reached deeply into both foreign and American societies, and it did so by and large secretly.

I hope what I have written here about the state of U.S. intelligence history does not sound unduly bleak. As indicated above, I believe that individual scholars have undertaken some excellent work on the subject. The

problem is that there is not enough of it, in part because of self-ghettoization, but also because of insufficient institutional interest and support. The secret history of American foreign relations is vitally important, and there is enormous public interest in it that is being fed mainly by journalistic works of “instant history” and by insider accounts that are often self-serving. The subject and the public deserve better.

My sincere thanks to Chris Moran, Kathy Olmsted, and Simon Willmetts for their comments on drafts of this essay.

Notes:

1. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1984).
2. See, for example, the introductory essay in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the U.S.: Historiography Since 1945*, ed. Christopher Moran and Christopher J. Murphy (Edinburgh, 2013).
3. For a good introduction to Intelligence Studies, see the fourth edition of Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology* (Oxford, 2014).
4. Two recent works of intelligence history by non-academic historians that exemplify the virtues of good journalistic research are Ian Johnson, *A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York, 2010); and Kai Bird, *The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames* (New York, 2014).
5. John Ferris, “Coming in from the Cold: The Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945-1990,” in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge, 1996), 562–98.
6. Max Fisher, “Top secret clearance holders so numerous they include ‘packers/craters,’” *Washington Post*, June 12, 2013, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/12/top-secret-clearance-holders-so-numerous-they-include-packerscraters/>. See also Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, *Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State* (New York, 2011). Surveillance is another massively important area of intelligence; indeed, there is an emerging interdisciplinary field of Surveillance Studies. For an introduction, see David Lyon, *Surveillance Studies: An Overview* (Cambridge, UK, 2007).
7. Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York, 1995); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (New Haven, CT, 2002); Stephen F. Knott, *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency* (Oxford, 1996); Michael Warner, *The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History* (Washington, DC, 2014). See also Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, “Antecedents and Memory as Factors in the Creation of the CIA,” *Diplomatic History* 40 (2016): 140–54.
8. John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York, 1986); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT, 2003); John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago, IL, 2006); Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York, 2007); Richard H. Immerman, *The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA* (Chichester, UK, 2014); Athan Theoharis et al., eds., *The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny* (Westport, CT, 2006). For a thoughtful analysis of the CIA’s active efforts to influence its own historical reputation, see Simon Willmetts, “The CIA and the Invention of Tradition,” *Journal of Intelligence History* 14 (2015): 112–28.
9. Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology* (Boulder, CO, 2001); James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency* (Boston, 1982); James Bamford, *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency* (New York, 2001); James Bamford, *The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA From 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America* (New York, 2009); Matthew M. Aid, *The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency* (New York, 2009); David Wise, *Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for \$4.6 Million* (New York, 1995); Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter* (New York, 1991).
10. On analysis of the Soviet Union, see John Prados, *The Soviet*

Estimate: U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, NJ, 1986); and Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., *Watching the Bear: Essays on the CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union* (Washington, DC, 2003). For a recent, wide-ranging work on U.S. nuclear intelligence, see Jeffrey T. Richelson's prodigiously researched *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (New York, 2007).

11. The best of the many studies on the intelligence failures leading up to 9/11 and the subsequent WMD debacle in Iraq are Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton, NJ, 2007), and John Diamond, *The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq* (Stanford, CA, 2008).

12. See, for example, Joshua Rovner, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence* (Ithaca, NY, 2011).

13. Richard H. Immerman, "Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Policy, and Politics," *Diplomatic History* 32 (2008): 1–23.

14. Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca, NY, 2010); Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York, 2007).

15. See, for example, Erik J. Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond* (Washington, DC, 2013).

16. Sarah-Jane Corke, *U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA* (London, 2008); Scott Lucas and Kaeten Mistry, "Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy, and Political Warfare in the Early Cold War, 1946–1950," *Diplomatic History* 33 (2009): 39–66; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York, 1996); Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, MA, 2001).

17. Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY, 2000); Stephen Long, *The CIA and the Soviet Bloc: Political Warfare, the Origins of the CIA, and Countering Communism in Europe* (London, 2014); A. Ross Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Washington, DC, 2010).

18. Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy, and the Origins of the Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945–1950* (Cambridge, 2014); Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London, 2002); Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA, 2008); Patrick Iber, *Neither Peace Nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* (Cambridge, MA, 2015). See also Eric Pullin, "Money Does Not Make Any Difference to the Opinions That We Hold: India, the CIA, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1951–58," *Intelligence and National Security* 26 (2011): 377–98.

19. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse, NY, 2004); Ali Rahnama, *Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks* (Cambridge, 2014).

20. Michelle Denise Getchell, "Revisiting the 1954 Coup in Guatemala: The Soviet Union, the United Nations, and 'Hemispheric Solidarity,'" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 17.2 (Spring 2015): 73–102. See, in particular, Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX, 1982); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ, 1991); Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Stanford, CA, 1999).

21. Don Bohning, *The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959–1965* (Dulles, VA, 2006); Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford, 2008); Stephen G. Rabe, *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (Oxford, 2011).

22. Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974* (Washington, DC, 2007); Lubna Z. Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*

(Lanham, MD, 2008); Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2011).

23. Hugh Wilford, *America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (New York, 2013); Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation-Building in the American Century* (Amherst, MA, 2012); Jonathan Nashel, *Edward Lansdale's Cold War* (Amherst, MA, 2005); Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., *Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY, 2010); Randall B. Woods, *Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA* (New York, 2013).

24. Kathryn S. Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996); John Prados, *The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power* (Austin, TX, 2013).

25. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York, 2004); Malcolm Byrne, *Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power* (Lawrence, KS, 2014); Theodore Draper, *Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York, 1991).

26. Mark Mazzetti, *The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth* (New York, 2013).

27. Tricia Jenkins, *The CIA in Hollywood: How the Agency Shapes Films and Television* (Austin, TX, 2012); Tony Shaw, *Hollywood's Cold War* (Amherst, MA, 2007); Simon Willmetts, *In Secrecy's Shadow: The OSS and the CIA in Hollywood Cinema, 1941–1979* (Edinburgh, 2016). For other connections between the CIA and American civil society, see *The CIA and American Foreign Policy*, ed. Ruud Meulen, special issue, *History* 100:340 (April 2015): 163–330.

28. The term "state-private network" was coined by Scott Lucas. See his *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (Manchester, 1999). See also Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, eds., *The U.S. Government, Citizen Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (London, 2006).

29. Simon Willmetts, "Reconceiving Realism: Intelligence Historians and the Fact/Fiction Dichotomy," in *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the U.S.*, ed. Christopher Moran and Christopher Murphy, 146–71.

30. Timothy Melley, *Covert Sphere: Secrecy, Fiction, and the National Security State* (Ithaca, NY, 2012).

31. Christopher Moran, "Ian Fleming and the Public Profile of the CIA," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15 (2013): 119–46; Hugh Wilford, "Essentially a Work of Fiction: Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt, Imperial Romance, and the Iran Coup of 1953," *Diplomatic History*, Advance Access, 2015; available online by subscription at doi: 10.1093/dh/dhv048 (forthcoming in print issue); Amy Zegart, "'Spytainment': The Real Influence of Fake Spies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 23 (2010): 599–622.

32. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 55–6.

33. For more on the genre of CIA memoir, see Christopher Moran, *Company Confessions: Revealing CIA Secrets* (London, 2015).

34. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London, 2001). See also Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence* (Oxford, 2013).

35. Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford, 2008).

36. Paul Michael McGarr, "'Quiet Americans in India': The CIA and the Politics of Intelligence in Cold War South Asia," *Diplomatic History* 38 (2014): 1046–82.

37. Andrew Friedman, *Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of U.S. Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia* (Berkeley, CA, 2013). Alfred McCoy has argued that techniques of repression invented during the U.S. occupation of the Philippines migrated back home to lay the foundations for today's surveillance state. See Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI, 2009).



UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

2017 SHAFR SUMMER INSTITUTE

SECURITY AND
CULTURES OF NATIONALISM
AND INSECURITY
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The term “national security” is everywhere. It permeates virtually every aspect of U.S. foreign relations and defines the relationship with the rest of the world is to a large extent based upon the requirements of national security, and how it connotes safety: its goal is the defense of the nation against foreign threats. Though the pursuit of national security is as expansive as to be virtually limitless. For the last several decades, threats to America’s national security have been found in Central Asia—even in the towns and cities of the United States itself. Under the aegis of national security, America has

But where does such a worldview come from? How do Americans conceive of threat and danger in the world? What is the thought of national security in these terms? We will also delve into questions about the influence national security has had on the industrial complex which, in turn, shaped America’s engagement with the wider world?

The cultures of American national security and insecurity will be at the heart of the 10th annual Summer Institute at Cambridge University. Designed for advanced graduate students and early-career faculty members in history and political science, the Institute will also provide a forum for participants to present their research and participate in workshops on professional writing provided with free accommodation and most meals in Cambridge, and will receive a modest honorarium.

The deadline for applications is **January 20, 2017**. Applicants should submit a c.v.; a brief letter detailing how participation in the research project they will present at the Institute; and a letter of recommendation, ideally from their dissertation advisor at Cambridge University <amp33@cam.ac.uk> and Mario Del Pero, Sciences Po-Paris <mario.delpero@sciencespo.fr>;



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much of the federal government's structure for foreign and military policies. It is no exaggeration to say that America's by they are defined, represented, and narrated to the public. At its heart, and in an instinctual way, "national security" often leads to difficult and controversial wars, it is essentially based on a defensive and fearful mindset. It is also so and everywhere, from the beaches of Cuba and the jungles of Indochina to the deserts of Arabia and the mountains of as a defensive perimeter that is now both global and holistic. Few of its interests are peripheral.

It constitutes the boundaries, legally, politically, geographically, and morally, of self-defense? Have Americans always as had on shaping the government's capacity to project power. If war made the state and the state made war in Europe, on of executive war powers? Have security concerns led to the establishment of a national security state or a military-

of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, which will take place **July 3-7, 2017** at Clare College, related fields, the program will feature seminar-style discussions and meetings with leading scholars. The Summer onial development, teaching, and publishing. Each participant will be reimbursed for return travel to Britain, will be

icipation in this year's Summer Institute would benefit their scholarship and careers; a short (300 word) abstract about dviser. Please send this material electronically (in Word or PDF) to both of the Institute's organizers, Andrew Preston, references should be sent directly by the referee. Please direct all questions to the Institute organizers.



The *Foreign Relations* of the United States at 155: A Progress Check

Stephen P. Randolph, Adam M. Howard, and Joseph C. Wicentowski

Since our last report in the September 2012 *Passport*, the Department of State's Office of the Historian has conducted a four-year surge of increased productivity. Twenty-five years ago, Congress passed the 1991 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (22 U.S.C. 4351 *et seq.*), which requires that the Department's Office of the Historian publish a "thorough, accurate, and reliable" documentary history of U.S. foreign relations at a thirty-year timeline from the date of the events. From 2009 to 2012, the Department of State invested major resources to ensure the Office of the Historian (HO) could strive to meet this statutory obligation after several years of high attrition, inadequate resources, and daunting declassification challenges. The Department assembled a new management team, established a new home for the Office at Navy Hill, and created several new historian positions to work on the compiling, declassification, and editing of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series.

This investment paid quick dividends as the Office published 26 volumes between 2013 and 2015, the most volumes published in a three-year period since 1994 to 1997. Last year our historians completed research on the last of the Carter administration *FRUS* volumes, while also publishing the first volume in the Reagan subseries, *Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*. That first Reagan volume appeared at the 31-year line, the first time that has been accomplished since 2007. Overall, the Office of the Historian now has 78 volumes in progress, stretching from the Eisenhower through the George H.W. Bush administrations. Our digital program, similarly, has grown in reach and content, and is now a leader in digital publishing and in open government data.

The Reagan and Bush Subseries

Planning began for our work on the Reagan subseries in 2007, and we can now report that nearly all 49 Reagan volumes have been researched, with the entire subseries projected to be compiled and reviewed by the end of 2018. In 2014 the Office, in consultation with the Department's Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), began planning the Bush administration volumes. As with earlier subseries, we conceptualized volumes along "core," "crisis," and "context" lines. "Core" volumes included documentation on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, national security policy, foreign economic policy, and the intellectual foundations of U.S. foreign policy. "Crisis" volumes focused on the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Panama. Traditional regional and bilateral relations, as well as emerging global issues such as public diplomacy, foreign aid, and the environment, comprised the "context" volumes.

When this planning effort began in 2014 for the Bush administration subseries, the Office had to balance the demands of fully documenting the administration and researching and publishing the volumes within a

reasonable amount of time. The Office conducted a series of planning efforts in collaboration with the HAC, seeking the right balance between these competing requirements. Last year the Office set the number of Bush volumes at 31, and historians began researching the first Bush volumes in early 2016.

FRUS Digital Archive

Since the 2009 launching of the Office's public website, history.state.gov, the Office has been steadily digitizing the back catalog of the *Foreign Relations* series, with the goal of creating a complete retrospective digital archive of all volumes published since 1861. For most users of the series, *FRUS* elicits an image of shelves full of dense tomes with ruby buckram covers. With the digitization of the series, *FRUS* is now a richly interconnected database whose full text can be searched in a fraction of a second. The archive currently holds 175,000 documents from 330 complete volumes and spans the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. This resource makes answering once painstaking questions elementary, and expands research possibilities considerably.

In the latest quarterly release of the digitized back catalog in June 2016, the Office added 23 volumes to the archive, which completed the corpus of volumes covering World War II and the Cold War. The website's search engine can explore the entire archive, a subset of volumes, or a single volume, and searches can be enhanced with a number of sophisticated parameters. At the current rate of production and resources permitting, the archive of over 525 print and electronic-only volumes will be completed in the coming 2–3 years, and the small number of microfiche volumes in the years thereafter.

The Office generally releases digitized *FRUS* volumes in reverse chronological order, but certain volumes with topical significance have jumped the queue for early posting. For example, in 2015, to mark the 150th anniversary of the assassination of President Lincoln, the Office released a volume from 1865 containing the letters of condolence sent to the Department of State by governments and civic associations from around the world. Also, in 2014, to mark the centennial anniversaries of events surrounding World War I, the Office began releasing volumes covering that period, including, to date, the War Supplement volumes from 1914–16 and the Lansing Papers covering 1914–20. The remaining World War I volumes will be posted in forthcoming quarterly releases.

The Office's initiative to digitize the series was considerably accelerated and simplified by a cooperative arrangement with the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center, who graciously provided the Office with high quality archival scanned images of *FRUS* volumes covering the period 1861–1960. In exchange, the

Office has provided the Center with its images from the post-1960 period, as well as all of the proofread, enriched digital texts of all volumes. This partnership has thereby improved the quality and quantity of both institutions' holdings, and was a major contribution to the Office's *FRUS* digital archive initiative.

Redesigned Website

The new version of history.state.gov, released in late April 2016, incorporates a mobile-friendly, responsive design. This means that the site is easier to read and navigate, whether a visitor is using a desktop computer or on a mobile device. By building the new site according to the draft "U.S. Web Design Standards," the Office ensured that the site meets high standards of accessibility and conforms to Section 508 Standards from the Rehabilitation Act.¹

The site is also considerably faster and more resilient to rapidly growing levels of traffic. In 2015, the Office's website received 7.6 million unique visitors who collectively visited nearly 18 million web pages—a growth of 25% over the previous year, and over 5 times the traffic in 2012. Visitors from the United States accounted for 75% of the website's traffic. The remainder—over 2.2 million sessions in 2015 alone—came from visitors abroad.

To protect all of these visitors, the new website forces all connections to be secure (a feature known as "HTTPS-only," or "HSTS"). This feature guarantees that all visitors' search terms and pages visited cannot be tracked or modified by third parties, and is particularly valuable in protecting foreign visitors' traffic from snooping by hackers or regimes that might track the activities of citizens, dissidents, and journalists. All federal websites must conform to this by December 31, 2016; the Office's website made the switch a full year early.² The site receives an "A" rating by SSL Labs, whose free service tracks websites' adherence to security best practices.

Looking ahead, the Office is planning a number of new features built on the new design, including chronological sorting of *FRUS* search results, a database of historical country names, and a unified biographical database of people who appear in *FRUS* and the Office's other publications and datasets.

Open Government Data Efforts

In the last year the Office has dramatically expanded its open government data efforts. Besides posting the *FRUS* digital archive for browsing and searching on history.state.gov and as e-books for use on e-readers, HO also posts the digital source files for the entire *FRUS* digital archive. With an eye toward facilitating preservation and analysis of this data, the Office prepared *FRUS* and its other article- and book-length publications according to the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) Guidelines, the standard XML-based format for digital texts used by libraries and digital humanities projects around the world.³ Similarly, the Office's other datasets, including databases of all U.S. ambassadors and principal officers, foreign travels of the President and Secretary of State, visits to the United States by foreign leaders and heads of state, and a subject taxonomy of the history of U.S. foreign relations, are all available in simple XML formats. XML is an open, non-proprietary, plain text format for storing documents and data, and it is readily ingested by modern database software for analysis. Besides all of this data, the Office has released the entire source code repository for history.state.gov, meaning that researchers can download and run a complete copy of the website on their own laptop or server.

These resources are all available via GitHub, the popular repository for open source software and open government datasets, at github.com/HistoryAtState. Interested readers

can subscribe to any publication's repository, notify the Office of typographical errors or suggest features, and even submit "pull requests" containing proposed fixes to problems.

The Office hopes that lowering the barrier to accessing these publications and datasets and presenting them in their highest quality form will empower researchers to tackle questions and perform analyses that were not feasible before. For example, as HO historian Thomas Faith demonstrated in a panel at SHAFR 2016, data visualization software can reveal connections within and across the *FRUS* subseries. We believe there is significant untapped potential in this unique corpus of documents and datasets spanning the globe, just awaiting researchers with the right combinations of interdisciplinary skills.

Besides this most recent development, the Office has played a major role in helping the Department of State meet its obligations for all of the Obama administration's major open and digital government initiatives. The 2009 Open Government Initiative directed each agency to identify three high-value datasets for posting on data.gov; the dataset that HO contributed became one of the top-five most popular datasets on data.gov.⁴ The 2011 Cloud First Initiative directed each agency to migrate three public-facing websites to the cloud; by migrating history.state.gov to Amazon Web Services, HO saved thousands of dollars per year in hosting costs and improved the speed, quality, and stability of the service for visitors around the world.⁵ The 2012 Digital Government Strategy directed each agency to produce three mobile-friendly services; HO made two contributions: (1) a new e-book edition of *FRUS*, in multiple formats supporting both the Amazon Kindle's MOBI format as well as the EPUB format that Apple iPad and other e-readers use, and (2) an Application Programming Interface (API) for web and application developers to integrate into their offerings. For example, a popular e-book application from China for Apple's iPhone and iPad platform reader, called ShuBook, now features the *FRUS* e-book catalog, with a one-click download of any volume. E-books offer some important advantages over print or online editions: they have a small download size for bandwidth constrained users, can be used and backed up offline (even full text search is possible offline), and are well-suited to screen readers for users with visual disabilities. In contrast to PDFs, the font and font size in e-books can be changed to meet the user's preferences.

Research with Digital Records

One of the critical research resources for HO historians working with the Reagan records has been the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) electronic system. The RAC, established in 1996 and sponsored by the National Archives and Record Administration's (NARA) Office of Presidential Libraries and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), makes it possible to scan classified records held at the presidential libraries to facilitate declassification review of these materials in Washington. The RAC proved to be somewhat of a mixed blessing for HO historians: on the one hand, it allowed them to conduct much of their classified research in Washington and devote more time to examining open records held at the Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California; on the other hand, organization of these materials in the RAC complicated accurate identification of a document's provenance. Ultimately, conducting research in the RAC has been most effective as a supplement to research at the Reagan Library.

One of the largest challenges facing HO over the next decade is the exponential increase in documentation due to the advent of digital technology. The Reagan and Bush administrations ushered in the use of e-mail in the PROFS (Professional Office Software), which was an IBM

proprietary office management tool used by National Security Council (NSC) staff. During the second half of the Reagan administration, the NSC staff came to use an additional email system, known as the All-in-One system. The Bush administration also used this system, which allowed for the transmission of email, calendars, and cables. During the fall of 1992, a new system known as CCMail was adopted and became the sole system used.

Thanks to NARA and the NSC, the Office gained access to the PROFS email in 2015 and will gain access to All-in-One in late 2016. It is working on gaining access to CCMail.

ICEDD Conference

The digital document challenge is not unique to HO historians. In April 2015, the Office hosted the International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents at the Department of State's Marshall Auditorium. Founded in 1988, this organization consists of institutions from about 30 countries that publish collections of documents covering the foreign relations of their respective countries.⁶

The Conference featured panels covering the challenges of declassification with U.S. documents, new technology applications for disseminating documents, and the various ways programs compile their document collections.

Unlike the *FRUS* series, which is entirely operated by the U.S. Government, most of the other ICEDD programs require cooperation between independent universities and their ministries of foreign affairs. Accordingly, the financing and organization of the publication of diplomatic documents can vary greatly from country to country.

One exciting, concrete result of the cooperation among the ICEDD programs is Metagrid, a web service facilitating crosslinking and discovery among high quality humanities resources, in particular, biographical resources.⁷ Spearheaded by the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland and now a project of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, Metagrid allows contributors to link to other contributors very simply and elegantly. The Office of the Historian's database of Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission of the U.S. Department of State now contains links to other Metagrid partners who have information on the same officials. The record on Secretary of State Elihu Root, for example, contains links to information and documents on Root from the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) and the League of Nations Search Engine (Lonsea).⁸

The 25th Anniversary of the *FRUS* Statute

October 28, 2016 will mark the 25th anniversary of President George H.W. Bush's signature of the statute placing the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, already 130 years old, on a statutory basis. The law has succeeded in creating a *Foreign Relations* series that is unique in many ways, most significantly in providing for a "thorough, accurate, and reliable" government-wide account of the foreign relations policy process.⁹ In the years since the passage of the law, the Department of State has developed effective working relations throughout the national security community to secure access and declassification of key documents, and has worked out processes for policy-level review of covert actions that have proven highly successful in enabling acknowledgement and declassification guidelines for over fifty such operations. President Bush's signature came at the dawn of the digital age, which has provided us both the opportunities and the challenges noted earlier—vastly greater reach for the series,

balanced by an ever-increasing volume and complexity of the documentation under work.

This success has led to new challenges. The sheer number of documents under research continues to increase exponentially, and the proportion of highly classified material is increasing at that same rate. We are now in a transitional time, primarily using paper archives, but the proportion of digital material will increase rapidly in the years ahead. As we enter the age of born-digital documents, the Office will face an array of technical and access issues that will have to be resolved. Declassification remains a standing concern; although the *Foreign Relations* series has a dedicated declassification program under the law, it is increasingly a challenge for our interagency partners to meet the timeliness standards established there, given the general strain on declassification resources. Acknowledgement and declassification of covert operations invariably are time-consuming efforts that will require additional substantial delays in publication for the volumes involved. Ultimately the existing issues in the world of declassification will demand technological solutions that are now in work, but some years away, it would appear, from entering service. Finally, as the series progresses toward the Clinton administration, the Cold War will no longer be the dominant framework of U.S. foreign policy. This will require the Office to re-conceptualize aspects of how the *FRUS* series is structured.

This retrospective reminds us that the *Foreign Relations* series is both older and younger than we generally realize. It is older, in carrying on traditions of governmental transparency that have been considered essential to a democracy ever since colonial times. It is at the same time younger, as despite all the progress noted earlier, we have not yet completed our publication of the Nixon/Ford material, the first subseries executed under the *FRUS* statute. As all historians will recognize, the one constant is change and adaptation, and we look forward to evolving as necessary to meet our mission under the law.

Notes:

1. For more on the U.S. Web Design Standards, see standards.usa.gov.
2. For more on this requirement, see White House Office of Management and Budget memorandum M-15-13, "A Policy to Require Secure Connections across Federal Websites and Web Services." Accessed on July 1, 2016 at <https://cio.gov>.
3. For more on the factors that informed the Office's selection of TEI and our approach to digital scholarship, see Joseph Wicentowski, "history.state.gov: A case study of Digital Humanities in Government," *Journal of the Chicago Colloquium on Digital Humanities and Computer Science* Vol 1, No 3 (2011). Accessed on July 1, 2016 at letterpress.uchicago.edu/index.php/jdhcs/article/view/80.
4. The Office's contributions to these initiatives have been discussed in media. See Ed O'Keefe, "Critics pan release of government information," *Washington Post* (January 27, 2010). Accessed on July 1, 2016 at voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/01/thoughts_on_the_white_house_da.html. See also Eliot van Buskirk, "Sneak Peak: Obama Administration's Redesignated Data.gov," *Wired* (May 19, 2010). Accessed on July 1, 2016 at www.wired.com/2010/05/sneak-peek-the-obama-administrations-redesigned-datagov.
5. See Sean Collins Walsh, "Federal Push for 'Cloud' Technology Faces Skepticism," *New York Times* (August 21, 2011). Accessed on July 1, 2016 at www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/technology/federal-push-for-cloud-technology-faces-skepticism.html.
6. The list of past conferences and participating programs can be found on the ICEDD website at diplomatic-documents.org.
7. For more information, see the Metagrid homepage at metagrid.ch/en.
8. For this record and the links to the other Metagrid contributors, see history.state.gov/departments/history/people/root-elihu.
9. For more on the origins of the 1991 *FRUS* law, see <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history/chapter-11>.

A View from Overseas: Special or at the Back of the Queue?

Fabian Hilfrich

Editor's Note: *The following essay is part of the Passport series, "A View from Overseas," which features short pieces written by scholars outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad who might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at passport@shafr.org. AJ*

If indeed June 23, 2016 was "independence day," as UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage proclaimed, then a European working and living in the United Kingdom felt like an American loyalist after the revolution. Without a vote in the matter, I woke up feeling rejected by an (admittedly slim) majority in a referendum that had increasingly revolved around the question of (European) immigration. Well, it could have been worse—I could be living in England where Brexit majorities were much larger, with the exception of London. Instead, I am living in Scotland where neighbors commiserated, as shocked by Brexit as I was, and where the head of the devolved government, Nicola Sturgeon, reassured me that I was still welcome in Scotland. Nevertheless, the actual consequences of Brexit remain completely unclear.

After more than forty years of membership in the European Communities and Union, no one in the United Kingdom knows what the future will hold—for immigrants, for British foreign policy, and, indeed, for the very cohesion of the United Kingdom if Scotland moves towards a second referendum on its independence. In fact, the ones who seemed to know the least on the day after the vote were those who had most loudly clamored for Brexit. The only thing they did know was that they would not be able to fulfil their promises on finances and possibly migration.

While the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is very difficult to predict—not least because Brussels must be tempted to preempt exit attempts by other member states by negotiating tough exit conditions—Brexit will also have consequences on British relations with the rest of the world. According to the Brexiteers, leaving the European Union will put the "Great" back into Britain. On its own, the country was a world power once, and only Brussels was keeping it from becoming one once again, so the argument went. Are these promises any more concrete than Donald Trump's of making America great again, however? During the campaign, the leavers promised more advantageous trade deals and better relations with everyone. While it is unclear why the rest of the world should offer larger trade

benefits to the much smaller British market than it already offers to the European Union, much of the subtext of the British version of "great again" was, of course, implicit references to the glorious history of the British Empire. As difficult as it is to predict the future, however, the empire surely will not strike back.

What about British relations to its former American colonies? Will London have to join the "back of the queue" in negotiating individual trade deals with Washington, as President Obama warned in his unprecedented intervention in the referendum campaign in April?

Or will the "special relationship" continue unchanged, as Washington has vowed in first reactions to Brexit—and as Obama had equally promised during that same April visit? Or will the relationship become even more important and intimate in the future as Brexiteers have insinuated? Perhaps if the next U.S. president is Donald Trump, the first foreign well-wisher on Britain gaining its "independence?" Or will consequences even transcend U.S.-British relations and require a re-thinking and re-formulation of U.S.-European relations?

Each of these scenarios is feasible, but it might be better to analyze the impact of Brexit on the different levels of U.S.-UK and, implicitly, on U.S.-European relations. Brexit will probably have the least consequences for the security and intelligence cooperation between the United States and Great Britain, for the simple reason that London never felt bound by its European allies in that regard. As we know since Edward Snowden's revelations, the "Five Eyes" intelligence sharing, an important pillar of the much-vaunted "special relationship," has been in place for more than seventy years, including also Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in the privileged exchange of secret information.

More importantly, British behavior since joining the EC in 1973 has repeatedly demonstrated that membership in the Communities and Union has never prevented London from joining with Washington when it thought its national interest was better served in that way. When forced to choose between Brussels and Washington, London only once—and only briefly—prioritized the former. That was shortly after entering when Prime Minister Ted Heath joined forces with Germany and France to resist a recalibration of transatlantic relations in the acrimonious "Year of Europe" discussions with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger between 1973 and 1974. Among other motives, Heath also felt obliged to demonstrate that Great Britain was not Washington's Trojan Horse, as Charles De Gaulle had famously predicted. Otherwise, though, Britain

pursued its late imperial adventure in the Falklands with more American than European support, and Margaret Thatcher's bond with Ronald Reagan was stronger than that with any European leader.

By the same token, Tony Blair rather joined George Bush's Middle Eastern crusades than investing political capital in deeper European unification, even in the face of most European partners' staunch rejection of the invasion of Iraq. Coordination between London and Washington proved consistently easier than between London and its European partners, and a truly European foreign policy never materialized. Moreover, British-American military cooperation has traditionally been and will remain more likely than European cooperation, even though conservative British publications liked to scare the electorate with the prospect of a European army in the Brexit campaign—only one of the pieces of disinformation that implied that London had no word or veto in matters decided by the European Union.

The crucial point about predicting continued close U.S.-UK relations is, however, that they would have continued irrespective of Brexit. British foreign policy has never been bound by European mandates, as the Brexiteers criticized. Creating the impression that London was shackled by Brussels in these matters and therefore needed to reclaim its "independence" was one of the more disingenuous claims in the referendum campaign. Future military and political cooperation with Washington will continue to depend far more on the shape and political persuasion of future British governments than on formal British relations with Europe.

Given British military capacities and the fact that it is one of only four European partners of the United States that spends the NATO-recommended two percent of GDP on its military, it is equally likely that Britain will remain Washington's preferred partner for unilateral or bilateral military interventions. Nevertheless, the United States will have to put to rest historical plans for a more independent and coordinated military partnership in Europe; a partner with whom there could have been a division of labor in upholding international order. These plans have been discussed since the end of the Cold War, even though their realization seemed increasingly unlikely even without Brexit. A common European foreign and military policy may long have been a goal, but rarely a reality of European unification.

Brexit's impact on trade and economic relations could be much more dramatic, particularly for Great Britain. Although I cannot claim much expertise in economic and commercial questions, it remains a mystery to me why global partners and the United States should be more interested in trade deals uniquely advantageous to Britain when they could enter the British market as part of a larger European deal. The British economy no longer has a large manufacturing component and many of its largest companies have long been taken over by foreign owners. Much of its economy has been globalized in this way—just like the economies of many other countries the world over. To claim that this globalized economy will recover its independence by leaving the European Union seems equally incredible.

What then does Britain have to offer that it was unable to offer as part of the European Union? One option for the British government will be to set a different regulatory framework than the European Union. Will it lure large (American) multinationals with lower tax rates, as Ireland did for quite some years even *within* the European Union?

Or will there have to be wage-dumping in an effort to successfully compete with the rest of Europe? What then about the charges of the Brexit campaign that Brussels was the enemy of the British working woman and working man (a charge ironically spearheaded by Ian Duncan Smith, the Work and Pensions Secretary responsible for unprecedented welfare cuts for working Britons while in government)? Will London remain one of the most important centers of global financial services? Or will large American and multinational banks and investment companies move some of their operations to other European financial centers to maintain access to the common market, as many of them had threatened prior to the referendum? Or will Great Britain maintain membership in that common market in order to guarantee not only the predominance of London's financial services, but also advantageous access to the markets of Europe? This, however, would require accepting the free movement of people and immigration from Europe, which turned into the most important issue for many Britons favoring Brexit.

While British-American economic and trade relations are far more unpredictable than the ones at the political and security level at the moment, it is difficult to see on the whole why American companies and the U.S. government would prioritize trade deals with London over those with the European Union. Undoubtedly, though, the British exit from European institutions will complicate passage of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which had already run into strong headwinds in Europe.

Perhaps the biggest impact of Brexit on U.S.-UK and U.S.-European relations will be cultural and atmospheric. It is contained in the deep convulsions that the decision symbolizes. In spite of Brexiteer-protestations to the contrary, the decision reflects a country that is less open to the world. Fears of immigration topped the arguments of the Brexit campaign and the decision was followed by a wave of anti-foreign outbursts that failed to discriminate between European and non-European immigrants. In this regard, Brexit was a reaction to the forces of globalization and crisis that many countries throughout the world are witnessing today, and which is admittedly accompanied by large-scale economic dislocation and a certain loss of national control and independence. Only

Populists suggest, however, that countries can close their borders and regain full control of their destinies. It was no coincidence, therefore, that Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders were the first who congratulated the British people on their decision to abandon the European Union. With friends like these... In fact, as much as Gilded Age economic crises required national regulation to counter national companies, globalization similarly requires more rather than less international and multilateral cooperation.

In this context, Brexit was Britain's Trumpean moment and, as one of my U.S.-born colleagues pointed out, the British would now be well advised to withhold sarcastic comments on Trump's presidential candidacy. Brexit symbolizes the centrifugal forces unleashed by globalization and represents a more fearful country in relation to the world that has chosen escapism over engagement. At the very least, this decision will weaken the United Kingdom economically and politically—particularly if Scotland ultimately decides to declare its own independence. More than that, Brexit also weakens the rest of a European Union that is already shaken by Eurozone and refugee crises. As with Wilders and Le Pen, it will also embolden anti-European forces in other key countries. At worst, Britain's

exit could inaugurate the end of the experiment of European unification after centuries of internecine conflict.

What does all this mean for the United States? Perhaps, there will not be many changes and Great Britain will remain Washington's staunchest military and political ally. Nevertheless, the potential weakening of the United Kingdom *and* the European Union will force Washington to re-assess its European policies after it had focused on Asia and Latin America since the turn of the century instead. Despite this recent re-focusing, Washington's European partners have proved its staunchest allies and supporters in the postwar and post-Cold War world and it will remain to be seen whether other powers or centers of power can compensate. If Washington does pursue a reformulation of its European policies and if London no longer speaks for Europe, U.S. leaders and elites may forge closer bonds with Berlin and Paris. This could diminish Great Britain's global weight even if bilateral relations remain strong and "special." (Nevertheless, Germany's reluctance to engage militarily abroad will undoubtedly persist, making it unlikely that Berlin would simply replace London as the most important European partner).

The first steps by the new British prime minister, Theresa May, raised another, potentially tantalizing scenario. Shortly after moving into 10 Downing Street, May vowed not to trigger Article 50, initiating Brexit, unless a "UK-wide approach" had been agreed. As Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has emphasized, this could give Scotland a veto on Brexit. Is May deliberately opening a backdoor through which she can exit from Brexit? Or is she just testing the waters on how costly such a reversal would be politically?

There will undoubtedly be many more maneuvers and discussions before Brexit becomes a reality. And it is anyone's guess what concrete shape this exit will take. In the meantime, however, it is hard not to argue that Brexit has weakened the UK and the EU simultaneously. Both will be weaker partners for the United States, particularly as they will long be preoccupied by dealing with the fallout of this crisis. On a more general level, Brexit also symbolizes the challenges of modernization, globalization and unfettered capitalism that Washington and all the other capitals on the globe will have to deal with in the future—hopefully not by trying to shut the world out.

In the next issue of Passport

A roundtable on Lori Clune, *Executing the Rosenbergs*

A presidential message from incoming SHAFR president Mary Dudziak

Kimber Quinney on academic freedom

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A Roundtable on International Experiential Learning

Kenneth Osgood, Alison S. Burke & Dustin Walcher, Kimber Quinney, Matthew Masur, and Brian C. Etheridge

Editor's note: *The essays that follow, with one exception (the Masur essay), are revised versions of papers presented at a panel on experiential learning at the 2016 SHAFR conference in San Diego. AJ*

What Did You Read on Your Study Abroad?: Balancing Academic and Experiential Learning in International Study Courses

Kenneth Osgood

We in academia may have a remarkably static view of what constitutes “education.” That’s a lesson I learned when I returned from my first study abroad trip in 2006. For four weeks that summer, fifteen students and I journeyed through five countries, exploring the European battlefields, monuments, and museums of the first and second world wars. We trudged through the trenches of Verdun. We climbed the dragon’s teeth along Hitler’s west wall in the rain. We hiked the Argonne. We journeyed inside the Maginot Line, riding a railcar through a seemingly endless tunnel array in one of its largest fortifications. We investigated the meaning of resistance. We grappled with historical memory. We peered uncomfortably into Hitler’s office, now a music school, in Munich. We stumbled silently through the gates at Dachau.

And so imagine my surprise, after completing such an ambitious and often moving excursion, to have the following dialogue repeat itself, virtually verbatim, as I shared my experience with my faculty colleagues. The fall semester was beginning, and the usual question opened the exchange.

“How was your summer?”

“It was fantastic! I took ten students through five countries in Europe studying World Wars One and Two.”

“That sounds great. What did you read?”

What did we read? This was the first question, every time, without exception. The first few times I answered politely, describing the readings and assignments that rounded out our coursework. But as it kept happening, as one colleague after another posed this as the first thing they wanted to know about our study abroad course, my internal monologue became increasingly agitated. The rant in my head went something like this:

“What did we read? Did I hear you right? I just took ten students out of the country for the first time in their lives. For many of them, this was the first time out of Florida! Do you realize that we literally picked up pieces of shrapnel and barbed wire out of a colossal artillery crater in France? We had seen the bones, the piles of bones, of the unidentifiable dead entombed at Verdun. We had interviewed a German veteran who had watched his comrades starve to death in an allied POW camp. We studied the terrain at the Hürtgen forest to try to understand how so many were led like lambs to the slaughter. We had experienced, at once, the

most inspiring adventure and the most sobering lesson in human cruelty and folly. And yet the first thing you want to know is what we read on the bus? How about: What did we do? Where did we go? What did we see? How did we feel?”

After all, ours was an experience that could not be replicated in the classroom. For teacher and student alike, the journey was transformative, unforgettable. The most valuable lessons we absorbed through discovery. What we learned, we remember by that feeling in our bellies when our minds conjure up those unforgettable images of the ovens and the gas chambers and the bones. By these experiences, we came to understand humanity in a deeper way. And yet to many of my colleagues, this kind of learning did not seem interesting, and perhaps not even important.

I came to understand – or at least hypothesize – that two attitudes informed the oft-repeated question, “What did you read?” First, as trained scholars acculturated by our professions and our own educational experiences, we tend to value “book learning” over other types of learning. We test students on skills (how well they write) but we focus most of our teaching on delivering content, whether through lectures, discussions, or readings. If there’s any doubt, recall an AHA job interview you participated in. From one side of the table came the standard question, “How would you teach x course?” From the other came the answer, “I’d assign x, y and z for students to read.” For



Students from the McBride Honors Program and Ken Osgood in 2014 on top of Montserrat, outside Barcelona, Spain. The jagged mountain is home to a famous Benedictine abbey and basilica, a destination for religious pilgrims, and a location rich in religious, political, and symbolic meaning to the region's history and identity.

historians, readings in primary and secondary sources, research papers, essays, identification questions and the like are the currency of our trade. They offer metrics by which we assess the rigor of our teaching and the success of our students. We don't quite know how to handle other types of educational activities, some of which just seem fluffy, "like the dioramas they do over in the College of Education," as a colleague once complained to me about a non-traditional assignment in another professor's class.

Second, and flowing logically from the first, an underlying suspicion of international study courses may have lurked behind the reading question. My colleagues may have been sizing me up, trying to assess whether my study abroad course was a "real" academic course or merely a glorified vacation. Did the students "earn" the three hours of academic credit they received? Or, for that matter, did I earn the salary that I received for teaching them? Was the whole enterprise one big boondoggle?

So herein lies the challenge for instructors of study abroad and experiential learning courses: how do we balance the learning that comes from experience against the demands of training students in the pertinent disciplinary field, to say nothing of the conventions of our university system? For starters, we should acknowledge that such a tension exists, and recognize the ways in which we seek to strike that balance. Speaking very generally, and recognizing the exceptions, study abroad courses tend to employ one of three approaches:

(1) International experience as backdrop: Students take a course in a given subject area that is largely the same as it would be "back home," except that it is taught somewhere else. This approach emphasizes meeting the learning objectives of a given course, with the international environment as a backdrop that provides students opportunities for experiencing life abroad on their own. A calculus course taught abroad would differ little from one taught at home; only the setting would change. In this approach, the international experience is separate from the academic content.

(2) International experience as an accessory: Students take a course on a topic related to the area in which the study was taking place, and instructors use this environment to enhance student learning about that topic. Teaching a course on the Italian Renaissance in Italy would offer all manner of obvious advantages to student and instructor alike. In this case, the setting informs and enhances the delivery of academic content, but the course still privileges the academic content that would be taught in any university setting. My course on the world wars followed this model, covering most of the basic topics one might expect in such a history course, but augmented by on-the-ground experiences that facilitated student understanding of those same topics I would have taught at my home university. In this approach, the international experience enhances the academic content.

(3) International experience as educational travel: The course and content are largely framed by the destinations; visiting sites of historical, cultural, or other educational interest drives the subject matter, the questions, and the learning. Thus a course may involve traveling from place to place in South Africa, with each stop along the way providing the focal point for the educational experience. Students learn about the diamond trade by visiting a diamond mine, they learn

about apartheid by visiting Nelson Mandela's prison cell, and so on. In effect, for this approach the international experience determines much of the content.

All three approaches reflect differing ways to negotiate the tension between academic content and experience. The first two privilege the academic: the achievement of learning outcomes that mirror those of a similar course at the home institution, albeit augmented in differing ways by the locale. The third approach uses the experience to determine much of the academic content, with learning outcomes structured around the experiences provided, albeit augmented by the expertise and direction of the instructor. All three approaches have distinct advantages, and each offers a valuable learning opportunity for students. Having interacted closely with students traveling abroad, I know many students who have experienced each of these approaches and they have returned from their study abroad experience transformed: eyes opened to differing cultures, they develop a sense of empathy and understanding, an appreciation of differing ways of life, that are hard to develop in the classroom.

And yet I also wonder if these approaches do all they can to maximize cross-cultural learning. Each, in its own way, remains framed by an assumption that the international component is meant to enhance the academic. That is, the teaching of specific subject matter in ways akin to the home university setting is paramount. When my colleagues asked me "what did you read," they were drawing on this assumption, asking, in effect: to what extent did this study abroad course fulfill learning objectives in a university setting as we understand them? Viewed this way, cross-cultural learning will always be secondary, an ancillary benefit, but not a pedagogical priority.

When I began preparing to teach my second study abroad course in 2014, I wondered if I could reverse the priorities. Could I develop an international study course that had a different emphasis: one that used academic content to help students learn more from the international experience, rather than using the experience to augment the academic content, as seemed to be the prevailing trend? What would happen if I reframed my course by restructuring my pedagogical priorities?

Several factors prodded me to ask these questions. Years earlier, when I taught the world wars course, I was in a History Department at a large public university offering a history course, so the disciplinary focus came



Students from Florida Atlantic University and Ken Osgood in 2006 studying the topography surrounding the Ludendorff bridge at Remagen, captured by the Allies in March 1945.

logically, unquestioned. But since then, I had moved to an engineering and applied science university to run the Honors Program, which functions like a small liberal arts college, albeit with a unique student body (all highly motivated science and engineering majors). The needs of my students – who get precious few liberal arts courses, but are hungry to understand the world through the exploration of complex, open-ended problems, and who must develop key skills in communication, critical thinking, and social awareness – challenged me to ask the question: How can I best help them grow?

Other factors also challenged my assumptions. I had now become more educated about the value of active learning as pedagogy—an approach well documented in the educational literature to promote higher levels of student satisfaction, depth of understanding, and engagement with the material – and my teaching had since evolved to emphasize such approaches in all my courses. I was also team-teaching the course with my colleague Sarah Hitt, a literature professor and a creative instructor who had researched early modern transatlantic Spanish narratives, and who brought her own set of questions to the course planning. The interdisciplinary partnership on its own ensured that the course could not be framed merely in the confines of our individual disciplines; each of us would have to branch out.

And then there was the peculiar nature of the whole international experience I had mapped out for the students. We were all going to live in Barcelona, Spain, for two months. During that time, the students would work in various internships, tailored to their interests and arranged by CIS Abroad, an educational company that develops international work, study, and service programs in cities around the world. Our students would work full time for eight weeks in such fields as patent research, software, networking, civil engineering, and environmental monitoring. In addition, the students would take the course taught by Sarah and I. We would teach in the evenings, after students got off work, or on weekends, when we could journey to various sites. Given all these parameters, it seemed silly to offer a course framed by one of the three approaches delineated above. The students were going to be working and living in this country for two months, shouldn't we prepare them to get the most out of it?

So we set ourselves to the task of designing a course that would help our students understand the environment in which they were immersed. Our students knew very little about Spain aside from stock images of paella, nude beaches, and bull fighting. Most knew a few Spanish words, and a few had some rudimentary language capability, but none had any significant knowledge of or exposure to Spanish culture and history. So we wanted to equip them with information, concepts, and strategies to empower them to get beyond crude stereotypes and the superficial concepts presented for tourists so they could engage in meaningful cross-cultural learning. Our first priority was to foist the responsibility for learning on the students. As instructors, we would function more as coaches and guides, rather than purveyors of knowledge. We would provide them with readings, resources, activities, and framing questions to direct their learning, but the challenge of discovery would be theirs. In this fashion, the course would link academic and experiential learning, providing an analytical, interpretive, and reflective space to process their Spanish experience.

The class turned an investigative eye on the central question: "What is Spain and what does it mean to be Spanish today?" Thus our foray into Spanish history and culture would be imbued with a sense of purpose: helping students make sense of their own encounters in this complex and dynamic country, its culture framed by its position as a crossroads between East and West and as a site

of bitter ideological and religious conflict. The readings in history and literature, the assignments, and active learning exercises would be framed around these themes, linked by the overarching purpose of understanding the culture they were encountering.

Structurally, we developed the course so that it had two interconnected components. First there was the familiar seminar format. We met twice per week in the evenings to discuss readings and assignments on Spanish history and literature. Students read works like George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia*, the Irish writer Colm Tóibín's travelogue *Homage to Barcelona*, and a Spanish detective novel by Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, *The Angst-Ridden Executive*. Each in its own way explored the meaning and legacy of the Spanish civil war, the Franco dictatorship, and its aftermath. Students also read primary sources, historical articles, and contemporary media sources on pressing problems like the Catalan independence movement, the signs of which were everywhere we turned in Barcelona. In selecting readings, we sought to expose students to a wide variety of themes about Spanish life and culture, and to do so in a way that could connect with things they would observe and encounter as they went about their daily lives. We consciously chose many works written by foreigners to prod students to reflect on their own experiences as visitors to the area, and to encourage reflection on the value and limitations of the observations of outsiders. In most course readings, Barcelona figured prominently. The authors used local places, events, objects, and experiences as symbols to communicate feelings, values, and points of view. In this way, the experiences of the authors would mirror those of the students.

This also allowed us to augment our seemingly conventional academic material with our second component: active learning assignments that pushed students to connect their experiences in Barcelona with themes and concepts from the readings. Our goal was to get students to explore their surroundings off the tourist trail, to learn from their explorations, and to see connections between what they were reading and what they were experiencing. To foster this kind of thinking, we developed a weekly assignment we called "literature in the real world." We directed students to connect the author's experience to their own, by exploring any experience or object – an event, memory, monument, place, feeling, taste, smell, work of art, poem, architecture, etc. – that was mentioned, described, or alluded to anywhere in the reading selection for the week. We directed them to find a way to communicate its meaning and significance to the class to help us all understand on a deeper level what the authors were trying to convey. For example, food and place figures prominently in the writings of the Spanish author Montalbán, and some students dined at the restaurants and sampled the foods enjoyed by his characters; others visited the setting for a given scene in the novel, or read newspapers referenced in the story. The students came to approach it like a competition to find the most unusual, unlikely, difficult, or even distasteful adventure. One student, for example, journeyed by bus to a remote location outside the city to walk the trenches where Orwell had fought, and recapped in vivid fashion the feeling of the "front."

Another recurring active learning assignment we called a "cultural investigation." Students read selections from John Hooper's *The New Spaniards*, an overview of various aspects of Spanish life and culture, including music, dating, food, media, sport, and politics. Hooper also is a foreigner (British), and students were tasked with "testing" his analysis to see if his theories about Spanish culture seemed to hold up. They were asked, "Do my own observations and encounters substantiate or call into question the broader observations made by Hooper?" To make these assessments, students interviewed co-workers,

read newspapers, visited sites, and conducted their own observations. Naturally, their analyses were somewhat superficial as they were operating with limited evidence and time. But the goal was to get them to think critically both about the source and their surroundings, to become critical and informed readers and explorers. It gave the readings deeper purpose – as text now became informed by experience. It sharpened their powers of observation and opened their minds to new questions.

Through these exercises, Barcelona itself became our classroom. Every new experience and discovery became an opportunity for learning. Chance happenings and encounters took on new meaning. For example, Tóibín opens *Homage to Barcelona* by describing a procession of life-sized figures with oversized heads –the locals called them *gigantes* – but the description or meaning did not resonate much with the students when they first read the text. Yet, by good fortune, our class happened across a veritable museum of such figurines in the town hall of the Sarrià neighborhood. (To us, they looked like life-sized bobbleheads.) We asked the building manager if we could come inside to see and he ended up provoking a marvelous discussion about their cultural significance, as well as the history and cultural traditions of Sarrià – which had once been its own independent community but had since been “gobbled up” (his words) by Barcelona’s sprawl. Similarly, on another unscripted excursion we came across a museum exhibiting Spanish comic books from the 1930s to 1970s. We organized an impromptu class meeting at the museum, and were able to visualize the experience of war and dictatorship on Spanish popular culture, with ideas about traditional gender roles, heroism, religious conservatism, and anti-Communism evolving graphically before our eyes. Other such unscripted learning opportunities the students experienced on their own. When one student woke up early to see the sunrise at the beach, he encountered a very different city. Most of Barcelona lay asleep (this is Spain, after all), and he encountered dock workers, fishermen, and other working class day laborers whose “rough and tough” appearance made him uncomfortable, a chance encounter that made him reflect on the meaning of class divisions to the city as well as his own privileged upbringing.

Theories of experiential learning indicate that reflection is key; students need to assess, analyze, and synthesize aspects of their experience in order to add order and depth to their “learning by doing.” Recognizing the importance of such reflection, we also devised two final synthetic projects to wrap up the course. Again, we set them up to connect “academic” and “experiential” learning. For one project, students developed an ethnography of La Rambla: the main thoroughfare of shopping, dining, and cultural life that formed the soul of the city and figured prominently in the three main texts for the course (Orwell, Tóibín, and Montalbán). Since this section of the city played such an important role in Barcelona’s history, culture, and identity, students discovered that the street is viewed and portrayed very differently by each author, and by different groups of people who walked the street. Likewise, each student responded differently to this noisy, crowded, exciting, thoroughfare. Accordingly, we tasked students with determining their own interpretation of what La Rambla means to Barcelona. To do this, they needed to spend some time there listening to conversations, observing behaviors, clothing, and attitudes, watching how human interaction is tied to aspects of the place, and analyzing the spectacles in art, music, and commerce that gave the street its life. The assignment was wholly open-ended, but it required students to both observe and research, for they couldn’t make sense of their observations without digging deeper into the readings we provided as well as other sources, living as well as textual.

The other final project we called a “travel zine.”

A “zine” is a self-published work of original text and images; in effect, a mini-magazine. We tasked students with developing a zine that communicated the meaning of their own Barcelona travel narrative: a way to tell their own story as a visitor experiencing and learning about Spanish culture and history. Stylistically, students were challenged to look to the readings for inspiration – as travel and exploration were themes of most of the readings. Since their work as interns was a major part of their Spanish experience, they needed to include something that drew from that experience as well. Again, we left the assignment open to unleash their individual creativity. Projects can and should be creative, we instructed them, but they should remain informative, well researched, accurate, and substantive. The last few days in Spain, the students spent reflecting on their experiences as they composed their zines. Sarah and I held “office hours” at a nearby coffee shop, where we all met for half a day. The students came to write, discuss their ideas, and seek inspiration from us and each other. The final projects included poems, short stories, analytical essays, photo essays and other forms of expression that reflected on experiences that mattered most to them. In these reflections we could discern students wrestling with their own identities as informed by their cultural encounters. One student, for example, linked the Catalan independence movement to his own personal struggles with LGBT equality. Another reflected on how the Spanish pace of life had forced her to confront her own life choices as a workaholic chemical engineer. In this way, the resulting projects were more than mere academic exercises; they provided mechanisms for students to make sense of and give voice to their cross-cultural encounters.

After I returned from Spain, I took a new approach to answering the question, “What did my students read while they studied abroad?” I answered by talking about how what they *read* interacted with and informed what they *did*, and how what students *did* informed what they *learned*. I explained how the whole course emphasized learning through experience, and how we used conventional academic tools (reading, writing, discussion) to help students not only learn *from* the experience, but to figure out *how* to learn from experience. In the end, our course design may offer ideas for a fourth approach to balancing academic and experiential learning on study abroad courses, one that prioritizes the experiential, using the academic as an accessory to facilitate that kind of learning by doing. I don’t posit that it is “better” than the other three approaches, for that depends on the educational objectives. But if a goal of study abroad is to develop cross-cultural understanding, then we should at least identify that as a desired learning outcome and consider framing our teaching to enhance that objective.

Laying a Foundation: The Challenges and Opportunities of Short-Term Study Abroad Courses

Alison S. Burke and Dustin Walcher

In the fall of 2014, one of us (Alison Burke) approached the other (Dustin Walcher) to ask about co-teaching a study abroad course. Burke had led a one-week study abroad course once before, and for a variety of reasons was looking for a collaborator. We had talked previously, although mostly in passing, about what a co-taught course might look like. Both of us understood how transformative an international educational experience can be for students. The challenge lay in finding ways for more Southern Oregon University students to benefit. Walcher agreed on the spot.

Southern Oregon University, which we have called home for the past eight years, enrolls approximately 6000

students, primarily from southern Oregon and the far reaches of northern California—a region that, historically, has been economically challenged. In many respects, SOU's profile is similar to those of other regional universities around the United States. Incoming students are not as well prepared for college-level work as the average American freshman. They are also more likely to be first-generation college students, come from lower-income families, be non-traditional students, and have part-time or full-time jobs in addition to being full-time students. They are less likely to have a passport—let alone one filled with stamps.

Few SOU students even consider taking a traditional semester or academic year abroad. For students who are the first people in their families to attend college, work multiple jobs to pay for school, or have children, a lengthy period abroad is simply not realistic. If they are going to travel, they need a shorter-term option. Consequently, our primary goal in offering our course was to give students, most of whom had never traveled abroad before and some of whom had never even been on a plane before, another way to get out of the country. The international experience was an end unto itself.

Naturally, we also sought to design an intellectually and experientially engaging course. We teamed up together for two reasons. First, as we will explain, putting together and running a faculty-led study abroad course is time consuming and labor intensive. There are numerous steps that need to be taken and challenges that need to be met before anybody ever stands in an airport security line. The prospect of dividing that workload was welcome. Second, creating an interdisciplinary course that was cross-listed between two departments served to broaden our reach (Burke is a criminologist; Walcher, a historian). More prospective students were likely to hear about our class because we partnered, and they had the choice of earning credit toward degrees offered in either criminology or history.

We chose to concentrate the course on the topic of “crime and violence in Britain and France” and to take the students to London and Paris over spring break. The themes were broad, and easily taught by a historian and a criminologist. The class design largely conformed to the third schema Ken Osgood identifies in his article in this series; we selected sites to visit that were consistent with the larger course themes and then developed content in large part around those sites. Students heard us lecture for the first five weeks of the winter quarter (yes, we are still on the quarter system). Then, in groups, they presented more detailed information about the history and criminological significance of some of the sites we were going to visit. Our students examined Jack the Ripper's crime spree in the broader context of an urban, industrial, late nineteenth-century city; medieval systems of justice and political legitimacy, with a focus on the Tower of London; and evolving systems of authority in revolutionary France. In addition to their group presentations, class participants completed a more detailed research paper on one aspect of their group assignment. As a result, before we ever left Oregon our students possessed a reasonable foundation of knowledge about what they were about to see.

The work we completed in the classroom, then, largely served to establish a basis for the students' learning experiences abroad. In addition to visiting the East End, the Tower of London, and the Conciergerie, they witnessed part of a trial at the Old Bailey, toured an additional former prison, and examined the evolution of French law enforcement practices at a policing museum, among other activities. While in Europe, we required each student to keep a daily travel journal. The journals proved exceptionally fascinating. We required participants to analyze and provide critical insights about the official site visits incorporated into the course. But in addition, most



SOU students at the Clink Prison Museum in London.

wrote in some detail about their day-to-day encounters with foreign cultures—and with each other. We could see the intellectual and personal growth on the pages after we returned.

Critics of short-term faculty-led study abroad courses are correct when they point out that such courses have inherent drawbacks that long-term programs do not. Students almost always remain clustered in their own groups. They observe other cultures, but do not have the time or any real opportunity to truly immerse themselves. Their rewards are thus more limited than those typically experienced by students who spend more time abroad—especially those who take classes at foreign universities as part of the regular student body (instead of remaining in sequestered classes).

However, unfavorably comparing the benefits of short-term faculty-led programs with those of long-term immersion programs assumes that students are choosing between those two options. The vast majority of students who enrolled in our course framed their choice as either going abroad with this class or not going at all (this was true of thirteen of the sixteen who enrolled). The student we had who was in his mid-thirties and had a wife and four children would be an unlikely candidate for a semester abroad. Indeed, the majority of our students who came to us without any experience traveling internationally could not imagine enrolling in a longer-term study abroad program and being thrown into an unfamiliar environment for an extended period of time. In our course the time abroad was limited, and wary students had two professors along whom they knew and trusted. From the perspective of most of our students, the course provided a safe introduction to international education.

Short-term study abroad, then, is best understood as the process of laying a foundation with the hope that students can build more elaborate international experiences upon it in the future. In fact, one of the students who joined us on this excursion accompanied Burke in her previous study abroad class to London. He had never been on a plane before that trip (and yes, the flight attendant gave him the requisite wing pin to mark the occasion), and he enjoyed the experience in London so much he enrolled in the class to London and Paris, and brought classmates who had never previously traveled abroad so he could mentor them and show them the ropes of international experiential learning.

Ideally, participation will spark an interest in the cultures and histories of other areas. Some students will go on to embark upon longer-term study abroad programs that they did not have the confidence to undertake prior to their short-term course. Others will travel internationally after graduating and will, we hope, go beyond mere tourism to lifelong experiential learning. By itself, the experience of learning abroad encourages students to examine the world and their own assumptions from another point of view.

All of this is to say that the rewards stemming from teaching a study abroad course are tremendous. But leading such an undertaking is not without significant challenges. Despite support from the provost, substantial and almost unrelenting institutional and other bureaucratic barriers threatened our class from the beginning. Some of those challenges were financial. To say that fiscal stress has become routine would be an understatement; SOU has been in retrenchment twice in the past decade. All administrative decisions are filtered through the lens of the university's fund balance. As a result, it is imperative that the class enroll a minimum of ten students, and ideally, more than fifteen. This institutional reality helps to contextualize our decision to partner and cross-list the course; by doing so, it became far more likely that enough students would enroll to permit the class to go forward.

Bureaucratic challenges were numerous, frustrating, and had the potential to undo the course. SOU's Office of International Programs (OIP) is led by proficient and helpful professionals. But it is also understaffed. When Burke led her first study abroad class to London, nobody in the OIP was responsible for assisting faculty with the logistical arrangements necessary to make a study abroad course a reality. Consequently, she used an outside travel agency that specialized in educational tours. After that class, the OIP worked on facilitating contracts with other agencies and offered some assistance for future classes, but we had a rapport with our previous agency so we opted to use them again. However, such outsourcing creates a host of additional challenges.

The first of those challenges involved contracts. Our travel agency had standard contracts, and SOU's legal counsel would review and modify them. But the OIP only partially facilitated communication between counsel and the travel agency. To ensure that the course was not undone by disputes over legal language, we had to stay on top of every detail. We followed up with multiple emails to the counsel, only to have him ultimately reply to somebody in the OIP. So we also had to keep in routine contact with the OIP, as that was the only way to find out whether we had to get back to the travel agency about time-sensitive details. Contracts also require the signature of the vice president of finance. He—and you may notice a trend here—did not usually respond to emails from faculty members either. Just managing the contracts required a great deal of fortitude.

But the contract problems paled in comparison to those emanating from the financial aid office, because students were also involved directly at this level. SOU's financial aid office as a rule does not disburse funds until the fourth week of the term in order to prevent students from collecting money and then dropping their classes. We



SOU students in front of the Eiffel Tower in Paris.

ran our course during the winter quarter, in advance of a spring break trip. Financial aid disbursements in the fourth week of the term would come after the airline's deadline for payment on reservations for spring break. Obviously, our students needed their financial aid in order to pay the travel agency.

We thought we had an agreement to move forward with early disbursements, but once again, we encountered communication challenges with various parts of the university. When students went to the financial aid office themselves, they were unable to make any headway. Ultimately, we asked for the intervention of a university vice president, escorted students to the office, and helped facilitate a financial aid process with which we had scant previous experience. We were ultimately able to secure an accelerated aid disbursement plan that gave students approximately forty-eight hours to make their payments.

We also received requests from student support services to meet with advisors who were concerned about the monetary aspect of the trip. As we previously stated, the students are not well off financially, so spending two thousand dollars extra for one class presented concerns for those whose job is centered on student success and retention. We had to assuage their misgivings and assure them that the trip would be extremely beneficial to the students. Significant time and energy was expended in managing the university's sometimes byzantine bureaucracy.

Unforeseen issues with students also emerged. Our advice is to expect the unexpected. We warned all students to resolve any passport issues (get a passport, renew a passport, locate a passport) well in advance of the class. Naturally, we had a student with a unique challenge. The name on his driver's license did not match the name on his birth certificate. Neither of us can remember why, but suffice it to say that with almost no time to spare he was able to secure a passport. Had it not worked out, he would have lost a substantial amount of money for the travel deposit *and* he would have failed the class.

The possibility of failing the class is another unique aspect of the short-term study abroad course. The one-week travel component is more important than the accompanying term of work, but both are necessary. A student cannot pass the four-credit class if either of those components is missing. Students' performance while abroad is a major consideration in their grade, so if they end up not being able to go, for whatever reason, they cannot pass the class. Similarly, if students are not good ambassadors of Southern Oregon University, they will not pass the class and may even be sent home early (that contingency is outlined in the contract they sign).

Midway through the winter, when we had to contend with so many bureaucratic obstacles while staying on top of all of our other duties, we swore to each other that we would never undertake such a task again. Once we got abroad, that unshakable resolve lasted less than forty-eight hours. Whatever frustrations we experienced getting the course off the ground seemed to pale in comparison with the incalculable benefits we witnessed. We saw our students' eyes light up when they visited the sites they had researched. We heard newfound excitement in their conversations about course material. And we saw significant personal growth. Students who had never visited a major city before and were intimidated at the prospect of using the London Underground were navigating the Paris Metro without trepidation just days later and exploring as much as they could in their unscheduled hours.

And so we are now in the midst of cramming for our next course abroad. This one will be on crime and violence in Italy.

A World Within: Teaching the History of U.S. Foreign Relations in Partnership with Community

Kimber Quinney

It has been the work of history to free truth—to break down the walls of isolation and of class interest which held it in and under. . . . The truth is not fully freed when it gets into some individual's consciousness, for him to delectate himself with. It is freed only when . . . the truth which comes to consciousness in one, extends and distributes itself to all so that it becomes the Common-wealth, the Republic, the public affair.¹

—John Dewey

When we think of boundaries in history, we might imagine an outline, a border, a map that defines a place in time and what happened there. We might also speak of disciplines and fields and methods of history that are bound by explicit and often distinct protocols and practices.

In recent years our conversations have pushed such boundaries. They have focused on the changing meaning of "nation-state" and conceptions of nationalism, for example, and they have benefited from interdisciplinary themes in our research. And, of course, as the present discussion about experiential learning shows, we are contemplating the boundaries of teaching history.

But I am interested in the boundaries of history in a more philosophical sense.² Where does the teaching of history begin and end? Do historians have a responsibility

to lend our expertise to society? Do we have a moral obligation to community? I am still grappling with these questions, but I would like to share just one example of a real-life context in which they converge.

Institutional Boundaries

Our worlds have very real, practical limitations. For example, my institution—California State University, San Marcos, which is thirty-five miles north of San Diego—is one of twenty-three campuses in the California state system. As part of the largest public university system in the United States, my campus is clearly hampered by bureaucracy and by the society in which it functions. Indeed, a good word to describe the CSU system in recent years is *beleaguered*. We weathered the storm of the recession relatively well, but it did have direct and lasting impact on our campus and local communities.

Our student population reflects the region that our institution serves. Over half our students identify as being traditionally underrepresented minorities. For the past three years, over half our graduates have been the first in their families to achieve a four-year college degree. We are officially designated as an Hispanic-Serving Institution, and it is fair to say that a good proportion of our students are undocumented. A majority of students work at least one and sometimes two or three jobs. More than ten percent of our students are veterans or dependents of veterans—the highest proportion in the CSU system. Cal State San Marcos also has the highest proportion, and the only increasing number, of American Indian students in the system. We serve proportionately more former foster youth than any higher education institution in the entire country.

Readers will not be surprised to learn that in the 2015–16 academic year, just under two percent of our student population studied abroad. The reality of the institutional context in which I teach is that only a small number of my students will find it feasible to study outside California, let alone outside the United States. But I believe I have an obligation to provide as many different learning experiences as possible. So when I began thinking about how to integrate experiential learning into my courses on the History of American Foreign Relations, I had no choice but to reframe the concept of an "international exchange experience" by expanding institutional and intellectual boundaries.

Boundaries of Knowledge

First and foremost (and this is essential to what follows), I am increasingly convinced that transformational learning happens outside the walls of the ivory tower. The definition and history of the term *ivory tower* is worth recounting. Defined by the dictionary as "a state of privileged seclusion or separation from the facts and practicalities of the real world," the phrase is biblical in origin. Appearing in the *Song of Solomon 7:4* ("your neck is like an ivory tower"), it was originally a reference to a noble purity.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, the phrase was used to describe intellectual pursuits that are isolated from everyday life. Although it first appeared in French, the earliest mention in English is in the 1911 translation of Henri Bergson's *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*. Although Bergson addresses the relationship between a comic and society, rather than between an academic and society, the meaning resonates:

Every small society that forms within the larger is thus impelled, by a vague kind of instinct, to devise some method of discipline or "breaking in," so as to

deal with the rigidity of habits that have been formed elsewhere and have now to undergo a partial modification. Society, properly so-called, proceeds in exactly the same way. *Each member must be ever attentive to his social surroundings; he must model himself on his environment; in short, he must avoid shutting himself up in his own peculiar character as a philosopher in his ivory tower* (italics mine). Therefore society holds suspended over each individual member, if not the threat of correction, at all events the prospect of a snubbing, which, although it is slight, is none the less dreaded.³

Today, *ivory tower* is used disparagingly, especially because it is assumed that intellectuals in the ivory tower do not recognize their disconnect from society and, worse still, do not seek to correct it.

One way of beginning to break through the walls of the ivory tower in the twenty-first century is community-engaged scholarship. The term “scholarship of engagement” was first used by Ernest Boyer in 1996. He redefined scholarly work to include academics who are involved in a reciprocal partnership with community and bring their expertise to bear on community problems. “The academy,” he wrote, “must become a more vigorous partner in the search for answers to our most pressing, social, civic, economic, and moral problems, and must affirm its historical commitment to what I call the scholarship of engagement.”⁴

Community-engaged scholarship implies a renewed role for universities to advance democratic principles and to contribute to the public good. According to the New England Resource Center for Higher Education, which is responsible for facilitating and approving the Carnegie Community Engagement Classification for universities across the nation, this practice of scholarship

includes explicitly democratic dimensions of encouraging the participation of non-academics in ways that enhance and broaden engagement and deliberation about major social issues inside and outside the university. It seeks to facilitate a more active and engaged democracy by bringing affected publics into problem-solving work in ways that advance the public good with and not merely for the public.⁵

This approach to the creation and dissemination of knowledge expands the mission and meaning of university teaching in the community and explicitly identifies concrete, “real life” experience as a high-impact practice—that is, a mode of teaching and learning that readily engages and transforms students.⁶

Boundaries of Experience

John Dewey’s philosophy of education and, in particular, the ideas he put forward in *Education and Experience* (1938) are as relevant today as they were one hundred years ago. Although many of us in higher education might dismiss Dewey’s ideas as being aimed at elementary school education, they are directly relevant to twenty-first century teaching and learning at the university level.

An advocate for progressive education, Dewey reminds us that education and democracy reinforce each other. One of his most insightful observations is that education for the benefit of a future value or in the abstract is far less impactful than education in the moment of experience.

What then is the true meaning of preparation in the educational scheme? In the first place, it means that a person, young or old, gets out of his present experience all that there is in it for him at the time in which he has it. . . . The ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the future contradicts itself. It omits, and even shouts out, the very conditions by which a person can be prepared for his future. *We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future* (italics mine). This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything.⁷

Dewey’s assertion that we are missing a potent learning opportunity (i.e., the moment when a student is most apt to learn) when we teach in order to prepare our students for a future assignment or grade or learning objective is insightful. Experiential learning happens in the moment.

David Kolb’s theory of the experiential learning cycle is especially relevant.⁸ Kolb boldly defines learning “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.”⁹ His experiential learning cycle is a theory that describes how we take in and process information and ultimately, apply knowledge. The four stages of this cycle are:

1. *Concrete Experience* (a new experience of situation is encountered, or a reinterpretation of existing experience).
2. *Reflective Observation* (of the new experience. Of particular importance are any inconsistencies between experience and understanding).
3. *Abstract Conceptualization* (Reflection gives rise to a new idea, or a modification of an existing abstract concept).
4. *Active Experimentation* (the learner applies them to the world around them to see what results).¹⁰

A student can enter at any point in this cycle of learning; each learning mode informs the others.

Within these institutional and philosophical frameworks, then, came the search for a feasible—even if imperfect—pedagogical practice as an answer to the irreplaceable experience of “study abroad,” and that is what I have come to identify as an “international exchange” experience at home, in San Diego.

Expanding Global Boundaries to Include Community

I suspect all the communities in which we teach have a significant number of associations and organizations that are global in orientation. In my city, for example, we have the San Diego World Affairs Council, the San Diego Diplomacy Council, the San Diego Chapter of United Nations, and the International Houses at Balboa Park. But we might further expand the boundaries of how we define *global*: in San Diego there are also many ethnic and cultural centers, immigration resource organizations, and faith and interfaith centers that lend a global character and perspective to our region.

One of the most successful partnerships is the ongoing collaboration between the university and the San Diego office of the International Rescue Committee. Founded

in 1933 at the behest of Albert Einstein, the International Rescue Committee provides aid to refugees and displaced persons around the world. It is hard at work in over forty countries and twenty-six U.S. cities “helping to restore health, safety, education, economic wellbeing, and power to people devastated by conflict and disaster.”¹¹

In June 2016, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees issued a report that reveals staggering—and historically unprecedented—figures of global migration. According to the UNHCR, 65.3 million people are currently displaced from their homes.¹² That number exceeds the figures in the aftermath of World War II. As a recent *Atlantic* article reported, “To put it in perspective, the tally is greater than the population of the United Kingdom—or of Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined.”¹³ Over three million people are from industrialized countries, the largest total UNHCR has ever recorded. Half of all refugees are children.

The current refugee crisis is obviously a major worldwide humanitarian crisis that is directly relevant to the history of U.S. foreign relations.¹⁴ But it is simultaneously a crisis that is directly relevant to San Diego. The urgency of the crisis, in other words, is felt in our communities, and its trends mirror global trends. According to the IRC San Diego website, “The IRC in San Diego opened in 1975 in response to the arrival of Vietnamese refugees resettling to the area, and has since grown to serve approximately 1,000 new refugee arrivals from many countries around the world each year. To date, the IRC has resettled over 28,500 refugees from 29 countries.”¹⁵ And the numbers continue to grow. In June of 2016, the San Diego chapter issued the following announcement, urging the local community to help: “Each year the IRC in San Diego resettles approximately 1,000 refugees with the majority coming from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia in recent years. Now, with only a few months left in the fiscal year, nearly half of all the people who will be resettled through the IRC in San Diego this year are set to arrive in just three short but very busy months. By September 30th, we expect as many as 500 individuals, mostly Syrian, to reach their new homes. This marks a significant change in the demographics of clients served by the IRC in San Diego. The majority of new arrivals will be Syrian, while for the past 8 years Iraqis have been the largest group served.”¹⁶

How do I convey the urgency of this crisis and its relationship to U.S. foreign relations in a way that does it justice? One approach is to invite my students to experience the reality, to witness how real lives are affected, to provide an opportunity for an “international exchange” program between my CSUSM students and the growing number of global refugee youth who now call San Diego home.

One of the many youth programs provided by the IRC is called IRC Peacemakers. The Peacemakers are high school and college students who speak to various groups in the community about their experiences as refugees. They benefit from the opportunity to develop their public speaking and leadership skills and share their personal stories through speaking engagements, while the program fosters multicultural understanding and raises awareness of issues affecting refugees and immigrants among people in the wider community—including my CSUSM history students.

Every year that I teach the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, I build in an “international exchange” experiential learning component that involves students in my class meeting with and ultimately befriending the IRC refugee youth in our community. The community partnership is ongoing and reciprocal. IRC youth attend our local universities; university students do their community service projects and internships at the IRC. In fact, a Cal State San Marcos graduate is the current director of the youth career development program at the IRC.

I recognize that there will be naysayers with regard to an “international exchange program” as it is defined here. This pedagogical approach is not intended to replace or replicate the more traditional, intensive, immersive experience in a foreign county. But it has value in its own right. It is far less cumbersome than a traditional study abroad program, which has bureaucratic, chronological, and geographic limitations; it creates a perpetual opportunity for learning; and it illustrates how the global is local, and the local is global. It also represents community-engaged scholarship and demonstrates reciprocal benefits to university and community. It thus reinforces civic learning and democratic engagement, typifying the essential relationship between education, history, and democracy.

Moreover, this kind of learning happens in the moment. It is a loosely structured, experiential format that shifts learning from an instructor-centered to a student-centered environment of cultural exchange. It personifies the political, epitomizing the essential (and yet all too often overlooked) relationship between policy and people. This version of an international exchange program provides a stark reminder to all of us that refugees become new Americans, thus exemplifying how American foreign relations continue to shape and reshape the nation.

Experiential learning in this context invites us to think differently about the boundaries of history—beyond the ivory tower—because we are forced to bear witness. We must question our obligations as historians (and students of history) to address and redress the consequences of U.S. foreign policy and to accept the responsibilities we bear to our own communities that have been so profoundly affected by that policy.

Notes:

1. John Dewey, “Christianity and Democracy,” in *The Early Works, 1882–1898*, vol. 4, *Early Essays and the Study of Ethics, 1893–1894* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1971), 8.
2. We need a roundtable on this topic! For inspiration, see the Research Seminar “Boundaries of History” offered by the History Department at St. Petersburg School of Social Sciences and Humanities; and Jan Eivind Myhre, ed., *Boundaries of History* (Oslo, 2015). Both address the kind of questions posed in this essay, including boundaries between professional history and “lay history,” and the public. For example, Myhre asks, “What were [the historians’] responsibilities, and how did, and do, morals enter into historical scholarship?”
3. Henri Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (New York, 1914), <https://archive.org/details/laughteranessay-00berggoog>.
4. Ernest L. Boyer, “The Scholarship of Engagement,” *Journal of Public Service and Outreach* 1, no. 1 (1996): 11–20.
5. http://www.nerche.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=265&catid=28.
6. The Association of American Colleges and Universities also defines diversity and global learning as a high-impact learning practice. <https://www.aacu.org/leap/hips>.
7. John Dewey, *Experience and Education*, Kappa Delta Pi Lecture, 1938, repr. 1997 (West Lafayette, IN), 49.
8. David Kolb, *Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development* (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1984).
9. *Ibid.*, 38.
10. *Ibid.*, 42.
11. <https://www.rescue.org/united-states/san-diego-ca>.
12. <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html>.
13. Krishnadev Calamur, “A Refugee Record,” *Atlantic Monthly*, June 20, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/un-refugees/487775/>.
14. With all my emphasis on transformative learning, I should be clear that the transmission of information is absolutely essential. I am careful to teach the “facts” about global migration (relying on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures,

for example, and including concrete, legal definitions of *refugee*, *international displaced persons*, and *asylum seekers*). I also trace the historical patterns, noting that the global refugee population grew from 2.4 million in 1975 to 14.9 million in 1990; a peak was reached after the end of the Cold War with 18.2 million refugees in 1993. By 2000 the global refugee numbers had declined to 12.1 million, and in 2005 it was down to 8.7 million, the lowest figure since 1980. Among the questions I put to the students: What changed in 2005? And what is the relationship between that change and U.S. foreign policy?

15. <https://www.rescue.org/united-states/san-diego-ca#why-are-refugees-arriving-in-san-diego>

16. <https://www.rescue.org/announcement/increased-arrivals-expected-through-september>

Our Time in Havana (and Ho Chi Minh City): Studying History While Studying Abroad

Matthew Masur

When I brought a small group of students to Vietnam in January 2011, I did not see it as my first foray into “experiential learning.” I’m not sure I was even familiar with the term, and if I was I probably dismissed it as just another trendy higher ed phrase—another way for teachers to use “impactful” strategies like “flipping the classroom” to “grow student engagement.” But while many of us may eschew the jargon that is common in higher ed circles, we also tend to embrace the concepts or practices it describes. Historians “flip” the classroom every day by having students read something outside of class and then discuss it with their classmates the next day. We have always worked to keep students engaged and interested. And while “experiential learning” might be slightly less common in history courses, we have found ways to learn about the past—and, by extension, how that past is understood—by bringing students to museums and historical sites.

Initially, my motives for bringing students abroad were not so lofty. A measure of selfishness may have been involved, as leading a student trip gave me a chance to return to Vietnam—something that wasn’t easy on an assistant professor’s modest salary. I had spent a fair amount of time in Vietnam and benefited tremendously from my experience. I also had a general appreciation for international travel and knew that many of my students had rarely, if ever, journeyed abroad. This is not to suggest that the educational benefits were an afterthought; it was just that I hadn’t spent much time considering how study abroad would overlap nicely with the goals I had for my history courses.

Although slightly more complicated than bringing students to a local historical site or interpretive center, study abroad provides excellent opportunities for students to complement more traditional forms of studying history. In the past few years I have taken students on three short-term study abroad programs: two to Vietnam, and most recently to Cuba. My institution has embraced short-term study abroad as an alternative for students who cannot participate in semester- or year-long programs, either for financial reasons or because of personal preferences. My trips took place during winter recess (Vietnam) or spring recess (Cuba), minimizing conflicts with other activities. In my experience a shorter program is also “safer” for students who are nervous about traveling abroad for an extended period. Granted, challenging yourself and becoming more independent is one of the main arguments for study abroad. Nevertheless, I’d rather see students go abroad for a week or two than not travel at all.

The first trip exceeded my expectations, so I brought a second group of students to Vietnam in 2013. Then last year I led a trip to Cuba as part of a course on the Cold



A marker at the Ap Bac battlefield

War. While it might be disingenuous for me to say that I had abandoned my earlier selfish motives (I *really wanted to visit Cuba!*), I had come to appreciate that study abroad, as a form of experiential learning, provides unique learning opportunities that are particularly well suited to the study of history. For one thing, venturing abroad can expose students to the diversity and interconnectedness of the world—central themes in many history courses. And visiting the places where history unfolded is a sensory experience that cannot be recreated in the classroom. Students can see the landscape, feel the climate, and hear the sounds (or note the absence of sounds) that provided the setting for historical events. Finally, they can gain a deeper appreciation of history as a mode of thinking and analysis by seeing how different countries tell the stories of their past, sometimes in ways that may not align with what students have learned in the classroom. While these “experiential” elements will not replace more traditional methods of studying the past (namely, reading and discussing primary and secondary sources), they can effectively complement the basic techniques we use in our courses.

Organizing these trips can occupy a fair amount of time, depending on the level of support at a given college or university. When I first traveled to Vietnam, we did not have a full-time study-abroad coordinator, so I ended up taking on most of the planning and administrative responsibilities.

For subsequent trips we used API, a company specializing in academic study- abroad programs. API was particularly useful for our trip to Cuba, which required us to navigate complicated regulations in both the United States and Cuba. For each trip I also worked with colleagues—both at my own institution and at other institutions—to share the responsibility of planning and running the trips.

If my institution is any guide, colleges are increasingly interested in showing that they provide a global education for their students. History is a logical field for exploring the processes of globalization, as historians can help to explain the roots and consequences of global interconnectedness. Traveling abroad can augment these historical discussions by giving students first-hand exposure to examples of globalization. At the same time, students can observe the resilience and persistence of local cultures in the face of globalization's seemingly inexorable march.

During my first study trip to Vietnam, students began observing signs of globalization before we even arrived at our destination. They were pleasantly surprised when we landed in Seoul for our layover and they were immediately greeted by the familiar pink-and-orange color scheme of a Dunkin' Donuts store in the airport. (For kids from New England, this is second only to a Red Sox hat as a comforting sign of home.) As we traveled around Vietnam, students continued to notice familiar sights, sounds, and tastes: KFC and Pringles, karaoke bars playing Katy Perry songs, shops selling knockoff Nike T-shirts. The students were especially surprised to see the proliferation of global brands and products in a nominally communist country. The juxtaposition of propaganda posters extolling Ho Chi Minh and gleaming new shopping malls and cafés was a bit puzzling and prompted numerous discussions about Vietnam's political and economic system.

Our experience in Cuba was a bit different, but no less revealing. Cuba was almost entirely devoid of the brands and symbols that students often associate with globalization; there was no Coca-Cola, no McDonald's, no Starbucks or Dunkin' Donuts. Cuba conformed to the students' preconceived notions of a closed, communist society. But upon further examination, it became apparent that Cuba was still integrated into a global system, if in slightly different ways. While we were in Havana a cruise ship docked and released a stream of international tourists. Propaganda posters around the countryside depicted the

smiling faces of international figures deemed friendly to Cuba, including Che Guevara, Hugo Chavez, and Nelson Mandela. And of course, the long history of globalization could be seen everywhere, from Spanish-style colonial mansions in Trinidad to vintage American automobiles on the streets of Havana.

I was a bit concerned that students would view globalization only through the spread of recognizable products and brands. In both Vietnam and Cuba I encouraged them to think about other components of globalization. For example, in Vietnam I had them read about American opposition to the importation of Vietnamese catfish.¹ In Cuba we talked about the spread

I was a bit concerned that students would view globalization only through the spread of recognizable products and brands. In both Vietnam and Cuba I encouraged them to think about other components of globalization.

of news and information on an island with limited telecommunications networks and internet access. The students were intrigued by the stories of entrepreneurial Cubans who shared international news and other information via the "packet": a USB drive loaded with articles and other reading materials culled from the worldwide web. In both countries we talked about the networks between locals and their friends and family members who had emigrated to the United States, particularly in terms of the financial remittances that constitute an important part of the Cuban and Vietnamese economies. And in Cuba we discussed the U.S.-Cuban collaborations

that have developed in areas like hurricane tracking, drug interdiction, and air traffic control.

An additional benefit of studying abroad is that it places students in the very locales where historical events unfolded. In my experience, students learned the most from their visits to the sites of battles or military operations. In Vietnam, we took a short detour on the way to the Mekong Delta to visit Ap Bac, the site of an early encounter between U.S. military advisors and Viet Cong soldiers. Having read about the battle, my students were aware of its significance and its repercussions for America's involvement in Vietnam. Visiting the actual site of the fighting, however, was different. Stepping off our bus, students could feel the heat and humidity that American soldiers would have encountered fifty years earlier. The rice fields where American advisors came under fire were still intact, with markers indicating where the fighting took place. Students could gaze over the rice paddies, observe the terrain, and imagine how the battle unfolded. A small museum included additional information about the battle, while a model village depicted the collaboration between NLF troops and the local population.

We had a similar experience in Cuba when we took an overnight excursion to Playa Girón, one of the landing sites of the Bay of Pigs invasion. As with the trips to Vietnam, the students were assigned readings—in this case, Howard Jones's *The Bay of Pigs*—to help them with historical context.² Visiting the site reinforced and amplified what the students had read, just as it did at Ap Bac. As our bus made its way to the beach, students gained a greater appreciation for the physical landscape and the road networks that contributed to the operation's failure. More than fifty years after the invasion, the area has not undergone extensive infrastructure development, so the students could still see the swampy surroundings and thick vegetation that Jones describes in his book. The students also had the opportunity to wade in the water where the invasion took place. At one point several students noticed small clumps of seaweed just below the surface of the water; according to Jones, the CIA mistakenly believed that beds of coral further out in the water were just additional masses of seaweed. When the rubber vessels approached the landing spot they briefly



Cuban Propaganda Poster

ran aground on the coral—one of the many missteps that marred the invasion.³

One final advantage of going abroad to study history is that it can help students see the varied ways in which people and nations tell the stories of the past. In both Vietnam and Cuba, students encountered state- or party-sanctioned versions of the past. This was true at Ap Bac and Playa Girón, where museums told the heroic stories of Vietnamese and Cuban patriots, many of whom were martyrs for national independence and social revolution. These accounts made some students slightly uncomfortable, as they pulled no punches in describing America's motives and tactics. My students were not terribly naïve—they had read other historical accounts that criticized American actions in Vietnam and Cuba. They were, however, surprised at what they viewed as a lack of objectivity in the narratives they encountered at museums and other educational sites in Vietnam and Cuba. I used these experiences to encourage students to think about the purpose of museums and other educational sites. Are they meant to inform? If so, about what? And although American museums may appear more evenhanded, what biases might they include?

One of the most productive experiential learning activities came after we visited the War Crimes Museum in Ho Chi Minh City. The museum is a common stop for tourists, and it often elicits complex reactions from American visitors. My students were no different: even those who harbored doubts about America's involvement in Vietnam found the pedantic and propagandistic tone to be rather off-putting. In order to give my students more context to understand the museum and the historical narratives it employed, I had them read Scott Laderman's excellent chapter on the museum in *Tours of Vietnam*.⁴

After spending a couple of hours at the museum, we adjourned to a local coffee shop and discussed our experiences. I am often skeptical of educational activities that ask students to reveal their "feelings," but in this case the students' reactions were informed by Laderman's excellent analysis of the museum. While most of them still found the presentation at the museum to be one-sided, they seemed to have a greater appreciation for the fact that this was a valuable opportunity to encounter a truly Vietnamese perspective on the war—even if it was only one of numerous Vietnamese narratives.

Students' encounters with "official" versions of the past were not limited to museums and battle sites. In both Cuba and Vietnam, students engaged in conversations with scholars, other students, and tour guides. These conversations often turned to America's complicated role in the world, both now and in recent decades. Here again, students were sometimes surprised at the rather harsh critiques that they were subjected to. They sometimes felt as if they had to either apologize for America's actions or, in other cases, justify them. But these moments when students felt defensive about being Americans were always balanced by other occasions when they experienced affection and admiration from people they encountered in both countries. In fact, they were surprised that they didn't encounter more animosity. Although it is a bit of a cliché, my students quickly recognized that people in Cuba and Vietnam often hold wildly divergent views of the American government and the American people. In both cases, there was no shortage of anti-American government sentiment—not surprising, considering the historical relationships involved. But people in both countries regularly expressed their hope for better relations with the United States. In Vietnam, much of the rhetoric seemed motivated by Vietnamese concerns about China's growing influence in the region. In Cuba, it was prompted by recent steps to establish diplomatic relations and end economic restrictions on Cuba. Whatever the motive, it gave my students insights into the complex interplay between the past and the present—a past marred

by violence and ill will, coexisting with a present marked by hope and optimism.

Notes:

1. Scott Laderman, "A Fishy Affair: Vietnamese Seafood and the Confrontation with U.S. Neoliberalism," in *Four Decades On: Vietnam, the United States, and the Legacies of the Second Indochina War*, ed. Scott Laderman and Edwin A. Martini (Durham, NC, 2013).
2. Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford, UK, 2008).
3. Jones, *The Bay of Pigs*, 100.
4. Scott Laderman, *Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides, and Memory* (Durham, NC, 2009), 151–82.

The Internationalization Agenda and the Teaching of American Foreign Relations

Brian C. Etheridge

The American Council on Education recently reported that internationalization efforts have "accelerated" across the landscape of higher education in the last several years. As part of their reaccreditation strategies, several American institutions have identified internationalizing the campus as a signature initiative, with enhancement plans like *Building International Competence*, *Learning without Borders*, and *Preparing for Success in a Global Society* that articulate ambitious learning goals for their students. Regrettably, however, historians of U.S. foreign relations, when they exist on such campuses, are often not included in these initiatives, even though their areas of specialization naturally position them to make significant contributions. Using the work of leading theorists in internationalization, I would like to suggest briefly how foreign relations historians could situate their teaching practices within this framework and thereby strengthen their teaching, their visibility in these efforts, and the agenda itself.

First, it is important to define what we mean by internationalization. Here I would turn to the work of Jane Knight, who has been toiling on this issue for many years. Seeing it as a response to the "the economic, political, and societal forces pushing 21st century higher education toward greater international involvement"—that is globalization—Knight describes internationalization as "the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions, or delivery of postsecondary education." To understand the effectiveness of institutions of higher education in addressing the challenges posed by globalization, Darla Deardorff has convincingly argued that we must move beyond raw numbers of international exchange and look instead at the intercultural competence of our students.¹

Although it is a contested term, scholars agree that intercultural competence involves helping students learn how to understand the world from a different perspective. In this way, intercultural competence broadens traditional notions of internationalization in significant ways. First, it takes into account cultural encounters in both domestic and international contexts, a scope that allows it to address issues around immigration and intergroup dynamics, as well as international or foreign relations. Second, intercultural competence stresses identity formation and interpersonal skills, in addition to acquiring knowledge about foreign affairs. In other words, rather than just knowing about another society or culture, intercultural competence seeks to empower students to engage in another culture appropriately and effectively.²

There have been many models for understanding how to people develop intercultural competence. Virtually all

of them share a framework that is segmented into stages. Two of the most popular are intercultural maturity and the developmental model of intercultural sensitivity. In their intercultural maturity model, Patricia King and Marcia Baxter Magolda argue that development must be understood across three different dimensions: cognitive, intrapersonal, and interpersonal. Central to their model is the observation that learners can get stuck if they do not develop in all three—so for example, if a student does not have a stable identity, if their sense of self is based on others, then it will make it challenging for him or her to learn about a different perspective without feeling threatened.³

Milton Bennett's developmental model of intercultural sensitivity (DMIS) is one of the most influential. Bennett's model traces how students can move from an ethnocentric to an ethnorelative perspective regarding difference. Bennett's first two stages are denial and defense: in the first, learners are unable to see or recognize cultural difference; in the second, learners see difference, and they do not like it, often feeling threatened by it. Frequently seeing the world in an "us vs. them" framework, they seek to erase difference, either by forcibly converting "others" or, in extreme cases, by eliminating them. In the third stage, that of minimization, learners suppress difference and emphasize common and universal values among all people. Although learners in this stage are able to build empathy with people unlike themselves, this stage is still considered ethnocentric because learners here often choose to dismiss behaviors or values that are inconsistent with what they see as universal. The last three stages are considered ethnorelative. The fourth stage, called acceptance, occurs when learners decenter their own culture and begin to see cultural difference as the product of different systems, including their own. The final two stages involve adaptation and integration, in which learners become bicultural and develop new, integrated identities.⁴

Achieving an ethnorelative position regarding difference is a long-term project, as Bennett's model stresses that learners cannot skip a stage in their development. Being able to work with our students, many of whom come to us in defense, and move them through to a stage of adaptation, in which they see difference, are comfortable with it, and are able to engage it, takes years of deliberate effort—hence, the popularity of institutional enhancement plans that provide a coordinated and comprehensive strategy of internationalization. Crucial to these efforts are the creation of learning opportunities in which students have

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experiences in which they feel disoriented, uncomfortable, even threatened, because these are key conditions for the growth that allows students to move through these stages. Darla Deardorff, one of the leading voices in this area, argues that study abroad and service learning, precisely the kinds of activities talked about in some of the other essays, are essential pedagogies in developing intercultural competence for our students.⁵

I would like to close by making a special plea for scholars in our field to consider how to incorporate these outcomes and pedagogies into our foreign relations classes. In teaching about America's encounter with the world, it can be easy to fall into the trap of offering narratives of policymaking, but I wonder if that means that we run the risk of perpetuating some of the flawed thinking that has created many of the mistakes we decry in our narratives. If we want to move our students past an American-centric way of viewing the world, we need to prepare our students to encounter difference, and then provide them the opportunities to do so. Ideally, this would happen through things like study abroad or service learning, but it could also incorporate simulations and role-playing experiences that encourage students to take different perspectives on foreign policy issues. Making efforts to help students understand and appreciate how our friends and adversaries have interpreted the world differently could lay the groundwork for a stronger and richer body politic. Raising student awareness about cultural difference not only enables and empowers them to operate successfully in a diverse society, it can also lead to better and more reasonable decisions long-term in our foreign policymaking.

Notes:

1. P. G. Altbach and J. Knight, "The Internationalization of Higher Education: Motivations and Realities," *Journal of Studies in International Education* 11, no. 3–4 (September 1, 2007): 290; Jane Knight, "Internationalization Remodeled: Definition, Approaches, and Rationales," *Journal of Studies in International Education* 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 11; Darla K. Deardorff, "A Matter of Logic?," *International Educator* 14, no. 3 (June 5, 2005): 26–31.
2. Darla K. Deardorff, "Assessing Intercultural Competence," *New Directions for Institutional Research* 2011, no. 149 (March 2011): 68.
3. Patricia M. King and Marcia B. Baxter Magolda, "A Developmental Model of Intercultural Maturity," *Journal of College Student Development* 46, no. 6 (2005): 571–592.
4. Milton J. Bennett, "Becoming Interculturally Competent," *Toward Multiculturalism: A Reader in Multicultural Education* 2 (2004): 62–77.
5. Deardorff, "Assessing Intercultural Competence," 69.

Indonesian Independence and Major Themes in U.S. Foreign Relations: Raymond Kennedy's Critical View from the 1940s

Robert Shaffer

In the upper-level undergraduate course in diplomatic history that I teach at a comprehensive state college, I have a number of goals for my students. I want them not only to learn about the varied events and personalities that must be crammed into a one-semester class covering 240 years, but also to reflect on recurring themes and patterns that characterize U.S. relations with other parts of the world. I believe they will be able to remember specific events and people better if they can attach them to broader trends. I help them make sense of those trends by selecting primary sources for them to analyze—sources in which policymakers and participants in world affairs with diverse perspectives express their understandings of the goals, motives, and actions of Americans. I also want to help students develop a worldview with which they can evaluate and engage present-day American interactions with the world at large, so we devote some time to examining the conceptual frameworks of historians. Finally, I want my students to develop oral presentation skills, so I assign each of them (there are usually about twenty-five in a class) a substantive primary or secondary source and give them five to eight minutes to summarize and analyze it. We then have a discussion in which the presenter both responds to and asks questions.

One of the sources that I use in class is a 1946 essay, "The Test in Indonesia," in which Yale sociologist Raymond Kennedy, a specialist in Indonesia, examined the war for independence then underway there and scrutinized the pronounced U.S. tilt toward the Dutch colonialists.¹ Kennedy also sought to analyze why U.S. policy in the Pacific took the form that it did after World War II. Several of his observations reinforce themes relating to U.S. interactions with the world that current historians have presented in textbooks, monographs, and articles. Having students read and comment upon this seventy-year-old primary source not only teaches them about an area of the world and an aspect of U.S. policy with which they are likely to be unfamiliar but also shows them how important themes in present-day diplomatic history were expressed by some scholars in the World War II and immediate postwar eras. The article is long and could certainly be excerpted for use in class, but even the details Kennedy provides on Dutch colonialism and on Indonesia's war for independence in 1945–46 have broader significance.

Many overviews of U.S. diplomatic history include in the introduction or first chapter several themes or patterns that the authors would like readers to keep in mind as they consider the varied events and personalities that span centuries and continents. Walter LaFeber explains in *The American Age* that the information he presents can be grouped into a few general themes: territorial and economic expansion; increased centralization of power

over time in the federal government and, more specifically, within the executive branch; "isolationism," by which he means what many call "unilateralism"; and a turn toward conservatism in global affairs, which LaFeber sees as all but complete by 1914.² Michael Hunt, in his exposition of key ideas motivating U.S. policy, emphasizes racist and racialist thinking; conceptions of "national greatness," or what many today would call—whether lauding or denouncing it—"American exceptionalism"; and, like LaFeber, hostility to revolution and upheaval.³ Robert Schulzinger points to the economic interests that lie behind many U.S. actions; hostility toward revolutionary nationalism elsewhere; and an unrealistically high self-regard on the part of the American public and policymakers—a self-regard that lends a "missionary" flavor to U.S. relations and leads to resentment by others. Schulzinger also recognizes competing interests behind U.S. policy: the executive branch vies with Congress, for example, and those who favor international cooperation contend with those who look mainly to further national interests and power.⁴

In *American Foreign Relations: A History*, Thomas Paterson and his co-authors are less specific in elaborating key patterns. They incorporate a number of interpretative frameworks, ranging from corporatism to gender, the environment, and reactions to America from those abroad. They do, however, like LaFeber, "emphasize the theme of expansionism," but also, like Schulzinger, they "show that on almost every issue in the history of American foreign relations, alternative voices unfailingly sounded among and against official policymakers."⁵ The companion reader of primary and secondary sources that Paterson has long edited, most recently with Dennis Merrill as co-editor, self-consciously presents scholarly perspectives on foreign relations at the beginning of each volume. These overviews differ by edition but have most consistently included William A. Williams's exposition of how economic expansionism combines with and complicates the missionary impulse to remake other societies in the American image, Norman Graebner's "realist" explanation, and J. Garry Clifford's examination of how bureaucratic conflicts within the U.S. government apparatus affect policymaking.⁶

Raymond Kennedy's 1946 analysis of Indonesia's war for independence, which includes the U.S. approach to that conflict, does not highlight all of these patterns or themes in American foreign relations, but it does evoke several of them. The presence in a primary source of such themes and concepts reinforces for students ideas discussed in class throughout the semester and reminds them that such themes have long informed debates about how the United States should act in world affairs. Events in Indonesia, which was the second most populous nation to emerge from colonization, can be usefully compared to the

granting of independence, “with strings attached,” to the Philippines by the United States.⁷ They have been discussed inconsistently in U.S. diplomatic history survey texts.⁸

Raymond Kennedy, born in 1906, earned bachelor’s and doctoral degrees from Yale. He worked briefly as a General Motors sales representative in the Dutch East Indies, but his scholarly interest in and fieldwork among the peoples of this archipelago led to a professorship at his alma mater. Active in sociological and Asian studies academic organizations, he came to wider public notice through *The Ageless Indies*, a popular survey of ethnography, geo-politics, history, and economics published in June 1942. The timing was propitious, as the U.S. entrance into the Pacific war led to greater interest in Kennedy’s area of expertise, which had formerly been relegated mainly to the realm of the exotic. The U.S. government, too, took notice of Kennedy’s status as one of the few Americans with firsthand knowledge of the East Indies, and invited him to advise the State Department and the armed forces on wartime challenges and opportunities in the region.

Kennedy quickly became frustrated with what he perceived to be the failure of the United States to adopt a full rejection of colonialism as a goal of World War II. His insider’s knowledge of Dutch imperialism and of the workings of the U.S. State Department informed his critical postwar speeches and writings. “The Test in Indonesia” was first delivered as a talk at a May 1946 Eastern Sociological Society conference, and it garnered respectful coverage in the *New York Times*. The monthly magazine *Asia* and the *Americas*, which published the speech three months later, was edited by Richard J. Walsh, the husband of novelist Pearl S. Buck and the president of the John Day Company, which had published Kennedy’s 1942 book.⁹

Kennedy’s essay can be divided into four sections: a general introduction on racially based colonialism as the most significant line of demarcation in the world in 1946; background on Dutch colonialism in the East Indies; the difficult Indonesian struggle for independence even after World War II; and the reasons for the U.S. support of Dutch efforts to reconquer its former colony. The first and last sections are the most important, to be sure, in a course on American foreign relations. Nevertheless, the explanation of how the Dutch operated in the Indies provides a compelling portrait of colonialism that is valuable for students, and the opportunities and challenges that the independence forces faced in 1945 and 1946 demonstrate the ideological complexities of World War II, a war that many students and other Americans still consider to be a straightforward war for democracy and against aggression. Thus, while I have students focus in class on the first page and the last two pages of this text-heavy five-page essay, I do have them consider the middle sections as well.

Kennedy’s opening paragraphs were stark and prescient: “A line separates the peoples and countries of the earth into two major divisions. It is a geographical, cultural and racial line,” with whites in Europe and the Americas constituting “the free nations” and “nearly all of the black and yellow or brown races” among the “dependent peoples” of Africa, Asia, and Oceania.¹⁰ Those held down by the racialized system of colonialism were now challenging their subordinate status with “a new and very powerful weapon”: the knowledge of “the great secret of imperialism: that the very nations—Britain, the Netherlands, France, and others—which were suppressing the rise of economic, social and political democracy in their colonies based their own entire national existence upon

the principles and ideals of democracy.” Thus, the new nationalist movements in Asia and Africa were “struggling for the ideals of their rulers,” and the imperialist powers, in “the great colonial paradox,” were “trying to deny realization of their own ideals in their colonial possessions.” This section of Kennedy’s essay—to which he returned in his final paragraph—succinctly summarized a key theme in modern history: the momentum toward decolonization after (and partly as a result of) World War II.

Kennedy made three additional comments in these opening paragraphs that add significance for U.S. policy and for today’s American students (although what is omitted about the state of the world in 1946 is equally important). First, he labeled the division of the globe by race and colonial status “a Jim Crow World,” and he reminded his readers from the outset that the United

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States was not immune to the injustices and hypocrisies of imperialist powers: in fact, it institutionalized racial divisions even within its own borders. Second, he observed that the “arch imperialist” Winston Churchill, one of the “Big Three” in World War II’s anti-Axis alliance, attempted to interpret the freedoms promised by the Atlantic Charter as pertaining only to white Europeans, and he emphasized that many in the colonial world therefore viewed that alliance with skepticism. Third, Kennedy noted that another “dependent countr[y] where the rising protest is now at the highest pitch of intensity” was Indo-China. It was a warning, in effect, against subsequent

U.S. efforts to stifle Vietnamese nationalism.

Kennedy’s division of the world’s peoples by their relations to racial imperialism would not have been the main way many Americans categorized the world in 1946. Some would have seen the main division in terms of the victorious Allies and the defeated Axis; others, like Churchill, who had delivered his Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri just two months before Kennedy delivered his address at the sociology conference, would have focused on the newly emerging conflict between “communism” and “democracy.” Highlighting for students this division over racial imperialism is important in challenging the ingrained mental geography, focused on Europe and/or the Cold War, with which many of our students enter our classrooms.

In his one-page review of the Dutch colonial record in the East Indies, Kennedy emphasized the abysmal educational system, which resulted in a 90 percent illiteracy rate and about twenty Indonesians—out of a total population of roughly 70,000,000—graduating from university each year. He did give the Dutch credit for instituting “excellent health and sanitation systems” and for their tolerance—unique among colonial powers—of “indigenous law, religion and customs.” Such tolerance did not extend to political expression, however: repression was so harsh that even the “singing of the nationalist anthem, ‘Indonesia Raya,’ was a punishable offense.” Almost all of the nationalist leaders in 1945–46, Kennedy tells us, had been imprisoned or exiled, often for years, in remote New Guinea detention camps.

In discussing how Indonesian nationalists were able to form a government in 1945, and why it quickly became embroiled in war with the British and Dutch, Kennedy emphasized, as do recent historians, the Japanese role in disrupting European imperialism in Asia. He denied, however, with some oversimplification, that Indonesian nationalists collaborated with their Japanese wartime rulers: “They heartily supported the Japanese slogan ‘Asia for the Asiatics,’” he wrote, “but they interpreted it as ‘Indonesia

for the Indonesians.” Kennedy pointed out that it was the Dutch and the British who relied on Japanese troops still stationed in Indonesia in the late summer and fall of 1945 to try to suppress the new Indonesian republic. This action, among others, went beyond the mandate regarding the East Indies given to the British by the Allied command, Kennedy charged, and set the stage for the independence war.¹¹ Again, the significance for students in addressing such events is that there was nothing inevitable about Europe’s return as colonial masters after the expulsion of the Japanese in 1945, and that Asian nationalists sought to use wartime circumstances to their own advantage, just as the Irish had during World War I and the African Americans had during World War II with the “Double V” campaign.

In mid-1946, Kennedy called the Indonesian revolution only partially successful. It still faced an uphill battle, primarily because of its failure to gain outside support. The “crucial factor” in that failure was the American stance on Indonesia, as other Asian countries were too weak or preoccupied to lend much aid to the nationalists. The only significant international support for the Indonesians in 1946 came from the Soviets, but their support was verbal rather than material. (Once India gained its independence, it was outspoken in its support for Indonesia in international forums.) U.S. support for the British and the Dutch in Indonesia, Kennedy lamented, came despite the fact that these “democratic” Allies have been the despots of the East.” Their conduct in the region was already contributing to the deterioration of American prestige in Asia.

What factors led the United States to support Dutch imperialism over Indonesian independence? In his fourth section Kennedy buttresses several of the important overall themes of recent diplomatic historians, which in turn takes his essay from an interesting case study to a broader interpretation—and critique—of U.S. foreign policy.

First, both the American public and American statesmen exhibited “provincialism and ignorance” when it came to Asia. They failed to understand these faraway lands and “the true significance of oriental resurgence to our own future and the future of the world at large.” As an expert on this largely unknown region, Kennedy was arguing for the importance of his specialty, to be sure, but he was also railing against American smugness when it came to the world beyond U.S. borders. For students today, Kennedy’s attempt to draw attention to Asia appears elementary, given the military and economic developments of the past sixty-five years, but his efforts to shake off the Eurocentric assumptions of most Americans are still worth noting.¹²

Kennedy tied America’s dismissive attitude toward Asia to an ingrained “Jim Crow complex.” Most Americans believed that whites should continue to rule over “the lower races.” He reiterated this point in his scathing conclusion: “So far as the United States is concerned, what has happened is that we, who have always had a double standard of democracy in our own country with respect to colored people, are now supporting the double standard abroad, also with respect to colored people.” This frank expression of a “racial hierarchy” parallels one of Michael Hunt’s major themes, of course, and historians such as Thomas Borstelmann have also analyzed race and racism as factors in U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War.¹³

Second, Kennedy wrote, the United States, “once a nation of radical revolutionists,” has, with its increased “wealth and power, become more and more conservative,” especially in regard to change elsewhere that might seem to benefit Communist Russia in any way. This observation also prefigured the analyses of Hunt and of LaFeber on the tendency of the United States to favor the global status quo by the mid-twentieth century. In this view, too, anti-Sovietism was not just—or even mainly—based on

opposition to totalitarianism, but on a less defensible fear of popular activism.

Third, Kennedy argued that “[t]he Anglo-American bloc is a reality, and in it, on colonial issues, the British set the policy line.” Coming on the heels of the first major foreign military alliance in U.S. history since the 1790s, World War II’s diplomatic and military coordination with Britain, and coming as well just weeks after Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, which called explicitly for a continued military alliance, Kennedy’s pronouncement appears to contradict LaFeber’s focus on American unilateralism, or freedom of movement in foreign affairs. But Kennedy believed that the American “align[ment] with the cause of imperialism in the Orient” stemmed in part from fear of “the spread of Russian influence,” so it was part of the turn to conservatism. The “Anglo-American bloc” correlates with Hunt’s identification of a long-shared Anglo-Saxon tradition between the United States and Britain, which itself had a basis in the concept of a racial hierarchy. One might point out here, too, that Kennedy believed the British manipulated the United States to gain assistance in re-imposing empire in Asia. Contrast that notion with the argument by historians such as John Lewis Gaddis that Western Europeans helped the United States establish a benevolent “empire by invitation” in Western Europe in the early Cold War. Kennedy’s formulation would lead us to regard Europeans as inviting the United States to help maintain their *literal* empires, with the United States dutifully following along.

Fourth, Kennedy pointed out that the U.S. Navy was seeking to expand into the Pacific in the wake of World War II. He reminded his readers that the Navy insisted on retaining control over the captured former Japanese mandates of Micronesia and rejected UN oversight. (Richard Walsh, Kennedy’s editor and publisher, had earlier reminded the readers of *Asia and the Americas* that this land-and-water grab violated not only the Atlantic Charter, which promised that neither the United States nor Britain would seek to add territory as a result of the war, but a specific pledge by the newly installed President Truman in July 1945 to the same effect.¹⁴) According to Kennedy, who had lectured to Navy officers in 1943 and 1944 on European colonialism in Southeast Asia and did so again after “The Test in Indonesia” was published, the Navy did not want an outside institution such as the UN delving into its conduct in its newly acquired Pacific territories, so it pressured the Truman administration to allow the Dutch the same “right” in Indonesia.

Of course, the American desire for territorial expansion that Kennedy points to here corresponds to one of the major themes that LaFeber and Paterson et al. identify in U.S. policy. But in addition, the ability of the Navy to overrule explicit statements by two presidents illustrates Robert Schulzinger’s point that there can be competing interests within the United States and J. Garry Clifford’s similar argument, excerpted in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, about the connection between “Bureaucratic Politics and Policy Outcomes.”¹⁵ (Kennedy suggested that these former Japanese mandates would “probably turn out to be quite worthless in the face of new methods of warfare,” presumably because air power would reduce the need for naval warfare. As it turned out, the United States did use these islands for military purposes, most infamously the atomic testing on Bikini Atoll beginning in July 1946, after Kennedy’s article was written but before publication.)

Fifth, Kennedy pointed to the influence of American corporations, “whose opinions carry great weight in the governing circles of our commercialistic nation.” More specifically, he named rubber and oil companies as among those that “undoubtedly exerted pressure on our policy toward” resource-rich Indonesia. But it must be said that he devoted few words to this factor, and his conclusions

might surprise some who have followed major trends in U.S. diplomatic historiography. Kennedy argued that these corporate interests “generally distrust independence movements,” fearing that nationalist movements might interfere with “properties and profits.” These brief observations do support LaFerber’s focus on economic expansion and Schulzinger’s on economic interests.

On the other hand, Kennedy’s observations contradict a major thesis of diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams, who enunciated the concept of “open door imperialism” less than fifteen years after Kennedy’s analysis appeared.¹⁶ Williams, of course, argued that the United States did not need a formal colonial apparatus to exploit other peoples economically; indeed, in particular instances, American capital worked to diminish European colonialism in order to have unfettered access to global resources and labor. Kennedy’s comments are not going to dissuade Williams’s numerous followers, but they do suggest that rigid generalizations about the relationship of American business to formal colonialism may be unhelpful. Indeed, Kennedy noted in a lecture at the Naval War College in November 1946 that the Indonesian Republic’s decree that “oil and other natural resources must be regarded as the common property of the Indonesians” would certainly affect the operations and holdings of Standard Oil, United States Rubber, and Goodyear Rubber.¹⁷

Finally, Kennedy addressed the “European point of view” that dominated the U.S. State Department and that he knew first-hand from his wartime service on the Southeast Asia desk. “All questions involving colonial areas must be passed upon by the European divisions concerned—British, Dutch, French and so on,” he asserted, “and these divisions have generally followed the policy of supporting the status quo as far as possible.” When Kennedy served at State, he had proposed an article for the *State Department Bulletin* that, while praising Dutch openness to postwar “compromise and conciliation” in the Indies, nevertheless criticized the strict punishment meted out to advocates of independence. The European Affairs desk vetoed publication, arguing that it would upset the Dutch.¹⁸ For Kennedy, thus, this Eurocentric approach had both personal and political repercussions; it limited his effectiveness at the State Department, but more importantly, it prevented the United States from appropriately responding to new, more legitimate Asian revolutionary movements. Aside from the conservative and racist biases of the Eurocentric approach, which again provides evidence for the ideas of LaFerber and Hunt, the privileging of one part of the bureaucratic apparatus over another supports the arguments of J. Garry Clifford. Other historians, of course, working on more narrowly defined topics, have also analyzed the European orientation of the State Department in these years.¹⁹

Thus far, in Kennedy’s eyes, the United States had clearly failed “The Test in Indonesia,” refusing to adjust to a new world in which the lives of 70 million Indonesians mattered as much as 10 million Dutch. Yet in some of his concluding comments (and in the very fact that his article was published at all), students can see more sanguine perspectives on U.S. foreign relations. In the newly established United Nations Kennedy perceived “the most hopeful development of all” for “dependent peoples,” as it provided a forum for discussion of their rights: “No longer can colonial powers operate with a free hand in the far corners of the earth, for their actions and policies are now subject to the scrutiny of the international organization.”

UN scrutiny barely scratched the surface in many

cases, but as it turned out Kennedy was correct with regard to Indonesia itself. Historians agree that as the Dutch persistently broke cease-fire agreements and stonewalled negotiations with the Indonesian Republic, publicity at the UN was key to the exertion of pressure on the Netherlands to grant independence to the Republic in 1950. Furthermore, one of the nations pressuring the Netherlands to do so was the United States, which changed its position in early 1949, in large part because the Truman administration felt that the war in Indonesia endangered the Marshall Plan’s success. But the administration’s about-face was also due to political pressure at home: from Congress, from a press more attuned by 1948 to Indonesian suffering, and from left-liberal internationalists in such groups as the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.²⁰ While one cannot, of course, determine whether “The Test in Indonesia” or Kennedy’s numerous other articles on the subject directly impacted U.S. policy, he was certainly part of a larger group which at least nudged the Truman administration in a new direction.

These two factors—the UN and critical public opinion—bring us back to other factors that some historians believe underlay U.S. foreign relations. As Robert Schulzinger explains, international cooperation could lead in a number of directions. In this case the UN, perhaps because it meets in New York City, was especially helpful in getting the United

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States to veer away from a reflexive defense of colonialism in 1946 toward an acceptance of one Asian nationalist movement by 1949. While LaFerber wants students to understand the default position of American policymakers as unilateralist, the existence of the UN did constrain U.S. freedom of action on Indonesia. As to the second point, Paterson and his co-authors, again, state that “on almost every issue in the history of American foreign relations, alternative voices unfailingly sounded among and against official policymakers.” Kennedy served, thus, not only as a critic deconstructing U.S. policy toward Indonesia, but as a historical actor in a sustained debate that affected such

policy. Moreover, Kennedy developed this critical approach in part from his personal experiences in the East Indies, demonstrating that Americans who lived abroad could be not only missionaries (broadly defined) spreading this nation’s power and culture, but interpreters for the people back home of the views and aspirations of others—a role I have elsewhere called “critical internationalism.”²¹

Of course, a professor should follow a discussion of Kennedy’s essay with a few additional observations about this important Southeast Asian nation. First, independent Indonesia fulfilled some of Kennedy’s hopes that it would initiate “a new era in colonial history” when it hosted the Bandung conference of Asian and African nations in 1955, inaugurating the “non-aligned movement.” The Eisenhower administration viewed this conference and the movement that succeeded it with great suspicion, and it even attempted, covertly but unsuccessfully, to overthrow the Indonesian government in 1957.²² Second, and even more dishearteningly, Indonesia’s increasingly unstable politics gave rise to a bloody coup in 1965 that inaugurated decades of military rule, supported by the United States. This coup snuffed out the vision of Raymond Kennedy and so many others that decolonization and democracy would develop in tandem, and it brings us back to Kennedy’s analysis of the United States as a nation opposed to radical nationalism.

Raymond Kennedy’s “The Test in Indonesia,” then,

informs students about an important episode in the global anti-colonial struggle, presents a pointed analysis of U.S. policy toward non-white peoples at the outset of the Cold War, and substantiates major themes of U.S. diplomatic historiography. Identifying differences as well as similarities between Kennedy's analysis and those of prominent historians helps students evaluate—not just memorize—their conceptual frameworks. Such evaluation, in turn, helps students develop their understanding of the American role in the world, which, one hopes, will lead beyond the course material to active and engaged citizenship. Sustained attention in class to this primary source from 1946, which also self-consciously acts as a scholarly analysis of the roots of U.S. policy, delivers a range of pedagogical payoffs.

One final fact about Raymond Kennedy that I save until the end of the discussion of his essay is a tragic one that students are guaranteed to remember. He returned to Indonesia in mid-1949 to continue his fieldwork on the acculturation of indigenous Indonesians to modern economic and technological influences. While traveling in April 1950 in central Java, Kennedy and *Time-Life* reporter Robert Doyle were set upon by a gang and brutally murdered. The culprits were never found. Indonesian Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta eulogized the Yale sociologist as “an eminent scholar and a man who was helping to build a bridge of understanding between the East and West.”²³ My students quickly recognize the irony in the fact that this American was killed in the nation that he had worked to bring into being, just as his Yale colleagues did at the time.²⁴ Discussing Kennedy's death in class has led to some clichéd responses, such as “No good deed goes unpunished,” but it also brings home to students the idea that the roads to decolonization and national independence, like all roads to human progress, have been filled with detours and obstacles.

Notes:

1. Raymond Kennedy, “The Test in Indonesia,” *Asia and the Americas* 46 (Aug. 1946): 341–45. For a pdf of Kennedy's article, e-mail the author at roshaf@ship.edu.
2. Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, from 1750 to the Present*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1994), xix–xx. LaFeber tentatively adds a fifth theme—the interconnections between domestic affairs and developments and foreign relations—between others that have taken up more fully; see, e.g., Robert David Johnson et al., “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Roundtable,” *Passport* 46 (Jan. 2016): 47–64.
3. Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987).
4. Robert Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*, 6th ed. (New York, 2008), chap. 1. Schulzinger highlights, more than LaFeber and Hunt, the limits to U.S. power in the world because of the actions of others.
5. Thomas Paterson et al., *American Foreign Relations: A History*, vol. 1, 6th ed. (Boston, 2005), xi–xii.
6. Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson, eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, vols. 1 and 2, 6th ed. (Boston, 2005), and *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, vols. 1 and 2, 7th ed. (Boston, 2010). For additional elaboration of such themes, see also Thomas Paterson and Michael Hogan, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1991). The first two editions of that volume (1991 and 2004) were edited by Paterson and Hogan; the third edition (2016) is edited by Hogan and Frank Costigliola.
7. See Robert Shaffer, “‘Partly Disguised Imperialism’: American Critical Internationalists and Philippine Independence,” *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 19, no. 3/4 (Sept.–Dec. 2012): 235–62.
8. Those with appropriate coverage include LaFeber, *American Age*, 520, and George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S.*

Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York, 2008), 634–35. References to U.S. involvement in Indonesian independence in Paterson et al., *American Foreign Relations* (212, 228, 248) and in Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900* (153) are vague and oversimplified. There is no discussion of these events in Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*; Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston, 1997); or Richard Immerman, *Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz* (Princeton, 2010).

9. Robert Shaffer, “Combating a ‘Half-of-the-World state of mind’: Indonesia Expert Raymond Kennedy Embraces World History, 1942–1950,” *World History Connected* 13 (Feb. 2016), not paginated, at <http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/13.1/shaffer.html>; Raymond Kennedy, *The Ageless Indies* (New York, 1942); “Sociologist Scores U.S. Policy in East,” *New York Times*, 5 May 1946, 26. Unless otherwise stated, other biographical details about Kennedy in the present essay are from “Combating a ‘Half-of-the-World state of mind.’”

10. These and subsequent quotations, unless otherwise noted, are from Kennedy, “The Test in Indonesia.”

11. For excellent accounts of these events, see George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY, 1952), esp. chap. 5; Robert McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49* (Ithaca, NY, 1981), esp. chap. 3; and Ronald Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Post War Asia* (New York, 2007), chaps. 9–10. All three authors discuss the complexities of collaboration as well as political and religious divisions in the nationalist camp, which impeded the struggle.

12. Later in his article, Kennedy noted that the U.S. press, on the whole, sided with the Dutch.

13. See, e.g., Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the World Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001). Kennedy's link between domestic and international racism reminds one, too, of LaFeber's tentative fifth theme, which involves domestic-international connections.

14. Richard J. Walsh, “Japan Stands Alone,” *Asia and the Americas* 45 (June 1945): 266; Walsh, “The Greatest Month in History,” *Asia and the Americas* 45 (Sept. 1945): 410–11.

15. On the Navy's role in postwar U.S. policy, see also Hal Friedman, *Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1946–1947* (Westport, CT, 2000).

16. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, 1959).

17. Raymond Kennedy, “Western Powers in Southeast Asia and Indonesia,” typescript, n.d. [15 Nov. 1946], box 1, Raymond Kennedy Papers (MS 1046), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT; also cited in Shaffer, “Combating a ‘Half-of-the-World state of mind.’”

18. Kennedy published the rejected essay as “Indonesian Politics and Parties” in *Far Eastern Survey* 14 (23 May 1945): 129–132.

19. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 14; Marc Gallicchio, *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York, 1988); John McNay, *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia, MO, 2001).

20. See, e.g., McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 257–59; Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation* (New York, 2015), chap. 4; Samuel Crowl, “Indonesia's Diplomatic Revolution: Lining Up for Non-Alignment, 1945–1955,” in *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962*, ed. Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann (Stanford, 2009), 238–57.

21. Robert Shaffer, “A Japanese Christian Socialist-Pacifist and his American Supporters in the 1920s & 1930s: Personal Contacts and ‘Critical Internationalism,’” *Peace & Change* 39 (Apr. 2014): 212–41.

22. See, e.g., Audrey and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York, 1995).

23. “Two Americans Are Found Slain in Jeep Journey in Central Java,” *New York Times*, 29 April 1950, 3; “Jakarta Deplores Americans' Killing,” *New York Times*, 30 April 1950, 40.

24. Maurice Davie, “Raymond Kennedy, 1906–1950,” *American Sociological Review* 15 (June 1950): 440–41; John Embree, “Raymond Kennedy, 1906–1950,” *Far Eastern Quarterly* 10 (Feb. 1951): 170–72.

Congratulations from SHAFR!

Congratulations go to several scholars who were recognized for their achievements at the annual SHAFR Conference in San Diego in June 2016:

Kate Epstein, Vanessa Walker, and Jim Meriwether recognized **Seth Anziska** with the Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History. They praised his dissertation--“Camp David’s Shadow: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1993,” completed under the direction of **Rashid Khalidi** at Columbia University—for its extensive multi-lingual and multi-national archival research that brings together newly declassified material to show how a relatively wide array of options for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the first years of U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s administration gradually narrowed, until a comparatively cramped scope for negotiations was left by the early 1990s.

SHAFR’s Dissertation Completion Fellowships went to two Ph.D. candidates, both of whom were on hand to receive their awards from the award committee—**Daniel Immerwahr, Mike Morgan, and Megan Ann Black**—who were also at the Saturday awards ceremony.

From the University of California Berkeley, **James Lin’s** dissertation tells the history of international developmentalist thought and policy as seen from China and then, after the revolution, Taiwan. He then considers Taiwan as not just a recipient but also a broadcaster of development. In the process, Taiwanese intellectuals selectively adapted, modified, and recombined U.S. strategies and then exported throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa in the 1960s.

Patrick Chung of Brown University seeks to put the transnational story of U.S. industrial jobs moving overseas into its appropriate context by writing a twinned history of industry in the United States and South Korea that identifies the U.S. military as the key broker, not only through its purchase orders but through its imposition of U.S. industrial standards on South Korea, which then allowed for the easy

establishment of transnational supply chains. The award committee especially praised the project’s multi-sited, multi-lingual study stretching from the 1950s to the 2000s that illuminates the history of globalization.

The Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize committee of **Barbara Keys, Andrew Johnstone, and Jenifer Van Vleck** selected **Tore C. Olsson** of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville for his article “Sharecroppers and Campesinos: The American South, Mexico, and the Transnational Politics of Land Reform in the Radical 1930s,” published in the *Journal of Southern History*. The committee was deeply impressed by the significance of the research findings, the distinguished writing, the breadth of archival work, and the interpretive skills demonstrated in the article.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize went to **Nancy H. Kwak** for *A World of Homeowners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid* from the University of Chicago Press, which uncovers the international dimensions of Americans’ celebrated but tottering homeownership system. Beginning in the rubble of World War II, the book traces how U.S. investors and builders disaggregated a global need for better shelter into a set of politically-embedded projects, not only at home but also in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The award



From left to right: Award committee member Mike Morgan, fellowship winners James Lin and Patrick Chung, and committee members Megan Ann Black and Daniel Immerwahr.



Myrna Bernath Book Award winner April Merleaux receiving her award from SHAFR President David Engerman.

committee—**Brooke Blower, Hal Brands, and Andrew Preston**—especially lauded the way in which Kwak unpacked matters of credit, loans, and investment guarantees with clarity and grace, making *A World of Homeowners* a work of impressive scope that is carefully argued, persuasive, and original.

Professor **April Merleaux** of Florida International University was on hand to receive the 2016 Myrna Bernath Book Award for her book, *Sugar and Civilization: American Empire and the Cultural Politics of Sweetness* from the University of North Carolina Press. The award committee—**Naoko Shibusawa, Ann Heiss, and Andy DeRoche**—

lauded the way in which this multi-archival study spanned numerous fields to demonstrate how sugar was, like cotton, one of those essential commodities that helped create our modern, globalized world. She also investigates the racialization of capitalism—as it related to sugar cane production in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawai'i, and the Philippines and to beet sugar production on the U.S. mainland—to demonstrate how tariffs became a site where competing notions about race, immigration, colonial possessions, American “character,” and economic development were worked out.

The 2016 Robert Ferrell Book Prize was awarded to **Madeline Y. Hsu** for *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority*, published by Princeton University Press. The prize committee (**Will Hitchcock, Lisa Cobbs, and Julia Irwin**) lauded Hsu for braiding together cold war history, immigration history, economic history, and the story of changing

perceptions of race in America to show an immigration policy meant to attract talented Chinese to the United States and to naturalize those already inside the country helped transform the Chinese people in the American imaginary into valuable assets in a global economic and ideological competition with the Communist world.

The highlight of the SHAFR Conference's annual awards ceremony is the Norman and Laura Graebner Award for lifetime achievement by a senior historian of U.S. foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field through their scholarship, teaching, and service. The prize committee—**Lien-Hang Nguyen, Penny von Eschen, and Edward G. Miller**—made the award to **Lloyd Gardner**, who received a tremendous outpouring of support and admiration expressed in enthusiastic letters of nomination from a wide array of scholars. All of these letters spoke to his distinguished career, including his vast scholarly contributions to the field, his impressive record of graduate and undergraduate teaching and advising, as well as his long-standing service and commitment to SHAFR. As one letter aptly states, Lloyd is a true giant in our field.

His research and writing ranged from his influential works on New Deal diplomacy and the Vietnam War to more recent studies on the Middle East and the history of whistleblowing from Eugene Debs to Edward Snowden. Lloyd Gardner also helped guide SHAFR almost at its inception in the late 1960s, was a member of Council, and most importantly served as SHAFR President in 1988. The award presentation ended with the words of one his former students: “From Lloyd I learned about history. And from Lloyd I learned what it meant to be a professional. I have long appreciated that at a very early stage in my career I learned from the best. And I continue to learn from him, and to be inspired by him, ever since. And I know I am far from alone.”



SHAFR President David Engerman stands next to his former advisor, Lloyd Gardner, who had just received the Graebner Award for lifetime achievement from the prize committee's representative, Penny von Eschen.



Julia Irwin—on behalf of the Robert Ferrell Book Prize committee—with the 2016 honoree, Madeline Hsu.

The Times They are A-Changin': A Snapshot of the 2015 SHAFR Teaching Survey Results

Kimber Quinney and Lori Clune

It's fair to say that some of our SHAFR members may have been channeling Bob Dylan in response to our 2015 SHAFR Teaching Survey.

Bob Dylan gave his very first interview with *Rolling Stone* in November 1969. That now famous interview, conducted by Jann Wenner, took over 18 months to coordinate, explained in part by Dylan's reluctance to meet and to be photographed, but also by Dylan's style. In the *Rolling Stone* piece, Wenner explains, "Bob was very cautious in everything he said, and took a long time between questions to phrase exactly what he wanted to say, nothing more and sometimes a little less." Dylan's responses to the first couple of questions provide a good indication of how the interview progressed:

When do you think you're gonna go on the road?
November . . . possibly December.

What kind of dates do you think you'll play – concerts? Big stadiums or small concert halls?
I'll play medium-sized halls.

And so it went, more or less (with an emphasis on the less).

In the case of our 2015 Teaching Survey, our questions were frequently longer than the answers we received. "Yes," "No," "none," and "N/A" were especially popular responses. More than one or two of the respondents conveyed a Dylanesque impatience, saying "This is a useless survey so I stopped filling it out..."

And yet, like any good *Rolling Stone* (or *Passport*) reporter, we persist in asking the questions.

In honor of Bob Dylan's 75th birthday this year, *Rolling Stone* compiled the 100 greatest Bob Dylan songs.¹ We thought it fitting to rely on Dylan as a framework for sharing the 2015 SHAFR Teaching results here. And it may help to know that we're not alone in relying on Dylan to speak for us—apparently the Supreme Court justices also borrow from the folksinger. According to a February 2016 *New York Times* article, Dylan "has long been the most cited songwriter in judicial opinions."² We've been similarly inspired by the rumors of Dylan's secret archive; the impending Netflix cartoon, "Time Out of Mind," that will include characters and settings drawn from the lyrics of Bob Dylan's songs; and a feature article in the *New York Times* published in May 2016, asking "Which Rock Star Will the Historians of the Future Remember?" in which Dylan featured prominently.³

In the same way that our survey results can only offer a small window into the state of our association with regard to teaching, we use a small sample of Dylan's 359 song titles to organize a sample of our survey results.

Changing of the Guards (1978)

In 2005, the SHAFR Teaching Committee conducted its first teaching survey. Richard Werking and Dustin Walcher deftly managed the results which *Passport* published that December.⁴ In 2015, the SHAFR Teaching Committee decided it was high time to return to our SHAFR members to get a fresh look at how pedagogical approaches may or may not have changed in the decade since the first survey.

Blowin' in the Wind (1963)

The results are not comprehensive, nor do we claim that they represent an accurate reflection of all SHAFR teaching faculty. In the same way that Werking and Walcher struggled to determine the 2005 survey response rate, the current teaching committee faced the same challenge, given the fluidity of SHAFR membership.

Every Grain of Sand (1981)

In contrast to the 2005 survey, which consisted of three parts with approximately 100 questions, we limited the 2015 survey to a total of 45 questions. Although we remain convinced that it was still too long, every bit of evidence that we managed to gather gives us further insight into SHAFR membership.

For example, the vast majority (85%) of respondents began teaching in 2000 or later. A similar number (89%) of respondents hold PhDs in History. Only 12% of respondents hold degrees in a discipline other than history—predominantly political science or economics.

Whereas the 2005 survey reported 12% respondents as "part-time," more than 30% of the respondents in the 2015 survey are lecturers or adjunct faculty. We are convinced that this trend is reflective of trends in the discipline, overall. Similarly, the survey indicates that the number of women in our field is growing. In 2005, 18% of the respondents were female compared to 30% who responded to the 2015 survey.⁵

Chimes of Freedom (1964), Masters of War (1963)

One of the more interesting observations with regard to the courses we teach is the wide variation in both theme and content. The range of courses included Treaties and International Law; Gender and U.S. Foreign Policy; Diplomacy, Security, and Governance; Transatlantic Relations; Origins of American Foreign Policy (colonial era to 1900); Cold War; Vietnam War; Arab-Israeli Conflict; and research seminars and historical methods courses, as well.

When we asked respondents to identify the top historic topics, themes, or interpretive frameworks of interest to their students, the responses similarly revealed a wide array of chronological periods and historical themes. Responses included imperialism, as well as tensions between imperialism and democracy, U.S. exceptionalism,

globalization and its relationship to the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, military industrial complex, rise and fall of the West, international trade and globalization; modern intellectual thought, empire and imperialism, founding period, 1848 revolutions, Manifest Destiny, Theodore Roosevelt, internationalism, isolationism, and peace.

I Feel a Change Comin' On (2009)

We wanted to know what new topics, themes, or interpretive frameworks that SHAFR teaching faculty are introducing into their courses. We learned that SHAFR members are innovating and adjusting their course content in many exciting ways. Respondents explained that they were focusing on domestic politics vis-a-vis foreign policy, including elections; impact on U.S. economy; and impact on immigrants. Still other responses indicated a shifting focus from elite decision making to group influences on those decisions.

"Surveillance, secrecy and civil liberties;" the war on terror; and the Middle East Cold War as a "a launching pad for terrorism" were equally intriguing responses that indicate a sign of our times. Human rights discourse, space and foreign relations, and digital diplomacy also tell us that our field is moving in new and different directions.

Tangled Up in Blue (1975)

In revising the 2005 survey questions in anticipation of launching the 2015 version, we were curious to learn the extent to which SHAFR members are relying on 21st century technological and other innovations. After all, smart phones, YouTube, and social media did not exist in 2005. The results were mixed.

Approximately 15% of respondents reported that they teach online and/or hybrid (face-to-face and online) courses related to U.S. foreign relations, while 42% of respondents rely on PowerPoint in the classroom, but not a single respondent employs Facebook or Twitter as a teaching tool.

When we asked how the advent of digital resources (e.g., full-text journal articles, primary sources, other websites) has affected teaching and/or how your students learn, we discovered that some of us are reluctant to introduce digital tools at all. More than a few said "not at all" or that digital tools had "Little effect on teaching." A major concern among many respondents was that basic reading, research, and writing skills are being undermined or stunted by technology:

"Unfortunately students still believe that research is web based rather than digging in the stacks of a library. I notice that more and more of their papers are "cut and paste" descriptive work rather than analytical."

"I am aware of many of the digital advances but worry that devoting time to such resources in the classroom takes students away from learning basic academic skills, communication skills, etc."

"Students are much more incapable of reading a serious book than ever before. The overemphasis of 'Digital This' and 'Online That' has the students unable to take notes in class and unable to read a serious book all the way through."

"Students don't go to the library anymore."

"I would say that students' reading skills—which are a precursor to writing skills—have declined."

"Technology hasn't really made things easier, and it has made some things more difficult."

Other SHAFR members, however, are apparently far more enthusiastic with regard to the potential of technology to enhance our teaching and student learning:

"Much easier to get students to write research papers based solely on primary sources; far less assignments involving secondary sources."

"Much easier for students to access journal articles (through the university portal) and on-line resources... Much easier to organize multi-media class content, make changes (great flexibility), look at things spontaneously in class, etc."

"Massively easier to teach source-based now."

"Excellent for primary source assignments."

"Enhances my flexibility and variety of sources; facilitates updating of resources; saves paper and student textbook costs."

"Enables students to work with primary sources."

"Digital resources make it easier to give students secondary-source content without relying on a textbook. Online primary sources are great for short student research projects."

"Could not imagine teaching without them. Absolutely essential to my teaching."

Beyond Here Lies Nothin' (2009)

When we asked if SHAFR members rely on any of the resources posted to the SHAFR website in their teaching, to our obvious disappointment, the vast majority (80%) said 'no.' Only a handful of respondents indicated that they consult the syllabi collection or lessons. Moreover, when we asked how often SHAFR members consult the SHAFR Teaching webpages, the responses were equally disappointing: 85% indicated that they never or rarely consult the site. Before launching the survey, we knew we needed to improve our SHAFR teaching resources; the survey responses confirmed an urgency to do so as soon as possible.

Don't Think Twice, It's All Right (1963), It's All Good (2009)

Although some of our SHAFR members may not have found the survey useful, the SHAFR Teaching Committee found it very valuable indeed.

The survey is a clear indication that we teach disparate and varied courses, and that we rely on a broad array of resources to practice our trade. Because of our shared global expertise among SHAFR teaching faculty, we are ever more convinced that SHAFR can be a frontrunner with regard to teaching the history of American foreign relations.

But we can't share our wealth of expertise if no one visits our website to find it. Spurred by the survey results, and with the support of SHAFR's excellent webmaster, George Fujii, and encouragement from the chair of the SHAFR Website Committee, Chester Pach, and from Council, the 2016 SHAFR Teaching Committee will make an exerted effort to revamp the SHAFR Teaching website.

Thanks to the responses to our survey, we now have a wealth of materials and resources that have been uploaded

to the website. In addition to recommended books, films, and other teaching materials, as well as digital primary sources and websites, we have updated the list of syllabi that are posted on the site, new lesson plans, and videos by our very own SHAFR members. We have also uploaded new content to support SHAFR members who help train K-12 teachers.

We will be incorporating interactive blogs on the site, and we invite all SHAFR members to participate. Do you have a recorded lecture on a particular topic? Did you give a talk about your most recent book? Did you redesign a course recently? Do you have lesson plans geared toward global learning in K-12? Please share your expertise with SHAFR members and the wider community of teachers (both professors and K-12 teachers) of American foreign relations by sending it to the Teaching Committee.

Things Have Changed (2000)

We would be remiss if we were to close without a final nod to Bob Dylan. In 2015, Dylan appeared on the cover of AARP Magazine—a far cry from *Rolling Stone*—and was featured in an exclusive, “uncut” interview, probably the longest of his career. Promoting his newest album, *Shadows in the Night*, which features covers of Frank Sinatra standards, Dylan divulged to the AARP that, if he had to do it all over again, he would have been a teacher—“probably Roman history or theology.”

We encourage readers to contribute their syllabi and teaching modules, and to help us to make the SHAFR Teaching site as useful as possible to SHAFR members and the wider community. Please contact Kim Quinney (kquinney@csusm.edu) for materials corresponding to higher education and Lori Clune (lclune@csufresno.edu) with regard to resources to support K-12.

Notes:

1. <http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/100-greatest-bob-dylan-songs-20160524/the-grooms-still-waiting-at-the-altar-1981-20160523>
2. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/us/politics/how-does-it-feel-chief-justice-roberts-to-hone-a-dylan-quote.html>
3. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/arts/music/bob-dylans-secret-archive.html>; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/magazine/which-rock-star-will-historians-of-the-future-remember.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FDylan%2C%20Bob&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection
4. <https://shafir.org/sites/default/files/Passport%20Dec%202005.pdf>
5. We suspect that our numbers mirror a similar trend in the discipline. The American Historical Association reported in March 2012 that 44.8% of History PhDs were women. “Who Are the New History PhDs?” *Perspectives on History*, March 2012.

SHAFR NEEDS YOU!

Volunteer now to serve on one of the many SHAFR committees that are the life-blood of our organization. It’s easy to nominate yourself or a colleague by using the new “Volunteer” button on the SHAFR website.



A Research Note on the Israel State Archives

Kenny Kolander

Last summer, thanks to generous funding from the history department at West Virginia University (WVU), I was able to conduct two weeks of research at the Israel State Archives (ISA) in Jerusalem. The trip was a huge success; I found some very illuminating documents that contributed significantly to my dissertation. I was also able to experience life in Israel for a few weeks. I met people, ate the local food, rode public transportation, and got to know Israeli culture more generally. In short, I had typical day-to-day experiences that enriched my understanding of Israeli society as well as my understanding of my research material.

My area of specialty is U.S. relations with Israel during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. In my dissertation, I argue that Congress played a pivotal role in advancing a special relationship with Israel during the Nixon and Ford years. This special relationship took the form of an informal alliance between Israel and the United States that was built upon a combination of national security, economic, and cultural factors. It manifested itself in political support and foreign assistance that increasingly took the form of weapons sales. The ways in which Congress challenged the White House on U.S.-Israeli relations impacted U.S. efforts to mediate peace agreements connected to the Arab-Israeli peace process.

My desire to conduct research in Israel reflects an ongoing effort in the field of U.S. foreign relations to address the importance of non-U.S. agency in shaping U.S. policymaking. I hoped to find Israeli discussions about U.S. policies, as well as evidence of any efforts to influence U.S. policy, and then ultimately write a chapter of my dissertation. I wanted to answer a number of questions. How did Israeli officials view the efforts of the Ford administration to facilitate peace negotiations, for example? What specific efforts were made to influence U.S. policymaking? What coordination, if any, existed between the State of Israel and pro-Israel lobbying groups in the United States?

I had a serious problem, however. I knew from my research that potentially important Israeli documents from the 1970s were rarely worked into the larger narrative of U.S. foreign relations with Israel. But the sources I wanted to view were available only in Hebrew, and like many scholars in the field, I cannot read a second language. I had to find a way to access some Israeli records in order to ground my understanding of the Israeli perspective in empirical research.

The wonderful archivists at the ISA helped to make this possible. I was able to communicate in English with several archivists via e-mail, and they sent me numerous finding aids before I traveled to Israel. Even though the finding aids were in Hebrew, I managed to make sense of them by using a generic translation tool from the internet. (I copied the Hebrew words from the finding aids and pasted them into the translation tool.) I then informed the ISA about which collections I hoped to view. If you are planning to research

at the ISA, keep in mind that the collections are off-site and make sure to give the archivists several days to pull documents and deliver them to the reading room.

Thankfully, I managed to find a good research assistant to help me in Israel. My advisor at WVU, Dr. James Siekmeier, put me in touch with his friend Dr. Gil Merom, who is originally from Israel and periodically researches there. Dr. Merom knows many people in the area and sent a message that I was looking for a researching assistant to the history department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Jonathan Matthews, a graduate student who is fluent in English, Hebrew, and German, accepted the job.

On my first visit to the archives Jonathan's presence proved why an English-only researcher would be wise to work with someone who speaks Hebrew. The security was not heavy at the ISA reading room, which is in the RAD Data Communications building in Har Hotzvim, a high-tech industrial park in northwest Jerusalem, but I did have to explain the purpose of my visit at the front desk. The person who sat there did not speak English. But Jonathan easily explained the nature of our visit in Hebrew, and we were allowed to pass through. (While I had letters of introduction from both my advisor and the chair of the history department at WVU, I do not remember anyone requesting them.) In subsequent days, two people sat at the front desk—one fluent in English and one in Hebrew—so I would have been fine without Jonathan's assistance after the first day. I found this situation to be common in Jerusalem: not everyone is fluent in both Hebrew and English.

For researching, Jonathan and I had a simple system. He would give me the author of a document, its recipient, and a brief overview of it. I would then decide if I wanted to focus on that document or if we should move on to the next one. If I felt the information was potentially relevant, we would go through the entire document word for word. He translated from Hebrew to English out loud, and I typed. In many cases a word or phrase did not translate well, so we had to come to an agreement about the best way to translate it into English without losing its Hebrew nuances. Idioms are the worst.

In addition to interpreting documents, Jonathan helped me to better appreciate Israeli society, culture, and politics. With his background in Israeli history, both from studying and living in Israel, he had many insights about Israeli officials that proved to be very instructive for me. Without his assistance I would have missed many small yet enlightening details. Ironically, thanks to our active discussions of the Hebrew-language documents and my having to type them out in English, I discovered that my understanding of the archival material from the ISA was beyond anything I had developed from researching English-language documents at a U.S. archive.

I did not get the sense that many documents had been pulled because of classification issues; however, according to recent reports, researchers may be less able to access sensitive material in the near future. During my visit I

was never told that I could not see certain collections, nor did I come upon anything that appeared to be redacted. (I do not recall seeing any of the dreaded pink sheets or blacked-out documents that I have seen in U.S. archives.) In fact, the tone and content of accessible materials seemed to suggest that little if any censorship had been employed. But recent reports about the ongoing digitalization efforts of the ISA indicate that paper documents may no longer be available to researchers and that the military will play a more active role in censoring available documentation. For more information, see a recent article by Dan Williams for Reuters: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-archive-idUSKCN0XH1OZ>.

Lodging and transportation proved to be almost as convenient in Israel as in the United States. I used Airbnb to book stays at two different apartments in Jerusalem, which certainly helped to keep down my expenses. I really enjoyed my conversations with both of my hosts, too. I recommend staying with people who have many positive reviews. I also recommend using the public busing system in order to avoid driving in busy Jerusalem, where the cacophony of automobile horns can be startling. One bus stop is a five-minute walk from the ISA.

Like many people in the United States, I had never experienced a city with a multitude of armed military

personnel. In Jerusalem, however, there is a noticeable military presence. I saw many Israeli soldiers with assault rifles on the streets and on or near public transportation, especially at the Central Bus Station. Many of them appeared to be in their early twenties and were probably fulfilling their obligatory military service. But I never felt threatened or concerned about my safety.

I also enjoyed sightseeing in my free time. Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, should not be missed. I was fortunate that Jonathan worked as a tour guide there and invited me to go along with one of his tour groups. He was a tremendous guide, and the personal stories related at the center are powerful and wrenching. My girlfriend and I also spent time visiting Masada, Ein Gedi (a nature reserve near Masada), the Dead Sea, and East Jerusalem.

My trip to Israel was a tremendous success, and I am very grateful for the financial support given by the history department at WVU. I certainly encourage others to consider researching in foreign archives, even if it means hiring a research assistant; and if you do go, I recommend absorbing as much of the culture as possible.

Call for Papers:

2017 UCSB/GWU/LSE International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War

The Center for Cold War Studies and International History (CCWS) of the University of California at Santa Barbara, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW), and the LSE IDEAS Cold War Studies Project (CWSP) of the London School of Economics and Political Science are pleased to announce their 2017 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at the University of California, Santa Barbara, on **April 27-29, 2017**.

The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that employ newly available primary sources or nontraditional methodologies. To be considered, each prospective participant should submit a two-page proposal and a brief academic c.v. (in Word or pdf format) to Salim Yaqub at syaqub@history.ucsb.edu by **Friday, January 27, 2017**. Notification of acceptance will occur by Friday, February 24. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers (no longer than 25 pages) by Friday, March 24. The author of the strongest paper will be awarded the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize of £100 to be spent on books in any form. The winner will also have an opportunity to publish his or her article in the journal *Cold War History*. For further information, please contact Salim Yaqub at the aforementioned email address.

The chairs and commentators of the conference sessions will be prominent faculty members from UCSB, GWU, LSE, and elsewhere. UCSB will cover the accommodation costs of admitted student participants for the duration of the conference, but students will need to cover the costs of their travel to Santa Barbara.

In 2003, UCSB and GWU first joined their separate spring conferences, and two years later LSE became a co-sponsor. The three Cold War centers now hold a jointly sponsored conference each year, alternating among the three campuses. For more information on our three programs, please visit the respective web sites:

<http://www.history.ucsb.edu/ccws/> for CCWS

<http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/programs/coldwar.cfm> for GWCW

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Projects/CWSP/cwsp.aspx> for CWSP

Book Reviews

The Light Under the Bushel: A Review of John Thompson, *A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015)

Elizabeth Cobbs

John Thompson advances a bold thesis despite a conventional title. *A Sense of Power* might be more aptly named *A Sense of Caring*. Yet books on foreign relations must contain words like “power,” “war,” and “empire,” so Thompson conforms to expectations while subverting them.

Thompson is a veteran Cambridge historian who has wondered since the Vietnam War why the United States takes upon itself the costly job of guaranteeing world security for relatively little gain. America's safety and prosperity depend far less upon world peace than do the fortunes of nations with fewer resources and crankier neighbors—meaning most everybody else. Thompson argues that the United States has confronted no existential foreign threats since the War of 1812. Territorial attacks have been negligible, an immense internal market serves most needs, extensive natural resources act as ballast, a strong military generates self-reliance, and vast oceans provide a degree of insulation afforded no other great power. So, if the United States faced no wars of necessity, why did it fight on behalf of others? “Coming from Britain,” Thompson avers in a rare personal reference, “I can only be profoundly thankful that Americans made this choice, as were millions of non-Americans across the world” (xi).

Thompson recognizes that not everyone felt the same. Indeed, animosity towards the United States grew along with its self-appointed responsibilities and became yet another justification for expanded military power: to protect Americans from the enemies they created as “top dog” (234). But Thompson is not interested in a profit-and-loss statement that evaluates the “merits or virtues of the American role” or its demerits and sins (2). He just wants to understand why U.S. policy evolved from resolute non-intervention for most of American history to nearly unbounded intervention after the mid-twentieth century.

In a careful, elegant dissection of material events and scholarly arguments, Thompson concludes that the only logical explanation is that the growing capacity of the United States stimulated a feeling of responsibility for nations about which Americans cared more deeply than many wished to admit: the “mother countries” of Europe. After all, what is power for but to accomplish things that matter? Nor did America employ all its moxie in war. It also supported such peaceful enterprises as the League of Nations, the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization. No American scholar would dare utter the phrase “noblesse oblige,” but this British don comes close. Yet Harry Truman's renunciation of the

Founders' non-entanglement policy was decades in the making, Thompson argues. Truman's decisive doctrine arose from a long-incubated “consciousness of the nation's power and the belief that this brought with it a moral obligation” (29).

Ironically, the United States made such efforts not because it had more to gain than most other nations, but because it had less. Although government officials found that persuading Congress to intervene always required the justification “because we have to,” in fact America never really did “have to.” Invulnerability, not vulnerability, inspired intervention. Policymakers' “striking confidence in the scale of American power” led to expansive commitments to “provide security across much of the globe” with little need for reciprocity (268). Such decisions originated not from “hard-headed assessments of the nation's economic and strategic interest,” but “from the extent to which Americans cared about what happened in the continent

from which the majority could trace their descent and with which they shared a religious, intellectual, and cultural tradition” (255). Encouraged by Europeans who had much more at stake than they did, Americans enjoyed the luxury of basing their actions on moral preferences. In the mid-twentieth century, they chose to do so.

Thompson adopts a polite Oxbridge tone towards other interpretations. He parses security and economic arguments carefully and at length, particularly those put forward by George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Dean Acheson, William Appleman Williams, John Mearsheimer, Melvyn Leffler, Barry Posen, and many others across time.

The evidentiary ground occasionally seems softer than Thompson acknowledges, such as when he argues that a final German victory in Europe and Japanese victory in Asia would not have threatened the United States as greatly in 1941 as Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted the American people to believe—and as historian Charles Beard did not. The author necessarily relies on counterfactual speculation when asserting that pure self-interest did not necessitate either a hot war with Nazi Germany or cold one with the Soviet Union. But most observers of U.S. politics will concur with Thompson that a lockstep consensus after World War II defined isolationists as “people who have no morals in international affairs” (184).

The conviction that isolationism was abhorrent resulted in increasingly broad commitments to a growing number of nations as decolonization brought more of them into existence. The devastation of World War II “and the related discrediting of isolationism,” Thompson asserts, “helps to explain why the claim that western Europe constituted a vital security interest was rarely disputed in public debate” (250). Americans possessed no psychological or ideological armor against the ever-widening argument that if non-entanglement was bad policy in one region, it was bad everywhere. The United States had to respond when called: sometimes damned when it did and always damned

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when it didn't. "The country's allies and clients became accustomed to demanding continued American support in meeting the problems and threats that confronted them" (276). Beyond Europe, policymakers were chided not to "draw a color line on freedom" (272).

A Sense of Power is a deft, literary, and persuasive analysis of America's twentieth-century evolution from the world's largest neutral nation to its most interventionist. Coming from a British observer and a historian of the Progressive Era who brings a fresh eye to foreign policy, it is more piquant and original than the title suggests. Of course, even this soft sell of American idealism will meet resistance from traditionalists who believe material explanations vanquish all others, including those advocates of the empire thesis who present their theory as fact. Yet books like John Thompson's *Sense of Power*, Frank Ninkovich's *Global Republic*, and my own *American Umpire* reveal a thirst for interpretations that take greater account of the trends of the past century, in which empires lost legitimacy, nation-states replaced colonies, arbitration blossomed, humanitarian intervention swelled, and war between countries declined dramatically—all goals to which the United States dedicated resources and lives. Why did America do so? According to John Thompson, because it cared.

Review of John Quigley, *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders: Deception at the United Nations in the Quest for Palestine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016)

Daniel Hummel

As most diplomatic historians will acknowledge, diplomats and policymakers are often willing to mislead each other if it serves the interests of their states. John Quigley, a scholar of international law at Ohio State University, seeks to define cases of diplomatic "deception" among Israel's founding generation—Chaim Weizmann, David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Abba Eban. In a short 240 pages, he provides a narrative of Israel's diplomacy at the United Nations that is anchored in the period between 1940 and 1967. He uncovers, through archival material from the UN and other sources, episodes in which Zionist and Israeli leaders deceived, misled, or spun events on the ground to their advantage.

Quigley's most intriguing argument is that early success by Zionists created "a developing operational ethic that falsehood was justifiable" in certain situations (160). The language itself is striking. The new state was learning through trial and error, like a child, how deception could produce positive results. This argument leads Quigley to some impressive contributions, especially in reframing the Soviet-Zionist relationship in the 1940s, but the argument is both problematic and underutilized. Many questions remain unanswered. How did such an ethic become institutionalized? When and why did this ethic reach its limits? Essentially, some of the basic questions that diplomatic historians ask are left unanswered. Quigley's approach to the material as a legal scholar contrasts starkly with the concerns of diplomatic historians.

The bulk of Quigley's analysis involves two of the original and ongoing issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict: the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee crisis. On both issues, Quigley documents the strategies of Zionist

and Israeli diplomacy and the ways in which key founders were less than forthcoming with information or downright misleading. Quigley is building upon the work of the New Historians in Israeli historiography (Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé), who have been presenting critical accounts of Israel's founding since the declassification of documents from the 1940s. He also draws on more recent scholarship by Avi Raz and John Judas, among others, who cast a similarly critical eye on more recent and more thematically diverse issues. Quigley is extending this approach into the realm of international diplomacy and especially into the arena of the United Nations.

Certainly, Quigley has uncovered some dramatic and interesting examples of his key claim about deception. Most striking are 1) The ways in which officials from the Jewish Agency, a key Zionist organization that helped form Israel's first government, framed problems in Palestine to the uninformed UN Special Committee on Palestine (which led to the UN plan of partition in 1947); 2) the claims by Israeli leaders (especially Ben Gurion) that Palestinian Arab civilians were fleeing Palestine not because of Israel Defense Forces provocations but because they were told to by Arab leaders; and 3) Israel's unfounded assertion, repeated for years by Abba Eban, that Egyptian forces attacked Israel on the morning of June 5, 1967 (in fact, the Israeli cabinet voted to begin operations the day before). These examples, each of which has had lasting effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict, are given more significance in Quigley's history because of the way they shaped diplomacy at the United Nations. In each case, Israeli diplomats were able to cause enough confusion or dissension about the basic facts on the ground that the UN was neutralized and did not interfere with Israel's state interests.

However, some of Quigley's examples of "deception" are less convincing. For example, he recounts how in 1948, Shabtai Rosenne, the Jewish Agency's chief lawyer, explained publicly that the Arab League's invasion of Israel on May 15, 1948, was to stop the creation of the Jewish state (93). Quigley disapprovingly notes that Rosenne neglected to mention that the Arab League also wanted to stem the tide of Palestinian expulsions. The more effective strategy was clearly to focus on the Arab League's existential threat to Israel—hardly a notable

example of deception. In another instance, Quigley quotes copiously from Henry Kissinger's glowing description of Abba Eban. Eban treated anti-Zionism and antisemitism as inextricable, and he privileged "protecting the Jewish people" over "accuracy" (137). In this and other examples, it is unclear exactly when hard diplomatic bargaining ends and the titular "deception" begins.

These ambiguous cases are crucial because they expose the blurry line between international norms in diplomacy and deception that most historical actors dance around and that intersects with each of the more significant cases described above. What is the definition of deception, and what is the significance of identifying cases of deception in international diplomacy? Quigley does not explicitly explore these questions or identify the boundary between diplomatic license and deception, even as his case hinges on its transgression. This vagueness is compounded by Quigley's use of numerous verbs and descriptors to characterize the actions of Israel's founders. They commit acts that range from "portraying [Israel's] actions and aims in terms that show Israel in a favorable light" (6) to "paint[ing] a rosy picture" (27) to promoting "pure fiction" (52). They are guilty of "distortion" (147), "dubious assertion

of facts" (233), "lying" (234), and "prevarication" (235). This last term is used throughout Quigley's final chapter and apparently means something different from "deception." The point here is not to morally excuse Israel's actions here but to pin down an analytical category of what actions count as deceptions.

This problematic language should not detract from the insightful contributions of *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders*. One of Quigley's most compelling arguments is about the decisive role that the Soviet Union played in aiding Zionist goals. The USSR gave the Jewish Agency and the early state of Israel more diplomatic cover in the United Nations than the United States did. As Quigley tells it, before 1946 Soviet intentions for Palestine were unclear, but in the decisive years between 1947 and 1950, the Soviet Union became a dependable ally of the Zionist movement. It was the USSR, which was more amenable to population exchanges than Britain, that Chaim Weizmann increasingly gravitated toward in the 1940s (33). It was the Ukrainian representative to the UN, Dmitri Manuiliski, who first referred to Israel as a state at a UN meeting (98). It was the Soviet representative, Yakov Malik, who argued against blaming Israel for the refugee crisis in 1948–49 (114). Quigley argues that Soviet support for Zionism was premised on "promises made to the Soviet Union" by Moshe Sharret, David Ben Gurion, and other Zionist leaders (99). The promises included Ben Gurion's assurance that Zionism was a socialist movement and that the interests of the new state of Israel would align with those of the Soviets. Though Israel was committed to a policy of "non-identification" and ostensibly distanced itself from both the USSR and the United States in the late 1940s and 1950s, even Soviet diplomats quickly realized that the state was tilting toward the West. It is unclear to what extent the attempt to convey impartiality was a Zionist strategy of intentional misdirection (or deception), a product of unanticipated developments, or a combination of both.

Ultimately, Quigley leaves both the historical and moral significance of his study under-articulated. It remains unclear if Israeli leaders were in any way uniquely deceptive, or if they were simply better at ordinary diplomatic duplicity than other leaders. Quigley shows the early success Israel enjoyed at the UN, especially in gaining crucial support from the Soviet Union. That success might imply a peculiar affinity for deception. Yet he readily states that "Israel is far from the only country to invent facts to advance its interest in international diplomacy" (233). He also quotes David Ben Gurion's biographer as saying that Ben Gurion believed that "under certain circumstances, it was permissible to lie for the good of the state" (161). But the evidence he presents cannot speak for itself.

Any discussion of deception has a moral dimension, as does virtually every aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In both the first and last pages of the book, Quigley discusses the Hebrew term "hasbara," which literally means "explanation" but has come to be used to characterize the state of Israel's public diplomacy strategy. Depending on one's point of view, hasbara can refer benignly to Israel's official explanations of its actions, or it can mean to "give a false explanation for actions and policies for which there is no valid justification" (1). Quigley implicitly sides with the critical judgment, but it is unclear what the implications of his position are. Does Zionist deception undermine the legitimacy of the state of Israel? Or does it, more modestly, demand Israeli correctives to the official record? Does it influence contemporary negotiations over a two-

state solution? These and other issues of significance are left unaddressed. It is unclear if the metric of morality is Quigley's primary measuring stick, though the term "deception" seems to indicate that it is.

Review of Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015)

Jeffrey Crean

Having existed for close to a generation, the new Cold War history is by now anything but new. These days, thanks to path-breaking works by scholars such as Odd Arne Westad, Matthew Connelly, Piero Gleijeses, and Lien-Hang Nguyen, the multinational, multi-archival approach to investigating major topics in the field is commonplace and in fact expected. Yet while some recent works of international history have been illuminating, many utilize their pioneering research either to confirm notions long suspected by expert observers or put forth poorly argued insights which fail to live up to the works' intimidating bibliographies. Featuring research from archives in ten countries on five continents, Jeremy Friedman's *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* has the requisite intimidating bibliography. But it also presents and proves novel arguments on an important subject frequently alluded to but rarely dealt

with in depth by previous scholars. Friedman argues that the Third World rivalry of the two great communist powers was rooted in their differing conceptions of revolution based upon divergent formative experiences and ideological traditions. Descending from the class-centered milieu of nineteenth-century European socialism, the Soviets developed an anticapitalist paradigm of global revolution that emphasized economic transformation. Emerging during a period when their nation was repeatedly attacked and assiduously exploited by foreign powers, Chinese communists, by contrast, had an anti-imperialist vision of revolution prioritizing national autonomy. When the anti-imperialist approach proved more useful in postcolonial environments, the Soviets felt compelled "to adopt the Chinese revolutionary agenda," winning the competition at great expense in both resources and credibility (14).

Focusing mostly on the 1960s, Friedman begins with Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power in 1956 and concludes with Mao Zedong's death two decades later. While touching upon events in Latin America, Friedman looks primarily at Africa and South Asia. As the post-Stalin USSR turned its focus away from Europe, a group of area studies experts known as *mezhdunarodniki*, or "internationalists," used their rare knowledge of regions to which the regime had previously played little attention to influence and guide policy (18). In *The Global War*, Westad emphasizes the part played by such experts in the late 1970s. Friedman makes a valuable contribution by highlighting the role of an earlier generation of Soviet scholars. Guided by the *mezhdunarodniki*, Soviet efforts in Africa during the late 1950s and early 1960s concentrated upon large-scale economic development and the rapid development of heavy industry. But outlays of considerable human and financial capital, first in Guinea, then in Mali, and then to a lesser extent in Ghana, proved fruitless as local political and military leaders soon severed ties in order to protect their own personal power.

In addition, Khrushchev's stated policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States made the Soviets appear

to the world's "have-nots" as satisfied "haves." China exploited this opening with its rhetorical militancy, which enabled it to punch above its weight, particularly in the realm of public diplomacy. Learning from his predecessor's failures, Leonid Brezhnev elected to simultaneously support armed militancy and exert greater control over potential client regimes. The Soviets outflanked the tough-talking but cautious Chinese by arming both rebels in the Congo and Israel's enemies in the Arab world while encouraging North Vietnam as it escalated its attacks upon its southern neighbor. The 1965 coups in Algeria and Indonesia, which deprived the Chinese of important Third World allies, severely set back Mao's foreign policy. Yet neither event benefited the Soviet Union, and a wave of right-wing military coups in Latin America deprived it of potential allies in that region. Struggling to fight the Cold War on two fronts, the Soviets deemphasized economic assistance and increased military aid, recognizing that supplying butter did them no good if they could not also control the guns.

The 1970s created both new challenges and opportunities for policymakers in Moscow. China's international reemergence after the ebbing of the Cultural Revolution led to rapprochement with the United States and the acquisition of the Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. From that perch, Mao's representatives in Manhattan sought to lead Third World opposition to both superpowers and champion complaints from the Global South about economic neocolonialism. Friedman argues for an anti-imperialist continuity between the supposedly militant China of the early sixties and its more moderate incarnation a decade later.

The fall of South Vietnam in 1975, combined with the concurrent Portuguese abandonment of its southern African colonies, provided the Soviets with new victories, while China turned inward and focused on its own economic development following Mao's death in 1976. The Soviets had prevailed, not only over the Chinese, but apparently against the Americans as well. However, these temporary triumphs were bought at the cost of economic resources they could not spare and commitments they could not afford to keep. In addition, they had abandoned their anticapitalist ideology, and thus pawned their revolutionary souls for a pottage of troublesome and parasitic clients.

Friedman builds upon previous works on the Sino-Soviet rivalry by Sergey Radchenko and Lorenz Luthi by making the story multilateral. Whereas those two scholars told bilateral tales, Friedman presents a series of parallel narratives on the relations between each power and their erstwhile friends in the developing world. Only Christopher Andrew's *The World Was Going Our Way* had attempted this before, and his monograph dealt only with the Soviet side. *Shadow Cold War* slants towards the Soviets, utilizing a far more varied panoply of records from Moscow than Beijing. A more diverse collection of Chinese documents from beyond the Foreign Ministry Archive might have rectified this imbalance, though other relevant documents might have been unavailable when Friedman conducted his research in country. A greater flaw, which may result in part from this limited archival variety, is the author's neglect of the role of Chinese domestic politics. Nearly all scholars over the past generation have argued domestic politics guided Mao's foreign policy, just as most China watchers at the time did. Friedman may be presenting a rejoinder to the notion that Mao's actions abroad were primarily about domestic mobilization and the marginalization of rivals for party

leadership. But he never does so explicitly. This neglect of *innenpolitik* is an unfortunate though anomalous oversight in an otherwise thorough yet efficient monograph.

One might argue that the outcome of both the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World and the larger superpower rivalry was preordained because of the Soviets' overwhelming resource advantage over the Chinese and their hopeless resource disadvantage compared to the Americans. While the latter is beyond the scope of his book, Friedman successfully makes the case for the relevance of ideology. Material superiority was necessary but not sufficient. Local rulers in Africa and Asia did not tilt decisively towards the more generous Soviets until Brezhnev adopted their preferred approach of militant anti-imperialism. As is so often the case in international relations, the dominant patron was forced serve the nominally submissive client.

In his conclusion, the author strives for current-day relevance by emphasizing the need to rectify continuing global—and domestic—imbalances in wealth. But this monograph's true lesson is the need for great powers to resist overreach. The Soviet leadership felt ideologically compelled to be the savior of mankind, and that compulsion led it to assume responsibilities and involve itself in quarrels that had little if any relevance to its continued existence as a great power. The Chinese Communist Party eventually chose a foreign policy of restraint. The Soviet communists won the battle for global influence, while the Chinese prevailed in the war for domestic survival.

Review of Chris Tudda, *Cold War Summits: A History, from Potsdam to Malta* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015)

David F. Schmitz

The book is entitled *Cold War Summits*, but Tudda argues that Potsdam was not the beginning of the Cold War. All sides made compromises, he concludes, and both President Harry Truman and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin expected to have another conference where they could settle outstanding questions such as Poland's borders and reparations to the Soviet Union.

Chris Tudda's *Cold War Summits* provides a unique perspective on the history of the Cold War. Tudda examines six different summit meetings that took place between the end of World War II and the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. There were three "traditional" meetings between American and Soviet leaders—Glassboro, New Jersey (1967), Vienna (1979), and Malta (1989). Three other gatherings—Potsdam (1945), Bandung (1955), and Beijing (1972)—defined the global nature of the Cold War and demonstrated the shifting focus of concerns from Europe, where the Potsdam Conference included Great Britain, to Asia, where the conferences at Bandung and Beijing focused on the Third World, East Asia, and China's rising influence. Tudda demonstrates why diplomacy was so valuable and why the preparations for the summit meetings were as important as the meetings themselves, particularly in a nuclear age.

Although not a sequel in any real sense, Tudda's study was inspired by David Reynolds's *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century*, which examined Munich (1938), Yalta (1945), Vienna (1961), Moscow (1972), Camp David (1978), and Geneva (1985). Reynolds identified three categories of summits, which often overlapped: personal summits that focused on the meetings of principals (Munich, Vienna); plenary summits (Yalta, Camp David) that tried to resolve outstanding issues in the sessions; and progressive summits (Moscow, Geneva) that were designed to be parts of a series of meetings and where the main work was done prior to the meetings and not by the leaders in the sessions.¹ Tudda builds upon this structure.

Each of the six case studies, based on multinational research, is well done. An appropriate amount of context is provided, particularly for those who might not be familiar with the events, setting up the reasons for the summits and what was at stake. The mix of detail and analytical analysis effectively summarizes the meetings, issues, problems, and outcomes. Tudda's findings are well balanced and will prompt further questions, discussions, and work on these meetings.

The book is entitled *Cold War Summits*, but Tudda argues that Potsdam was not the beginning of the Cold War. All sides made compromises, he concludes, and both President Harry Truman and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin expected to have another conference where they could settle outstanding questions such as Poland's borders and reparations to the Soviet Union. The Cold War, therefore, "did not begin at Potsdam, nor was it inevitable."²

The inclusion of the Bandung Conference is particularly valuable, as it dealt with the two key issues of the post-World War II world, the Cold War and decolonization. It also showed the complexity of the Cold War and demonstrated that the nations of the so-called Third World were not passive pieces on a global chess board. The nations in attendance reached a consensus that called for neutrality in the Cold War, resistance to both Western and Soviet imperialism, and a focus on economic development, but the conference also revealed the divisions among these nations and the difficulties of forging true neutrality in the face of U.S. and Soviet military and economic power.

The often overlooked Glassboro and Vienna meetings provide excellent bookends to the détente era and, in conjunction with the Beijing summit, illustrate the achievements of diplomacy in this era and show the rise and decline of the effort to redirect the Cold War policy of the United States from containment through confrontation to containment through negotiation. As Tudda demonstrates, Glassboro was a critical moment in moving arms control negotiations forward, while Vienna showed how, because of the difficulty of building on earlier achievements, changes in the international environment, and domestic politics, these efforts were exhausted by 1979. *Cold War Summits* provides the most complete examination of these two meetings to date.

The December 1989 meeting at Malta between President George H. W. Bush and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, just a month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, provides a fitting conclusion to the book, as it marked in many ways the peaceful end of the Cold War. From his study of that meeting, as well as the meetings that preceded it, Tudda draws three primary conclusions. First, the existence of nuclear weapons "made diplomacy even more important" than before, especially for the superpowers. The risk of actions based on "mistakes, miscalculations, belligerency, and being allied with nations that seemed almost determined to drag the superpowers into proxy wars that could escalate" into great power conflicts "made the idea of summits . . . not only more attractive but crucial to the survival of the world." Second, the various summits all demonstrated "the importance of personal interaction between world leaders." All other parts of diplomacy—such as letters and telegrams, meetings with ambassadors, meetings of other top officials—were important, but "there was no substitute for personal meetings between leaders." The commitment to "high-level, personal diplomacy signaled the seriousness with which leaders took summitry and helped to overcome mistrust and misunderstanding"

during the Cold War. This second point leads to Tudda's most important conclusion: the fact that the "Cold War ended without a nuclear war" was "to a large measure due to the summits convened by world leaders in the preceding decades."³

Whether they read it in its entirety, or for the individual case studies, all scholars of the Cold War will benefit from engaging with Tudda's study of Cold War summits. American presidents and foreign leaders make other international trips to different nations that are not summits yet are designed to deal with specific diplomatic purposes and goals. One can hope that Chris Tudda will at some point take up a number of the most important of those trips to see what patterns and lessons can be learned from them.

Notes:

1. David Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2007).
2. Chris Tudda, *Cold War Summits: A History, From Potsdam to Malta* (London, 2015), 4.
3. *Ibid.*, 184.

Appy explores the evolution of American national self-perception from the end of World War II to the present day. For Appy, the Vietnam War was the pivot point that "provoked a profound national identity crisis, an American reckoning" that "shattered"—albeit temporarily—what he calls the "central tenet" of American identity: American exceptionalism.

**Review of Christian G. Appy,
*American Reckoning: The
Vietnam War and Our National
Identity* (New York: Penguin
Books, 2015)**

Amanda C. Demmer

On July 11, 1995, President Bill Clinton announced the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). The move, which came two decades after South Vietnam's collapse, offered a natural opportunity for the president to reflect on the Vietnam War and its legacy. Instead of a historically accurate account of the conflict, however, Clinton offered what, by then, had become the standard narrative of misremembering. "Whatever we may think about the political decisions of the Vietnam era," Clinton explained to the Americans sitting before him and those watching on television, "the brave Americans who fought and died there had noble motives. They fought for the freedom and the independence of the Vietnamese people."¹

That speech, which emphasized the "distinguished" American veterans, especially those "soldiers who did not return," barely mentioned Hanoi. Instead, Clinton kept his focus on American sacrifices, wounds, and reconciliation. In his conclusion, he noted with pride that his decision to normalize relations would "help our own country to move forward on an issue that has separated Americans from one another for too long" and offered "the opportunity to bind up our own wounds." He went on to argue, even plead, for the nation to "move on to common ground. Whatever divided us before let us consign to the past."² In short, Clinton offered what Christian G. Appy describes in his *American Reckoning* as "healing, not history."³

Appy explores the evolution of American national self-perception from the end of World War II to the present day. For Appy, the Vietnam War was the pivot point that "provoked a profound national identity crisis, an American reckoning" that "shattered"—albeit temporarily—what he calls the "central tenet" of American identity: American exceptionalism.⁴ Appy makes a valuable contribution to the voluminous literature on the Vietnam War by tracing the ways in which the conflict influenced American self-perception, and he does so without belittling or overlooking Vietnamese sacrifices and scars. His aim is to show how,

during the war, Americans became so keenly aware of the destruction their military wrought on Vietnam that it jolted them into questioning their assumptions about American goodness, righteousness, and justice.

In delightfully accessible prose, Appy documents how the U.S. experience in Vietnam revealed to Americans—both those serving abroad and those at home—that American exceptionalism was a myth. “Part I: Why Are We in Vietnam?” devotes separate chapters to the human, geostrategic, egocentric and economic rationales given for U.S. involvement in Vietnam and exposes the fault lines in each. “Part II: America at War” describes those who served, discusses American military strategy, and analyzes the multifaceted antiwar movement while “Part III: What Have We Become?” explains how most Americans either forgot or selectively remembered the events he outlines in Parts I and II. Through an examination of Hollywood films, popular songs, previously classified documents and everything in between, Appy shows how U.S. presidents, policymakers, and pundits reassured Americans that they and their nation were, and indeed had always been exceptional, even during the Vietnam War.

As Appy notes, this revision “required some serious scrubbing of the historical record.”⁵ Synthesizing some of the best new work on the post-1975 era, he argues Americans recast themselves as the primary victims of the conflict and elevated veterans, especially those who did not return, as the centerpiece of a “watered-down and militarized reconstruction of heroism.”⁶ While this revisionism is most often associated with President Ronald Reagan’s rebranding of the Vietnam War as a “noble cause” and his elevation of the prisoner of war myth, Appy argues that the process began with President Gerald Ford and far outlasted Reagan’s presidency. His point is illustrated by Clinton’s comments on U.S.-Vietnamese normalization. Those remarks may have sounded familiar and accurate to Americans in 1995, but they would have seemed incongruous or even ridiculous to Americans during the war’s military phase.

Appy makes a strong case that Americans’ misremembering of the Vietnam War is just as central to American identity as the war itself. Appy thus echoes the calls Edwin Martini, Viet Thanh Nguyen, and others have made for Vietnam War scholars to award as much attention to conflict’s post-1975 phase as they do to the war’s origins and military aspects.⁷ In advocating this approach Appy also joins a growing number of scholars—like Mary Dudziak, for example—who challenge the neat temporal boundaries we often affix to warfare.⁸

Most fundamentally, *American Reckoning* suggests that Americans have learned the wrong “lessons of Vietnam.” While Appy acknowledges that Americans are more than willing to criticize specific government programs or decisions, the belief in American exceptionalism remains so “seductive” that to “challenge its validity strikes many as mean spirited, even seditious.”⁹ This state of affairs, Appy argues, serves a “permanent war machine” that now largely operates without impinging on Americans’ daily lives, as U.S. citizens live without fear of being drafted and U.S. policymakers pay for wars through loans instead of higher taxes.¹⁰ Appy concludes his monograph by encouraging Americans to confront the past: “Perhaps the only basis to begin real change is to seek the fuller reckoning of our role in the world that the Vietnam War so powerfully awakened—to confront the evidence of what we have done. It is our record; it is who we are.”¹¹

Appy’s intended audience thus extends far beyond the academy’s doors. Undergraduate readers and the growing number of Americans with no living memory of the conflict will likely learn a great deal from this concise yet powerful distillation and find it difficult to put down. Professors of history and American studies offering courses

on the Vietnam War, historical memory, identity politics, war and society, or U.S. history after 1945 ought to give *American Reckoning* serious consideration. Appy’s work is an accessible, timely, and thought-provoking account of the ways Americans justified, fought, remembered and misremembered the Vietnam War. He navigates readers through six decades of American history while using a variety of primary sources and taking the time to explore both well-known and often-overlooked episodes. Despite the colossal—and always growing—amount of scholarship on the Vietnam War, *American Reckoning* is a welcome addition.

Notes:

1. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations with Vietnam,” July 11, 1995, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51605>.
2. Ibid.
3. Christian G. Appy, *American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity* (London, 2015), xv.
4. Appy, x, xi.
5. Appy, 285.
6. Appy, 236.
7. Edwin Martini, *Invisible Enemies: The American War on Vietnam, 1975–2000* (Amherst, MA, 2000); Viet Thanh Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).
8. Mary L. Dudziak, *War Time: An Idea, Its History and Its Consequences* (Oxford, UK, 2013).
9. Appy, 333, 334.
10. Appy, 335.
11. Appy, 335.

Review of Francisco Javier Rodríguez Jiménez, Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Nicholas J. Cull, eds., *U.S. Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)

David J. Snyder

This volume offers a focused study of American public diplomatic efforts in the context of Francoist and post-Franco Spain. Such specificity is a welcome development in public diplomacy studies. Clearly the institutional history and the political, ideological, and cultural implications of U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War are well enough understood that we can begin to ask probing questions about that effort in specific local contexts, as many scholars have begun to do. The book promises to extend this analytical richness by offering two overlapping contexts. First, it looks at U.S. public diplomacy in Spain, a country often neglected in the broader diplomatic literature. Second, it examines how U.S. efforts did—or did not—extend democracy and democratic practice in Spain under the Francoist dictatorship and during the transition to democracy. In so doing the volume demonstrates how public diplomacy studies enrich our understanding of international relations more broadly. Because of this admirable concentration, however, important opportunities are missed.

U.S. Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain is a small book, and smaller still when we exclude chapters tasked with stage-setting and historical context. Of those chapters that substantively address public diplomacy operations, several get bogged down explicating the bilateral relations broadly, meaning there is little space left for the critical interrogation of public diplomacy operations, and therefore public diplomacy concepts as such. The well-worn phrase “soft power,” for example, is employed uncritically in several chapters (as it is in the literature more broadly).

Most troubling in this regard is the failure to come to terms with one of the central themes of the book: democracy. After a useful chapter by Giles Scott-Smith examining the stakes of American democracy promotion in the twentieth century, little more is done with democracy as a concept. None of the chapters define what is meant by democracy; rather, it is taken for granted that democracy is the inverse of the Franco dictatorship, that the health of the latter is an obstacle to the former. This is a shame, since the practice of public diplomacy offers much nuanced analytical territory to study democracy development in a local context. How did American culture offer political or cultural alternatives to the status quo? How did American efforts promote social networks or empower civic groups, the sinews of modern democratic practice? How did American efforts challenge prevailing juridical norms? Crucially, none of the authors extend Scott-Smith's observation of an important question in public diplomacy scholarship: did the United States operate as an agent of democracy in Spain, or was it merely an exemplar?

The most developed theme addresses the rise of Spanish technocracy during the high tide of American modernization efforts in the 1960s. Here American doctrine began to dovetail with the (apparently) indigenous currents of Spanish technocratic modernization. Clearly American ideas played a role. Yet while several of the chapters mention this development, none exploit fully the analytical possibilities on offer. What of, to take one example, the apparent conflict between the traditional anti-Americanism of Spanish elites, who were closely associated with the regime and invested both in Franco and in the broader tradition of conservative European disdain for American culture, and the eagerness of those same elites to embrace American modernity in its productive and technocratic modeling and to import American techniques into modernizing Spain? Much more might have been done with this apparent paradox, since—despite the firewalls within Spanish political culture—American public diplomacy appears to have been catalyzing support for the regime at the same time it was helping to undermine it. These processes are hinted at in several of the articles, but a rigorous and detailed treatment of this tantalizing story remains to be undertaken.

Some chapters focus on discrete public diplomacy efforts, such as the American library in Madrid (the Casa Americana), American Studies in Spain, various iterations of political and intellectual exchange (the Leader Program, the Fulbright Program), and there is some attention to radio. But otherwise the volume offers little analysis of American film, cultural diplomacy (especially art and music), or exhibitions. Technical assistance and productivity missions are underemphasized, given the importance of those initiatives to U.S. policy and, apparently, to the Spanish case. Only the American Studies initiative gets its own chapter, and here important questions about the qualitative nature of American Studies in Spain have been shelved in favor of quantitative data about numbers of grantees and budgets. The near-complete absence of the infamous 1966 Palomares nuclear accident seems a serious omission in this regard. While David Stiles has offered a fine account of the information strategy associated with the accident elsewhere, the current volume seems to cry out for a consideration of how the accident impacted long-term bilateral relations.¹

One essay hints at this richer analytical possibility for

Public diplomacy scholarship often reaches a negative conclusion—i.e., it judges a given U.S. policy initiative to have been a failure—and I have published such conclusions several times. An exhibition, presentation, lecture, or recital often provokes an immediate critical response, and most of the contributors to this volume, like many scholars in other contexts, conclude that U.S. public diplomacy did not enhance the image of the United States in Spain or contribute much to indigenous democratization efforts. But in this case, given that the United States generally stood behind the regime when it was strategically advantageous to do so, the anti-American position happened to be the pro-democratic position.

public diplomacy studies: Neal Rosendorf's account of what is essentially Francoist propaganda in and toward the United States. The chapter is a reminder of the constant feedback loops of international culture and international political messaging that proliferated in an era of mounting technological diversity and richness. And yet the success of Rosendorf's article shows the absence elsewhere of what is supposedly the central focus of this book: a deep analysis of the American role in promoting, extending, or catalyzing Spanish democratic practice.

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Note:

1. David Stiles, "A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8:3 (Winter 2006): 49–67.

Review of Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, *Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015)

Michael Brenes

S*ailing the Water's Edge* is a book written for political scientists, but diplomatic historians will find it useful if they want to study the domestic politics of foreign policy. Its thesis will sound familiar. Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley argue that domestic politics matter significantly in understanding American foreign policy since 1945, since "politics does not always stop at the water's edge" (154). But the ways in which Milner and Tingley go about proving this thesis make the book relevant and its conclusions fresh. Analyses of domestic politics can sometimes be vague and misleading, but the authors bring new empirical and quantitative data to bear in order to prove, in very specific terms, how domestic politics can arrange and alter foreign policy outcomes. They are programmatic and deliberative in their efforts at assessing just how domestic politics can reshape American foreign policy—and when they cannot. In avoiding the broad scope of the domestic and exploring its particulars, Milner and Tingley demonstrate the limits and boundaries faced by policymakers in pursuing a foreign policy of liberal internationalism.

The authors are primarily focused on how the presidency and the executive branch are constrained by the interplay of domestic politics in the United States. But their book is not a study of the presidency. Their analysis accounts for how domestic pressures—and the ways they are manifested in defense appropriations and the budgetary process—give Congress and various lobbying and interest groups significant power to affect the executive's desired course of action. Foreign aid, trade policy, immigration, defense budgets, and public opinion, they argue, play a prominent role in affecting how members of Congress respond to foreign policy dilemmas and determining whether the president can be cajoled into a policy substitution. Milner and Tingley target these factors for their ability to be "highly distributive" (50)—i.e., to deliver many material benefits to domestic constituents. It is here that the book excels. As the authors acknowledge, the discussion of how the political economy of U.S. foreign relations shapes policymakers' changing outlook toward the strategy and substance of international affairs represents their overarching contribution to the field (14).

Within this theoretical framework, Milner and Tingley suggest that the militarization of American foreign policy is a corollary of domestic politics. As a policy instrument, militarization can overcome the varying bureaucratic and institutional constraints imposed upon the president. It is therefore not a policy failure, they argue. Nor is it an artifact of American culture. It is a recurring product of the institutions of American foreign policy, integral to the scaffolding of American democracy and to the way the legislative branch wields power. With this argument, Milner and Tingley are making another significant contribution to the literature on domestic politics and American foreign policy—and a provocative one: they suggest that an overreliance on the military option over diplomatic and economic alternatives is an outgrowth of processes and structures designed to restrain that option.

The authors' conclusions rest predominantly upon a single historical case study: American foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa from the presidency of Bill Clinton to that of George W. Bush. The reasons Milner and Tingley focus on post-Cold War U.S.-African relations are varied, but their decision ultimately rests on how the domestic interests they have selected influenced policy changes over a period of more than twenty-five years. During the Cold War, the United States considered Africa to be a pawn in its struggle with the Soviet Union, but the continent was largely untouched by military interventions. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, that situation began to change. Clinton sought to increase America's role in the region through trade agreements and economic arrangements that favored development and modernization. His effort to engage Africa through trade policy drew Congress into the process, which meant increased lobbying from interest groups that sought to propound their ideological positions and promote their economic interests. With the president constrained by Congress, "American policy in Sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly militarized over the 1990s" (233). A similar phenomenon was repeated in the George W. Bush administration after September 11, 2001, when Bush "began to pursue a markedly more militarized policy on the continent" (249).

Milner and Tingley are to be applauded not only for their insights on the militarization of American foreign policy, but also for the richness of their quantitative data and for the conclusions they draw from it. Indeed, the book's tables and graphs showing when interest groups lobbied Congress and tracing congressional involvement in the United States Agency of International Development are fascinating and are employed in ways that historians should try to emulate. *Sailing the Water's Edge* also adds to the scholarship on Congress and American foreign

policy. Historians and political scientists still know little of how Congress contributes to American foreign policy—although historians are probably less knowledgeable on the subject—and Milner and Tingley offer a welcome addition to the literature.¹ Chapter 4 offers an interesting overview of congressional budget-making and roll call votes on foreign policy instruments and shows where the president can shape both. From this evidence, the authors conclude that the parochial concerns of members of Congress and their dedication to satisfying their constituents' expectations prevent the president from dealing effectively with foreign policy issues attached to the fate of America's political economy.

These accomplishments notwithstanding, the book is problematic for historians. I can't help but feel that Milner and Tingley could have relied more on history to prove their claims. While the case study of U.S. policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa legitimizes Milner and Tingley's operative theory effectively, there is no historical nuance, and the narrative feels incomplete. Again, as a historian, I bristled to see how the authors reference and use historical developments to prove an argument instead of deriving the argument from the history. They draw theoretical correlations from history, but without demonstrating causation.

These objections don't detract from the book's arguments, but they do attest to the methodological and epistemological differences between historians and political scientists, and thus to the inherent challenges the book presents for historians. It is also overladen with academic jargon and with terms used almost exclusively by political scientists. Milner and Tingley should not be faulted for having a conversation with their peers and building upon the existing literature within their field, but the language and structure of the book may deter historians from reading it.

That would be a pity, since *Sailing the Water's Edge* can provide historians with nuanced insight into how American foreign policy is conducted in both a historical and contemporary context. Despite its intended audience, the book offers much-needed clarity on America's democratic way of war. It can also help scholars in their efforts to better theorize the interrelationship between domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy.

Note:

1. Some useful books on the role of Congress in shaping U.S. foreign policy include Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York, 2005); Andrew Johns, *Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the War, and the Republican Party* (Lexington, NY, 2010); Rebecca U. Thorpe, *The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending* (Chicago, 2014).

Review of Nicholas J. Schlosser, *Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War Against East Germany* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015)

Laura A. Belmonte

Nicholas Schlosser's new book on Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) is a first-rate addition to a growing body of work on propaganda in the post-World War II era. Drawn from research in German and U.S. archives, *Cold War on the Airwaves* is exceptionally well documented on both sides of the ideological battle, a rarity in much of the literature because of gaps in recordkeeping and barriers to archival access.

Created by the U.S. government in the final months of World War II as a means of communicating with the population of the American sector of occupied Berlin, RIAS initially adhered to objective, nonpartisan standards of journalism. But as Soviet-American relations

unraveled after the war, the station metamorphosed into a propaganda outlet aimed at countering communist broadcasts originating in the Soviet Occupation Zone (which later became the German Democratic Republic [GDR]). To German citizens living behind the Iron Curtain, RIAS was a reliable source of news and entertainment. To the East German government, RIAS was a direct threat to its authority that had to be thwarted through information campaigns, jamming, and covert operations.

Part of the broader U.S. ideological offensive during the Cold War, RIAS was nonetheless unique. Originating from West Berlin and staffed almost entirely by Germans, it focused mainly on programming and news about Germany. It was more like Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which were manned mainly by refugees from communist nations, and less like Voice of America, which was not as localized.

The book is structured into six well-written and soundly argued chapters. Chapter 1 lays out key themes nicely and situates the text within the historiography on political broadcasting in Germany. While Schlosser places his work into the larger frame of studies of U.S. cultural diplomacy, he consciously focuses on the news broadcasts of RIAS, touching on the cultural and entertainment aspects of its programming only briefly. His evidentiary base is made up largely of broadcast transcripts and listener surveys conducted by both the U.S. Information Agency and the East German government. The deployment and assessment of information from these coexistent efforts is a key strength of Schlosser's work. As a point of comparison, consider that RG 306 at the National Archives contains transcripts for only about five years of Voice of America broadcasts and has only isolated examples of broadcasts originating in the communist bloc. It thus is quite difficult to document VOA's specific broadcasts in many timeframes. Nor are there many instances where we have extensive documentation of a targeted nation's concurrent radio broadcasts.

Chapter 2 traces the early years of RIAS and the internal challenges it faced as the political climate of postwar Germany changed between 1946 and 1949. RIAS officials at first struggled with inadequate equipment and limited resources. They initially adopted a strict posture of neutrality, according all political parties equal airtime to broadcast their views, even when many listeners requested more critical perspectives on the Soviets, whose Radio Berlin broadcasts frequently attacked those running the western sectors of the city. With the onset of the Berlin blockade and the subsequent airlift, U.S. officials ordered RIAS to adopt an anti-Soviet posture and to dismiss employees sympathetic to communism and accommodation with the Soviet Union. In an effort to raise its profile and increase its broadcasting capabilities, U.S. officials also gave RIAS additional funding, which was used to improve facilities and upgrade transmitters.

RIAS began to monitor Radio Berlin's broadcasts closely and quickly refute its claims. That strategy satisfied the audiences that craved perspectives different from those disseminated by the Soviet Union and the Socialist Unity Party. Many listeners wrote RIAS to convey their frustration with living conditions in communist-controlled sectors of Germany. RIAS, Schlosser argues, became "a two-way channel from which individuals could hear the voice of the United States and through which listeners could direct their concerns directly to American officials" (43).

Chapters 3 and 4 examine RIAS's campaigns against

East Germany. Chapter 4 focuses on the station's treatment of the 1953 popular uprising in East Berlin. After the division of Germany into two separate nations in 1949, RIAS newscasts aimed to undermine the GDR. That goal was often difficult to reconcile with its self-designated role as a purveyor of objective journalism, but RIAS followed the United States' global propaganda strategy and continued to stress accuracy in its reporting. Publicizing the real-life truths about policies and daily life in the GDR, RIAS leaders concluded, would be the most effective way to erode popular support for the East German regime.

However, the limits and potential perils of stoking mass discontent became evident in June 1953, when RIAS reports helped transform a general strike into a nationwide upheaval. Aware that the Stasi believed that RIAS instigated the protests and attuned to the fragile state of U.S.-Soviet relations in the immediate aftermath of the death of Joseph Stalin, RIAS leaders de-escalated broadcasters' rhetoric in order to avoid triggering a Soviet intervention in West Berlin. At the same time, East German broadcasters scrambled to respond to the protests.

In the aftermath of the revolt, the GDR government concluded that RIAS had played a central role in shaping public views of its authority. In Chapters 5 and 6, Schlosser details the GDR's efforts to defend its control over East German media and to portray RIAS as a nest of spies. The GDR attempted to block West German broadcasts through jamming and used derogatory media campaigns about RIAS, Stasi infiltration, arrests, and show trials to persuade East Germans to stop listening. Thanks to RIAS counter-jamming and East German citizens' refusal to capitulate, these campaigns never entirely succeeded; ironically, they helped reinforce RIAS's claims about the illegitimacy of the GDR's pretensions to democratic rule.

With the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, many East Germans came to value RIAS even more highly, since it provided more accurate news than the GDR and was one of their few remaining connections to the West. Although the wall made it much harder for RIAS operatives to get direct reports on the state of the GDR from East Germans themselves, the station endured and became a jointly funded U.S.-German endeavor. With the onset of *Ostpolitik* in the early 1970s, the GDR eased restrictions on listening to RIAS, and the station once again began receiving thousands of letters from Germans, who saw it as a combination town hall and direct hotline to the U.S. government. After the Cold War ended, Germany assumed sole control over RIAS and in 1994, merged it with several other German stations (including several based in the former GDR) and launched *Deutschlandradio*. That network continues to operate out of the old RIAS headquarters in Berlin, which stands as a lasting reminder of the station's vital role in the Cold War era.

While specialists in cultural diplomacy always face challenges in documenting the transmission and reception of information campaigns, Schlosser's rich, bilateral trove of sources helps him transcend some of these difficulties. However, his decision not to integrate the cultural and entertainment aspects of RIAS's programming leaves the reader wondering how these factors helped shape popular views of the GDR and the West. There is a robust literature on these cultural dimensions that Schlosser could more fully amplify and engage. This quibble aside, *Cold War on the Airwaves* is excellent and should be of broad interest to specialists in a wide array of fields.

SHAFR Council Minutes
Thursday June 23, 2016
8:00AM to 1:10PM
Boardroom (Room 226)
Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice
San Diego, CA

Council members present:

Terry Anderson, Mark Bradley, Amanda Boczar, Tim Borstelmann, Robert Brigham, Amanda Demmer, Mary Dudziak, David Engerman, Petra Goedde, Amy Greenberg, Paul Kramer, Alan McPherson, and Penny von Eschen.

Others attending: Amy Sayward (*ex officio*), Salim Yaqub, Melani McAlister, Julie Laut, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Patricia Thomas, Anne Foster, Andrew Johns, Kenneth Osgood, Andrew Preston, Kathy Rasmussen, and Kimber Quinney.

Business Items:

1) Opening

The Council meeting began at 8:00 a.m. with a welcome from SHAFR President David Engerman. The minutes from the last Council meeting had been approved by email vote previously.

2) 2016 SHAFR Conference Report provided by Program Committee co-chairs Melani McAlister and Salim Yaqub as well as SHAFR Conference Coordinator Julie Laut

Laut reported that some 440 participants had pre-registered for the conference, making it one of the larger non-D.C. conferences. Thanks were expressed to the Provost of the University of San Diego (USD), Dr. Andrew Allen, for his contribution to the conference, which included all AV costs, several refreshment breaks, and use of the USD trams to facilitate movement between the campus and the conference hotels during the morning and late afternoon. Cornell University Press and Oxford University Press also served as sponsors for refreshment breaks. Three usual exhibitors did not attend this year's conference, but there was one new exhibitor, for a total of 12 exhibitor tables. Laut also pointed out that CSPAN 3 was televising David Engerman's Presidential address as well as one of the panels. She also noted that more than 100 conference attendees had signed up for the free walking tour of Balboa Park and for the social event at the Natural History Museum.

The Program Committee report highlighted some of the unique aspects of this year's program, including several panels on humanitarianism, human rights, and Africa. The acceptance rate for panel proposals for this year's conference was 88%; additionally there were 48 individual paper proposals, of which 32 were accepted (66%), and 10 panels were constructed from these proposals. While the acceptance rate was relatively high, the Program Chairs noted that this allowed a greater diversity in topics in the conference; greater diversity also came from the Global and Diversity Scholars travel awards. In total, there were 93 regular panels and 1 teaching panel on this year's program. The Program Committee urged the Council to provide clearer guidance to participants on the proper format and timing of conference papers. The committee chairs also noted 25 cancellations of presenters this year, including a high number of last-minute cancellations. Council discussed the possibility of some type of sanction for cancellations, but the consensus was to take up the issue at a later time if this signals the beginning of a trend rather than being an aberration. Council thanked McAlister, Yaqub, and Laut for their fine work.

3) 2017 SHAFR Conference

In looking forward to the 2017 SHAFR Conference in Arlington, VA, Laut pointed out that the popularity of this year's walking tours might prompt a similar activity at future conferences. She also suggested raising the rates for advertising and exhibiting at the conference in the future. In response to Council Member Mark Bradley's pre-conference question about reducing SHAFR's carbon footprint, Laut recommended eliminating the paper registration form (only one received this year) and reducing the number of programs printed.

Adriane Lentz-Smith and Bob Brigham reported on behalf of the 2017 Program Committee and announced the other members of their committee. Vice President Mary Dudziak recommended a focus on strengthening existing outreach for the upcoming conference and stated that she was looking forward to working with the Program Committee.

4) Report of Committee on Minority Historians in SHAFR by Adriane Lentz-Smith

Lentz-Smith spoke on behalf of herself and co-chair Lien-Hang Nguyen about increasing involvement and continuing attendance of minority historians by working to create a community within SHAFR, not just recruiting one-time presentations but fostering long-term association with the organization. She also pointed out that awards to graduate students might not immediately yield consistent membership but can result in positive associations and even promotion of SHAFR. Council concurred with the need for a continued and committed effort in supporting minority historian involvement in SHAFR.

5) 2018 SHAFR Conference Proposal by Petra Goedde

Goedde recapped the proposal sent earlier to Council that the 2018 conference be in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, due to its affordability, the east-coast location, the historical sites and archives that are available to scholars, and its walkability due to being in the city center. Additionally, significant funds have already been pledged by neighboring universities and institutions to underwrite some conference costs. Von Eschen moved that the proposal be seconded, Anderson seconded, and the Council voted unanimously to accept it.

6) *Creation of a Conference Committee*

Dudziak explained that conference committees can assist organizations in recruiting conference cities further ahead of time, conducting outreach, and recruiting strong panel proposals in addition to handling policy matters, such as ensuring greater access to those with a disability, considering a policy toward those who cancel after the program is printed. Engerman added that such a committee could also work on longer-term issues, such as greening the conference. Bradley made a motion to create such a committee, which was seconded by Brigham and approved unanimously.

7) *Renewal of Program Coordinator*

Given that Laut's contract was a one-year contract and given Council's enthusiasm about Laut's work on the San Diego conference, Council discussed renewal and recommended a three-year contract offer with a raise (with the option to leave the position with one year's notice) to be made by Engerman. The motion was made by Greenberg, seconded by Goedde, and passed unanimously.

8) *Council discussion of SHAFR's financial position*

After Sayward highlighted a couple parts of the financial reports that were circulated ahead of the Council meeting, Borstelmann shared parts of the conversation that the Ways & Means Committee had had the previous day. Given recent withdrawals from the endowment and the lower amount offered to SHAFR by the Oxford University Press contract, the committee suggested that Council develop a policy regarding the regular level of endowment draws and some slight adjustments to the annual budget moving forward. Engerman and Sayward will meet in the fall (along with accounting professionals) to develop the FY 2017 budget and a clearer set of financial reports to guide Council's decision-making in the future.

As part of the budget restructuring, Sayward had recommended and the Ways & Means Committee agreed to recharacterize the "Assistant Director" budget line as "Support Services for the Executive Director," in order to provide a greater range of more specialized services moving forward. Funding for the coming fiscal year will remain at the same level. This motion by the Ways & Means Committee was seconded by von Eschen and passed unanimously.

9) *SHAFR Publications Discussion* with Anne Foster, Patricia Thomas, and Andrew Johns

A discussion about how to improve the membership renewal process and ensure that late or forgotten renewers (including life members this year) receive both *Diplomatic History* and *Passport* ensued between Andrew Johns, Trish Thomas, and Council. Johns, Engerman, and Thomas will have follow-up conversations with the goal of improving the process, including multiyear renewals and more clearly alerting members that a delay in renewing may result in not receiving all of their publications. Dudziak suggested a follow-up conversation at the January 2017 Council meeting to assess progress.

Sayward summarized her written report on the process of digitizing past issues of the SHAFR newsletter, which will require additional financial resources to complete. Once the digitization nears completion, she will work with Johns to integrate the two websites and launch/announce the initiative.

Following up on an issue raised in Johns' report, Bradley suggested that Council might be the most appropriate body to create a service award for SHAFR. Johns agreed, and Engerman agreed to appoint a task force to make a recommendation at the January 2017 AHA Council meeting. If approved, nominations could be received and an award made in June 2017.

The Council all offered congratulations for the work that Cullather and Foster had done with *DH*, specifically with regard to mechanics and improved style guides for authors. Foster announced that the physical space that the journal occupies at Indiana University will be moving. The process of sharing book reviews between the journal and *Passport* was working well, but *Passport* reviews are not generally accessible through on-line queries. Johns and Thomas will discuss the issue further.

10) *Summer Institute* reports by Kenneth Osgood and Andrew Preston

2016 Summer Institute Coordinator Osgood summarized his report, emailed earlier to Council. The Summer Institute begins on Monday, June 27th 2016 in the Netherlands. Ten participants from North America and Western Europe were chosen to participate from the 46 applications received, which came from all over the world. Some discussion ensued about how to encourage Institute participants to become long-term members of SHAFR and how to ensure a diverse set of participants.

2017 Summer Institute Coordinator Preston detailed the planning taking place for next year's Institute at Cambridge University from 3-7 July. The location allows easy access to the Churchill and Thatcher papers. The morning sessions will be based on the readings, and the afternoon sessions will be focused on professional development. The theme will be "Security of the State."

11) *Report of the Committee on Women in SHAFR* by Kathy Rasmussen

Rasmussen reminded Council of the committee's mandate to submit a report every five years and to track progress in the interim. She highlighted from the list of 13 recommendations flowing out of the 2013 report that Council might consider how best to assist parents attending the conference with their children, activate the committee's webpage to provide additional information to SHAFR's membership, and assist the committee in its on-going data-gathering, which will become more intensive if the committee chooses to pursue a climate survey. While it was suggested that the first issue might be

considered by the newly created Conference Committee and that the second should be considered by the Web Committee, Goedde made a motion to authorize the President and Executive Director to gather data about SHAFR's members through its conference membership and organizational membership renewals; the motion was seconded by Bradley and passed unanimously.

12) Report of the Teaching Committee by Kimber Quinney

Quinney, who had just completed meeting with the Teaching Committee, urged Council to think about ways to give SHAFR's teaching efforts the same sort of time and space that it does for research. She specifically recommended additional web resources for teaching and suggested leveraging SHAFR resources to develop new resources through partnerships with other organizations and institutions, perhaps including the Gilder-Lehrman Institution and the University of Wisconsin. Council members provided some considerations for the Teaching Committee in moving forward with the idea of external partnerships.

13) Continuation of Council discussion of SHAFR's financial position

The Ways & Means Committee also recommended increasing conference registration from \$85/\$35 to \$100/\$40 (for faculty/professionals and for students respectively). Boczar seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.

In discussing a policy on endowment draws, the Ways & Means Committee recommendation of spending up to 3% of the total endowment yearly was modified to use FY 2017 as a transition year (since drastic changes are not needed) and to fully implement the policy for FY 2018. Brigham seconded the amended motion, which passed unanimously.

14) Report on external partnerships by Penny von Eschen and Amanda Boczar

Following up on their written report circulated ahead of time to Council, von Eschen and Boczar reiterated their recommendation to Council that the partnership with the Trans-Atlantic Studies Association be discontinued, that the relationship with the National History Center be maintained for the next year, and that Council consider increasing its contribution to the National Coalition for History. Council accepted the first two recommendations but declined to increase support at this time for the National Coalition for History. The motion was made by von Eschen, seconded by Borstelmann, and passed unanimously.

15) Report on SHAFR Fellowships by Robert Brigham, Terry Anderson, and Petra Goedde

Summarizing the ad hoc committee's earlier report, Brigham pointed out that it was unusual for an organization of SHAFR's size to make so many and such substantial fellowships and travel grants to graduate students and international scholars. It was disappointing to find that the data (which is incomplete due to few students submitting the requested reports) did not support the idea that such fellowships and awards lead to long-term SHAFR membership in most cases. Discussion followed about the best way maintain this program of fellowships and travel grants at a sustainable level given the Council resolution to bring the budget closer in line with the new endowment spending policy. Ultimately, Borstelmann moved that the Global and Diversity Scholars grants be trimmed from \$35,000 to \$30,000; this motion was seconded by Bradley and passed unanimously. Additionally, Borstelmann moved that SHAFR trim the number of Bemis grants from fifteen to ten in the coming year; this motion was seconded by McPherson and passed unanimously.

16) Closing

Engerman thanked outgoing Council members Alan McPherson, Penny von Eschen, Mark Bradley, and Bob Brigham for their service. Dudziak similarly thanked David Engerman for his service as SHAFR's President. After a round of applause, Council adjourned.



Professional Notes

Paul Thomas Chamberlin will be Associate Professor of History at Columbia University starting in the fall of 2016.

Jessica Chapman, Associate Professor of History at Williams College, received an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation New Directions Fellowship to pursue her next project, a cultural and economic study of Kenya's running industry.

Daniel Hummel will be an inaugural Postdoctoral Fellow in History and Public Policy at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University beginning in August 2016.

Autumn Costa Lass will be Assistant Professor of History in the School of Behavioral and Social Sciences at Wayland Baptist University beginning in the fall of 2016.

Robert McMahan will be spending the fall 2016 semester as the Stanley Kaplan Visiting Professor of American Foreign Policy at Williams College.

Lien-Hang T. Nguyen will be the Borg Chair in the History of the United States and East Asia at Columbia University starting in the fall of 2016.

Christopher Nichols, Assistant Professor of History at Oregon State University, was named a 2016 Andrew Carnegie Fellow by the Carnegie Corporation.

Kimber Quinney will be Assistant Professor in the Department of History at California State University, San Marcos beginning in the fall of 2016.

Olivia Sohns will be Assistant Professor of History at the University of Central Florida starting in August 2016.



Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, January 1 — December 31, 2015

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation to the Department of State (HAC) has two principal responsibilities: It oversees the preparation and timely publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, and it monitors the declassification and release of Department of State records.

The Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 (Public Law 102138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.) mandates these responsibilities. It calls for a "thorough, accurate, and reliable" documentary record of United States foreign relations. Since the enactment of this law, State's Office of the Historian (HO) has worked diligently to compile and publish *FRUS* volumes which meet this standard.

HAC appreciates that meeting this standard has become ever more challenging and complex. The number of vital government documents pertaining to foreign relations that are produced by a wide spectrum of government departments and agencies has exploded since the 1960s. Yet Congressional legislation requires the publication of "thorough, accurate, and reliable" volumes no later than 30 years after the events they document. HO has struggled to meet these twin obligations. HAC nonetheless is delighted to report HO's impressive progress over the past several years in approaching the 30-year timeline. The publication in 2015 of the initial volume in the Ronald Reagan administration series marks the

first time a *FRUS* volume has been published at the 31-year line since 2007. Although the Reagan years reflect a spike in covert actions that will present declassification challenges, the HAC cannot exaggerate how encouraged it is by HO's productivity.

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute also mandates that HAC monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State's records. The HAC expressed its disappointment and concern over this area of its responsibility in its report last year. That concern and disappointment has intensified.

Executive Order 13526, issued in December 2009, mandates the declassification of records over 25 years-old—unless valid and compelling reasons can be specified for withholding them. With a few exceptions, State's Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) warrants praise for its efforts to meet that requirement, although problems with resources, staffing, and facilities, exacerbated by the controversies over Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's emails and attendant issues, has impeded its efforts. Further, because of the time required for reviews by multiple agencies other than State with equities in its documents, the many technological problems that arise in connection with the growing number of electronic records, and the frequent delays in the transfer of the records to and their processing by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), a large percentage of State's records may not be available to researchers for many years beyond the E.O.'s requirement. HAC applauds the leadership of both IPS and NARA for addressing these issues so conscientiously and aggressively in 2015. But without more resources and an even greater effort, the problems will surely grow worse.

Publications of the Foreign Relations Series

Compiling the continually increasing number of records necessary to document an administration's foreign policies, culling from them the limited number that can be managed in one volume yet provide a "thorough, accurate, and reliable" history, and declassifying that selection, poses an exceedingly difficult challenge. Still, during 2015 the Office of the Historian published ten *FRUS* volumes. These are:

1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

1969–1976, Volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972

1977–1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula

1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

1969–1976, Volume E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973

1977–1980, Volume XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation

1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

This impressive list includes the long-awaited Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, 1977–1980, and Documents on Chile, 1969–1973, as well as the first volume in the Reagan administration series, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. The total of ten volumes published in 2015 is not only one more than in 2014, but it is the first year during which HO published ten volumes since 1996. The nineteen volumes published between 2014 and 2015 is a two-year total not achieved since 1992.

It is likely that HO will finally meet its statutory thirty-year timeline as it publishes more volumes in the Reagan administration series over the next few years. Maintaining its 2015 rate of publication, however, will be difficult. In addition to declassification dynamics, some of the factors influencing publication are beyond HO's control. Severe cutbacks in the Remote Archives Capture Program, for example, may affect compilers' access to material at Presidential Libraries. Owing to the currently volatile relationship between the United States and Iran, to provide another example, the State Department continues to withhold its approval for publishing the eagerly anticipated retrospective volume on Iran 1953. The HAC's outlook for 2016 and beyond is nevertheless optimistic. Because HO has already finished compiling, reviewing, and editing 10 volumes, and more than 20 others are in declassification process, the Office now has an opportunity to publish at least some Reagan volumes inside the 30-year timeline.

Also noteworthy in 2015, HO accelerated and systematized a program to publish on its website digitized volumes from the *FRUS* back catalog. Released on a quarterly basis to widespread acclaim, these complete text ebook versions of *FRUS* are fully searchable and can be downloaded for free to tablets and phones. Additionally the office continues to build on its past successes in public outreach by exploiting social media platforms and to support the Department of State through its preparation of briefing papers that provide historical context to contemporary issues, such as the negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program and the reopening of the US Embassy in Havana.

HAC commends HO for its achievements. While the entire office deserves praise for its contributions, the Historian, Deputy Historian, General Editor, and others in supervisory positions warrant special mention. Their managerial skill has played a pivotal role both in the office's prodigious output and high morale.

The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement

The HAC does not underestimate the challenges that HO must still confront in meeting the statutorily mandated 30-year timeline for publishing *FRUS*. The Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 mandated and facilitated research beyond the State Department and White House: in the files of the CIA, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE), and all other Executive Office agencies involved in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Not only must these agencies declassify their documents for inclusion in the series, but all agencies and departments, most notably the CIA, DOD, and DOE, must review documents of any origin in which they have "equities."

In an effort to facilitate access and review, the State Department in 1992 signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the CIA and established a State-CIA-National Security Council (NSC) "High-Level Panel" (HLP) to provide guidelines for declassifying and publishing documentation relating to covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities that had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy and to adjudicate disputes. These initiatives, coupled with the very positive relationship HO has developed with CIA over the past several years, has paid dividends. CIA consistently reviews both specific documents and compiled volumes in a timely manner, and in 2015 it agreed to acknowledge four covert actions that will be documented in future volumes. Nevertheless, the frequent reliance on covert actions in the Reagan and subsequent administrations will doubtless require lengthy declassification processes that will inevitably delay publication of a significant number of volumes beyond the 30-year target.

In general, HO receives excellent support from all of its interagency declassification review partners. Particularly praiseworthy are DOE and NSC, which, while still protecting sensitive equities, produce timely and careful reviews aimed at releasing as much historical information as possible. CIA has established a rigorous process for review and declassification, and it is well aware of the requirements established by both legislation and Executive Order. DOD, however remains the weak link. Structural impediments, inadequate training and oversight for reviewers, and a shortage of personnel present severe obstacles to DOD's timely review of *FRUS* volumes. Because declassification review authority is diffused across the massive DOD bureaucracy, rather than residing in a single dedicated review staff, reviews are often inconsistent and exceed deadlines. DOD reviews frequently result in excessive redactions of improperly withheld information, necessitating time consuming appeals that delay the process further.

Declassification Issues and the Transfer and Processing of Department of State Records

The HAC has previously expressed grave concern over the inability of NARA to process and transfer electronic and paper records in order to make them accessible to scholars and the public in a timely manner. The committee appreciates the challenges generated by underfunding, understaffing, the increased volume of documents, and the rising number of electronic documents. Electronic cables and emails pose particularly nettlesome challenges, exacerbating the bottlenecks in the review, declassification, and transfer process that have built up over the years.

HO commends NARA's leadership for tackling these issues, but the improvements have been far from sufficient. NARA continues to lack a staff sufficient to execute basic archival functions such as processing and describing records and providing adequate reference service. It is not evident to the HAC, moreover, that carrying out these functions is currently NARA's chief priority. It has, for example, made slight improvements to the National Archives Catalog. But these improvements, and the Catalog itself, cannot substitute for the development of fulsome finding guides and an archival staff with deep subject expertise.

Within the State Department, the Systematic Review Program (SRP), the situation is better—but not by much. And serious problems loom in the future. SRP's commendable effort has enabled it to stay on track in meeting its obligations to transfer paper records to NARA. It also kept up with HO's *FRUS* production. But serious technological issues that attend the review of electronic records, the equities that other agencies have in them, delays in the construction of a new facility, and an increase in Freedom of Information and Mandatory Review requests have seriously impaired SRP's review and transfer of electronic records.

Only dramatic advances in technological instruments, coupled with similarly dramatic increases in funding and personnel, will prevent these problems from growing worse as the volume of electronic records increases, in no small part because the State Department has instituted a new system to capture all email, regardless of how senior the official who sent or received it. Furthermore, the Obama administration has mandated that by December 31, 2016, all federal agencies must manage their email records in an electronic format, and by December 2019, they must manage their permanent electronic records in an electronic format.

Because meeting these deadlines will challenge both NARA and IPS, the HAC will target the years 2016 and 2019 for special attention.

Richard H. Immerman, Chair

Laura Belmonte	Trudy Huskamp Peterson
Mary L. Dudziak	Susan Perdue
Robert McMahan	Katherine A. S. Sibley
James McAllister	Thomas Zeiler

Recent Books of Interest

- Atkinson, David C. *The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States* (North Carolina, 2017).
- Belmonte, Laura A. *The International LGBT Rights Movement: A History* (Bloomsbury, 2017).
- Benton, Laura and Lisa Ford. *Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850* (Harvard, 2016).
- Bozo, Frédéric. *French Foreign Policy Since 1945* (Berghahn, 2016).
- Bozo, Frédéric. *A History of the Iraq Crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991-2003* (Columbia, 2016).
- Brands, Hal. *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (Cornell, 2016).
- Brunnermeier, Markus K., Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau. *The Euro and the Battle of Ideas* (Princeton, 2016).
- Carruthers, Susan L. *The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace* (Harvard, 2016).
- Cha, Victor. *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, 2016).
- Clemens, Walter C. *North Korea and the World: Human Rights, Arms Control, and Strategies for Negotiation* (Kentucky, 2016).
- Clune, Lori. *Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World* (Oxford, 2016).
- Conze, Eckart, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon. *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s* (Cambridge, 2016).
- DeRoche, Andy. *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States, and Southern Africa* (Bloomsbury, 2016).
- Eder, Jacob S. *Holocaust Angst: The Federal Republic of Germany and American Holocaust Memory since the 1970s* (Oxford, 2016).
- Elkind, Jessica. *Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War* (Kentucky, 2016).
- Filipink, Richard M. *Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy During the 1960s: An American Lion in Winter* (Lexington, 2016).
- Fischer, Conan. *A Vision of Europe: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression, 1929-1932* (Oxford, 2017).
- Folly, Martin H. *New Order Diplomacy: The Axis in International Affairs, 1939-1945* (Bloomsbury, 2017).
- Haass, Richard. *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* (Penguin, 2017).
- Harris, Sarah Miller. *The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War* (Routledge, 2016).
- Henkin, Yagil. *The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East* (Lexington, 2016).
- Herring, George C. *The American Century and Beyond: U.S. Foreign Relations 1893-2014* (Oxford, 2017).
- Holm, Michael. *The Marshall Plan: A New Deal for Europe* (Routledge, 2016).
- Hoppen, K. Theodore. *Governing Hibernia: British Politicians and Ireland, 1800-1921* (Oxford, 2016).
- Karp, Matthew. *This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy* (Harvard, 2016).
- Kaussler, Bernd. *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Realpolitik of Deceit* (Routledge, 2017).
- Khalil, Osamah F. *America's Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State* (Harvard, 2016).
- Kurashige, Lon and Alice Yang eds., *Major Problems in Asian American History: Documents and Essays*, 2nd ed. (Cengage, 2017).

Leake, Elisabeth. *The Defiant Border: The Afghan-Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization, 1936-1965* (Cambridge, 2016).

Levering, Ralph B. *The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History* (Wiley, 2016).

Levgold, Robert. *Return to Cold War* (Wiley, 2016).

Little, Douglas. *Us Versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat* (North Carolina, 2016).

Lubin, Alex and Marwan Kraidy. *American Studies Encounters the Middle East* (North Carolina, 2016).

Madokoro, Laura. *Elusive Refuge: Chinese Migrants in the Cold War* (Harvard, 2016).

Makko, Aryo. *Ambassadors of Realpolitik: Sweden, the CSCE, and the Cold War* (Berghahn, 2016).

Matray, James I. *Crisis in a Divided Korea: A Chronology and Reference Guide* (ABC-CLIO, 2016).

Matray, James I. and Donald W. Boose Jr., *Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War* (Ashgate Publishing, 2014).

Mayblin, Lucy. *Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

McDonald, Bryan L. *Food Power: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Food System* (Oxford, 2016).

McDougall, Walter A. *The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How's America's Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest* (Yale, 2016).

McKenna, Rebecca Tinio. *American Imperial Pastoral: The Architecture of US Colonialism in the Philippines* (Chicago, 2016).

McKercher, Asa. *Camelot and Canada: Canadian-American Relations in the Kennedy Era* (Oxford, 2016).

McPherson, Alan. *A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Wiley, 2016).

Mead, Walter Russell. *The Arc of a Covenant: The United States, Israel, and the Fate of the Jewish People* (Knopf, 2017).

Miller, Chris. *The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR* (North Carolina, 2016).

Millett, Allan R. *A Short History of the Korean War* (Tauris, 2016).

Moss, Richard A. *Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente* (University of Kentucky, 2017).

Neagle, Michael. *America's Forgotten Colony: Cuba's Isle of Pines* (Cambridge, 2016).

Onslow, Sue. *Britain and Rhodesia* (Tauris, 2016).

Parker, Jason. *Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (Oxford, 2016).

Paulmann, Johannes. *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2016).

Peifer, Douglas Carl. *Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents* (Oxford, 2016).

Pham, Quynh and Robbie Shilliam. *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonizing Visions* (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016).

Robin, Ron. *The Cold World They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter* (Harvard, 2016).

Ruger, Jan. *Heligoland: Britain, Germany, and the Struggle for the North Sea* (Oxford, 2016).

Rust, William J. *Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action and the Origins of the Second Indochina War* (Kentucky, 2016).

Ryan, David. *US Collective Memory, Intervention, and Vietnam: The Cultural Politics of US Foreign Policy Since 1969* (Routledge, 2017).

Sayward, Amy. *The United Nations in International History* (Bloomsbury, 2017).

Seib, Philip. *The Future of #Diplomacy* (Wiley, 2016).

Spohr, Kristina and David Reynolds. *Transcending the Cold War: Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in Europe, 1970-1990* (Oxford, 2016).

Smith, Tony. *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today* (Princeton, 2017).

Thompson, Michael G. *For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War* (Cornell, 2016).

Touray, Omar Alieu. *The African Union: The First Ten Years* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

Vitalis, Robert. *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Cornell, 2016).

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
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Yaqub, Salim. *Imperfect Strangers: American, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (Cornell, 2016).

Passport invites members of SHAFR to submit brief proposals for potential historiographical articles, pedagogical essays, and commentary/opinion pieces for the “Last Word” column. Proposals should be sent to Andrew_Johns@byu.edu.

Passport



In Memoriam: Alexander DeConde

On May 28, 2016, Alexander DeConde died at his home in Goleta, CA, at the age of ninety-five. DeConde was a highly prolific, acclaimed, and influential historian of U.S. foreign relations and one of a tiny handful of individuals who could truly claim to have founded SHAFR. His reach, however, extended well beyond those realms.

DeConde was born in November 1920 in Utica, NY, and raised from early childhood in California's San Francisco Bay Area. He earned his bachelor's degree from San Francisco State College in 1943 and served with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific during World War II. Following his discharge DeConde attended Stanford University, where he received both his MA and his PhD. In 1961, having taught at Whittier College (in Southern California), Duke University, and the University of Michigan, he joined the history faculty of the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he remained until his retirement in 1991.

Over his five-plus decades of active scholarship, DeConde wrote or edited around twenty books, most of them in the general area of U.S. diplomatic history. His monographs tackled an extraordinary range of subjects, from the Quasi-War with France, to Herbert Hoover's policies toward Latin America, to U.S. relations with Italy, to the role of race and ethnicity in shaping U.S. foreign policy, to "presidential machismo" in the conduct of foreign affairs. DeConde's last monograph, *Gun Violence in America*, published in 2001, moved squarely into the domestic sphere, providing deep historical grounding for a debate that was to grow far more pressing in subsequent years. Altogether, his writings featured an appealing combination of rigor and meticulousness on the one hand and boldness, restlessness, and ceaseless curiosity on the other. DeConde approached each research undertaking with such erudition and authority that it seemed to be his life's work, yet he was ever ready to move on to the next project.

In his own understated way, this historian born during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson kept abreast of, and in some cases anticipated, cutting-edge movements in his profession. *Presidential Machismo*, published in 2000, resonated with gender-based interpretations then taking hold in U.S. foreign-relations scholarship. His 1992 book *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy* insisted on treating Anglo-Americans as a distinct ethnic group and thus foreshadowed the "whiteness" studies of a decade or two later. In these instances, as in all others, DeConde wrote with precision and clarity, avoiding the jargon and impenetrable prose that have too often impeded a broader understanding of novel and challenging scholarly approaches.

When it came to SHAFR, DeConde was not merely present at the creation; he was one of the main creators. In the mid-1960s, DeConde and Joseph P. O'Grady of LaSalle College (in Philadelphia) began polling colleagues around the country on the desirability of a society for U.S. diplomatic historians. Encouraged by the response, they and David M. Pletcher of Indiana University formed themselves into



an organizing committee, which invited interested scholars to an inaugural meeting held at the convention of the Organization of American Historians in Chicago in April 1967. There, SHAFR was born. DeConde served as the Society's second president and remained actively involved for the rest of his career. In 1988, he was the first recipient of SHAFR's Norman and Laura Graebner Award for lifetime achievement.

Among his many contributions to SHAFR, DeConde was instrumental in establishing the various Bernath Prizes within the Society. Stuart L. Bernath was a talented young scholar who in 1968 earned his PhD at UC Santa Barbara under DeConde's supervision, only to die of bone cancer two years later. Learning

that Bernath's parents wished to create a scholarly prize in his memory, DeConde persuaded them to do so under SHAFR's auspices. He and other SHAFR members worked with the Bernaths to endow several Stuart L. Bernath prizes to recognize the accomplishments of up-and-coming scholars of foreign relations. Two Myrna F. Bernath awards, named for Stuart's mother following her death, were later established to recognize and promote outstanding foreign-relations scholarship by women.

DeConde's intellectual contributions and leadership qualities were noted throughout the historical profession and the world of scholarship. Over the course of his career, DeConde received Fulbright, Guggenheim, Social Science Research Council, and American Philosophical Society research awards. He served as vice president and president of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association and was active in many other scholarly organizations.

DeConde's writings and his service to SHAFR and similar associations have powerfully influenced two or three generations of students and scholars. Less widely known are his contributions to the study of history at UC Santa Barbara, his academic home for most of his career. When DeConde arrived at UCSB in 1961, its history department trained students only up to the master's level, though the UC system had recently authorized the creation of a history PhD program. Because DeConde had experience with doctoral programs elsewhere, he played a key role in designing, implementing, and guiding this expansion, especially in 1964-1967, when he chaired the UCSB history department. The history faculty grew extremely rapidly in these years, and DeConde and his colleagues attracted many world-class scholars to the university. The distinguished reputation that the UCSB history department currently enjoys is largely owing to DeConde's leadership a half-century ago.

Those who knew DeConde at UCSB—students and faculty alike—remember a dignified and exacting, yet also a modest and gracious figure who insisted on high standards, eschewed turf battles, gave credit to others, and led by quiet example. Neil York, who received his PhD from UCSB in 1978 and now teaches at Brigham Young University, did an orals field with DeConde. "I knew, as did

everyone who chose him," York recounts, "[that] there was no messing around. Do the work well and survive; slackers beware. Even so, as far as I know, he never humiliated students, never knowingly embarrassed anyone." Sears McGee, who has taught at UCSB since 1971, recalls "that despite his towering stature in his field, [DeConde] was the most diffident of men," one whose invariably incisive comments in department meetings were prefaced, equally invariably, by humble disavowals of expertise in the matter at hand.

DeConde is survived by his wife, Glace Baeza DeConde; by four sons from his first marriage to the late Jeanne Seeger Stoner; and by many grandchildren, great grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and in-laws. A celebration of his life was held on August 6, 2016, at the Rancho Embarcadero Community Center in Goleta.

—Salim Yaqub

Sources consulted: Obituary for Alexander DeConde, *Santa Barbara News-Press*, July 1-15, 2016, <http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/newspress/obituary.aspx?n=Alexander-Deconde&pid=180519107#sthash.Es46erEa.dpuf> (accessed July 13, 2016); "Santa Barbara Honors Alexander DeConde," *University Bulletin* (A Weekly Bulletin for the Staff of the University of California), July 18, 1966, 1-2; Alexander DeConde, "In at the Foundation," *Historia* (Newsletter of the UCSB History Associates) 24:2 (November 2010), 5; DeConde, "SHAFR's Birth: A Reflection," *Diplomatic History* 31:3 (June 2007), 365-7; Gary Hess, "SHAFR's Crucial Decade," *ibid.*, 407-8; Betty Miller Unterberger, "Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Organization and Growth of SHAFR," *ibid.*, 383, 385.

I am grateful to Hal Drake, Fred Logevall, Sears McGee, Kimber Quinney, and Neil York for sharing their reminiscences and reflections with me.

Note:

1. In 1970, Bernath's dissertation was published by the University of California Press as *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy*.

In Memoriam: Diane Shaver Clemens

I was greatly distressed when a former classmate informed me of the death of my major professor. Diane Shaver Clemens, professor emerita of U.S. diplomatic history at the University of California, Berkeley, died on May 18, 2016.

Clemens, who was an active member of SHAFR for many years, was best known for her groundbreaking 1970 book, *Yalta*.

Beyond scholarship, Clemens contributed to public life through her service on the State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. According to Professor Roger Louis of the University of Texas, the former committee chairman, “she was a dedicated and meticulous member of the committee.”

In addition, Clemens made the internet a livelier forum for diplomatic historians. She was an original member of the H-Diplo Editorial Board, where she remained for sixteen years. “She was always fully engaged with H-Diplo and with her advisory board duties, and wrote reviews for us when asked,” recalled Diane Labrosse, H-Diplo’s managing editor. “I always recall being thrilled when I saw the ‘athenal’ address in my inbox.” Of course, those who knew Clemens will never forget that “athenal” was the user name of her Berkeley e-mail address.

Born in Cincinnati, Ohio on September 5, 1936, Diane Shaver was the daughter of Gilbert Jerome Shaver and the former Elizabeth Schwab. Mr. Shaver was a prominent attorney in Wyoming, Ohio, and also served for a time in the Ohio House of Representatives. Young Diane graduated from Wyoming High School in 1954.

After earning B.A. and B.S. degrees at the University of Cincinnati in 1958, Diane remained at the institution as a Taft Teaching Fellow, completed her M.A. degree in 1960.

Eventually, she moved on to the University of California, Santa Barbara, where she commenced doctoral studies under the prominent diplomatic historian Alexander DeConde, who would participate in the founding of SHAFR, and serve as the organization’s second president in 1969.

By the time she completed her doctorate in 1966, Diane Shaver had become Diane Shaver Clemens, wife and mother. Her first husband, Walter Carl Clemens, is a prolific scholar of international relations. Iolani Clemens is their daughter.

Diane Shaver Clemens, now assistant professor of history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, based her book on her dissertation. In *Yalta*, Clemens argued that “the Big Three” of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had reached an agreement in February of 1945 that would have secured a peaceful world after World War II. Only the death of Roosevelt two months later prevented the realization of the Tripartite Agreements of the Yalta Conference.

“I set out to compare and contrast the positions, proposals, agreements, disagreements, and changes of positions of the leading diplomats at the Conference,” Clemens wrote. “I hoped

thereby to learn what really did and did not happen.”

Her careful research ensured that she succeeded in her mission.

Clemens dismissed the popular accusation that an ailing Roosevelt simply capitulated to a domineering Stalin: “No one can prove that Roosevelt’s health affected the results of the Yalta Conference, or that it did not... it is irrelevant whether Churchill was depressed or Roosevelt sick or Stalin overburdened. Only a critical evaluation of what these men decided and how they decided it can yield an objective judgment of Yalta.”

German reparations comprised a key element of the deal made by the Big Three. Adolf Hitler’s aggressive war

had devastated the Soviet Union, which was bearing the brunt of the fighting in the European theater. Therefore, the Allies would have required Germany to pay \$20 billion in reparations in kind, with \$10 billion going to the Soviet Union. Much of this wealth could have come from the western part of Germany. Besides compensating the victims of war, the reparations were intended to prevent the resurrection of German militarism.

Another important issue was Poland. After all, Nazi Germany had invaded the Soviet Union through Poland. The Soviets had an interest in ensuring that the Polish government would be a friendly one. At Yalta, the Big Three agreed to accept the pro-Soviet government that was already in place. This provisional body consisted of leaders who were known as the Lublin Poles. By way of concession, Stalin accepted the addition to the Warsaw regime of some members of the anti-Soviet Polish government-in-exile, the London Poles. Free elections would follow in due course. The Anglo-Americans had good reason to trust Stalin’s word. The Soviet leader had already allowed free elections in Austria and Finland. Furthermore, he pointed out to Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta, he had recognized General Charles de Gaulle as the leader of France, and the Frenchman had yet to stand for election.

Clemens regarded the Yalta Conference as an agreement among realists to maintain spheres of influence. The parties agreed that just as the Anglo-Americans had an interest in Western Europe, the Soviets had one in Eastern Europe.

After Vice President Harry S. Truman succeeded Roosevelt, the new president essentially reneged on the Yalta Agreements. The Truman administration rejected the Lublin government in Poland, and crucially, denied the Soviets any reparations from Germany’s western zone. As a result, a threatened and betrayed Stalin seized Eastern Europe with a newly dictatorial iron grip, and the Cold War commenced. “We are living with the problems of a world that did not benefit from the experience at Yalta,” Clemens concluded from the perspective of 1970. “It is perhaps relevant to ask what the world would have been like if the spirit of Yalta had triumphed.” It perhaps still is.

Yalta won Clemens a tenured position at Berkeley. In 1972, she moved to California with her daughter. As a professor at Berkeley, Clemens continued to reflect on the early origins



Left to right: Richard F. Allen, Lubna Qureshi, and Diane Clemens in May 2006

of the Cold War. Her criticism of Truman's inexperience and parochialism continued, as did her careful and meticulous reading of the evidence. When Truman had met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in late April 1945, the encounter had not gone well. The minutes stated that "the president said he desired the friendship of the Soviet government, but that he felt it could only be on the basis of mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one way street."

It is a popular legend that Truman told Molotov "to go to hell." For her 1992 article in *The International History Review*, Clemens consulted the notes of Charles Bohlen, a Truman adviser, for evidence of such a profane ejaculation. "This is not true," Clemens concluded:

Truman may have used the term 'one way street', as he had used the words to his advisers earlier in the day to show how tough he intended to be. It is also unlikely that there was an exchange between Molotov and Truman in which Molotov said 'I have never been talked to like that in my life' and Truman replied 'Carry out your agreements, and you won't get talked to like that'.

While Clemens's political orientation may have been on the left, she had an old-fashioned respect for the U.S. Constitution, and the original intent of its framers. In the 1978 edition of the *Encyclopedia American Foreign Policy*, which was edited by her former professor Alexander DeConde, Clemens published a remarkable essay on executive agreements.

Essentially, an executive agreement is an agreement made by the president with a foreign power, and without the ratification of the Senate: "The most sensitive policies, especially war and peace, are arranged and executed by the president through extraconstitutional means."

Clemens regarded executive agreements as largely a twentieth-century phenomenon, an unhealthy one that left the president with too much power in foreign policy. As admiring as she was of Franklin Roosevelt, she included him in her category of presidents who had overstepped their constitutional bounds. In 1933, Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union entirely on his own initiative. He also singlehandedly arranged the destroyer-for-bases agreement with Great Britain in 1940, in spite of our official policy of neutrality.

More ominously, executive agreements led the United States into war in Korea and Vietnam. Truman excluded the legislative branch from his decision to send troops to South Korea, claiming that his "constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief... repeatedly recognized by Congress and the courts" authorized him to do so. When pressed to provide a legal precedent for this argument, Truman said, "I haven't got it with me just now."

Washington's protracted engagement in Vietnam began with an executive agreement in 1950 that recognized the puppet regime of Emperor Bao Dai, and provided military aid to the emperor's puppeteers, the French. If the American war in Vietnam had its roots in the Truman administration, it lasted until nearly the very end of the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, who frequently claimed his right to act as commander-in-chief, too. "The development of executive agreements is intertwined with the ascendancy of presidential power," Clemens observed.

She provided a close reading of the Constitution to make a case that the president is not automatically commander-in-chief: "When and if Congress declares war, the president becomes commander-in-chief."

She notes the specific wording of the Constitution, that appoints the president "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the United States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." In the strictest legal sense, the armed forces can only be called into service when Congress declares war.

It is fascinating to reflect that presidents such as Truman, Nixon, and George W. Bush were never commander-in-chief, even at the height of war, because Congress had never declared war in those periods.

When I was her teaching assistant, Clemens took her study of the Constitution seriously enough to include a lesson on the subject in every undergraduate lecture course she taught.

Beyond the Constitution, the matter of multiculturalism engaged her pedagogical attention. I recall that she had little patience for the fixation of more conventional historians on dead white males. In reference to Arthur M. Schlesinger's Jr's *The Age of Jackson*, Clemens asked: "How can you write a book about Andrew Jackson without mentioning Indians?"

With her second husband, Dr. Richard F. Allen, Clemens published *The Forging of America, 1492-1904: A Cultural Diversity Reader* in 1992. Although they did not neglect mainstream historical figures, the textbook included the perspectives of Native Americans, African Americans, and Asian Americans. The couple created their own undergraduate course in multicultural U.S. history as well. Dr. Allen was an impressive figure in his own right. By training a specialist in Old Icelandic sagas, he became a self-taught expert in American history.

It is impossible to capture her personality in an essay, but her humor will always stay with me. On the morning of 9/11, she held class as usual. She mentioned that the university administration had decided to keep the campus open as a gesture of defiance against the terrorists. She thought that was just dandy: "They are standing up for their rights with our lives!"

Clemens, one of the gentlest people I have ever known, was ferociously protective of her graduate students. She was a lioness, and I was her cub. When I first came to Berkeley, she drafted me to serve as a teaching assistant for her first-semester course on U.S. diplomatic history. I found dealing with the undergraduates to be very intimidating because I was very green. Even worse, a few of the undergraduates did not enjoy dealing with me, either. One student, in collusion with some of his classmates, addressed an e-mail to the entire class shortly before the final to complain that my grading was too harsh. I was so mortified that I did not even want to show up for the examination.

At the final, I returned graded term papers as the students handed in their exams. Clemens asked to see the term paper of my leading critic. I had given him a B-. She wrote on his paper: "I would have given you a D. Diane Shaver Clemens."

Clemens is survived by her daughter, three grandchildren, two great-grandchildren, two stepchildren, and four step-grandchildren. Dr. Allen, her second husband, passed away in 2014.

Lubna Qureshi

The Last Word: The New Ringleader

Amy Sayward

In September 1991, Peter Hahn and I both started at Ohio State—he as a professor new to the university, while I was a new graduate student in the diplomatic history program there. Ever since he has played a key mentoring role in my developing career. As a graduate student he provided much appreciated critiques whenever the organization or flow of my writing veered off course, and he insisted that I give my “job talk” to him and a handful of others before leaving for my on-campus visit at Middle Tennessee State University.

Although I didn’t land at a Research-I university, he always encouraged me to continue my scholarship and writing, and he and others helped me to stay engaged in SHAFR—serving on prize committees, working on the SHAFR Roster, reviewing my first book in *Passport*, and serving on the *Diplomatic History* editorial board. As a result, the annual conferences became a bit like a reunion each year for me—a time when I saw my friends but also got to meet new colleagues, forge new professional connections, and get feedback on my ideas; I also felt increasingly old as graduate students started presenting research on things I remembered.

I was truly pleased when I heard that Peter had succeeded Allan Spetter as SHAFR’s Executive Director, because I knew he would do a great job. Council’s wise decision rather quickly bore fruit, as *Diplomatic History* became a source of significant income wisely invested along with the Bernath funds. Soon the organization was shifting from dorm rooms and overtaxed local arrangements folks (especially in DC) to hotel conferences that still looked out for graduate students’ tight financial situations. Like everyone else in SHAFR, I noticed and appreciated the changes.

But I didn’t truly appreciate how much SHAFR had grown under Peter’s direction when I was approached about applying to succeed him at last year’s conference. Although my very first thought was to consider if I had time to do the job justice, I didn’t realize just how many aspects there were to this new position even by the end



Peter Hahn and Amy Sayward as they moved SHAFR’s records from Ohio to Tennessee.

of 2015. Fortunately, I love learning new things—although learning Quick Books and accounting principles hasn’t been the most fun I’ve ever had. Working to keep the committees and the website up-to-date; paying editors, dissertation completion fellows, and Global Scholars among others; thanking the donors to the Leaders’ Fund and Council members cycling off; putting together financial reports and Council agendas; printing certificates for our many graduate-student award winners; helping with upcoming conferences; and thinking about the future—all that and more is part of the job.

Since August, I have felt very much like a brand new ringmaster who had been coming to the circus for many years, who watched the ringmaster and appreciated how smoothly the circus went, and who imagined that I too could someday be a ringmaster. Although I never thought it would be easy or simple, I also have a much deeper appreciation now for how much Peter managed to make work together seemingly

without the strenuous effort that has sometimes marked my late-night accounting efforts. But if I follow the ringmaster analogy, it also seems like all the key performers have also been looking out for me. Tim Borsfelmann and David Engerman have showed great kindness and patience as the first SHAFR Presidents in more than a decade to have more institutional wisdom than the Executive Director they served with—as have the webmaster, the members of Council and of SHAFR’s various committees, and countless others.

While the “Last Word” sometimes has a critical or challenging tone, my “Last Word”—which is really my first word to the membership of SHAFR as a whole—is one of appreciation for all the hard work that has gone into making this such a wonderful organization and a pledge that I will always do my best to carry on the work in a manner that will honor my predecessor and the organization. If you ever have a question, a concern, or an inspiration about SHAFR that you’d like to share, you can reach me at Amy.Sayward@shaf.org.

PASSPORT
Mershon Center
for International Security Studies
The Ohio State University
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
passport@shafr.org

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