PASSPORT



THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW

Volume 55, No. 2 September 2024

Inside....

SHAFR Collaborations with Other Organizations

Teaching the Bomb

Elizabeth Morrison and the UN 1945

and more!

Passport
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review

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Contributors
Passport **55/2 (September 2024)**

Kristin L. Ahlberg recently retired as Assistant General Editor, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, after 21 years of federal service. She worked on over 80 *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes as a technical editor, compiler, and reviewer. Lloyd Ambrosius was Kristin's adviser for both her M.A. (1999) and Ph.D. (2003) degrees in history at the University of Nebraska. Her book, *Cultivating Compassion: Human Rights, World Hunger, and the Carter Administration*, is under contract with the University Press of Kansas with an anticipated publication date of 2026. She currently serves on SHAFR's Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize Committee, as well as on committees for the National Council on Public History, Organization of American Historians, Society for History in the Federal Government, and Western History Association. Kristin is also a book review editor for *Agricultural History.*

Shaun Armstead is a historian of twentieth-century Black women's internationalism. She earned her Ph.D. in history from Rutgers University-New Brunswick. Her work considers the affective and interpersonal dimensions of the National Council of Negro Women's Afro-Asian and Pan-African solidarities. She is spending the 2023-2024 academic year in residence at Brown University as a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Department of Africana Studies. She will then join the Department of History at University of California, Santa Barbara as Assistant Professor of History beginning July 2024.

Steven J. Brady is Associate Professor of History and Director of Undergraduate Studies and Advising at The George Washington University. He is the author of *Chained to History: Slavery and U.S. Foreign Relations to 1865* (2022) and *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953-1960* (2009). His current research project is "Less than Victory: American Catholics and the Vietnam War."

Susan A. Brewer is the co-editor with Richard H. Immerman and Douglas Little of *Thinking Otherwise: How Walter LaFeber Explained the History of U.S. Foreign Relations* (2024) and the author of *The Best Land: Four Centuries of Love and Betrayal on Oneida Territory* (2024) and *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq* (2009).

Robert K. Brigham is Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations at Vassar College, where he is also Faculty Director of Vassar's Institute for the Liberal Arts. He is the author of ten books including *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam* (2018) and *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* (2006). In 2023, he received SHAFR's Peter L. Hahn Distinguished Service Award.

Jessica Chapman is Professor of History at Williams College. She is the author of *Remaking the World: Decolonization and the Cold War* (2023) and *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam* (2013). She is currently working on an international history of Kenyan runners, part of which appears as "Running to School: U.S.-Kenyan Athletic Pipelines in the 1970s," *Diplomatic History* 48:1 (January 2024): 2047.

Daniel Chardell is Henry Chauncey '57 Postdoctoral Fellow at Yale University's Jackson School of Global Affairs. He received his Ph.D. in History from Harvard University in 2023. Drawing on English and Arabic-language sources, he is currently writing the first archivally-based international history of the Gulf War of 1991.

Lori Clune is Professor of History and Graduate Coordinator at California State University, Fresno. She is the author of *Executing the Rosenbergs: Death and Diplomacy in a Cold War World* (2016), which was recently highlighted in Netflix's *Turning Point, Season Two: The Bomb and the Cold War* (2024). Her current research concerns a history of video games in the United States.

Frank Costigliola is Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. His publications include *Kennan: A Life Between Worlds* (2023); *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (2012), which received SHAFR's Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize; and, as editor, *The Kennan Diaries* (2014), which received SHAFR's Link-Kuehl Prize. A past president of SHAFR, he received SHAFR's Norman and Laura Graebner Award for lifetime achievement in 2022.

Nicholas Cull is Professor of Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California's Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. Originally from Britain, he is a historian of the role of culture and communication in international relations. He is past president of the International Association for Media and History. His many publications include most recently, *Reputational Security: Refocusing Public Diplomacy for a Dangerous World* (2024).

Carolyn Eisenberg is Professor of U.S. History and American Foreign Policy at Hofstra University. Her book, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49* (1996), was awarded the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from SHAFR; the Herbert Hoover Library Prize; and was a finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize. Her most recent book, *Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Wars in Southeast Asia* (2023), received the Bancroft Prize. She serves on the board of Historians for Peace and Democracy.

Jessica Gienow-Hecht is Chair of the Department of History in the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. She is the author of two monographs, including *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920* (2009, 2012); the (co-)editor of seven books and the series *Explorations in Culture and International History* (since 2003); and is currently working on a volume tentatively titled *Der stolze Staat: Macht und Identität – wie Nationen ihr Selbstbild verkaufen*. (*The Proud State: Power and Identity — How Nations sell their Image*).

Kathryn Allamong Jacob is an associate of Harvard University's Department of History and the former Johanna-Maria Fraenkel Curator of Manuscripts at the Schlesinger Library at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University. She is the author of *Capital Elites: High Society in Washington, D.C. After the Civil War* (1994); *Testament to Union: Civil War Monuments in Washington, D.C.* (1998); and *King of the Lobby: The Life and Times of Sam Ward* (2010). Morrison Hunter's diary is among the first she read for her ongoing project to describe in depth the diaries and diarists in the Schlesinger Library's collections.

Andrew L. Johns is Professor of History at Brigham Young University and the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, and a Faculty Fellow in Constitutional Government at the Wheatley Institute. He is the author and editor of six books including, most recently, *The Price of Loyalty: Hubert Humphrey's Vietnam Conflict* (2020); the general editor of the Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy and Peace book series, published by the University of Notre Dame Press; and the editor of *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* since 2011. He is past president of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association.

Autumn Lass is Associate Professor of History at Wayland Baptist University. She teaches courses in US Foreign Relations and Public Diplomacy. She is currently researching women's role in crafting public diplomacy and propaganda for the State Department during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

Hang Le-Tormala teaches U.S. History at Haskell Indian Nations University in Lawrence, Kansas. She is the author of *Postwar Journeys: American and Vietnamese Transnational Peace Efforts since 1975* (2021).

Kyle Longley is Henry Salvatori Professor of American Values and Traditions and Professor of History at Chapman University, where he also serves as the Director of the M.A. program in War, Diplomacy, and Society. He is the author of nine books including *Senator Albert Gore, Sr.: Tennessee Maverick* (2004) and *LBJ's 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America's Year of Upheaval* (2018). A past president of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, he currently serves as the Executive Director of the Society for Military History.

Matthew Masur is Professor of History at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, New Hampshire, where he teaches courses on American foreign relations, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and modern East Asia. He is the editor of *Understanding and Teaching the Cold War* (2017) and coeditor of *Understanding and Teaching the Vietnam War* (2013). He has published articles and essays in *Diplomatic History*, *North Dakota Quarterly*, and *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review.*

Connor Naylor is a Ph.D. student at Binghamton University. He holds a master's degree in history from California State University, Fresno, where his research concerned historical memory and the 1780 British Siege of Charleston, South Carolina. The resulting thesis, under the guidance of Dr. Brad Jones, was awarded Outstanding Thesis for the College of Social Sciences in May 2024.

Jason C. Parker is Professor of History at Texas A&M University. He is the author of *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1938-1962* (2008), which received SHAFR's Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize; and *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (2016).

R. Joseph Parrott is Assistant Professor of Diplomatic and Transnational History at The Ohio State University. Interested in the intersection of U.S. foreign affairs, decolonization, and transnational ideologies, his forthcoming book, *Grassroots Diplomacy: How African Liberation Mobilized New Left Internationalism*, considers how Portuguese African freedom movements helped transform western engagement with the Global South. He is the coeditor of *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War* (2022).

Elisabeth Piller is Assistant Professor of Transatlantic and North American History at the University of Freiburg. She works on U.S. and European foreign policy and transatlantic relations in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Her publications include *Selling Weimar. German Public Diplomacy and the United States, 1918-1933* (2021), as well as articles in *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of Contemporary History*, and the *English Historical Review.* She is currently finishing her second book, examining U.S. humanitarian aid to Europe and the difficult renegotiation of transatlantic power during and after World War II.

Sandra Scanlon is Lecturer in American History at University College Dublin. She is the author of *The ProWar Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern American Conservatism* (2013). She has been a Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Associate Professor at the Department of History at Emory University, and is currently examining popular responses to the Iraq War.

Giles Scott-Smith is Professor of Transnational Relations and New Diplomatic History at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. He is one of the organisers of the New Diplomatic History network (www.newdiplomatichistory.org) and founding editor of *Diplomatica: A Journal of Diplomacy and Society*. His most recent publications include (with Bram Boxhoorn) *The Transatlantic Era in Documents and Speeches 1989-2020* (2021) and (with Gaetano di Tommaso and Dario Fazzi) *Public Health and the American State* (2024).

From the Chancery: Final Thoughts

Andrew L. Johns

One last time, with apologies to (the now retired) sportswriter Peter King as per usual.

1. I think that on 3 March 2024, I submitted my resignation as *Passport* editor to SHAFR president Mitch Lerner (who is also my predecessor as editor...a little serendipity), effective as of 31 January 2025.

2. I think that I remember the first time the notion of editing *Passport* came up. Mitch Lerner came and spoke at the Kennedy Center for International Studies at BYU in January 2011 and gave a terrific lecture. Afterwards, at lunch at a hilariously mediocre Thai restaurant, Mitch mentioned that he was planning to step down as editor and wondered if I had any suggestions for a replacement. We talked about several possibilities, and then I said that I might be interested in being considered. The rest, as they say, is history.

3. I think that the list of people who I need to thank for their contributions to *Passport* over the past fourteen years is longer than I have for this column...but I would be remiss and exceptionally ungrateful if I did not mention Julie Rojewski, our production editor who has now endured and outlasted both Mitch's and my tenure as editor; Allison Roth, our longtime copyeditor who retired in December 2023; Vaneesa Cook, who took over as copyeditor and has been just terrific; my assistant editors David Hadley, Zeb Larson, Brionna Mendoza, and Addie Jensen, each of whom has made my job easier (and congrats to Addie for defending her dissertation in June 2024 and starting her tenure-track job at Montana State this fall); the scores of authors who have graciously participated in roundtable reviews on their books, the presses that provided review copies of books; and the hundreds of SHAFR members and other scholars who have written reviews and essays for *Passport* over the years. On that last point, the support that I have received from most SHAFR members has been gratifying and has made *Passport* that much better. I will miss those interactions tremendously and genuinely hope that SHAFR will support my successor even more vigorously.

4. I think that the field of U.S. foreign relations has experienced significant centrifugal forces over the past several decades. That has produced some excellent scholarship (e.g. internationalization, greater breadth and depth of topics , recognizing more complex and diffuse influences on the making and implementation of policy) and has also led in some questionable directions (e.g. decentering the role and influence of the United States to a nearly ahistorical degree, a disdain bordering on marginalization for "traditional" diplomatic and political history and historians). But it strikes me that a little centripetal force might not be the worst thing to try and bring the scattered and disparate elements of our field back into closer contact. To be sure, the expansion of the field is largely a good thing, but at times the eclectic nature of the conference program can make it seem like we are a hundred smaller subfields lacking much in the way of connective tissue, and conversations among those distinct groups seem to happen only infrequently. We tend to get siloed into our specialties and few of us look at the 30,000 foot view in the way that Walter LaFeber, Thomas Bailey, or George Herring were able to do. Honestly, I am not sure how to make that a reality–the "Seven Questions on..." column in *Passport* attempts to generate interest in those directions–but it is certainly a goal worth pursuing.

5. I think that academia is mired in a number of competing existential crises at the moment, each of which has the potential to cause unprecedented chaos, controversy, and calamity in our profession. Political interference from state legislatures on both sides of the ideological spectrum, declining (vanishing?) job prospects, a lack of understanding (both within and beyond the academy) of what "academic freedom" actually should mean, and severe economic challenges are only a few of these concerns. Not the least of the problems, however, is the inability of some arrogant academics to accept ideas, beliefs, or people who fall outside of their myopic ideological and experiential spectrum... or to accept the fact that their perspective on the world may not, in fact, be the correct one. As Socrates (and, of course, Bill and Ted) observed, "The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." Recognize that a Ph.D. does not convey omniscience. A little humility can go a long way.

6. I think that the decision by MIT and other universities to end the practice of requiring diversity statements as part of applications for faculty positions is an excellent development in the on-going struggle to protect free expression in the academy. Diversity statements are compelled speech that act as a *de facto* litmus test, tend to enforce and encourage ideological homogeneity, and pose a direct threat to academic freedom. I also think that SHAFR's conference presentation proposal system should remove even an optional diversity statement from the process for the same reasons.

7. I think that, along the same lines, the decision by Harvard and other universities to end the practice of issuing statements on political, social, and other public issues and adopting institutional neutrality is outstanding and long overdue. I have advocated restraint on this point for years, not only for departments and universities, but also for professional organizations in academia (particularly for SHAFR). Even a supermajority vote by an organization does not represent everyone's perspective; people can express themselves individually with exceptional ease in other venues with the proliferation of social media platforms and the internet.

8. I think that SHAFR's decision to move the annual conference back to the end of June–when it was held traditionally until a couple of years ago–is a good one. Not only does the earlier weekend conflict with Father's Day and the final round of the U.S. Open, but anyone teaching on the quarter system (many of the universities on the west coast, for example) found themselves unable to attend the conference the past several years due to the conflict with finals or graduation.

9. I think that I have enjoyed about 98.3% of the past fourteen years as editor of *Passport*.

10 I think that the temptation to emulate Michael Corleone at the end of *The Godfather* by settling all my accounts (rhetorically, not with Rocco Lampone)–naming names and providing details relating to that other 1.7%–in this column is nearly irresistible.

Moreover,

I could go on, but I will restrain myself. To quote Jimmy in *8 Mile*, however, "Don't ever try to judge me dude. You don't know what...I've been through."

11. I think that discretion being the better part of valor, with a strange sense of solidarity with the classification regime at State, the CIA, et. al, and in keeping with the advice I have gotten from people I trust and respect, I have reluctantly redacted most of my previous comment. As Tyrion Lannister said, "Sometimes nothing is the hardest thing to do."

12. I think that the cost of travel and accommodations at the Toronto conference demonstrates pretty convincingly that a European-based SHAFR conference is a bad idea. In theory, sure–let's go to London or Berlin or Madrid or Sydney or (as Tom Zeiler advocated for years) Havana. In reality, though, few graduate students, contingent faculty, or even tenure-track faculty without endowed chairs or lacking robust research accounts have access to the thousands of dollars of travel funds that would be required to attend a conference at these destinations. Plus, the costs to the organization itself would be significant and prohibitive, which is highly problematic given the current state of SHAFR finances–I mean, we may not be back at the Renaissance in Arlington after 2025 due to rising expenses. Other options–like SHAFR-sponsored panels at European (or Asian or South American) conferences–make far more financial sense, particularly given the economic factors at play for the organization and for its members. But let's definitely think about going back to the west coast before too long; SHAFR has only been west of the Mississippi River three times in nearly fifty years. I hear Vegas is nice...

13. I think that Mitch Lerner's tenure as president of SHAFR was outrageously successful in the face of serious economic obstacles and major organizational turnover and personnel changes. And that SHAFR-themed Hawaiian shirt he procured for his presidential address? Priceless.

14. I think that I say this a lot, but one more time for those in the back not paying attention: SHAFR needs to do anything and everything that it can to resurrect the Summer Institute program... wait, what was that? We found a way to bring the Summer Institute back? That is the best news I have heard since I found out that the 2025 PCB-AHA conference will be in Las Vegas. Seriously, this is an outstanding development, one that will benefit not only the participants in future Summer Institutes but also SHAFR as an organization. Good luck to Michael Brenes and Alvita Akiboh in 2025–let's hope that this will be the beginning of a long and uninterrupted run of successful Institutes.

15. I think that SHAFR's creation of the Walter LaFeber-Molly Wood Distinguished Teaching Award is an outstanding decision, and I am proud to have played a small part in making that a reality. I only met Walt a couple of times at conferences, although he gave probably the best lecture I have ever heard back in 2006: an hour-long *tour de force* in his home state of Indiana that synthesized about 250 years of the history of U.S. foreign relations seamlessly, expertly, and without a single note in sight or syllable out of place. Simply astonishing. His influence on the field–not only with his scholarship but also in terms of his legacy with scores of graduate students he advised and thousands of Cornell undergraduates he exposed to his perspectives on the past in his courses–is nearly incalculable. But I am beyond thrilled that Molly Wood (an alum of the first Summer Institute in 2008) has been recognized for her unending, tireless, and unselfish devotion to teaching during her career at Wittenberg University (much of the time in the face of nearly insurmountable odds due to adverse circumstances); as a long-time member of–and one of the driving forces behind–SHAFR's Teaching Committee; and as the inaugural teaching-centered member of Council. Molly truly cares about her students, about her colleagues, and about furthering SHAFR's mission to teach the history of U.S. foreign relations (something which is too often overlooked by members focusing primarily on scholarship), and I am thrilled that the organization can honor her commitment in this way. You should go donate to the (tax deductible) prize fund.

16. I think that Richard Immerman will do an excellent job as SHAFR's new Executive Director. His experience with the organization is nearly unrivaled, and he will be an important voice advising Council and guiding the organization as SHAFR navigates the perilous financial, cultural, professional, and political challenges that it is facing currently and will certainly encounter over the next several years.

17. I think that whoever replaces me as *Passport* editor will do a terrific job. SHAFR has scores (if not hundreds) of talented, creative, and intelligent members who would thrive in this position, and my successor will probably turn my tenure as editor into a distant and forgotten memory with their insights and innovations. I look forward to seeing how *Passport* evolves in the coming years.

18. I think that I need to publicly thank a number of people in SHAFR for their support and encouragement over the past two decades. As I wrote over five years ago in this column, most of my closest friends are members of the organization (and I'm still not sure what that says about my lack of a life the other eleven months and three weeks of the year), and the sense of camaraderie and friendship that permeates and transcends the Renaissance and other conference sites is overwhelming. In no particular order and with apologies for anyone I have left out (there are definitely scores of people in that category), my heartfelt gratitude to David Anderson, Lori Clune, Tom Schwartz, Brian Etheridge, Molly Wood, Kimber Quinney, Jason Parker, Jeremi Suri, Marc Selverstone, Kelly McFarland, Heather Dichter, Kelly Shannon, Mitch Lerner, David Schmitz, Ken Osgood, Andrew Preston, Kara Vuic, Bill Miscamble, Chester Pach, Kyle Longley, the late George Herring, and Kathryn Statler. The extremely short list of people on the diametrically opposite side of the spectrum is addressed above in #10.

19. I think that I will miss being as deeply involved with SHAFR as I have been for the past two decades, but I am leaving on my own terms. Neil Gaiman wrote, "What do I do now? I don't know. Fade away, perhaps." That about sums it up. I wish the organization and its members continued success going forward.

20. I think that's it. I'm out.

Attention SHAFR Members

"Elections belong to the people. It's their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters."
Abraham Lincoln

The 2024 SHAFR election is upon us. As is traditional, *Passport* is publishing copies of the candidates' biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president, as well as biographies for the candidates for Council and the Nominating Committee, as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the candidates and vote in this year's elections. Additional information, including brief CVs for each candidate, will be available on the electronic ballot.

Passport would like to remind each member of SHAFR that voting for the 2024 election will begin in early August and will close on **September 30, 2024**. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Julia Irwin (jirwin7@lsu.edu), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

"We do not have government by the majority. We have government by the majority who participate."
Thomas Jefferson

"The exercise of the elective franchise is a social duty of as solemn a nature as [a person] can be called to perform."
Daniel Webster

Passport urges each member of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization's self-governance this year. As we know, elections have consequences.

2024 SHAFR Election Candidates

President	**Melani McAlister**, George Washington University
Vice President/President-Elect	**Jay Sexton**, Institute on Constitutional Democracy, University of Missouri **Kathryn Statler,** University of San Diego
Council (At-Large)	**Elisabeth Leake,** The Fletcher School, Tufts University **Mario del Pero,** Institut d'études politiques, Sciences Po–Paris
Council (At-Large)	**Maurice Jr. Labelle,** University of Saskatchewan **Kaeten Mistry,** University of East Anglia
Council (Teaching)	**Brian Etheridge**, Kennesaw State University **Paul Rubinson,** Bridgewater State University
Council (Graduate Student)	**Alex Southgate,** Temple University **Zachary Tayler,** Ohio University
Nominating Committee	**Marc Palen,** University of Exeter **Karine Walther,** Georgetown University–Qatar

Proposed By-Laws Amendment #1:

Council voted unanimously to eliminate gendered language in the SHAFR By-Laws, which requires amendments to Article II, Section 5(f); Article III, Sections 1 and 3.

Do you approve of this amendment?

Yes No

(This version shows the changes that would be made; additions are shown in italics and in blue)

Article II, Section 5(f): If a SHAFR member is nominated and placed on the ballot, but fails to win election, ~~he or she~~ *that member* shall wait one year before being nominated again for the same or a different office.

Article III, Section 1: The President shall supervise the work of all committees, formulate policies for presentation to the Council, and execute its decisions. ~~He or she~~ *The President* shall appoint the members of the Program Committee and of special committees, commissions, and boards. ~~He or she~~ *The President* shall sign all documents requiring official certification. The President shall be *ex officio* a member of the Council and shall preside at all Membership and Council meetings at which ~~he or she~~ *the President* is present.

Article III, Section 3: The Executive Director shall have charge of all Society correspondence, and shall give notice of all Council meetings. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall keep accurate minutes of all such meetings, using recording devices when deemed necessary. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall keep an accurate and up to date roll of the members of the Society in good standing and shall issue a notification of membership to each new member. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall see that the By Laws are printed periodically in the newsletter. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall submit all mail ballots to the membership and shall tabulate the results. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall retain those ballots, for possible inspection, for a period of one month. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall give instructions of the Council to the new members of committees when necessary. Under the direction of the Council, ~~he or she~~ *the Executive Director* shall manage all funds and securities in the name of the Society. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall submit bills for dues to the members and deliver an itemized financial report annually to the membership. ~~He or she~~ *The Executive Director* shall have custody of all records and documents pertaining to the Society and be responsible for their preservation, and shall prepare an annual budget for approval by the Council. The Executive Director shall be ex officio a member of the Council, but without vote.

Proposed By-Laws Amendment #2:

Council voted unanimously to amend Article V, Section 1, to require an international member of the Nominating Committee and to eliminate outdated information.

Do you approve of this amendment?

Yes No

(This version shows the changes that would be made; additions are shown in italics and in blue)

ARTICLE V: COMMITTEES
Section 1 The Nominating Committee shall consist of three members in good standing who hold no other office in the Society and shall be elected for a term of three years, ~~except that members of the first Nominating Committee shall be appointed by the President to terms of one, two, and three years, respectively.~~ The Chair shall be held by the member with the longest years of service, except that when two or more members have equal length of service the President shall designate which of them shall serve as Chair. If a post on the Nominating Committee becomes vacant through death, resignation, or ineligibility through acceptance of an office in the Society, the President shall appoint a member to fill the post until the next annual election, when a replacement shall be chosen for the unexpired term. *Additionally, at least one member of the Committee shall reside outside of the United States (at time of election), thereby requiring the Nominating Committee to put forth a pair of qualifying Nominating Committee candidates if necessary to meet this minimum number.*

2024 SHAFR Election Biographies and Candidate Statements

PRESIDENT

Melani McAlister: is Professor of American Studies and International Affairs at George Washington University. She is the vice-president of SHAFR, where she has served on many committees over the last two decades, including as program cochair, Ways and Means, and the Bernath article prize committee, as well as on the board of *Diplomatic History*.

McAlister is author of the forthcoming book, *Promises, Then The Storm: Notes on Memory, Protest, and the Israel-Gaza War* (London, MACK, Oct. 2024), as well as *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (2018, 2nd ed. 2022), and *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945* (rev. ed. 2005, orig. 2001). She is the coeditor of three collections, including *The Cambridge History of America and the World, vol. 4* (2021). McAlister is currently working on a project that explores the circulation of Third World music and literature in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, tentatively titled: "The Art of Solidarity: The US Market for Third World Culture in the Late Cold War."

She has published broadly in both academic and general interest outlets, and serves on the board of *American Historical Review*, *American Quarterly*, and *Modern American History*. She is a Treasurer and a member of the Board of Directors of the American Council of Learned Societies.

We are once again at a time of reckoning for the role of the US in the world. The war in Gaza, the rapid escalation of the climate catastrophe, and the threats of antidemocratic forces around the world mean that our work is more important than ever. This is a time for SHAFR historians to make our voices heard: to grow our organization, increase our public profile, and speak forcefully about the relevance of our field.

SHAFR has been my primary intellectual home for more than two decades, and I have consistently attended our conferences and meetings, where I worked alongside many others to expand the definition of who and what is part of "US in the World," while not leaving behind traditional scholarship in diplomatic history. Expanding the diversity of our scholarly approaches is intimately linked to the increasing diversity of our membership, in terms of race, age, gender, and sexuality.

If elected, I will support increased attention to issues such as the environment, racial capitalism, global health, and technology, as well as more resources for graduate students, BIPOC historians, and scholars from outside the US. Internationalizing SHAFR is particularly important now: just as our work is increasing transnational, multilingual, and interdisciplinary, our membership is increasingly global, bringing a range of valuable perspectives to the study of the US in the World. I will work hard to continue the push, already well underway, to make SHAFR a big tent for a broad range of scholars and scholarship.

VICE PRESIDENT/PRESIDENT-ELECT

Jay Sexton: My research revisits nineteenth-century foreign relations, contending that this period should not be seen as the runway to post-1945 dominion, but rather as its own era of contested and contingent imperial formation. I am particularly interested in uncovering the entangled relationship between the global empire projects of Britain and the U.S.

I have authored/coedited seven books, including *Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era* (2005); *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (2011); and, *A Nation Forged by Crisis: A New American History* (2018). I'm a champion of academic collaboration. The highlights of my career so far have been the collaborative books co-edited with, respectively, Richard Carwardine, Ian Tyrell, and Kristin Hoganson (two books!). With Sarah Snyder, I'm founding co-editor of Columbia University Press's "Global America" book series, which now has 20 titles in production.

The first two decades of my career unfolded in Oxford, where I earned my PhD and ultimately worked my way up to Director of Oxford's Rothermere American Institute, the largest center for the study of the U.S. outside of North America. In 2016 I returned to my native Midwest as Chair (and now Director) of Missouri's Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy. At Missouri I have fundraised to establish an MA program in Atlantic History, as well as student programs in Oxford, Cape Town, and DC. My involvement in SHAFR includes conference cochair, *DH* editorial board, and Bernath Lecture committee/chair.

The strength of SHAFR lies in its intellectual dynamism and pluralism. Annual conferences and the pages of *Diplomatic History* are sites of robust exchange. It is refreshing for an organization to embrace real debate, especially when that involves both speaking and listening (never underestimate the latter!). Thanks to the commitment of members and organization leadership over many years, SHAFR has become more diverse in demographic, as well as intellectual, regards, though work remains on this front.

The main job of future SHAFR leadership is to keep up this momentum, while growing the organization's membership and annual conference. The key is collaboration with the well-functioning governance structures of council and the organization's many committees. As I have throughout my career, as part of SHAFR leadership I would work with colleagues in an open and constructive manner. I'd hope we all would have fun, as well.

There are specific opportunities to be had for SHAFR in 2026 (the year in which the scholar appointed in this cycle will serve as president is the year of the U.S. semi-quincentennial). Critical consideration of the U.S. at 250 is not the exclusive domain of organizations devoted to early America. I would platform SHAFR members during the semi-quincetennial, centering in scholarly and public discussions the legacy of the United States in global context. This is an opportunity to expand our ranks and (finally!) entrench pre-1900 scholarship within our organization.

Kathryn Statler: I am Professor of History at the University of San Diego, where I have taught for twenty-five years. My publications include *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (2007); *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (2006; coedited with Andrew Johns); and, most recently, "Death Grip Handshakes and Flattery Diplomacy: The Macron-Trump Connection and Its Greater Implications for Alliance Politics," in *The Liberal Order Strikes Back?: Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and the Future of International Politics* (2023). My current research project is *Lafayette's Ghost: How Women and War Kept the Franco-American Alliance Alive for 250 Years*, which examines the importance of cultural diplomacy in alliance formation and preservation.

I have been a member of SHAFR since 1993 and presented my first paper in 1996. I have served in elected (Council and Nominating Committee) and appointed (Ways and Means Committee, *Diplomatic History*'s editorial board, Myrna Bernath Committee, William A. Williams Grant Committee) positions as well as on SHAFR task forces. I also cochaired the 2017 SHAFR/Miller Center workshop on public engagement and hosted the 2016 SHAFR conference at USD. As a result, I am extremely familiar with how SHAFR operates. I am also a general editor of the "Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace" book series at the University of Notre Dame Press, on the editorial board for the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, an elected member of the PCB-AHA Council, and a frequent contributor to H-Diplo and *Passport*.

I have spent most of my academic career studying alliances—how and why they fail and what it takes to maintain them long-term. As SHAFR president, I would focus on fortifying SHAFR's alliances, first and foremost within SHAFR through formal and informal community building. We all understand the enormous benefits of interaction among members and need to ensure these opportunities arise more frequently. Promoting broader coordination with external communities (including other professional societies, regional and national foreign policy organizations, local veterans' and peace groups, and international constituencies) is also essential. In addition, SHAFR needs alliances that provide increased revenue to support graduate students and faculty whose institutions lack funding. I fully endorse SHAFR's recent emphasis on teaching, public engagement, and diversity and plan to further these aims by encouraging undergraduate engagement in SHAFR, especially given universities' growing sponsorship of undergraduate research and travel.

SHAFR is not only my intellectual home but also where some of the most friendly, generous, and dedicated people in the world reside. Walking into a SHAFR conference is always a welcome homecoming that allows me to catch up on my colleagues' work and lives at panels, over coffee, and at social events. Their influence has made me a better historian and a better person, and I want every current and future SHAFR member to have the same experience. Ensuring our own sense of community will allow us to build alliances with others and keep SHAFR relevant and vibrant.

COUNCIL (AT-LARGE SEAT #1)

Elisabeth Leake: I have been Associate Professor of History at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, since 2022, where I hold the Lee E. Dirks Chair in Diplomatic History. Before that I was Associate Professor of International History at the University of Leeds (UK). My research focuses on the intersections between the global Cold War and decolonization, with particular attention on US relations with South Asia and the impacts of colonial knowledge-production on domestic and foreign policy-making. I am the author of two books, the latest of which, *Afghan Crucible: The Soviet Invasion and the Making of Modern Afghanistan*, won the Robert H. Ferrell Prize in 2023. I have been a member of SHAFR since 2011 and have served on the conference committee (2016-21), the 2021 conference programming committee, and the graduate students grants and fellowships committee (2022). I also established the SHAFR UK/Ireland seminar series in 2020, now run by Ilaria Scaglia. Additionally, I serve as the chief editor of the *Journal of Global History* and am an associate editor for the H-Diplo RJISS forum, where I've enjoyed supporting and promoting SHAFR authors.

Mario Del Pero: Mario Del Pero is Professor of International History at Sciences Po, Paris, and Senior Research Fellow at the *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale* (ISPI), Milan. He teaches graduate and undergraduate courses on the United States in the world, 20th/21st century global history, transatlantic relations, and Cold War history. His research focuses on the United States in the world, particularly in the post-World War II era. He is the author or coauthor of eight books, including an intellectual biography of Henry Kissinger (*The Eccentric Realist*, Cornell UP, 2009) and a general history of U.S. foreign policy (Libertà e Impero, Laterza, 2022, 4th ed.).

He has published research articles in numerous journals, including the *American Historical Review*, the *Journal of American History*, and *Diplomatic History*. He regularly comments on U.S. politics and foreign policy on the Italian and Swiss public TV and radio. His commentaries on current affairs have appeared in various magazines and newspapers, including the *Washington Post*, *The Guardian*, *Politico*, *The Hill*, and *Le Monde*. A longstanding member of SHAFR, he has served on the editorial board of *Diplomatic History* (2012-14, 2021-23), and several committees, including the Bernath and Ferrell Prizes, and the Membership Committee.

COUNCIL (AT-LARGE SEAT #2)

Maurice Jr. Labelle: Maurice Jr. Labelle (Moe, *pour les intimes*) is Director of the SSHRC-funded NonAligned News Research Partnership and an Associate Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan-located on Treaty 6 Territory and the Homeland of Michif/Métis (Canada). Moe's current interests center on decolonization and anti-racism in the world. His first book project is entitled: *Tragedy of Decolonization: Lebanon, the United States, and the Making of the Postcolonial World, 1941-67.*

Since 2008, SHAFR and its members have offered me countless support, mentorship, and community. I have greatly benefited from involvement in twelve (12) SHAFR annual meetings, the 2011 Summer Institute, and four (4) sponsored panels at the AHA and OAH. The Robert A. and Barbara Divine and Samuel Flagg Bemis grants funded my dissertation research. *Diplomatic History* and *Passport* have also provided me with platforms to publish on U.S.-Middle East relations, as well as the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.

Naturally, I have tried to give back to our community as much as possible. I am especially proud for serving on the Committee on Women and SHAFR'S inaugural Conference Task Force and Reporting Team. It would be both an honor and a privilege to be an at-large member of Council.

Kaeten Mistry: I am Associate Professor of History at the University of East Anglia (UK) and my research focuses on the domestic and transnational forces shaping the U.S. in the World. I have published widely on the history and politics of U.S. foreign relations, national security, and the international cold war. Among my publications are *Whistleblowing Nation: The History of National Security Disclosures and the Cult of State Secrecy* with Hannah Gurman (Columbia, 2020), *Waging Political Warfare: The United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War* (Cambridge, 2014), articles in the *Journal of American History* and *Diplomatic History*, as well as guest editing *Intelligence and National Security* (2011). My current project is on the culture of state secrecy in modern America (contracted to Harvard). Like many non-U.S. based scholars, the SHAFR community has been my intellectual home away from home. It welcomed and supported my work at the 2010 Summer Institute. I co-chaired the 2019 programme committee, have served on the Committee on Public Outreach and Engagement and Membership Committee (including as chair), and been a mentor at conference job workshops. I have also sought to broaden our community informally, including initiatives to increase international submissions for SHAFR conferences since 2013.

COUNCIL (TEACHING-CENTERED SEAT)

Brian C. Etheridge: Brian C. Etheridge is passionate about SHAFR's teaching mission, and undergraduate education more broadly. Active in the organization since 1997, he has participated in eighteen sessions at the annual meeting (with six on teaching) and been involved with thirteen SHAFR initiatives/committees, the most relevant of which has been SHAFR's Teaching Committee (six years total with two as chair). He also has a record of administrative leadership in matters related to teaching and learning. He is associate dean for academics in the Keeping Sights Upwards Journey Honors College and professor of history at Kennesaw State University. At previous institutions, he has been responsible for units dedicated to faculty development and academic innovation. A previous winner of the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize, he is the author of *Enemies to Allies* (2016) and co-editor of *The United States and Public Diplomacy* (2010), *Curriculum Internationalization and the Future of Education* (2018), and *Shaping a Peaceful World* (under consideration). In addition to his work on American foreign relations history, he has published on honors education, cybersecurity education, and game-based learning. As part of his teaching practice, he is revising two role-playing games on American foreign relations history (with students as co-creators and play-testers).

Paul Rubinson: I am professor of history at Bridgewater State University, a teaching-centered college founded by Horace Mann in Massachusetts. There I teach four courses each semester, including core surveys, courses for history majors, and seminars for firstyear students. My research looks at the intersection of science and international social movements, including the antinuclear movement and the campaign for human rights. I am the author of *Redefining Science* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2016) and *Rethinking the American Antinuclear Movement* (Routledge, 2018), and I currently hold the 2024-2025 BSU Presidential Fellowship for my next book project, *Mistress of the Sciences, Asylum of Liberty*. I have published articles in *Diplomatic History*, *Cold War History*, and *Isis*, and have been a member of SHAFR for about twenty years. I recently received two fellowships from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum for the development of college courses on the Holocaust. Throughout my career, I have struggled to balance my commitment to teaching with the desire to produce scholarship in an institutional setting not always conducive to research. While almost all SHAFR members teach, those who come from teaching institutions face unique professional challenges, and I intend to be a voice for them on the SHAFR council.

COUNCIL (GRADUATE STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE)

Alex Southgate: Alexandra Southgate is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at Temple University where she studies twentieth century U.S. foreign relations and cultural history. Her dissertation research focuses on Quaker internationalism during the early Cold War and explores the relationship between religious pacifism and diplomacy. She received both her B.A. in History and M.A. in Contemporary International History from the University of Toronto.

Alongside her historical research, Alexandra is passionate about editing and archival studies. She is currently an Assistant Editor for *Diplomatic History* and has previously worked for Rise Up! Feminist Digital Archive and Canada Declassified. Recently, she edited a collection about feminist archives for *Rejoinder*, an online journal published by Rutgers' Institute for Research on Women entitled "The Archival is Political." Alexandra is very interested in archival records sharing and collaboration—particularly to support graduate students and contingent scholars.

Alexandra is enthusiastic about international scholarship and exchange: in 2021 she was a Wilson Center Cold War Archives Research Fellow and in 2023 she studied at the University of Cologne as a Visiting Scholar. SHAFR is already a hub for international connection and Alexandra hopes to support initiatives to make the organization even more accessible.

Zachary Tayler: Zachary Tayler is a third-year doctoral student at Ohio University. His dissertation will examine how a number of issues between 1975 and 1995, including Indochinese refugees, prisoners of war/missing in action, and the Third Indochina War, forced the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to maintain a dialogue that eventually led to the normalization of diplomatic relations. Zach's first journal article, "Humanitarian's Legacy: Patricia M. Darien and the Indochinese Refugee Crisis," is set for publication in March 2025. He is a member of SHAFR's graduate student committee and looks forward to contributing to the SHAFR community. Before pursuing his doctorate, Zach taught 7th grade social studies in Queen Anne's County, Maryland, for four years.

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Marc Palen: I am a Senior Lecturer at the University of Exeter in England. My research explores how ideology and the international political economy have shaped US globalization and imperial expansion since the mid-19th century. I have been a SHAFR member for fifteen years, have published three articles in *Diplomatic History*, presented at numerous SHAFR conferences, have reviewed article manuscripts and books for *Diplomatic History* and H-Diplo, and have served on SHAFR's Open Access Task Force and SHAFR's Development Committee. Starting in 2025, I will also serve on *Diplomatic History*'s Editorial Board. I strongly endorse SHAFR's commitment to diversity and to its support for graduate students and the precariously employed. While among the latter in 2013, I was very fortunate indeed to receive SHAFR's W. A. Williams Junior Faculty Research Grant to support research on my first book, *The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalisation, 1846-1896* (Cambridge University Press, 2016). My newest book, *Pax Economica: Left-Wing Visions of a Free Trade World*, was published with Princeton University Press (2024). I look forward to expanding my service to SHAFR as an international member of the Nominating Committee.

Karine Walther: Karine Walther is associate professor of History at Georgetown University-Qatar. She earned her Ph.D. in History from Columbia University in 2008. Karine is currently finishing her second book, *Spreading the Faith: American Missionaries, ARAMCO, and the Birth of the U.S.Saudi Special Relationship, 1889-1955*, under contract with the University of North Carolina Press. Her co-edited volume (with Oli Charbonneau), *The Gospel of Work and Money: Global Histories of Industrial Education*, is forthcoming with the University of Pennsylvania Press. She is co-editing another volume, *Global Histories and Practices of Islamophobia*, with Abdullah AlArian.

I have been a member of SHAFR since I was a graduate student where, knees shaking, I presented my first academic paper. In the years that followed, SHAFR has become my home base and its members are where I go first to get feedback on my research. I have been proud to give back to SHAFR by serving and/or chairing multiple committees: the Michael J. Hogan foreign language fellowship committee (member/chair), the conference program committee (member), the SHAFR council (member), the newly created task force on Code of Conduct (member/chair), and the dissertation prize committee (member/chair). I would be honored to now serve on the nomination committee.

A Roundtable on David Prentice, *Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam*

Steven J. Brady, Carolyn Eisenberg, Robert K. Brigham, Hang Le Tormala, and Sandra Scanlon

Too Legit to Quit?: A Review of David L. Prentice, *Unwilling to Quit*

Steven J. Brady

In *Unwilling to Quit*, David L. Prentice addresses a significant gap in the scholarly literature on the United States and the Vietnam War. There is currently a very extensive literature on the origins of American commitment to the war in Vietnam, but the "unwinding of American involvement" has received far less attention. Davis F. Schmitz, for one, has contributed significantly to our understanding of US policy during the Nixon administration. More recently, Carolyn Woods Eisenberg has written an exhaustive study of Nixon and Kissinger's policies in, and the impact of those policies on, Southeast Asia.[1] Still missing, however, was a focused, international history of the end of the US commitment to preserve the Saigon regime with the use of American military power. With Prentice's latest book, we now have such a study.

Chapter 1 addresses the foreign policy legacy that Nixon inherited from Lyndon Johnson. It was "a bad inheritance," and one "not of his making." But, as Prentice observes, Johnson had also bequeathed to his successor some degree of flexibility. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, Johnson left open to Nixon the option to escalate or de-escalate the violence. While the incoming president had to manage a difficult situation, he could exercise a measure of control. Emphasizing a central theme of the book, Prentice notes that "America's exit [from Indochina] was by no means foreordained in January 1969"(10). Nixon, instead, had options, even a year after Tet, especially since American public opinion was not so uniformly opposed to the war by late 1968 and defeat was not considered a viable option. Whether Nixon had a pathway to an honorable outcome remained unclear at that point.

"For Nixon," Prentice observes, "the war and its outcome were political, strategic, and personal" (27). This complexity gave leverage to his informal political advisor and soon-to-be Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, who wanted to use the buildup of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as an opportunity to reduce the number of American combat troops in Vietnam. Always sensitive to public opinion on the war, especially after Tet, Laird urged Nixon to seek the presidency by portraying himself as the "peace candidate." Otherwise, Laird was convinced, "Nixon was headed for political and strategic defeat." In addition, he wisely advised the Republican nominee to move away from his pledge to "end the war," and instead to promise the more feasible ending of "American participation in the war" (29). His strategy paved the way for the policy that Laird would soon name "Vietnamization." Yet Nixon, being Nixon, insisted on keeping open the possible use of air power to coerce Hanoi to negotiate, even if that step did not seem politically viable in 1968. His hands were not tied. But his options were limited.

Chapter 2 focuses on the first months of the Nixon administration. The new president had to make actual decisions about Vietnam policy, rather than simply speaking about it, in vague terms, to voters. His major advisors disagreed on whether to de-escalate (Secretary of State William Rogers and Laird), or to increase the military pressure (Kissinger). Since the president failed to make a clear decision on the matter, "the administration went several directions at once"(31). The new Secretary of State consistently advocated for a negotiated settlement with no escalation. Laird, in fact, would be the strongest, and in the end the most successful, partisan of "de-Americanization"—which is what Nixon had called for in the 1968 campaign. But Nixon and Kissinger's plan to concentrate policymaking in the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) "challenged Laird's and Roger's authority"(35). The president and the national security advisor were both highly aware of domestic and congressional opinion, so they sought a way to ratchet up the pain on Hanoi without inflaming a backlash that would force them into a precipitous withdrawal from the war. This would have meant a unilateral abandonment of Saigon, which was not an option for Nixon or Kissinger at the time. They opted instead for the decision to bomb communist sanctuaries in Cambodia in secret.

Chapter 3 addresses March-June 1969, during which Laird "sought an exit from Vietnam not beholden to the Paris talks of escalation"(53). He was willing to divorce US troop withdrawal from discussions of mutual withdrawal of US and North Vietnamese troops, and, thus, from negotiations about escalation. The withdrawal of US troops was also a goal of South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu , a point of agreement which presented one less problem to the administration. And while the JCS considered ARVN unready, "domestic needs rather than military assessments motivated US reductions"(58). It was Laird who christened the new approach "Vietnamization." In March 1969, Nixon made the decision to withdraw a token number of troops that summer. While Nixon still hoped to bring an end to the war via negotiations and ramped-up pressure, the public responded favorably to the announcement that 25,000 US troops would be heading out of South Vietnam by the end of August. This "bought Nixon time," which was the goal. But "how much time remained uncertain"(73).

Chapter 4 covers the eventful period from June-August 1969. Kissinger by this point was fretting the possibility that the president would undermine negotiations though regularly-scheduled troops withdrawals, which undercut any leverage the US might have in Paris. Why would Hanoi give an inch when the Americans were going to leave, eventually, on their own? He thus sought to convince Nixon to "go for broke," applying military muscle (84). Consequently, Kissinger advocated sternly for Operation Duck Hook, a "decisive military escalation designed to

compel a negotiated settlement" (87). In order to advance the operation's chances for acceptance, Laird was kept in the dark about it. Nixon, as Prentice explains, "had wearied of waiting for the other side to compromise"(93). He, like Kissinger, now favored escalation, not just to inflict pain on the North, but to signal Nixon's resolve. Hanoi, he was convinced, would get the message. However, Laird was aware of Duck Hook, even if not of its details. The scene was set for a showdown over Nixon's assent.

In Chapter 5, Prentice presents a thorough and well-sourced explanation for Nixon's ultimate decision to "postpone" Duck Hook. Aggressively championed by Kissinger, the plan called for what the National Security Council staff called "*short, sharp military blows of increasing severity*" to compel Hanoi's capitulation (112; emphasis in the original). Kissinger sold the escalation as a way to bring the communists to heel and end the deadlock within a short period of time, thus avoiding what he saw as the probability that Vietnamization would prove politically unsustainable. Initially, Nixon strongly favored Duck Hook. But increasing domestic hostility to the war, both in Congress and the general public, gave Laird the opening to press for the Vietnamization option. Given the chance to assert his opinion, the secretary made the most of it. Vietnamization—and Laird—prevailed.

The October 15 Peace Moratorium reinforced the perception that "the American public would not tolerate escalation of the war" (118). But this assumption raised two problems in the White House: Nixon wanted to avoid looking intimidated by the antiwar movement; and Kissinger still wanted to hit the North hard. This dilemma shaped Nixon's famous November 3 Silent Majority address. Kissinger had drafted a hardline ultimatum, but Nixon was too sensitive to domestic politics to accept it. The result was a mixed bag, as hawkish rhetoric was tempered by a call for "perseverance and domestic solidarity" (121).

Chapter 6 takes the story from the Silent Majority speech to spring 1970, a "period of cautious optimism in America's Vietnam War"— a time when it seemed that "Vietnamization might provide the basis for an allied victory" (124). The response to Nixon's Silent Majority address had produced the desired results, strengthening the public consensus that the US could not simply "cut and run" in South Vietnam. This support, together with the implosion of the Mobilization movement, gave Nixon some much-desired breathing room. The Vietnamization policy appeared to Nixon and Thiệu as "a psychological, political, and military winner" (130). For this reason, Prentice rejects the commonly-held conclusion that Nixon had accepted the need for a "decent interval" between US withdrawal and the collapse of Saigon. But Kissinger remained pessimistic about Vietnamization's chances for success. One key factor remained totally out of US control: "communist determination"(136). Any optimism in Washington had to be tempered by the realization that the North might simply refuse to give in, opting instead to send more troops to the South. Kissinger, therefore, wanted to increase the punishment inflicted on Hanoi, which had decided that it could overcome Vietnamization by waiting it out, ready and able to "continue the war regardless of the physical and human costs" (142).

Chapter 7 begins with Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia. Thinking that he "had the doves and the war under control," and that the military tipping point was close (143), the president took a step to push it over the edge. In doing so, he had "misread the calm at home" (144). The "incursion" into neutral Cambodia "ruined Nixon's image of careful moderation" (148). It set loose an explosion of protests, which were especially notable on numerous college campuses such as Kent State. It also ended the congressional patience that had allowed Vietnamization to proceed on Nixon's timetable. Kissinger used this opportunity to argue for slowed troop reductions and continued bombing. But once again Laird won the day, and withdrawals continued. The ill-advised, American-supported ARVN incursion into Laos turned into a disaster, highlighting the weakness of the Republic's military. In light of PAVN's success in Laos, Hanoi prepared to launch a massive offensive. Meanwhile, Nixon's own diplomacy of détente and the opening with China seemed to undercut the very reason that the US was fighting the war. Optimism about victory in Vietnam appeared to be at an end everywhere but in Hanoi.

In his final chapter, Prentice analyzes events that led to Saigon's fall in April 1975. In 1972, Nixon had scored a hat trick, with trips to Moscow and Beijing, a breakthrough at Paris, and a massive victory in the 1972 election. But these victories notwithstanding, events that year "demonstrated how imperfect Vietnamization had been" (168). Faced with Thiệu's refusal to accept the draft Paris Accord, and Hanoi's refusal to make more significant concessions, Nixon was "frustrated with both the North and the South" (172). He chose to break the diplomatic stalemate via a massive use of force against the North with the Linebacker II bombings. Though a final accord was soon reached, Nixon still had to deal with an increasingly assertive Congress, exercising its power of the purse, to end US involvement in Vietnam, both militarily and financially. The end was now in sight for Saigon. But as Prentice points out, South Vietnam "died not from an economic collapse or internal revolution but from military defeat—the one contingency Vietnamization was supposed to prevent" (178).

In his conclusion, Prentice presents a brief discussion of the historiographical schools that have analyzed the course of the war from 1969 to 1972. Was this period a "lost opportunity" for victory or at least an earlier, negotiated end to the war? Or was it a time of "national self-deception," during which the slogan "peace with honor" simply gilded the lily of an inevitable US defeat? Prentice sees these as the wrong questions to ask. He approaches the matter from what he calls a "post-revisionist" perspective. Like the post-revisionist synthesis regarding Cold War origins, this school of thought "sees complexity and contingency" rather than "easy answers" (180). In this school of interpretation, scholars make the salient point that Nixon entered office with "no good choices" when it came to Vietnam. Any approach designed to bring a quick end to the war would be taken as a loss for the US, both domestically and internationally. It would be so, in large part, because the Saigon regime was unable to withstand the only terms of a negotiated peace that Hanoi would have accepted at that point. The president thus "chose to continue the war rather than face the hard reality of personal and national defeat" (182). Feeling constrained by public opinion that would have countenanced neither escalation nor abandonment of an ally, Nixon chose what seemed like the best of the bad options available to him.

One of Prentice's most impressive contributions is his rescuing of Melvin Laird from the wilderness of scholarly obscurity. *Unwilling to Quit* places Laird at the center of the story and action as a key decision-maker during the Nixon administration's debate about Vietnam War policy. He emerges, in fact, as the only member of Nixon's cabinet who could match, and sometimes excel, Henry Kissinger in the art of bureaucratic politics. He favored Vietnamization when both Nixon and Kissinger wanted, instead, to escalate the violence, and he was central to Nixon's decision to stress Vietnamization over bellicose ultimatums in the Silent Majority speech. He championed the long game instead of the "Big Play" initially favored by Nixon. Laird prevailed. The victory was not a minor one given the complexity of the problem and the many voices vying for attention.

It is a standard practice among academic book reviewers to raise critical questions, even in positive reviews. In this vein, I raise two issues. The first, briefly, is one of

narrative chronology. Prentice says that Nixon decided to Vietnamize the war early in his administration. But he also seems to argue that Nixon and Kissinger sought victory in the war, the apparent opposite of Vietnamization. It was thus unclear to me what Prentice was asserting on this question of timing.

Additionally, Prentice may well take too seriously the Nixon-Kissinger call for "peace with honor," a framework that is overly generous toward Nixon. He asserts that the issue of liquidating American commitment to the war with honor was "the question that would consume [Nixon's] administration" (30). But was it? A strong case can be made that by late 1971, the administration was not trying to achieve "peace with honor," whatever that meant to the president at that point, but rather he was attempting to disguise the fact that the US had already been defeated.[2] If an honorable exit meant leaving the US allies in Saigon with a good chance of survival—the irreducible minimum of any honorable settlement—then Nixon's diplomacy with the Thiệu government in January 1973 suggested that something much less than honorable was happening. The South Vietnamese president understood that the ceasefire-in-place agreed to by Kissinger at Paris made his country's chances of survival extremely remote. So too did Nixon.[3] Since Prentice titles all his chapters after popular songs, a novelty that works better for some than for others, I offer one of my own: Prentice might have said that Nixon was "too legit to quit." It is to his credit that he did not.

These criticisms aside, *Unwilling to Quit* is an impressively, indeed exceptionally, well-researched book. Its re-centering of Laird makes a vital contribution to our understanding of policymaking in the Nixon administration. Whether the go-to phrase "Nixon-Kissinger policy" should be replaced by "Nixon-Kissinger-Laird" I will leave to other scholars to hash out. But the case for the change has now been made, and it has been made well.

Notes:
1. David F. Schmitz, *Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2014); Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Wars in Southeast Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023).
2. On this, see Schmitz, 132-133.
3. Eisenberg, 493-494.

Review of David L. Prentice, *Unwilling to Quit*

Carolyn Eisenberg

In spring 1968, millions of Americans had reason to think the end of the Vietnam War was in sight. The mounting expense, the growing casualty list of U.S. soldiers, and most importantly, the shock of the Tet Offensive had radically shifted the domestic landscape. Lyndon Johnson's decision to institute a partial bombing halt, to open negotiations with Hanoi and to terminate his own candidacy for president, all pointed in this direction.

The election of Richard Nixon, a seasoned Cold Warrior, to the White House might have signalled a retreat from diplomacy. However, throughout his campaign, Nixon maintained he had a "secret plan for peace." And while he offered no specifics, voters could reasonably assume this was his goal.

As a Republican, Nixon had the option to blame his Democratic predecessors for the Vietnam failure and rapidly terminate the project and bring the war to an end. Instead, he pursued the war for his entire first term, with more than 20,000 American soldiers killed, 100,000 injured, 2-3 million Asians dead, and the lands of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam dangerously scarred until this day.

Why did this happen and how? Drawing upon the vast collection of declassified documents, historian David Prentice ably explores this still challenging subject. In his clear, sharply argued new book, *Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam,* he maintains that beneath the twists and turns of policy, during this period, there was a consistent strategy pursued by the administration. Most historical writing on this period centers on the role of President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Prentice adds a third participant to this narrative, namely Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In his view, Laird's proposed strategy of "Vietnamization" was adopted early on, and slowly but continuously implemented over the course of four years.

This approach was publicly articulated by the President, on numerous occasions: his plan was to withdraw American troops in increasing increments, while providing the Army of South Vietnam with the resources to confidently replace them. As explained by Laird, by following this course, the Vietnam War could be extended, while maintaining popular consent. If Americans could see that casualty rates were declining, and increased numbers of troop were coming home, they would be less impatient with its continuation.

Laird's view contradicted Henry Kissinger's own belief that increased violence was necessary to compel Hanoi to accept a favorable peace agreement. It was also at odds with Nixon's preference for escalation. Indeed, left to his own devices, Nixon might have stood by Kissinger. However, as Prentice demonstrates, Laird's ace-in-the-hole was the state of public opinion. As a seasoned politician, the Defense Secretary was keenly aware of the political protest that was sweeping the country. In his view, it was only a matter of time before the antiwar movement prevailed. He reminded Nixon that a disillusioned Congress could eventually cut off the funds.

By late summer 1969, Nixon veered close to Kissinger's approach—signaling Hanoi that absent a more flexible stance, as of November 1, his administration was prepared to ratchet up its military effort. For months, under the rubric of Duck Hook, military officials and National Security staff crafted various schemes to damage North Vietnam. Under consideration were an array of brutal actions:

> U.S. air and sea forces would devastate the country's military and economic infrastructure while quarantining it with mines and a naval blockade. Rail lines, power stations, airports, North Vietnam's factories, storage depots, naval vessels and even the levees that protected North Vietnam's rice paddies and villages from devastating floods were potential targets (110).

However, as the deadline for decision approached, the military and civilian personnel had difficulty settling on a specific plan.

That October, antiwar sentiment in the country was on the rise. Most ominous from the White House standpoint was the adherence of politically moderate people to the cause of peace. Citing the work of historian Melvin Small, Prentice registers the importance of the October 15 Moratorium Day, in which an estimated two million people, across the country, participated in an array of peaceful antiwar activities. Favorable press coverage amplified their message. Even before that exact day, Nixon was mindful of the rising dissent and clearly understood that Duck Hook or its equivalent would generate a fierce public backlash.

With this as backdrop, Nixon labored furiously on a public address scheduled for November 3. Prentice offers a new interpretation of this "Silent Majority" speech. The oration is usually seen as an especially skillful effort by Nixon to undercut future moratoriums and to ramp up support for the war. And while it served both aims, it

also signified his acceptance of Secretary Laird's strategic vision over that of Kissinger. In other words, "Barring a diplomatic breakthrough, Vietnamization would remain Administration policy" for the next three years (123). While the subtitle of this book is *"The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam,"* most of the narrative is focused on the events of 1969. At the end of that year, Laird's strategy of Vietnamization looked promising. As predicted, the emphasis on troop withdrawals was popular and gave Nixon additional room to maneuver. It was also helpful that this approach had the approval of General Creighton Abrams, U.S. troop commander in South Vietnam, as well as South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu.

It is perhaps surprising that Thiệu was an early advocate of "Vietnamization." Prentice explains that even before Nixon took officethe South Vietnamese leader was acutely aware of the discontent rising in America. He believed that the removal of thousands of American soldiers would calm this down. And if this step was accompanied by substantial economic and military aid, it would enable his armed forces to assume control of the war. At some later point, Thiệu's attitude would change, but it initially gave Nixon breathing room to shore up his domestic support.

As described by Prentice, the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front believed that Nixon had made a shrewd move, which would quiet protest in the United States, enabling him to extend the time that the United States remained in the war. They did not consider this a "camouflaged retreat" (158). Indeed, as of early 1970, their position in the South had become precarious, the morale of their troops had declined, and they had limited ability to launch a new offensive. However, these leaders and many cadres had been fighting their whole lives for the unification of their country, and there was no thought of giving up. "If new optimism typified the mood in Washington and Saigon, then renewed determination, rather than new pessimism, characterized Hanoi" (142).

During the next three years, despite fluctuations on the battlefield, the Nixon Administration followed the Vietnamization concept. The removal of U.S. troops remained an imperative, as was the increased aid to the Saigon government. By November 1972, there were few American combat soldiers left in the South. While the U.S. numbers might have dwindled, at the time of the Paris Peace agreement, there were an estimated 140,000 North Vietnamese soldiers inside South Vietnam. Prospects that the regime could survive, absent American ground troops, were greatly diminished. This was not the endgame that Nixon officials had imagined.

What went wrong? Prentice is never explicit about his own attitude towards Vietnamization. However, in his early chapters, there is an implication that if properly implemented, Laird's strategymight have preserved South Vietnam's independence. But both Nixon and Thiệu became over-confident and took a series of foolhardy steps which undermined the entire process of bolstering the South Vietnamese military with decreasing U.S. combat troops. "Each president sought short-term solutions to the complex problems created by U.S. troop withdrawals and North Vietnamese obduracy," Prentice writes. Their actions "alienated the constituencies they needed to sustain support over the long haul" (143).

In Thiệu's case, the ongoing American support strengthened his authoritarian bent. During this period, he imposed harsh economic measures, circumvented the National Assembly, cracked down on political dissenters, and engineered a farcical national election, thus becoming "the dictator that American doves had long held him to be" (156).

On the U.S. side, there were also major blunders. Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia turned into "an error of 'Epic Proportions,'" despite warnings by Secretary Laird and others. While the President's November speech had been effective, this dramatic expansion of the war re-awakened mass protest. From the campuses to the halls of Congress, dissent was rampant.

Other calamities followed. Lam Son 719, an effort by the South Vietnamese military to march into Laos and block the movement of North Vietnamese troops and material into South Vietnam, proved especially demoralizing. Beginning in February 1971, Saigon troops were expected to reach the crossroads town of Tchepone and to remain there until April. Yet faced with a surprising number of enemy troops, and huge casualties, most never arrived. And those who were helicoptered in quickly abandoned their position on orders from Saigon.

Despite these setbacks, Prentice argues that Vietnamization continued to be Nixon's policy until the Paris Agreement, when U.S. withdrawal was complete, and the prisoners released. Yet the outcome was different than Laird and other advocates had imagined: the North Vietnamese and their National Liberation Front (NLF) allies were in a strengthened position, while domestic pressure in the United States restricted the flow of aid.

Historians will find Prentice's discussion of the 1969-70 period especially valuable. He is certainly correct in highlighting the role of Secretary Laird, and the significance of troop withdrawals. At the time, many in the antiwar movement tended to minimize the importance of that decision. In subsequent decades, historians have often focused on Nixon's escalations, while downplaying the steady reduction of troops. Yet the Vietnamization strategy was a direct response to pressure from protestors and members of Congress. At times this external influence constrained Henry Kissinger's predilection for increased military force. But not entirely. While "Vietnamization" was a central feature of Nixon's strategy, Prentice is on questionable ground in making it the only strategy that Nixon pursued. The abandonment of Duck Hook was indeed a pivotal event, but it did not signify the administration's rejection of escalation. From the bombing of Cambodia and Laos in 1969, to the bombing of North and South Vietnam in the Spring of 1972, to the Christmas Bombing in December 1972, this was a continuing thread of policy. If domestic pressure to end the war continued, it was because the administration's actions, in addition to the invasion of Cambodia, were morally abhorrent.

In this larger story, the role of Melvin Laird is more complicated than Prentice allows. At the outset, the Secretary may have truly believed that the strategy of Vietnamization could save South Vietnam. But this idea was increasingly disproved. Indeed, his transcendent goal was to get as many American troops home as quickly as possible, *regardless* of the situation on the ground. He was personally opposed to the invasion of Cambodia, and to many of Nixon's subsequent escalations. Yet whatever his private objections, he dutifully trekked up to Capitol Hill to defend the administration's actions. In this way, he was able to keep his job, and to remain effective in reducing the harm to Americans.

Of less consequence to Laird and his colleagues was the suffering U.S violence inflicted on the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Prentice has kept a steady focus on policymaking in Washington. Yet by ignoring the results of U.S. action in these places, his account gives more sympathy to Nixon and his colleagues than they deserve. The familiar anecdote of President Nixon on the grounds of the Lincoln Memorial, attempting to communicate with student protestors, seems less consequential than the devastation inflicted on Cambodia.

These concerns notwithstanding, David Prentice has done an admirable job of illuminating a complex story. There is much to learn from this well-written, engaging, and carefully documented book.

David L. Prentice, *Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam*

Robert K. Brigham

Unwilling to Quit is a welcomed addition to the scholarship on the Nixon administration's Vietnam War policies. Nixon came into office wanting to de-Americanize the war. He also wanted to apply military pressure against North Vietnam to force Hanoi's leadership into making concessions at the nascent Paris peace talks. He hadn't worked out the formula exactly, but he knew he had to change the geometry in Vietnam to get an honorable peace. Nixon was desperate to devote more attention to what he considered more important foreign policy challenges, namely relations with the Soviet Union and China. Luckily for Nixon, he chose Melvin Laird, a long-time Republican member of the House of Representatives from Wisconsin, to be his secretary of defense.

Laird was an inspired choice, and David L. Prentice is one of the few scholars who takes this appointment seriously. In the first months of the administration, Laird promoted what he called "Vietnamization," the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops and the handing over of major combat responsibilities to the South Vietnamese armed forces. To make Vietnamization work, Laird argued that the plan also required a significant realignment of military budgets and hardware. The United States would build up the South Vietnamese air force and its long-range bombing capabilities to compensate for the reduced number of U.S. troops. Laird believed that he might get another five years of war funding out of Congress if Nixon accepted these changes. The war at this point was all about time. Laird thought Vietnamization bought South Vietnam just enough time to allow Saigon to build up its military, political, and economic capacities to stand up to the communists on their own.

Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, stood in Laird's way. Kissinger hated everything about Laird's plan. He thought it deprived U.S. negotiators in Paris of their most valuable asset, coercive diplomacy. How could the Nixon administration pressure Hanoi militarily during a unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal? Kissinger was also quite upset about being bested by Laird. Prentice offers a compelling look at the political intrigue inside the Nixon administration, concluding that the rivalry between Laird and Kissinger was intense and somewhat destructive. Nixon's secretary of state, William Rogers, understood that it was best to stay out of Nixon's way when it came to the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. This added fuel to the contest between Laird and Kissinger because Rogers was out of the picture when it came to influencing the president.

Initially, Nixon sided with Laird. Vietnamization could produce tangible results almost immediately, the president concluded, and that was precisely what he needed. Prentice's handling of the decision-making inside the White House is superb. With flourish, he shares the strategic thinking among Nixon's chief foreign policy team. He also makes clear that Nixon was in charge even though Laird announced Vietnamization publicly before Nixon was ready. Over the course of Vietnamization, U.S. troop withdrawals generally happened according to Laird's timetable. He had a keen sense of what Congress could tolerate and what the American people demanded. Few others in the administration had their finger on the pulse of public opinion as firmly as Laird.

What makes *Unwilling to Quit* so valuable, however, is its sophisticated telling of Saigon's reaction to Vietnamization. Prentice carves out unique territory in the scholarship by arguing that Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, South Vietnam's President, understood U.S. politics better than most previous studies have suggested. Prentice argues that Thiệu anticipated and even encouraged Vietnamization as a way to mature the state apparatus in South Vietnam. Furthermore, Thiệu envisioned an economic Vietnamization, the slow but deliberate acceptance of fiscal independence and responsibility in Saigon. In short, Prentice concludes, Thiệu initially embraced Vietnamization because he had to, but he then turned it into an asset to help South Vietnam develop and stand on its own.

In its first year, Vietnamization did what Laird and Nixon had intended it to do. The American public and Congress responded favorably to U.S. troop withdrawals, and Nixon's "Silent Majority" speech of November 1969 firmly established Vietnamization as the way that the war would end. It was not going to be the easy path, Nixon told the nation, but it was "the right way" (123). By taking this long and difficult road, the United States offered South Vietnam its best chance for survival. The United States would not withdraw precipitously, Nixon pledged, but would stand by the Saigon government as it grew strong enough to defend its own freedom.

Many South Vietnamese, for the first time since the war began, "looked to a brighter tomorrow" (132). Indeed, the major success of Vietnamization rested with the South Vietnamese, according to Prentice. Saigon had weathered the first U.S. troop withdrawals, had increased its troop strength, had recaptured territory lost during the 1968 Tet Offensive, and had extended security in the countryside. The Thiệu government even instituted some long-needed changes, like a major land reform campaign launched in March 1970. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agreed that Saigon had made significant gains in the first year of Vietnamization, concluding that South Vietnam was "stronger militarily and politically today than ever before" (136).

Hanoi was worried about Vietnamization's success too. Lê Duẩn, the Communist Party's Secretary General and a long-time proponent of military victory in South Vietnam, conceded that U.S. troop reductions would prolong American staying power. He had to further prepare his people for the possibility of a forever war. Exhaustion was always a concern.

By April 1970, Vietnamization was seen by all sides as a limited success. Primarily, Prentice argues, it bought Saigon time, and it created the circumstances for South Vietnam to stand on its own. What happened then? Why did the war end in defeat for South Vietnam following a unilateral American withdrawal?

Prentice correctly concludes that there were three main factors leading to South Vietnam's defeat. First, U.S. airpower masked the overall weakness of the South Vietnamese armed forces. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) acquitted itself quite well in Cambodia and during the Communist 1972 Easter Offensive, in both cases scoring significant military victories. But in both of these instances, U.S. air power made all the difference. In 1971, the ARVN performed poorly during Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos when it had to fight without U.S. troops or advisers present. Half of all South Vietnamese forces were captured or killed, highlighting the army's deficiencies. In the end, Prentice concludes, South Vietnam was not able to defend itself against a relentless enemy.

Second, the Thiệu government failed to make meaningful political and economic reforms quickly enough to secure the public's support. The 1971 South Vietnamese election showcased the government's anti-democratic tendencies. Thiệu kept opposition candidates from joining the presidential race, effectively making him the only choice. This soured much of the South Vietnamese public toward Thiệu's autocratic rule and undermined his legitimacy. Thiệu also had a rocky relationship with the

National Assembly, which handicapped his reform efforts. Furthermore, South Vietnam never gained control of its economy. On Thiệu's watch, inflation became rampant. Prentice attributes most of South Vietnam's woes to its inability to right its economic ship.

Finally, Prentice believes that Nixon and Kissinger supported policies that unwittingly undermined Vietnamization's success. Nixon never relinquished his initial desire to use American firepower to force Hanoi into making concessions at the Paris negotiations. Coercive diplomacy was always at the forefront of Kissinger's Vietnam War thinking. During 1969, Nixon and Kissinger had discussed a plan—Operation Duck Hook—that would increase bombing raids against North Vietnam, mine Haiphong's harbor, and target the intricate Red River dike system. They thought military escalation would force Hanoi to bend the knee. Nixon put Duck Hook on the back burner when he embraced Laird's Vietnamization plan in the spring of 1969, but the use of military force was always on the president's mind.

In April 1970, when the United States launched an incursion into neutral Cambodia to destroy North Vietnamese military outposts and munitions there, Nixon unknowingly sped up the Vietnam clock. Prentice argues that the president undermined his own policy by bringing the war back into full congressional view after presenting a successful strategy to assuage growing anxiety about Vietnam. Nixon's Cambodia policy led to several bipartisan congressional efforts to force a complete U.S. withdrawal from the region. Though none passed both houses of congress initially, they did limit what the president could do in Laos and Cambodia and drew attention to the ticking clock, which measured America's dwindling support for continued military involvement.

Prentice offers an analysis of alternatives that Nixon could have considered and implemented. After Vietnamization's success of 1969 and early 1970, Nixon could have spent his political capital on something other than an expansion of the war. Prentice argues that Nixon should have worked more willingly with Congress to get the military and economic aid South Vietnam needed. Instead, the president chose to keep Congress at bay, hoping that the White House could take political advantage of troop withdrawal announcements to expand the war behind the scenes. Nixon always had his eye on domestic politics, so he knew the risks of revealing his actual policies.

Prentice also believes that Nixon instinctively did not want to abandon "the possibility of escalation and coercive diplomacy" (185). Nixon never gave up on the belief—shared with Kissinger—that North Vietnam must have a breaking point that he could find and exploit. What was it about Nixon and Kissinger that they stubbornly clung to the efficacy of military intimidation against North Vietnam? Prentice could have explored this issue in more detail.

I have a few minor quibbles—and one major one—with this otherwise excellent book.

The construction of historiographical schools of thought—orthodox, revisionist, post-revisionist—is a good way to prepare students for comprehensive exams, but the practice has limited use beyond that. Prentice calls himself a post-revisionist and argues, "where others see easy answers, the post-revisionists see complexity and contingency" (180). This is far too reductionist to be useful. Furthermore, instead of complexity and contingency, *Unwilling to Quit* often avoids major historiographical arguments. For example, scholars continue to debate whether the Christmas bombings (Linebacker II) forced concessions in Hanoi and drove Lê Đức Thọ back to the bargaining table or if the attacks on North Vietnam were simply a fig leaf for an agreement that was so flawed it was essentially a U.S. surrender document. Prentice enters the fray with a half-hearted statement, writing "Linebacker II brought all sides back to the diplomatic table, resulting in the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973" (173).

There are times in the narrative where I wished Prentice had slowed down a bit and analyzed events more fully. This is especially true when dealing with Nixon and the Congress. Nixon's desire to chart his own path in Vietnam, free of congressional meddling, is such an important part of this outstanding book that I wish Prentice gave us more details from the House and Senate. The bipartisan nature of the efforts to end the war are such an interesting chapter in this history, and we could have benefited from a deeper treatment of them. Readers need to know, for example, that the United States was losing about two hundred military personnel per week in Vietnam at the beginning of the Nixon administration, and this situation took a heavy toll on public opinion and, therefore, Congress.

We also could have benefited from a deeper conversation about the link between military campaigns in Vietnam and the process of Vietnamization. One of the reasons Vietnamization was successful in 1969 was due to the redeployment of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division from I Corps to III Corps, the area around Saigon and northwest to the Cambodian border. This move led to a dramatic decrease in communist attacks on Saigon. American and South Vietnamese troops also inflicted heavy casualties on communist forces without raising public ire. This gave Saigon time to breath, time to implement training programs, and time to focus on manpower and logistical needs. Ironically, it also drove North Vietnamese forces deeper inside Cambodia, leading to the 1969 bombing raids and the 1970 incursion that Prentice argues was one of the contributing factors to Vietnamization's ultimate failure.

Now to the major quibble. Prentice has sanitized Nixon to the point that he is almost unrecognizable. Throughout the book, Nixon is shown as a rational actor who never lets his insecurities and emotions mix with policy decisions. Every decision he makes, in this telling, is carefully calculated for its strategic and tactical value. Every decision is made with a steady hand and steely-eyed realism. Prentice does conclude that, "Watergate and the war ran together," and that "Watergate considerably reduced the president's power and options further still," (175) but there is not much consideration of Nixon's emotions or personality beyond that.

It may be true, as some Nixon scholars claim, that Nixon was no trickier than his predecessors. But the war and Watergate took a personal toll on Nixon, and readers should see the impact of this pressure on the man and his thinking. Did Nixon's near obsession with leaks and perceived slights have a role in the administration's Vietnam policies? Did Nixon's scandal undo the promises he and Kissinger made to Thiệu about Vietnamization and U.S. support? Did Watergate erode support for Vietnamization in Congress, even among Republicans? How much of Nixon's unwillingness to work with Congress was because of his personal make-up? Readers need to have the full Nixon on the page to assess the man and his policies.

These comments aside, *Unwilling to Quit* is a significant addition to the scholarship on the Vietnam War. Utilizing the latest source material from the United States and archives in Vietnam, *Unwilling to Quit* is a must-read for historians of U.S. foreign relations because it covers so much new ground on an important topic.

Review of David L. Prentice. *Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam.*

Hang Le-Tormala

The recent passing of Henry Kissinger once again reminded the world of a war that deeply divided the United States, one that consumed "the best and the brightest" Americans (to borrow historian David Halberstam's words) serving various administrations of *the* world power at the time. As one of the most controversial conflicts in U.S. history, the Vietnam War has inspired generations of scholars to examine its politics and the decision-makers involved. The robust body of literature on the topic prompts the question: Is there anything new to say about the Vietnam War? What else have we not learned about the U.S. policies of escalation and de-escalation or the ending of the United States' involvement in Vietnam? David L. Prentice's beautifully written monograph will surprise those who believe that the full story of the Vietnam War has been told. Presenting President Richard Nixon's "Vietnamization" phase of the conflict in Indochina in a new light, *Unwilling to Quit* scrutinizes the political context and the individuals who influenced the president's de-escalation policy in the final years of the war in Vietnam. Prentice persuasively presents three major arguments. First, he holds that it was Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, not Nixon, who pursued and persisted in the policy of Vietnamization, gradually turning combat duties over to the South Vietnamese army, which is often perceived as a pivotal move and particular characteristic of the Nixon Administration. Second, Prentice focuses on the period of 1969-1971 as the defining years of Nixon's shift in his Vietnam policy. What happened after 1971, he argues, amounts to the consequences, not the causes of that transformation. Third, Prentice presents Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, President of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), as a major influence on U.S. policy, playing a significant and active role in convincing Nixon that Vietnamization was plausible. Mining the newly declassified documents and international archives, Prentice sheds new light on the much-debated topic.

Chapter One familiarizes readers with a brief history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the stalemate that Nixon inherited. Facing a resolute enemy and a war-weary home front, Nixon wrestled with an honorable exit from a quagmire that had entrenched previous administrations. He wanted to end the war, but he certainly did not want to be the first U.S. president to lose a war. His predecessor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, had attempted to negotiate with Hanoi and accepted the National Liberation Front (NLF), North Vietnam's ally in the South, in the peace talks that followed the Tet Offensive in 1968. President Thiệu, however, rejected the idea of a coalition government for South Vietnam that would include the NLF. Frustrated by Johnson and concerned about U.S. domestic tension, which posed a threat to U.S. funding for his war effort, he wanted to reduce American direct involvement and strengthen his army. Thiệu started to advocate for de-Americanization in mid-1968 in the hopes of pacifying antiwar Americans, which in turn would help maintain popular and congressional support for his country. Thiệu's initiative was supported by General Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr. (Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam), Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, but Johnson discarded the idea of unilateral withdrawal. Johnson wanted North Vietnamese forces out of the South as well, but he did not believe that Thiệu's plan paved the way to victory for South Vietnam. Likewise, Nixon never proposed unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops, either. De-Americanization, renamed "Vietnamization" in 1969 by Melvin Laird, therefore, was an idea inherited, not created by the Nixon Administration, asserts Prentice.

Chapter Two describes the Nixon-Kissinger alliance, resulting in an escalation of the violence in Vietnam and its neighboring countries. Winning the election by a landslide in 1968, Nixon entered the White House with his campaign promise "Peace with Honor," but without a plan to accomplish it. "Goaded by [National Security Advisor Henry] Kissinger", Prentice writes, Nixon intended to escalate the war to bring North Vietnam to its knees. Melvin Laird opposed escalation (32). However, he was by no means a dove. As Prentice pinpoints, Laird shared the same goals as Nixon: to prevent South Vietnam from crumbling under communist expansion and to secure Nixon's reelection. The difference lay in their approaches. On the one hand, Kissinger advocated coercive diplomacy for a negotiated victory, in which he hoped to bring the communist leaders to peace talks by increasing military pressure on Hanoi. Laird, on the other hand, concerned about domestic unrest and congressional constraint, sought to prolong the war, buying time to strengthen South Vietnam's military, restore public support, and secure continued U.S. funding for an ultimate victory. While understanding Laird's rationale for de-escalation, Nixon found Kissinger's "great power diplomacy" more appealing as it fit perfectly with his "Madman Theory." The "mad pair" of Nixon-Kissinger even reformed the National Security Council to empower the White House in shaping foreign policies (39). As Prentice indicates, the alliance was so strong that Nixon and Kissinger would try to circumvent both secretaries of State and Defense in pursuing coercive diplomacy.

Chapter Three focuses on Laird's efforts to sell Vietnamization to Nixon and the president's dilemma of whether to agree with the Secretary of Defense or to listen to the National Security Advisor. While the idea of Vietnamization was not new, the key point in 1969 was to change Johnson's plan of bilateral withdrawal to unilateral withdrawal. Laird gained significant support from President Thiệu and General Abrams for this strategy. For them, troop withdrawal did not mean abandonment. It served, instead, as a means to soothe American public and congressional antiwar sentiments. Once political support was restored, they believed that financial assistance, which South Vietnam desperately needed to build up its military and economy, would be secured. Then the republic would be able to fight off communist expansion. Laird saw the urgent need to ease domestic tensions and warned the president that he had but "a brief grace period," (57). Understanding the threat of the ticking time bomb, Nixon agreed to a token unilateral withdrawal to regain support and buy time for military escalation from Thiệu. In the meantime, Laird, knowing the president's hidden plan of escalating airpower, executed his own secret agenda. The Secretary of Defense leaked to the media information about withdrawal before the president announced it, ignored a presidential order on escalating bombing campaigns, and reduced air operations in Vietnam altogether. He also proposed a draft lottery. To Nixon's frustration, it seemed he had no option but to follow Laird's path.

Chapter Four contextualizes Nixon's decision making in the entanglement of international politics. After announcing U.S. troop withdrawal from Indochina, Nixon took a further step, stating that he was going to apply the same strategy to the U.S. global commitment – emboldening local forces so that they could take up the primary responsibility of containing communism. The so-called Nixon Doctrine was an attempt to balance "America's needs with its global obligations" (74). Prentice offers a keen insight into how other international leaders viewed and responded to Nixon's moves. Bolstered by progress in his regime's capability to control more territory, Thiệu continued to push for Vietnamization. Leaders of North Vietnam and the NLF were skeptical. They believed

Vietnamization was a propaganda ploy and anticipated a U.S. military escalation as "a wild beast in its death throes"(81). The North Vietnamese Communist Party's First Secretary, Lê Duẩn, employed the strategy of "talking while fighting" until achieving the reunification of Vietnam (82). Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split added complications to the matter. While the Soviet Union wanted North Vietnam to negotiate peace, China pushed for resolute fighting. The U.S. desire to achieve détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China also had an impact on its Vietnam policy.

Chapter Five details the critical moment when Nixon abandoned the strategy of Duck Hook and switched to Vietnamization between September and November 1969. Codenamed "Pruning Knife," Duck Hook was Kissinger's design to launch "a savage, decisive blow against North Vietnam" (105) should the latter refuse to bow to him at the negotiating table by November 1st. According to Prentice, the bond of the "mad pair" was most manifested in the Duck Hook planning process as Nixon gave "explicit instructions" to exclude Laird and other cabinet members from the affair (106). Laird, however, in his own way, learned about Duck Hook anyway. Believing "Duck Hook would be too costly, financially and politically," he worked relentlessly to prevent the military onslaught (111). As Prentice proves, Laird understood the real risk of challenging public opinion in a democracy. Eventually, Nixon changed his mind in October and officially announced Vietnamization in November.

Chapter Six analyzes Nixon's "Great silent majority" – those who did not oppose the war, or at least at that point remained "unwilling to quit." Under Prentice's scrutiny, there was a glimmering hope of success for both the United States and South Vietnam, among leadership and ordinary citizens, between November 1969 and March 1970. Nixon's and Thiệu's rating improved. So did optimism for South Vietnam's progress. As the author aptly points out, it was because most people perceived Vietnamization as good politics underpinned by domestic pressure. Few realized that it was fundamentally a military strategy to buy time in regaining internal and external support, to strengthen the ally, and ultimately to resume military operations to defeat the enemy. Soon the "progress" reported from South Vietnam proved to be hollow.

Chapter Seven investigates how Vietnamization fell apart. Overconfidence and miscalculations are common formulae for failures. As the glimmering hope in late 1969 and early 1970 became magnified, U.S. and South Vietnamese leadership felt emboldened, so emboldened that they believed it was time to act. Nixon and Kissinger thought they could bypass Congress and resume escalation. "They were wrong," Prentice fittingly remarks (144). When MACV (US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) proposed invasions of Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971, respectively, to destroy North Vietnam's southward march, Thiệu and Kissinger readily agreed. Thiệu was positive his army would succeed, provided that U.S. air support was at his disposal. Kissinger saw an opportunity to resume escalation and slow down withdrawal. While confident in his "Great Silent Majority," Nixon also wanted to win the non-silent minority's votes. Thus, he ordered the invasions while speeding up withdrawal. The military operations were disastrous, revealing South Vietnam's unreadiness and reigniting antiwar protests. Adding salt to injuries, the year 1971 also witnessed Thiệu's dubious reelection and the release of the Pentagon Papers. These two events significantly diminished public trust in both the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments. The "light at the end of the tunnel" was about to be extinguished.

Chapter Eight examines the three tests that Vietnamization had to undergo: politics, military, and diplomacy. Of the three, the political test brought victory for Nixon. The fact that he won reelection with a landslide in 1972 indicated Vietnamization worked beautifully, as Laird had anticipated in 1969. The glory would not last long, however. Militarily, it exposed South Vietnam's weaknesses and its dependence on the United States' generous, long-term support. Unfortunately, by 1972, the South Vietnam republic's survival seemed much less important to the United States. The American exit became the top priority. Hanoi, on the other hand, awaited an opportunity. Without U.S. firepower to challenge them, reunifying the country under communism was no longer out of reach. Nevertheless, until that day, North Vietnam would suffer from U.S. operations Linebacker and Linebacker II, the bombing campaigns that unleashed "unprecedented U.S. firepower" (171). The signing of the Paris Accords of 1973 officially ended the United States'' involvement in Southeast Asia, asthe end of the Republic of Vietnam loomed large on the horizon.

Through David L. Prentice's skillful dissection, he displays the details of a complex picture of Vietnamization. He masterfully walks readers through the labyrinth of individual personalities, personal pursuits, national interests, and international relations – all factors that are involved in a major policy shift in an effort to achieve the same outcomes. Prentice reminds us that personality matters, even in high politics. One might find it amusing seeing Laird outwit Kissinger (33-34) or outmaneuver Nixon (62). The title, "Unwilling to Quit," aptly applies to all sides: the Nixon administration and a significant portion of the American population, Thiệu's regime, and Lê Duẩn's forces.

Unwilling to Quit is a fascinating read for anyone interested in the politics of the Vietnam War, conflict or peace studies, and diplomatic history. The historian's poetic writing style brings high politics to life. Undergraduates of upper levels and graduate students will benefit from the rich content and analytical approach of the book. My only minor suggestion is to add chapter descriptions to the introduction in future editions. Nevertheless, the monograph serves as an excellent example of comprehensive and resourceful research, especially for graduate students or novice scholars. Not only did Prentice take advantage of newly declassified documents in the United States and Vietnam, he also creatively drew upon sources from seemingly unrelated archives in Australia, England, and Canada. Furthermore, the author's interview with the key character, Melvin Laird, is another precious gift to readers.

David L. Prentice, *Unwilling to Quit: The Long Unwinding of American Involvement in Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2023)

Sandra Scanlon

David Prentice offers a compelling narrative of the final years of American warmaking in Vietnam, presenting what can justly be described as the definitive account of the policymaking process during the first years of the administration of President Richard Nixon. Extensively exploring newly declassified materials from the Nixon White House, Prentice deftly articulates the variety of military and diplomatic options—and indeed the diversity of courses pursued—during the first year of the administration. Ultimately, he convincingly argues, the president accepted the only viable long-term option—de-Americanization of a war that the United States could not anticipate ending by other acceptable means. Yet, as the title of the monograph makes clear, the White House, most Americans, and many Vietnamese 'remained unwilling to quit.' There was no single decision making process that defined the fates of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. Even as the Nixon administration determined

to withdraw its own troops in piecemeal fashion, Prentice makes clear that there was no "teleological winding down of America's war in Vietnam." The policy that became known as Vietnamization was a process continually contingent on military, diplomatic, and political factors, while the "temptation to terminate the conflict with military force remained strong" (1). While Vietnamization became the process by which the United States slowly ended its military presence, and ultimately its military commitments, to South Vietnam, it did not in itself define either the terms or means by which the United States would exit Southeast Asia. Prentice's work thereby directly challenges accounts of the Nixon administration that have argued that the inauguration of Vietnamization in mid-1970 represented a turning point at which the president had a clear vision as to the outcome of the war. Key policymakers—Melvin Laird and Henry Kissinger most especially—saw diverse opportunities and threats stemming from phased troop withdrawals. In the long process of taking American personnel out of Southeast Asia, policies were influenced more by misplaced optimism than an assumption that the United States would ultimately cut and run or secure no more than a decent interval between the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime.

At the heart of Prentice's work is a call to recognize the pivotal role of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in determining U.S. policy in Vietnam during the first two years of the administration. Without a clearly defined plan to end the war, the Nixon administration in 1969 considered a range of military and diplomatic options. As previous scholars—most notably Jeffrey Kimball—have argued, the president's focus on a military solution during 1969 was paramount, and he favored military escalation at key points until 1973.[1] Prentice does not challenge this perspective, but he stresses that earlier accounts have failed to acknowledge Laird's significance during 1969 or consider the reasons why his policy preference ultimately formed the bedrock on which U.S. policy was based. By 1971, Prentice concludes, the idea that the U.S. military would leave Vietnam regardless of the diplomatic outcome trumped any other policy option. Laird's commitment to removing American servicemen was based firmly on domestic considerations, notwithstanding the view shared by many in Washington that America's interminable war in Vietnam was damaging its global credibility. Laird "was no dove" (53) and he shared the goal of ensuring South Vietnam's long-term security that drove National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's militaristic approach during 1969. Kissinger's position was more favored by Nixon during 1969, however, Laird "quietly and methodically prepared to set America on a different course out of Vietnam" (52). Warning Nixon that the public would not tolerate the continuation of the war at its current level, Laird sought a way to buy time for South Vietnam. As such, he set about pursuing a withdrawal strategy that would decouple troop withdrawals from a diplomatic solution or an abrupt ending of the war. He "pursued a policy of Vietnamization to achieve the same ends as Nixon and Kissinger, but his strategy would prolong the war to enable South Vietnamese self-defense in the absence of a peace settlement" (53). Indeed, it was Laird's lack of faith in a diplomatic solution that conditioned his view that South Vietnam's survival largely depended on endless war, a war that, at least politically, U.S. personnel could not fight. Prentice sees Vietnamization as Laird's means of dealing with a domestic political problem—a means of buying time in the face of growing antiwar activism that would reach an inevitable conclusion—while maintaining a commitment to securing an elusive victory in Vietnam.

As much as Prentice methodically sets out the means by which Laird secured his policy objectives between 1969 and 1971, he attributes far greater weight to the agency of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, and particularly President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, than earlier scholars of the Nixon administration. Building on scholarship that looks at the war from Vietnamese perspectives, Prentice details Thiệu's early embrace of incremental U.S. troop withdrawals and his increasing influence on defining the parameters of U.S. policy in both principle and practice.[2] Utilizing sources from British, Australian, and Canadian diplomatic archives, Prentice paints a picture of a leader at once committed to his state's survival through the demonstration of independence and the securing of U.S. military and economic assistance, and yet still incapable of truly understanding the limitations of his government's domestic authority or military capabilities. Gauging international perceptions of Thiệu provides important context to American perspectives, but the work of engaging with a wider range of Vietnamese sources remains to be done. Still, the emphasis on Thiệu recontextualizes American decision making. Believing that U.S. withdrawal was inevitable given the growth of mainstream antiwar activism and Congressional challenges to the White House, Thiệu pushed for reduced American military personnel in exchange for guarantees of economic support and military assistance. The nature of such military assistance remained ambiguous, and it is possible that, during the development of Vietnamization, Thiệu expected the United States to continue its air support indefinitely. In many respects, Thiệu saw Vietnamization the same way that many American conservatives did — as an opportunity to unfetter South Vietnam from the constraints associated with limited war.[3] While American policymakers may have had similar ambitions, Prentice makes clear that even as Laird was determined to keep withdrawals at pace, the administration had no set plan for such withdrawals, the timings of which were supposedly contingent on diplomatic progress; but they were increasingly determined by the rate of Congressional opposition to the war and Nixon's pessimism about domestic political circumstances.

Thiệu's agency was indirect but helped negatively shape both American military perspectives about the capacity of South Vietnamese forces to stand alone, and Congressional attitudes about the desirability of allying with the South Vietnamese regime at all. Thiệu's authoritarian approach was devastatingly revealed by his 1971 election, and along with the military disaster of Lam Son 719—which revealed that U.S. and Vietnamese expectations about American air support for ARVN ground operations was unsound—these factors vitalized Congressional calls for setting a firm date for U.S. withdrawal. Increasing challenges to the pace of Nixon's withdrawal strategy, and White House fears that amendments setting out clear dates for withdrawal would further constrain U.S. diplomatic leverage, enhanced Nixon's commitment to pressuring Hanoi via short, intensive bombing campaigns. As such, Prentice dissects the turbulence underpinning decision making, and the interplay between political, military, and diplomatic objectives. While previous scholars have certainly paid considerable attention to Nixon's worldview and political calculations, Prentice considers the broader domestic context. In this sense, Nixon is less an architect than a player in a multifaceted, highly contingent environment. The domestic context became "an ever-present third adviser, always shaping Nixon's thinking on Vietnam. Kissinger and Laird gave him options; the polls, press, and Congress gave demands" (40).

Rather than look for clear rationality in policy decisions, *Unwilling to Quit* reflects on the function of delusion. By early 1970, Nixon and Thiệu's "new optimism had become hubris" and their actions during 1970 and 1971 did much to undermine Vietnamization (143). Prentice notes that when Nixon visited the United Kingdom in 1969, British officials "did not interpret Midway or the Guam speech as the beginning of an American sellout. They saw Vietnamization

as Nixon's attempt to 'buy time' at home while pursuing the military and diplomatic measures necessary to achieve a settlement" (95). The British may have shared Nixon's hopes for Vietnamization, hopes that at times were also held by policymakers including Laird and Kissinger. But both men recognized that Vietnamization was unlikely to bring peace, and they clearly anticipated that war would either continue or resume once U.S. ground forces departed. If Kissinger was more realistic about the likelihood of South Vietnam's inability to survive a post-withdrawal assault from North Vietnam, Laird early on disputed warnings from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While they concluded in 1969 that South Vietnam could manage domestic attacks from the National Liberation Front, the JCS rejected hopes that South Vietnamese forces would be able to withstand an invasion from North Vietnam. "Laird," Prentice notes, "disagreed and ordered the JCS to prepare and equip the South Vietnamese to handle both regular and guerilla forces" (105). If Laird was clear-sighted about the domestic constraints on continuing the war, he too was subject to unwarranted optimism about the ability of the United States to control the post-withdrawal situation in Vietnam. As 1972 revealed both North Vietnam's intransigence and its military fragilities, Prentice describes how Nixon's fear that "Vietnamization was a hollow strategy" coexisted with his continued determination to use bombardment to avoid quitting either the war or the "political winner" that withdrawals promised (168). Nixon, along with Thiệu and Lê Duẩn, had little hope of avoiding war after the Accords went into effect, but "Nixon and Kissinger believed the agreement would justify continued U.S. assistance to South Vietnam and intervention with airpower should North Vietnam violate it, though they hoped that deterrence and great power diplomacy would make such violence unnecessary" (174). If not quite in the realm of wishful thinking, such optimism ignored the reality that military assistance required Congressional support for both Nixon and Thiệu, which in 1973 could have been deemed unlikely by any informed observer and which became entirely untenable once Watergate consumed the political agenda.

Analyses of the Nixon White House based on access to declassified administration sources has formed a major part of the war's historiography for upwards of twenty-five years. In parts, *Unwilling to Quit* covers familiar territory, particularly as it describes the final year of the war. This is in part because Prentice's clear objective was to demonstrate Laird's considerable influence in overcoming Kissinger's hostility to troop withdrawals and credit his success by 1971 in putting the United States on an irrevocable path to withdrawal. Laird seems to leave the scene for much of the book's final chapters, which is somewhat jarring. Thiệu remains a clear presence, but further studies—utilizing Vietnamese sources—will need to tell the story of his government's final days. *Unwilling to Quit* leaves the reader—as no previous study of Nixon's Vietnam policy has done—with the inescapable view that Laird's withdrawal strategy overcame all other alternatives because domestic realities undercut any goal of avoiding catastrophe for South Vietnam. The outcome for the Republic of Vietnam was neither foreordained nor secured by Nixon's policies, and the pace of withdrawals remained contingent on events in Vietnam and Paris. Scholars will debate the extent to which U.S. support could have sustained South Vietnam in the long-term, but Prentice ably elucidates that that withdrawal in 1973 did not indicate a conscious embrace of a decent interval or a firm plan to return to an air war against North Vietnam. The only outcome set in stone was the U.S. exit from its ground war in Southeast Asia, and the only clear goals were those centered on the political wellbeing of American leaders, who were vulnerable to criticism from the American public.

Notes:
1. For divergent opinions on the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy and its expectations for peace and U.S. military policies in a post-settlement Southeast Asia, see Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); and Robert K. Brigham, *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam* (New York: Public Affairs, 2018).
2. See Pierre Asselin, *Vietnam's American War: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Simon Toner, "Imagining Taiwan: The Nixon Administration, the Developmental States, and South Vietnam's Search for Economic Viability, 1969-1975," *Diplomatic History* 41:4 (September 2017): 772–798; Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).
3. See Sandra Scanlon, *The Pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern American Conservatism* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013).

Editor's note: *Passport* offered Dr. Prentice the opportunity to respond to the roundtable reviews on his book. He responded as follows: "Rather than read and respond to the participants, the author has elected to spend time with his family." Given that he has left academia, *Passport* understands and accepts Dr. Prentice's decision. ***AJ***

A Roundtable on Jessica Chapman, *Remaking the World: Decolonialization and the Cold War*

Jason C. Parker, R. Joseph Parrott, Matthew Masur, Shaun Armstead, and Jessica Chapman

Jessica Chapman, *Remaking the World: Decolonization and the Cold War Passport* Roundtable Introduction

Jason C. Parker

If the independent nation-states of the 1960 "Year of Africa" were individual people, they would be bringing up the rear of the Baby Boom, and looking ahead to collecting Social Security next year. The Cold War ended half their "lives" ago, well before they had hit middle age. Thus, although detailed empirical investigation into their lifespans has proceeded apace, it is far from archivally complete. Its conceptual framework is even less so. Our understanding of the twinned postwar phenomena of decolonization and the Cold War, and of their precise interrelationship, is necessarily only in its early stages. Jessica Chapman's *Remaking the World: Decolonization and the Cold War* arose as an attempt to fill both classroom and conceptual needs. Her synthesis curates six case-studies– India, Egypt, Congo, Vietnam, Angola, and Iran– in pursuit of a holistic if not quite comprehensive understanding of the nucleic connections between Cold War and decolonization. The reviewers concur with her core argument of the fundamental inseparability of the two phenomena, "intertwined in a recursive loop" as Masur puts it, and on the whole they praise the book, though not without some reservations.

The reviewers agree on the book's strengths. In addition to its persuasive central claim of inseparability of the two (in Armstead's words) "mutually constitutive processes," they recognize that its scope is ambitious– perhaps beyond the limits of realizability in a single volume. They find nonetheless that Chapman has made an admirable intervention that gains much ground. They laud its inclusion of not just the American and Soviet superpowers but two of the other major external actors involved– the secondary communist powers of China and Cuba– as well as "internal" actors like Nehru and Nasser. All of these could stake a more plausible claim of "Third World" identity in the decolonization drama than could either of the global-North superpowers. This netted them little more external control than had U.S. or Soviet intrusions; all parties were at the mercy of one another, and above all of events. But it did open up avenues for cooperation and manipulation. As Armstead writes, Chapman posits the expiring empires "as less a canvas for the US, Soviet Union, China, and Cuba to paint their aspirations for the future than an active participant in the Cold War." She does so artfully– all the reviewers praise her prose– including when the tale turns to suffering and tragedy in, for example, Vietnam. Two of the reviewers single out that chapter as especially strong, unsurprising given the author's expertise and previous book.

Some little overlap exists among the reviewers' critiques. All acknowledge the challenge of assembling a selection of case-studies that coheres even as it falls short of a perhaps-unattainable comprehensiveness. The number, depth, and selection of case-studies makes structural imbalances of various kinds difficult to avoid. The reviewers' criticisms are leavened by sympathy for any scholar taking on this challenge, and by the aforementioned recognition of the book's ambition and accomplishments. For Masur, the most striking imbalances are to be found in individual chapters such as the one on the Congo. In that and a number of others, he laments the lesser attention paid to the late- and post-Cold War phases of the story. Armstead and Parrott disagree on an important conceptual matter, which in turn points to the sharpest critique of the lot. While Parrott finds that Chapman's framing ultimately reproduces a global-North-centered vision of the postwar era, Armstead finds the rough opposite– that the book balances "both [Cold War and decolonization] in a single narrative that avoids replicating in print the subjugation of the Global South." For Parrott, this imbalance in sources and structure leads to an asymmetry between the book's two main themes, such that the book falls short of its stated mission. He argues that this forecloses many of the interpretive possibilities for understanding the postwar global-South, above all the networks and groups that sought more and various internationalist/cooperative alternatives to the Cold War framework and to the postcolonial unitary nation-state alike.

Parrott has a point that such roads-not-taken are in need of deeper and continued studyas we rethink the postwar era. But many of these "roads" are more fascinating in retrospect than they were consequential in their moment. Most avatars of internationalist solidarities were themselves unwilling to give up hard-won national sovereignty in the name of some grander abstract aspiration. Chapman concedes that her national-case-study structure ineluctably pulls her analysis away from such visions. She is, however, on solid empirical ground insofar as the nation-state model did in fact triumph in the end. As we exhume that story, we should indeed be mindful of those roads not taken, and perhaps even regret the lost potential opportunities. At the same time, we should take care not to write the nation-state's triumph into a self-fulfilling prophecy– but, on any realistic scale or timeline, the nation-state was always thought to be the likeliest model by virtually all players who were actually in power, whether at the superpower, metropolitan, or anticolonial-nationalist levels. As the roster of U.N. member nations rose from fifty-one in 1945 to almost two hundred a generation later, the savvy bettor would have if anything wagered on the "over" of the latter number. Finally, *pace* Parrott, "elevating internationalist aspects of the decolonizing project to

operate at the same level as familiar policies such as containment" is tough to imagine given the state of the field as it stands– again, more fascinating than consequential. For all the tragedy at particular sites of decolonization, such stakes amounted to less than the prospect of an existential, worldwide, hair-trigger nuclear apocalypse.

As part of the growing corpus of works by such scholars as Odd Arne Westad, Heonik Kwon, Lorenz Luthi, Jeff Byrne, and Frank Gerits, *Remaking the World* contributes valuably to our classroom efforts as well as to our conceptual ones. Westad's latest in particular offers a provocative tandem with Chapman's book; relocating the four decades of the Cold War proper into a century-long time-frame raises captivating questions about our holistic view of modernity in world history. As those decolonized sovereign nation-states enter what would be their human twilight years, they will in the process soon reach an equilibrium in which the spans of their colonial and postcolonial periods are of equivalent length. Chapman's book adds to the body of scholarship that advances our understanding, and facilitates our work doing the same with our students, of the world that the "long Cold War" and the even longer (ongoing?) process of decolonization made.

Review of Jessica M. Chapman, *Remaking the World: Decolonization and the Cold War*

R. Joseph Parrott

In recent years, decolonization and its ramifications on the global system have arguably begun to displace the bipolar Cold War as the centerpiece of international history. While the superpower conflict cannot be ignored and continues to demand attention for its contemporary echoes, a proliferation of scholarship has offered new analyses of both familiar and novel events from the perspective of actors long seen as peripheral. This has produced an awareness of both the ways that the decentralization of the international system complicated the Cold War and how that conflict constrained ambitious decolonial and anti-imperial projects seeking political, economic, and social independence. Yet many of these fascinating and informative studies have been somewhat esoteric in their interests and dense in their research, limiting their ability to communicate these intellectual shifts outside the field.

Enter Jessica Chapman's *Remaking the World: Decolonization and the Cold War*. This synthetic history uses over three decades of scholarship to explore how economic and military battlegrounds emerged in the Global South as an extension of the Cold War. An expert on the South Vietnamese state, Chapman deploys the same careful consideration of domestic anti-colonial politics – and their operation within Cold War constraints – that informed her previous scholarship, but now on a global scale. With an eye for detail and an ear for pithy analytical quotes from historical actors and historians alike, she lays out a broad examination of how decolonization and superpower conflict operated across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Postcolonial states "faced an onslaught of postcolonial problems that played out under the long shadow of the Cold War" (10). Superpower attempts to manage these tensions, she argues, served to widen and deepen the conflict while often having deleterious, polarizing effects on the nationalist projects that emerged in the wake of imperial retreat.

After setting the stage with an overview of the main events of the Cold War and decolonization, Chapman uses six case studies to explore key inflection points in this interaction. The first two focus on how India and Egypt sought to forge independent foreign policies while navigating and utilizing the Cold War to achieve goals of domestic development and regional influence. Chapman presents India as the archetype for the superpowers' economic competition in the Global South. She credits Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with pioneering the idea of non-alignment, an attempt to create "the space necessary to develop independently while also enabling [postcolonial states] to court critical foreign aid" (43). Nehru successfully parleyed these dual sources of assistance into ambitious modernization programs, but the process was complicated by regional rivalries with Communist China and US-allied Pakistan. As regional tensions turned to armed conflict, India drifted toward the Soviet Union while the United States aligned with China and Pakistan, creating a nuclear arms race in South Asia that outlived the Cold War. Egypt under Gamel Abdel Nasser initially followed a similar path to Nehru's India but achieved its greatest victory by nationalizing the Suez Canal and navigating the crisis caused by European intervention. While not delving deeply into Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions, Chapman notes that regional tensions again reinforced Cold War divisions as they became entwined with the Arab-Israeli conflict until Anwar Sadat worked with the United States to normalize Egyptian relations with the Jewish state. The lesson here seems to be that neutrality proved difficult to achieve amidst regional competition, which encouraged Cold War alignments even when the superpowers proved reluctant to graft the global conflict onto local ones.

The next pair of case studies shift to highlight the expanding role of Cold War interventionism during the period of rapid decolonization and global revolutions in the 1960s. The complex conflict between the Pan-African nationalist Patrice Lumumba and the Belgian-backed secession of Katanga invited a controversial United Nations intervention and resulted in Lumumba's assassination. Chapman highlights a general theme of the book when she notes "The intervention of former colonial powers, the superpowers, and the UN into the crisis infused the Congo's civil conflict with ideological and military characteristics that subverted the country's – and indeed much of Africa's – political and economic development" (139). The damage such intrusions caused is nowhere more obvious than Vietnam, which is unsurprisingly the most detailed and convincing case given the author's expertise on the topic. As anti-colonial revolution gave way to superpower supported civil war, both North and South Vietnam adopted increasingly authoritarian systems, fueling an aggressive militancy in Hanoi and revolutionary challenges to Saigon's rule. Neither U.S. troops nor diplomacy could protect the South, as the United States underestimated North Vietnam's commitment to revolution and overestimated the influence of allies like the Soviet Union and China. Indeed, as the American war finally ended, the simmering regional tensions it masked emerged quickly, leading to the brief Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

The book concludes with an examination of the long-term effects of Cold War intervention through the cases of Angola and Iran. Chapman provides a good overview of the competing ethnic and ideological origins of Angolan nationalist parties during the anti-Portuguese liberation movement, and their subsequent competition for control of the independent state. She follows Piero Gleijeses' timeline that posits a U.S. intervention alongside South Africa that invited a Cuban-led, Soviet-backed defense of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The limited MPLA victory helped revive the Cold War; it indicated a new ability for the Soviet Union to project its power directly into the Global South while rallying cold warriors concerned over the post-Vietnam drift of U.S. policy to support an anti-MPLA guerilla movement, fueling a civil war that only ended in 2002. By contrast,

the revolution in Iran emerged from the legacies of an earlier intervention, as the authoritarian rule of the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran elevated the Ayatollah Khomeini's radical Islamist nationalism as the most viable alternative. Khomeini's revolution rejected both Soviet and American visions of modernization but exacerbated ethnic and religious rivalries in the region, inspiring a decade-long war with Iraq in which both sides were supported by U.S. arms. The Cold War continued to fuel internecine conflicts, even as the Islamist revolution challenged the superpower monopoly on ideological competition.

While these cases are all complex, the book manages to offer a highly readable overview of the Cold War in the Global South. Chapman is an excellent writer, and she marshals an impressive ability to balance detailed political histories of individual states with high diplomacy. Most chapters feature multiple, overlapping competitions in both domestic and international arenas, yet the actors and their interests remain clear. Her command of the Cold War literature is impressive, and she ably condenses key insights from long, dense monographs into narratives that remain accessible to non-specialist scholars and students. Her ability to interweave the analyses and conclusions from well-regarded historians of twentieth century international affairs makes this a one-stop-shop for familiarizing the uninitiated with both the factual outline and key interpretations of the Cold War in the Global South. At their best, some of these chapters–like the one on Vietnam and much of the Congo section–are practically state of the field overviews, at least in terms of English-language literature.

Yet as strong as the book is in conceptualizing and covering the Cold War, it is inconsistent in its analysis of the global process and projects of decolonization. While the introduction and conclusion seek to position these two phenomena as near equal in their importance to the twentieth century, the superpower competition is more prominent across chapters. It defines the timeline, cases, and themes to the detriment of fuller discussions of nationalism and Global South anti-imperialism. This begins in the first overview chapter, where the Wilson-Lenin philosophical competition over self-determination introduces the topics of nationalism and decolonization rather than a host of alternatives like the congress movements in India and South Africa, W.E.B. DuBois' conceptualization of the global color line, or even Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905. The first stirrings of post-war nationalism are then situated within a discussion of containment. This framing continues throughout the book, with superpower policies receiving more detailed considerations than Southern ideas, debates, and institutions. In the Egypt chapter, for instance, there are numerous quotes from U.S. officials ranging from John Foster Dulles to Harry Truman to the U.S. minister in Cairo in 1932, but only one passage in Nasser's own words. A quick glance at the index or a text search provides further evidence of this imbalance: Dulles appears more than Kwame Nkrumah, Mao Zedong, or Ho Chi Minh; U.S. Senator Joe McCarthy as much as Frantz Fanon.

As a result, the ways that Global South leaders reimagined the international system, transnational ideas of decolonization and development, and the institutions to address historic inequities get short shrift. To give one surprising example, there are just two vague allusions to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), despite case studies featuring major founding personalities in Nehru and Nasser. Non-alignment is dealt with primarily as an extension of Indian foreign policy, meaning there is no discussion of the competing visions of Southern international activism that informed the institution and ultimately limited its effectiveness far more than the Cold War. Chapman even seems to condense the Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961) Conferences into a single event, saying that Nasser rubbed shoulders with Josip Broz Tito at the earlier Afro-Asian summit (82). I suspect this was a product of editing or trying to integrate too much information into a single sentence, but it gives a sense of how briefly this movement is considered when Cold War topics like Eisenhower's New Look adjustment to containment or Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights get entire paragraphs.[1]

Some of these issues reflect the inherent difficulties in balancing many different narratives and themes across the case studies, but it also reveals a real problem with existing scholarship that is replicated in Chapman's research. Frank Gerits notes in his work on Ghana that historians have traditionally downplayed broad visions of international affairs and institutions emanating from the Global South, especially in terms of their ability to operate as universally accessible or interventionist ideologies.[2] This helps explain why the massive process of decolonization that transformed the globe has long been subservient to discussions of the Cold War in international histories of the twentieth century, only emerging as a phenomenon of equal or greater weight in the last ten to fifteen years. Therefore, even the deeply researched, multi-archival studies of the New Cold War History tended to focus on how Southern nationalism complicated or qualified superpower ambitions, and these texts guide much of Chapman's analysis. This is especially frustrating because scholars like Michelle Louro, Adom Getachew, Jeffrey James Byrne, and Asher Orkaby have produced important work using Southern nations, leaders, and conflicts as starting points to reorient their analysis of the international system and competition within it.[3] With inconsistent attention to this scholarship on the global ideas and implications of decolonization, the ideological and military competition between the superpowers serves as the primary element drawing linkages across case studies, limiting Southern projects to a primarily national scope.

This reinforces the temptation to treat the case studies discretely. Lowering the barriers between chapters would have produced some novel conclusions due to the clear and fascinating overlaps that appear throughout the narratives presented in the book. It would have been interesting, for instance, to use Michelle Louro's study of Nehru to highlight the specific influence socialism had on nationalist worldviews during the interwar period, and how the decision to abandon that radicalism after achieving independence shaped Indian ideas of neutralism.[4] Similarly, Chapman could have considered how the Sino-Vietnamese War complicates Cold War narratives of intervention that rely heavily on assessments of the Franco-American conflicts in South Asia, or she could have used Lorenz Lüthi's exploration of the NAM to explain the ways that Nasser's activist vision of "positive non-alignment" contrasted with Nehru.[5] Highlighting the central role that Mobutu's Zaire/Congo played in Angola offers implications for assessing whether U.S. interventions caused their own domino effects.[6] Chapman's habit of quoting liberally from her secondary sources when offering analysis, focused as many are on specific countries and Cold War relationships, further distracts from the connections and cross-currents visible in the book. For instance, a concluding quote in chapter 7 from Paul Thomas Chamberlin saying that the Iran-Iraq War pointed to "the likelihood of resurgent regional conflicts in the Global South as the U.S.-Soviet rivalry began to wind down" is a fine insight, but it felt limited and a little incongruous because previous cases in the book highlight the *consistent* presence of such conflicts (242). The Arab-Israeli wars, the Indo-Pakistani wars, the South African invasion of Angola, and the Sino-Vietnamese War – not to mention other events like Nasser's intervention in Yemen – all indicate that the Cold War always struggled to constrain these rivalries, even when the superpowers desired to do so. The book is peppered with such intriguing connections and overlaps thanks to the detail and depth of the case studies, but their full impact on our understanding

of decolonization and the Cold War is not always clear.

I ultimately wondered if part of my frustration lay in the cases chosen. It is difficult to criticize an author for selecting specific examples as they try to balance themes, sources, and legibility, and Chapman's chapters do an excellent job giving broad coverage of the Cold War and its intersection with local priorities and competitions. While others have done this before, notably Arne Westad in *The Global Cold War* and edited volumes from Robert McMahon among others, Chapman provides expansive fifty-year histories of these countries that go well beyond moments of crisis to illustrate how relationships evolved and legacies outlasted the Cold War.[7] Nehru's neutrality looks much different in light of the polarization caused by regional conflict in the 1970s and the nuclear arms race it produced. But it would have been interesting to center at least one or two cases on states that better elided Cold War divides and/or superpower constraints, with concrete connections to the other chapters. Algeria, for instance, would have been a fascinating venue to look at how revolutionary forms of decolonization manipulated the Cold War, the material benefits of Pan-Arab solidarity, matters of resource sovereignty in the New International Economic Order, and eventually OPEC with its ability to unite both radical states and American allies like Iran and Saudi Arabia. This would have provided an illustration of the limits of Cold War interventionism – or at least the nuances of superpower influence – while elevating internationalist aspects of the decolonizing project to operate at the same level as familiar policies such as containment.

Despite the overemphasis on the Cold War, this is a worthwhile book. It captures the complex interaction between the superpower conflict and the rapid proliferation of new states in the Global South, showing how the pressure of the Cold War reinforced both regional and internal division among postcolonial states. I found myself marveling at the detail present in these cases and the clarity with which all these events were lined up next to each other. This balance between breadth of coverage and engaging narrative makes *Remaking the World* readily accessible to a variety of audiences and a useful tool in the classroom.

Notes:
1. It may also be the product of relying on older scholarship that dealt with Bandung tangentially and tended to reiterate myths about the conference. See Robert Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong)," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 4:2 (2013): 261-288.
2. See Frank Gerits, *The Ideological Scramble for Africa: How the Pursuit of Anticolonial Modernity Shaped a Postcolonial Order, 1945–1966* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023), introduction; Frank Gerits, "'When the Bull Elephants Fight': Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957–66)," *The International History Review,* 37:5 (2015): 951-969. See also, Jeffrey James Byrne, "Reflecting on the Global Turn in International History or: How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love Being a Historian of Nowhere," *Rivista italiana di storia internazionale* 1 (January 2018): 11-42.
3. Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Asher Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
4. Michele Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
5. Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism," *Humanity* 7:2 (Summer 2016), 206.
6. See for example, John Marcum, *The Angolan revolution, Vol.2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978); Witney W. Schneidman, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004).
7. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Robert J. McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Review of Jessica Chapman, *Remaking the World: Decolonization and the Cold War*

Matthew Masur

In *Remaking the World,* Jessica Chapman tackles "two deeply interconnected global phenomena: decolonization and the Cold War" (1). Her account spans more than five decades and touches on subjects ranging from economic aid, nuclear proliferation, international alliances, and covert activities. Key actors include the two great Cold War protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union; later supporters of anti-colonial movements like China and Cuba; colonial governments; the United Nations; and nationalist leaders in the "global south." The final product is a detailed but readable synthesis of the most up-to-date scholarship that will prove highly valuable to scholars and students alike.

Remaking the World is an ambitious project. Twentieth century decolonization was "both global and highly specific" (1). While some global patterns emerged, each struggle for independence had its unique qualities, shaped by local conditions and the policies of the colonial power. Adding to the complexity, decolonization "unfolded in the shadow of the Cold War," a dispute that endured for nearly a half century and encompassed, in some form or another, virtually the entire world. Chapman effectively weaves together these topics, revealing their inseparable nature. She does not argue that the Cold War drove decolonization, or that decolonization shaped the Cold War. Rather, she asserts that they were intertwined in a recursive loop, with the two processes influencing and in turn being influenced by one another.

The bulk of the narrative encompasses the period from Eisenhower to Carter (or, if you prefer, Khrushchev to Brezhnev). The early- and late-Cold War eras come into play as well, though briefly. Key topics in the book include the role of colonial and post-colonial elites; the non-aligned movement; conflicting Soviet and American visions for the developing world; the consequences of the Sino-Soviet split; and the emergence of China and Cuba as *major players in conflicts over decolonization. Chapman also* highlights the bloody and tragic consequences of the explosive combination of decolonization and great power rivalry. As she puts it, "breaking free from imperial control, either formal or informal, was no cure all" (10).

Chapman winnows down an unwieldy topic by choosing six representative case studies: India, Egypt, the Congo, Vietnam, Angola, and Iran. The case studies are organized somewhat chronologically, at least in terms of when each area emerged as a nexus of decolonization and Cold War rivalry. Each case study includes pertinent information about the pre-Cold War period (usually focusing on World War I-era nationalist movements and disruptions during World War II) as well as post-Cold War developments. But the bulk of each case study is dedicated to exploring the process of decolonization after World War II and examining how that process was influenced by—and in turn influenced—the Cold War.

The case study approach involves some trade-offs. By focusing on a handful of anti-colonial struggles, Chapman necessarily leaves out countless others. Readers needing a single volume with broad and comprehensive coverage of decolonization during the Cold War may want to look at Odd Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War* (a book that Chapman cites extensively). And some readers may question Chapman's particular cases. Why Egypt instead of Algeria? Vietnam instead of Indonesia? Congo instead of Kenya? Chapman's choices may not satisfy everyone,

but by focusing on a limited number of countries, she is able to provide ample detail while keeping the book manageable.

Chapman's carefully selected case studies allow readers to "track connections between the processes of decolonization and the Cold War across time and space" (7). They represent different geographic regions (South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and southern Africa) with distinct regional and local conditions. While each country's experience was different, certain patterns emerge. Anti-colonial movements and newly-independent countries had to navigate a tense international setting. They could choose to lean toward one side in the Cold War, or they could try to establish themselves as neutral or "nonaligned" countries. Each path brought its own risks and rewards. They also experienced interference from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba—nations that were committed to using anticolonial conflicts for their own ends. And in each case, achieving independence came at enormous cost, both during and after the independence struggle.

Chapman traces American and Soviet involvement in each case study. American officials were seemingly unable to see any part of the globe as inconsequential to American interests. Even when figures like John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter pledged to reevaluate American policy in the developing world, they often fell into the same clumsy interventions as their predecessors. Soviet leaders do not fare any better in Chapman's account. Khrushchev emerged in the years after Stalin's death and oversaw a "thaw" in the Cold War. In spite of his calls for "peaceful coexistence," he saw the rapidly decolonizing world as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to promote global Marxist revolutions and gain an upper hand in the Cold War. Khrushchev's "adventurism" was one of the factors that transformed anti-colonial conflicts into dangerous Cold War battlegrounds.

Despite ample coverage of the United States and the Soviet Union, one of the strengths of Remaking the World is that it shifts the focus away from the Cold War superpowers. Especially as the Cold War dragged on, countries like China and Cuba began to play a more prominent role in the global process of decolonization. China, for its part, wanted to eclipse the Soviet Union as the world's leading promoter of Marxist revolution. Cuba intervened in African independence movements in the 1970s, driven by a desire to gain regional influence and export its unique version of revolutionary Marxism. The two Cold War superpowers obviously play an important role in her story, but in Chapman's account, they are part of an ensemble cast, not the headliners.

In *Remaking the World,* anti-colonial figures garner as much attention as American presidents and Soviet premiers. Jawarhalal Nehru and Gamel Abdul Nasser, instrumental leaders in the nonaligned movement, feature prominently in the chapters on India and Egypt, respectively. In the Congo, Chapman traces the fraught relationship between Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu. In Vietnam, Chapman describes Ho Chi Minh's role in organizing the anti-colonial Viet Minh. Other leaders—most notably Le Duan—receive equal or even greater coverage. In Angola, Chapman explains the complex interactions between Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, Agostinho Neto's MPLA, and Holden Roberto's FNLA.

The chapter on Vietnam highlights the strengths of the book. As with the other chapters, Chapman synthesizes the most up-to-date books and articles by leading scholars in the field. She uses these works to trace important historiographical developments. She notes, for example, the factional divisions in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) that have been studied by scholars like Pierre Asselin and Lien-Hang Nguyen. She also traces the rise of Le Duan, who eventually overshadowed more well-known DRV figures like Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Chapman explains how these political developments unfolded in the shadow of the deepening Sino-Soviet split. By the early 1960s, the schism was widening, with China and the Soviet Union differing over military strategy, ideological purity, and how best to promote communist revolution. These divisions were mirrored in Hanoi, with the Lao Dong Party experiencing its own political factionalism. The North Vietnamese found themselves in the unenviable position of trying to maintain strong relations with two rival powers. As she explains, "while the Sino-Soviet rivalry posed a challenge for North Vietnamese diplomats, they ultimately benefited from their ability to play the two sides off on another" (173).

Similarly, Chapman explains how competing political factions influenced developments in the Republic of Vietnam under Ngo Dinh Diem. The chapter is a reminder that the transitions from Eisenhower to Kennedy to Johnson to Nixon are certainly important, and brought about significant changes in America's involvement in Vietnam. But these changes are, in Chapman's account, somewhat eclipsed by the power struggles in Hanoi and the transition from Diem to a revolving door of weak and ineffective governments.

Chapman also delves into Vietnam's post-war history, briefly summarizing Vietnam's conflicts with Cambodia and China and mentioning Vietnam's recent emergence as an important American ally in Asia. But these events are mentioned in passing—they account for only about one-and-a-half pages. As with the other case studies, I was left wanting to know more about the history of these countries after the Cold War ended. For those nations, like Vietnam, who lost an important patron after the fall of the U.S.S.R., one might wonder how it affected their economy and their national security. In the case of Vietnam, were the political schisms of the anti-colonial period mended or did they persist?

The brief attention to post-colonial and especially post-Cold War history arises throughout the book. Coverage of the consequences of decolonization—civil strife, economic exploitation, racial tensions, authoritarian rule—is at times perfunctory. For example, in the chapter on the Congo, Chapman devotes roughly fifteen pages to the critical three-month period from July-September 1960. After such painstaking detail, Congo's entire post-1960 history is covered in roughly the same number of pages, making it appear as something of an afterthought. Other chapters suffered from a similar imbalance of coverage. In Chapman's defense, it is simply impossible to cover every facet of a topic so large and complex. Adding more details to the book would run the risk of making it unwieldy. While I might quibble with some of her choices, *Remaking the World* effectively distills a complex topic to a manageable length.

Chapman's intended audience for Remaking the World is undergraduate students. The book should find a place in upper-division courses on American foreign relations, decolonization, the Cold War, and the twentieth-century world. Graduate students, too, will find that Chapman's account has a lot to offer. Her writing is lively, and she condenses an enormous topic into a manageable length. The introduction in particular serves as an excellent overview of the intersection between the Cold War and decolonization. It will be invaluable for students who want a single-volume examination of the connections between these global phenomena.

Instructors might consider pairing *Remaking the World* with Heonik Kwon's *The Other Cold War*. Kwon's volume is also brief and does not endeavor to provide a comprehensive account of decolonization during the Cold War. Whereas *Remaking the Cold War* is heavy on detail and narrative, *The Other Cold War* focuses more on constructing a unified theoretical framework. Read together, the two books could provide students with very different but complementary approaches to the same topic.

Remaking the World may not be the best fit for all syllabi, especially introductory courses or broad surveys. While Chapman is mostly successful at synthesizing a large topic, at times the sheer volume of information can be dizzying. Each case study covers several decades, countless political shifts, and numerous local nationalist figures and organizations. The narrative often veers from colony to metropole to Moscow to Washington. Occasionally the book becomes bogged down in the details, often at the expense of reinforcing the big themes and connections. Less advanced students will likely struggle to follow the narrative.

Scholars of decolonization or the Cold War may overlook a book that is mostly synthetic, especially one that incorporates a rather small number of primary sources. That would be a mistake. Many scholars are spread thin these days, and keeping current on new scholarship can feel like a Herculean task—after reading one important new book, you realize that two more have just been published. Chapman has performed a valuable service by synthesizing voluminous recent scholarship on decolonization in six different countries. But she has not simply summarized or rehashed the work of other scholars. She has marshalled this material and used it to construct a clear and cogent analysis of the intertwined phenomena of decolonization and the Cold War.

Review of Jessica Chapman, *Remaking the World*

Shaun Armstead

The connection between the Cold War and decolonization has been a central feature in histories of post-World War II diplomacy. Early efforts focused on the US-Soviet Union standoff. In doing so, these studies presented newly independent nations as little more than stages upon which superpowers waged the battle between communism and liberal democracy. Some scholars have encouraged altering this framework to understand postcolonial leaders and nations as more than pawns in the US-Soviet competition for global hegemony. Such calls have led to a spectrum of scholarship seeking to better understand how the Third World shaped the Cold War and what value Cold War paradigms have for understanding postcolonial hopes.

With *Remaking the World*: *Decolonization and the Cold War,* Jessica M. Chapman offers an intervention that privileges none of the prevailing interpretations. Rather, she asserts, decolonization and the Cold War are best understood as "mutually constitutive processes in which local, national, and regional developments altered the superpower competition as much as it transformed them" (8). *Remaking the World* develops this argument across seven chapters, the first providing a general overview of the period with the remaining six offering case studies on India, Egypt, the Congo, the Vietnam War, Angola, and Iran. Chapman deploys this structure to offer a rich account of the various "turning point[s]" in the Cold War (8). This approach seeks to present the decolonizing world not as a canvas for the US, Soviet Union, China, and Cuba to paint their aspirations for the future but as an active participant in the Cold War and the geopolitical dynamics existing today.

The chapter on India covers an early moment in Cold War and decolonization histories. India's inaugural prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, wished to transform India to a modernized and autonomous postcolonial nation. To this end, his "Nonalignment" philosophy, in which his nation remained neutral in the US-Soviet standoff, guided his diplomatic efforts. However, as Chapman illustrates, Cold War diplomacy made this position untenable. Since it fell short of an anticommunist position, nonalignment, to the US, represented a threat to American principles of liberal democracy and capitalism. US efforts to undercut nonalignment included aid promises entailing demands for allegiance and arms deals to Pakistan to defend South Asia against communist control. Both US and Soviet interventions in India-Pakistan border disputes, a consequence of decolonization, imposed a Cold War varnish that fueled regular skirmishes. In these ways, Chapman demonstrates how Cold War actors distorted decolonization for their purposes, and how decolonization leaders shaped the Cold War.

Chapman's next chapter on Egypt further outlines how US and Soviet Cold War imperatives upended postcolonial state building. While nominally independent, Egypt had been under the yoke of British domination since 1882. Gamal Abdel Nasser's vision for a postcolonial future involved redressing the wrongs of British control and uniting the Arab world under Pan-Arabism and nonalignment ideals. Like Nehru, Nasser sought aid and arms from both the US and Soviet Union without pledging allegiance to either. And like Nehru, this position, as well as Nasser's opposition to Israel, worried US politicians and advisors. Oil resources and strategically located airfields enhanced Egypt's value to the post-Stalin Soviet Union, which piqued US interest as well (77). Similar to its approach to India, the US offered aid with strings attached, namely a demand for Egyptian peace with Israel. When concerns over Nasser's allegiances rose to a fever pitch, American diplomats sought to isolate the leader by creating a conservative bloc of nations in the Middle East. These actions shaped the dire economic straits Egypt was in by the 1970s as it battled for a reclamation of territory Israel had seized in the Six Day War. The Cold War process in Egypt, as with India, derailed decolonization.

Chapman's chapter on the Congo further exemplifies the melding of the Cold War and decolonization in forging a new world. In American cold warriors' minds, political discord in the Congo was fertile ground for Communists to gain access to the country's raw resources. These concerns, as Chapman shows, undermined Congolese efforts to pursue an independent future. Competing visions from Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Kasavubu, and Moïse Tshombe for the postcolonial nation included centralized governance and pan-Africanist solidarities, a federation of states, as well as calls for drawing boundaries reflective of the different ethnic groups residing in the Congo. Yet Africans' desires to forge a path away from imperialism toward freedom and liberation became proof of their vulnerability to Communist puppeteering in the eyes of US policymakers. Chapman also acknowledges how racial biases shaped views that "Congolese politicians, unprepared for self-rule, would be easily duped and co-opted by communist agents" (123). Such impressions motivated interventions into Congolese affairs that resulted in the assassination of Lumumba and the rise to power of the Washington-backed Mobutu. They also reflected deeply ingrained rejections of Black political agency that others have traced back to European and American responses to Haitian independence. Thus, Chapman demonstrates that not all aspects of this post-WWII world were new.

The chapter on the Vietnam War charts significant shifts in the Cold War narrative. Chapman offers a nuanced examination of political actors and their range of ideological positions and strategies. Lê Duẩn, who by the mid-sixties assumed leadership of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, and Ngo Dinh Diem, the US-backed leader of South Vietnam, are the central Vietnamese figures. Chapman also details the political development of Ho Chi Minh, initial leader of the Vietnamese Workers' Party and how his successor, Lê Duẩn, who, unlike Ho Chi Minh, preferred China to the Soviet Union, differed from him. At the opposing end was Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader the US reluctantly supported, who, according to Chapman, "was not the American puppet that he has long been considered" (156).

Chapman also delineates how US presidential administrations from Truman to Johnson valued Vietnam's significance to the Cold War and US interests in different ways. Truman's interest in anticolonial movements remained tepid when compared to his concern over communist influence in Europe. Eisenhower offered greater aid to Vietnam (and other countries) during his presidency, but it was Kennedy who saw the so-called Third World as the definitive Cold War battleground. His decision to increase aid and send additional military advisors to Vietnam reflected a cautious attempt to forestall increased US involvement while fortifying South Vietnam against the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) and the National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NLF). This position survived and intensified after Kennedy's assassination, under Johnson's presidency. Armed with a "blank check" from a Congress convinced of the need for US global leadership against the communist bogeyman, Johnson increased US troops on the ground to support South Vietnam against communist-controlled Hanoi. This case study functions as a conclusion to a quartet of chapters across which US commitment to global leadership rises and falters, Sino-Soviet relations grow acrimonious, and Third World liberation politics ascend. Attending to these dimensions, Chapman achieves her objective of historicizing two strands—the Cold War and decolonization—of post-WWII global history.

The final two chapters illustrate how the end stages of the Cold War continued to affect decolonizing nations. In the Angola chapter, Chapman highlights how shifting geopolitical goals and allies as well as Vietnam War fatigue converged with postcolonial efforts. Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, fifteen years after the "Year of Africa," in which a record seventeen African countries became independent. Its longer, protracted journey to independence was a consequence of Portugal's determination to retain Angola as a colony. In the wake of decolonization, Angola became embroiled in a competition among three anticolonial movements. To the right, the anti-western and anti-communist Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA); to the left, the Marxist-influenced Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); and in the center, the less ideologically rooted Union for the Independence of the Totality of Angola (UNITA) all vied for influence. Complicating the political situation further was the subsequent involvement of the US, Moscow, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, and apartheid South Africa. As in previous case studies, Chapman elucidates how civil unrest was swept into Cold War geopolitics.

As Chapman illustrates, the US and the Soviets were disinterested in Angolan politics at first. Fatigue and embarrassment from the Vietnam War made the US reluctant to jeopardize Soviet-US détente. The Soviet Union, initially underwhelmed by Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA, displayed a similar reticence. This hesitation, however, did not last long. Suspicions that Moscow was sending arms to MPLA to bolster its position against the FNLA/UNITA prompted Gerald Ford to send covert aid to the FNLA under Operation IAFEATURE (194, 195). Yet this "tangled web in southern Africa," to borrow Chapman's phrase, exceeded Soviet and US actions. Cuban involvement in 1975 fueled Soviet leaders' decision to support the MPLA (198). While China aspired to replace Moscow as leader of the global communist revolution, Cuba's Fidel Castro and Che Guevara wanted to disseminate an ideological model that took seriously both anticolonialism and communism. In Chapman's words, Africa afforded a means to "strike at the soft underbelly of American imperialism [and] promote socialism" while honoring Cuba's African roots (197). A postcolonial moment thus became subsumed in Cold War morass as struggles over communism descended on the region. In turn, Angola became yet another tragic example of how "Africa's process of decolonization, swept up as it was in the Cold War, has yet to be completed" (143).

The concluding chapter on Iran exemplifies Chapman's argument on the inseparable relationship between decolonization and the Cold War. In "revolutionary Islam" Iranian anticolonial activists advanced another proposed vision for the world beyond the Cold War's bipolar divisions. The concept articulated aspirations to cast off western influence and pursue a future that neither liberal democracy nor communism directed. For Chapman, Iran-US relations exemplify key aspects of US diplomacy after World War II. Mohammad Mosaddeq, Iran's prime minister, was the first elected official the CIA ousted to protect American interests. Iran was also an early instance in the Cold War in which anticommunist US politicians betrayed American principles of democratic governance by supporting the shah, a leader who relied on suppressive measures to retain power. Iran's shah was fixated on amassing a military arsenal and modernizing Iran to improve the nation's standing. To achieve these goals, he sought friendly relations with the US. For instance, after the British military left the Persian Gulf, the shah positioned Iran as a viable defensive replacement against communist nations (229). His efforts were successful. Iran's transition from a client state of the US to its partner began during the Johnson administration (228-229). More personally, both Johnson and Nixon spoke admiringly of the shah (226, 230). Friendly relations with the shah ultimately imperiled American interests in the Middle East. Iranians grew increasingly resentful of the shah's undemocratic practices. As public resentment toward the shah sparked the Iranian Revolution, opposition to the US and the Soviet Union intensified as well. As Chapman explains, both nations exhibited a "failure to apprehend how fully the Islamic Revolution in Iran circumvented the bipolar ideological structure of the Cold War" (237).

Remaking the World demonstrates the value in and complexity of writing global histories. Other scholars have decentered the West and East-West competitions precisely because the Cold War looms so large, shadowing the experiences of decolonizing peoples, particularly their hopes and proposed solutions for a postcolonial future. Weaving both streams into a single narrative is no easy feat. Chapman expertly avoids replicating old narratives about the subjugation of the Global South to the Global North. Consequently, Chapman offers an ambitious and vital intervention. In its commitment to bringing the Cold War and decolonization into the same analytical frame, *Remaking the World* explains how multiple objectives in the mid-twentieth century shaped and undermined each other. As current events in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East show, the consequences of these commingled global processes remain with us.

Responses to Reviewers

Jessica Chapman

Allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude to Andrew Johns for arranging this roundtable, and to Shaun Armstead, Mathew Masur, and Joseph Parrott for their lively commentaries on *Remaking the World*. There are few things in this academic life more gratifying than reading a set of reviews by top notch scholars who see the value in what you aim to accomplish in print. The genesis of *Remaking the World* was a frustration with holes in my own understanding of the connections between the Cold War and decolonization—oft asserted but rarely charted systematically—and the attendant struggles I faced finding classroom-ready readings to assign on the topic. I am gratified that Armstead, Masur, and Parrott concur on the sore need for a book that weaves together the global processes of decolonization and the Cold War, and that they largely agree that *Remaking the World* goes a long way toward filling that void. It was equally heartening that their valid critiques all tied back to the book's central claim that decolonization and the Cold War were inseparable processes that, as Masur writes, "were intertwined in a recursive loop, with the two processes influencing and in turn being influenced by one another." At no point did I kid myself that *Remaking the World* would cover the interconnections between those processes comprehensively or flawlessly. My hope, instead, was that the book would distill disparate, wide ranging and, as Parrott points out, sometimes esoteric literature on decolonization and the Cold War into a novel and compelling framework around which discussions about this complex history could be staged.

Masur calls this an "ambitious project" that constructs "a clear and cogent analysis of the intertwined phenomena of decolonization and the Cold War." Armstead notes that it was "no easy feat" to write a history that balanced the East-West competition and the political projects of decolonizing peoples "in a single narrative that avoids replicating in print the subjugation of the Global South to the Global North." Parrott, although ultimately concluding that the book "captures the complex interaction between the superpower conflict and the rapid proliferation of new states in the Global North," is more critical of an imbalance in coverage that he argues tends to privilege the structure of the Cold War and the voices of actors from the Global North. Masur's desire to see more coverage of the post-Cold War period seems to stem from a similar concern. While I am glad that, on balance, the reviewers agree that the book succeeded in interweaving the narratives of decolonization and the Cold War, I see no reason to dispute these assertions that the manuscript could have been improved.

There is certainly some validity to Parrott's observation that the scholarship on which I relied, and my own training as a historian of U.S. foreign relations and Cold War history, may have impeded my ability to present a fully balanced picture.

Perhaps the decision to structure the book around six discrete national case studies—connected as they may have been—lent the manuscript to a type of methodological nationalism, leading me to focus more on the local and regional particularities at play than on the larger structures of anticolonial and postcolonial solidarity and activism that, in Parrott's estimation, received short shrift. Furthermore, Masur is correct to note that a number of alternative cases, like Algeria, Indonesia, or Kenya, would have yielded different insights. As Armstead describes, the selected case studies took readers around the globe to advance a particular narrative arc. Presenting a complete global history was neither the result, nor my intent.

I would not deign to argue against the importance of the cases Masur notes, nor dismiss the Southern ideas and movements that Parrott identifies as having elided the Cold War framework. The book may well have been strengthened by expanding the selection of case studies and tending to solidarity networks in the Global South more systematically. My only defense is to point out that doing so would have entailed tradeoffs that might have undermined the ultimate goal of producing a readable, engaging narrative that tended simultaneously to multiple, overlapping competitions in both domestic and international arenas. As Masur points out, charitably, "It is simply impossible to cover every facet of a topic so large. Adding anything to the book would run the risk of making it unwieldy and would likely detract from the finished product." Alas, my goal with the introductory chapter was to provide a global snapshot to help readers frame their readings of the six case studies to overarching global processes. After cutting the initial version of that chapter by more than half in service of readability and clarity, I will be the first to admit that it is not comprehensive. My efforts to avoid bogging down readers in confusing detail—even if not entirely successful, in Masur's view—required making some hard choices and deep editorial cuts. Perhaps, then, it is useful to think about how to expand the discussion of decolonization and the Cold War outward from *Remaking the World* by reading or assigning it alongside other sources.

I always imagined that the book could be used as an anchor point for examining connections between the superpower competition and the decolonizing process. While it can certainly be read on its own, it is perhaps most useful in conversation with a range of primary and secondary sources that complement—and perhaps challenge or complicate—the book's arguments. Masur is quite right to point out that *Remaking the World* could be valuably paired with Heonik Kwon's *The Other Cold War*. Indeed, I did just that with great success when I first taught the book last fall in my own seminar on decolonization and the Cold War. Likewise, many of the issues Parrott points to as important but underplayed could be engaged by assigning complementary sources, including many of those he discusses in his review. My own syllabus included works by some of the scholars he cites, including Jeffrey James Byrne, Lorenz M. Lüthi, and Frank Geritz. What I sacrificed in coverage, whether intentionally or as a result of the limitations in my own training and perspective, can and should be brought into conversations about this book and its overarching claims about, as Armstead writes, "how Cold War actors distorted decolonization and how decolonization leaders shaped the Cold War."

All three of these thoughtful reviews have prodded me to think in new ways about the Cold War and decolonization. I welcome the opportunity to reconsider questions that have grown a bit stale after pondering them in isolation, and working to hammer them into book form. For this I am deeply grateful to Armstead, Masur, and Parrott for their sustained engagement with issues that we all find so deeply important.

In the Next Issue of *Passport*:

*A roundtable on Julia Irwin's *Catastrophic Diplomacy*;

*A roundtable on Tyson Reeder's *Serpent in Eden*;

*SHAFR election results;

*A new editor of *Passport*;

and much more!

2025 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
Renaissance Arlington Capital View, Arlington, Virginia, June 26-28, 2025

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its 2025 annual conference. **The deadline for proposals is December 1, 2024.**

SHAFR is dedicated to the study of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. This includes not only foreign relations, diplomacy, statecraft, and strategy, but also, heterogenaous approaches to Americans' relations with the wider world, including, but not limited to, global governance, transnational movements, religion, human rights, race, gender, political economy and business, immigration, borderlands, the environment, and empire. SHAFR welcomes those who study any time period from the colonial era to the present. Given that the production, exercise, and understanding of U.S. power takes many forms and touches myriad subjects, the Program Committee welcomes proposals reflecting a broad range of approaches and topics.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to the values of equity, access, and representation. The organization invites proposals from all, especially scholars of color; those who identify as women, trans, and non-binary; individuals residing outside of the United States; untenured and contingent faculty; scholars working in other fields and disciplines, and those who work in less commonly studied chronological periods or who engage with unusual methodological approaches. The Program Committee welcomes—but does not require—proposals that include a brief statement detailing how their submission advances SHAFR's commitment to these values. Graduate students, international scholars, and scholars whose participation might expand the organization's breadth are encouraged to apply for SHAFR grants to subsidize the cost of attending the conference.

2025 is the anniversary of several significant historical events including the 160th anniversary of the end of the US Civil War; the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, the atomic bombings of Japan, and the division of Germany; the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War and the beginning of operations of UNRWA; the 60th anniversary of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act; the 55th year of Earth Day; and the 50th anniversary of the reunification of Vietnam. Special consideration will be given to panels that provide new perspectives on historical events that the year 2025 commemorates.

SHAFR 2025's Program will be structured through a series of themes. Each proposal is expected to note one primary and one secondary theme suited to their proposal. The Program Committee might assign a different theme than the one selected at the time of proposal submission in order to bring greater coherence to the Program. The SHAFR 2025 themes include: Belonging/Exclusion, Capitalism, Disease/Health, Environment/Extraction, Genocide, Indigeneity, Labor, Law/Sovereignty, Media/Technology, and Territoriality.

The Program Committee welcomes panels that transcend conventional chronologies, challenge received categories, or otherwise offer innovative approaches and fresh thinking. SHAFR 2025 is particularly open to co-sponsorship of panels with professional associations in associated historical fields and subfields.

Panel sessions for the 2025 meeting will run for ninety minutes. A complete panel typically includes three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a conceptually more expansive roundtable discussion with a chair and three or four participants. Papers should be no longer than twenty minutes and must be shorter in situations where there are more than three paper presentations. The Committee is also open to alternative formats, especially those based on discussion and engagement with the audience, which should be described briefly in the proposal.

Individual paper proposals are also welcome, though complete panels with coherent themes will be favored over single papers. Those seeking to create or fill out a panel should Tweet #SHAFR2025 and/or consult with the SHAFR Conference Coordinator, Kaete O'Connell, at conference@shafr.org to help identify scholars with similar interests.

The Program Committee will develop a pool of potential commentators/chairs for panels constructed from individual proposals. If you are interested in volunteering for this pool, please contact the program co-chairs, Jayita Sarkar and Aileen Teague, at program-chair@shafr.org.

Policies

Each conference participant may only serve on the program twice, each time in a different capacity. For example: one may serve once as a chair and once as a commentator; or once as panelist and once as chair or commentator. No participant may appear on the program more than twice. Any special scheduling requests (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal.
AV requests, along with a brief explanation of how the equipment is essential to the presentation, must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal. AV access is limited and expensive and will not be available to all panels. As such, please carefully assess your AV needs and realize that such requests can place limits on when and where we schedule accepted panels.
All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via the procedures outlined at https://shafr.org/shafr2025. Applicants requiring alternative means to submit the proposal should contact the program co-chairs via email at program-chair@shafr.org.

Generally, annual membership in SHAFR is required for those participating in the 2025 meeting. The president and Program Committee may (upon request) grant a few exemptions to scholars whose specializations are outside the field. Membership instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals. Everyone appearing on the program is required to register for the conference.

SHAFR and the media occasionally record conference sessions for use in broadcast and electronic media. Presenters who do not wish for their session to be recorded may opt out when submitting a proposal to the Program Committee. An audience member who wishes to record audio or video of a panel must obtain written permission from panelists. SHAFR is not responsible for unauthorized recording. SHAFR reserves the right to revoke the registration of anyone who records sessions without appropriate permissions.

Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants

SHAFR will award several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students presenting papers at the 2025 conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed $500; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make decisions regarding awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications must include: a 1-page letter from the applicant and a reference letter from the graduate advisor that also confirms the unavailability of departmental travel funds. All items must be addressed/submitted for your application to receive consideration. The two items should be submitted via the on-line interface at the time the panel/paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant's submission is accepted by the Program Committee in a separate decision. **Application deadline: January 3, 2025.**

SHAFR Global Scholars and Diversity Grants

SHAFR also awards Global Scholars and Diversity Grants to help defray travel and lodging expenses for the 2025 conference. These grants are aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting helps to diversify the organization. Preference will be given to those who have not previously presented at annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR, scholars who offer diverse and complementary intellectual approaches, and scholars from outside the United States. "Scholars" includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further integrate grant winners into SHAFR, awards include one-year membership that includes subscriptions to Diplomatic History and Passport. Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short cv (2-page maximum) and a 2-3 paragraph essay addressing the fellowship criteria (including data on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received). All items must be addressed/submitted for your application to receive consideration. Please submit your application via the on-line interface. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant's submission is accepted by the Program Committee in a separate decision. **Application deadline: January 3, 2025.**

Open Doors and Border Walls: The Wisconsin School and the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy

Susan A. Brewer

Over the past few years, some of us have engaged in an invigorating discussion about the legacies of the Wisconsin School of Diplomatic History while collaborating on a collection of essays called *Thinking Otherwise: How Walter LaFeber Explained the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*. This reflection, presented at the annual SHAFR conference held in Toronto in 2024, was part of a panel dedicated to the continuation of that conversation.[1]

To me, one of the strengths of the scholars of the Wisconsin School was their analysis of the integration of foreign and domestic policy. This topic is one of current interest. *Rethinking U.S. World Power: Domestic Histories of U.S. Foreign Relations*, edited by Daniel Bessner and Michael Brenes and published in 2024, considers the crucial interconnections of domestic politics with international affairs. In a recent *Foreign Affairs* article, "Politics Can't Stop at the Water's Edge," political scientist Elizabeth N. Saunders argues for more elites, expertise, and professionalism in U.S. foreign policymaking, presenting a case that would have made Elihu Root proud. Also in *Foreign Affairs*, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor during the Obama administration, sums up policy recommendations in his article, "A Foreign Policy for the World as It Is: Biden and the Search for a New American Strategy," with this admonition: "Ultimately, the most important thing that America can do in the world is detoxify its own democracy."[2]

Like James Madison, the scholars of the Wisconsin School saw no daylight between domestic and foreign policy. Their analysis was inspired by progressive historians who examined the problems of economic and social inequality in American society. They were interested in how those with power and influence pursued policies at home and abroad that often advanced their own opportunities at the expense of others including workers, immigrants, and people of color. William Appleman Williams encouraged his students to examine the world view of policymakers in order to understand the attitudes and beliefs of those in power. As Lloyd Gardner observed during his 2024 presentation at SHAFR and elsewhere, the Wisconsin School is about ideas as well as economics.[3]

I felt that this approach opened the door, so to speak, for me as a student of the Wisconsin School, to pursue my interest in questions of foreign relations, culture, and identity. I was interested in how Americans saw themselves in the world and why. That interest drew me to the study of war propaganda and the deliberate attempts to manipulate public opinion about the global role of the United States. Propagandists crafted stories of a heroic contest between civilization and barbarism, which sought to deflect troubling issues of colonial rule, the exploitation of natural resources belonging to other people, and the deaths of millions. As Walter LaFeber taught me and a multitude of graduate and undergraduate students, investigate what policymakers said and what they did.[4]

The Wisconsin School embraced revision in an era known for consensus. In the early years of the Cold War, the Truman administration celebrated the announcement, made by Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, that politics stopped at the water's edge. The story of Senator Vandenburg's conversion from isolationist to internationalist, it was hoped, would serve as a model for the rest of the country. Just as Humphrey Bogart's character Rick in *Casablanca* had done, Americans should commit to sticking their necks out. A bipartisan consensus on the policy of containing communism could allow the U.S. government to pursue international commitments, military buildup, and covert operations without being constrained by domestic politics.

As many scholars have shown, however, considerable effort went into the construction and maintenance of that consensus, which illustrates that domestic and foreign policies continued to be intertwined. Even so and perhaps because they had worked so hard to promote it, Cold War policymakers cherished this notion that the United States could play a steady leadership role in world affairs without a lot of interference from congressional oversight or popular protest or the results of presidential transitions. That is why some of them condemned the scholars of the Wisconsin School who insisted on addressing the economic interest underlying some nobly expressed defense of freedom or on pointing out that public skepticism regarding foreign policy was fundamental to the democratic process or, as Lloyd Gardner did, on describing policymakers as "architects of illusion."[5]

The Wisconsin School was home to the sort of radicals who investigated the roots of U.S. foreign policy. Walter LaFeber did just that in his essay "Foreign Policies of a New Nation: Franklin, Madison, and the 'Dream of a New Land to Fulfill with People in Self-Control,' 1750-1804," which appeared in *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations*, edited by William Appleman Williams. The title comes from a poem by Robert Frost about James Madison's "dream of a new land" where people ruled themselves.[6]

LaFeber wrote about how the extension of the sphere, according to Madison, would allow the American republic to flourish as ever evolving factions balanced each other. Madison's dream, to be sure, did not include all the people on land that belonged to someone else. Yet, this vision that the United States could conduct territorial and commercial expansion while also preserving republican virtue was fundamental to the American experience and, as the Wisconsin School contended, worthy of critical assessment.

Many members of SHAFR have carried on the examination of the reach of the American empire and rightly pointed to when, where, how, and why it failed to live up to its principles. I did not realize, however, how much I had assumed that the United States would try or at least appear to try to live up to those principles. I reflected on my faulty assumption, for instance, when I read Jason Parker's

Hearts, Minds, Voices: *U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*, published in 2016. In his book, Parker deftly examines the muddled efforts of the United States Information Agency to promote the U.S. agenda to people around the world who were engaged in asserting their independence from colonialism. He describes how public diplomats expressed respect for Arab nationalism or used news reports about the Freedom Riders to show how a few Americans were confronting racial segregation. How quaint, it seemed to me from the perspective of the era of the Trump presidency, that the administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy even attempted to project some type of republican virtue. None of those diplomats served a president who dismissed their host nations as "shithole countries" or so obviously admired authoritarian rulers unencumbered by checks and balances.[7]

The Wisconsin School highlighted the fragility of the American experiment with its competing demands of maintaining a republic and building an empire. LaFeber described what he called the "cruel paradox" faced by John Quincy Adams who devoutly believed in expansion but also recognized its potential to do harm, as when he warned against going abroad in search of monsters to destroy or objected to the use of force in the Mexican War or stood in opposition to slavery and its spread across the continent.[8]

And what if expansion, so elemental in the American experience, were to stop? In his prize-winning *The New Empire*, LaFeber argues that in the 1890s, as the so-called frontier was considered closed and industrialization, accompanied by the consolidation of wealth, inspired distrust of authority, labor unrest, and the rise of populism, U.S. policymakers viewed overseas expansion as the solution to domestic crises. LaFeber thoughtfully assessed these leaders and their policies. He wrote that he grew to respect "the intelligence, discipline, and even courage of officials who had to deal with a terrible depression that transformed the nation's economy, society, politics, and foreign policies—and who used that transformation to make the United States one of the world's greatest powers in a very brief period of time." He continued, "they nevertheless used that transformation as an excuse to counter most important American principles, notably self-determination, and at times to commit atrocities in Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, Central America, and China."[9]

Over a century later, the Trump administration built a wall as an answer to America's problems. The wall was "a monument to disenchantment," according to Greg Grandin in *The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America*. A wall suggests that there is no need for compromise and consensus-building at home or diplomacy and commitments abroad. I wonder what Robert Frost would say about the appearance of a wall in Madison's dream of a land inhabited by people in self-control. I wonder what William Appleman Williams would say about the trajectory from the open door to a steel barrier on the border.[10]

Too often misleadingly characterized as "economic determinists," the Wisconsin School raised timely and timeless questions about militarization, the growth of executive power, corporate influence, and what the United States meant when it promoted self-determination. Their interest in understanding the world view of the people they wrote about meant that they considered ideas, economics, politics, religion, class, race, and culture. They explored the tensions between republic and empire and the entanglements of foreign and domestic policy. They showed us the importance of knowing our roots and questioning assumptions, including our own.

Notes:

1. The author thanks Bob Hannigan, Richard Immerman, and Linda Nemec for their contributions to this reflection. Susan A. Brewer, Douglas Little, Richard H. Immerman, eds., *Thinking Otherwise: How Walter LaFeber Explained the History of US Foreign Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024); "The Generation that Never Arrived: Thinking Otherwise about the Wisconsin School of the 1950s," panel chaired by David Green with Susan A. Brewer, Lloyd C. Gardner, and William O. Walker, III, SHAFR Annual Conference, 15 June 2024, Toronto. At the SHAFR conference, members of the panel and the audience also considered the provocative essay by Ryan M. Irwin, "Requiem for a Field: The Strange Journey of U.S. Diplomatic History," *Passport* 54 (September 2023): 26-38.
2. Daniel Bessner and Michael Brenes, eds., *Rethinking U.S. World Power: Domestic Histories of U.S. Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024); Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Politics Can't Stop at the Water's Edge: The Right Way to Fight Over Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2024): 86-103; Ben Rhodes, "A Foreign Policy for the World as It Is: Biden and the Search for a New American Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2024), https://foreignaffairs.com. See also Daniel Bessner, Michael Brenes, Amanda C. Demmer, Aaron Donaghy, and Andrew Johnstone, "Seven Questions on…the Nexus of Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics," *Passport* 54 (September 2023): 52-58.
3. This paper is drawn in part from Susan A. Brewer and Robert E. Hannigan, "Extending the Sphere: *The New Empire*," in Brewer, Little, and Immerman, *Thinking Otherwise*, 62-81; Lloyd Gardner, remarks at Zoom meeting, 13 May 2024.
4. Susan. A. Brewer, *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
5. Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
6. Walter LaFeber, "Foreign Policies of a New Nation: Franklin, Madison, and the 'Dream of a New Land to Fulfill with People in Self-Control,' 1750-1804," in *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. William Appleman Williams (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), 9-37.
7. See, for example, Richard H. Immerman, *Empire for Liberty: A History of US Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010) and Daniel Immerwahr, *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States (NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019).* Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Josh Dawsey, "Trump Derides Protections from Immigrants from 'Shithole' Countries," *Washington Post*, January 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html. President Trump's comment to lawmakers at a White House meeting received wide coverage in the national and international press.
8. Walter LaFeber, ed., *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Speeches & Papers* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 24.
9. Walter LaFeber, "Preface, 1998," in *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898: Thirty-Fifth Anniversary Edition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), xvi.
10. Greg Grandin, *The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2019), 272.

SHAFR and Collaborations with Other Professional Organizations

Kyle Longley and Toshihiro Higuchi & Roger Peace

SHAFR & SMH

Kyle Longley

There are few organizations that mesh as well as SHAFR and the Society for Military History. Attend either annual conference, and you see a significant number attending both events.

Since taking over as executive director of the SMH in March 2023 after a three-year stint on the SHAFR Council, I have seen the overlap in many ways. For example, last year at the AHA in San Francisco, we had over 70 people attend Beth Bailey's Marshall Lecture on the impact of race on the military in Vietnam. Probably thirty-five percent were SHAFR members (maybe higher).

In some ways, George Marshall epitomizes the collaboration that can occur between SHAFR and SMH. A warrior and diplomat, Marshall showed the blending of the two fields. I think there are many ways the organizations can continue this process that I will propose to the new executive director, my mentor, and friend, Richard Immerman.

First, at events such as the AHA and OAH (among many), we can coordinate our presentations and publicity to promote our various panels which too often are few and far in between. Such cross fertilization will enhance participation and hopefully encourage people to submit panels and simultaneously have people from other fields attend.

We can also explore how to promote students and fellowships among each other's membership. SMH has over 3,300 members, including many undergraduate and graduate students. Many in both organizations work at the intersection of war and diplomacy, and pushing students to join both groups and apply for the numerous travel grants and awards make a lot of sense.

We can even think about working on coordinating conferences, especially at the local and regional levels to maximize participation and resources. There are many great regional meetings including those like the UC Santa Barbara one on the Cold War and the one of war and society at Temple University for graduate students. At the minimum, we can do more to promote them among our memberships.

At some point, we could think about merging the conferences for at least a year. With decreased travel budgets and skyrocketing costs of hosting of conferences since COVID, we could consider the possibilities as both organizations now meet every other year in the DC area. It would give us a way to maximize our numbers (this past meeting, we had 932 participants, probably 15-20% also active SHAFR members) and secure better deals. More important, the interchange would enhance both organizations and the intellectual pursuits.

A lot these ideas have already been done informally on a smaller scale, but certainly we can improve the process. As someone who has his heart in SHAFR and been a member since the late 1980s, I want to maximize the impact of both groups, and working even more closely will enhance the process.

SHAFR & Peace History Society

Toshihiro Higuchi and Roger Peace

Peace History Society (PHS) shares with SHAFR the scholarly agenda of studying the questions of war and peace. Since its establishment in 1964, PHS has been dedicated to encouraging, supporting, and coordinating scholarly research on peace, nonviolence, and social justice in world history. Given the significant and fruitful overlap in research concerns, many PHS members have been active in SHAFR. As we now live in a world of heightened violence – wars, genocides, hate crimes, and unnatural disasters – we believe there is an important opportunity ahead for collaboration between peace historians and scholars of the U.S. in the World to draw insights from the past and prepare the next generation of leaders for a more diverse, equitable, and peaceful world.

In terms of studying wars, one such opportunity is to more thoroughly investigate alternatives to war advocated by various parties, examining both realistic policy options for peaceful diplomacy (often the road not taken) and the people and movements advocating such options (a major focus of peace historians). Peace historians could benefit from the in-depth studies of U.S. foreign policy and international relations by diplomatic historians, while the latter could benefit from incisive critiques of war that ask whether the war in question was necessary and just (*jus ad bellum*), in keeping with international law today. The debilitating costs and casualties of war on all sides could also be explored in more depth along with whether such conduct conforms to international humanitarian law.

Another potential area for collaboration is to historicize the notion of peace in all its complexity. Historians tend to see peace as the mere absence of war. This negative definition of peace has led many to dismiss the question of peace as irrelevant for their research unless it explicitly deals with war. Advocacy for peace, however, is much more than opposition to war; it is a transformative act of world-making, seeking to bring about fundamental social changes by nonviolent means for genuine, lasting peace. Studying the history of peace advocacy therefore would help us better understand the history of violence and injustice that such advocacy tried to address with courage and foresight. In doing so, we can also recover and foreground in analysis the forgotten voice of historically marginalized people – women, non-whites, queers, refugees, working poor, and people with disabilities – whose visions of peace can offer radical critiques of the existing world order.

Peace history is part of a wider, value-based field of peace studies. Its orientation is both idealistic in the sense of envisioning a peaceful and just future, and realistic in the sense of recognizing the debilitating costs of war and supporting the efforts of nations and citizens over the last century to build an international moral infrastructure that eschews aggression and upholds human rights. From the vantage point of peace history, war and empire-building are anachronisms, peace must be realized in the future, and lessons gleaned from the past should reflect this orientation. That many Americans today believe their

nation is pursuing a course of peace and justice despite its leading role in the arms race as well as being the largest arms exporter indicates a dire need for propaganda analyses to accompany critiques of U.S. foreign policy.

The inclusion of overt value-based assessments of U.S. foreign policy is controversial, to be sure, but this is not a bad thing for our profession. Assessing policies through the lens of morality, legality, and historical contingency, we can encourage rigorous investigation and critical thinking. Lessons may be drawn that make history relevant to the present and the future. Giving due recognition to citizen movements and their influence in policy making in the past would empower students in having a voice in policy making today. In this way, we can inspire interest and involvement rather than resignation and apathy. As students around the world are demanding peace with justice more vocally than ever, peace historians and scholars of the U.S. in the World can work together to draw on the past for solutions and inspiration in building a more just and peaceful world. We welcome SHAFR historians at our biannual conferences, affiliate sessions and events at the AHA meetings, and through our journal, *Peace & Change*. We also invite nominations for book and article prizes. Please visit our website (https://www.peacehistorysociety.org/) for more information.

WALTER LAFEBER-MOLLY WOOD PRIZE FOR DISTINGUISHED TEACHING

SHAFR is proud to announce the creation of the Walter LaFeber-Molly Wood Prize for Distinguished Teaching. This award will recognize exceptional teaching in the field of American diplomatic history. The prize of $500 will be awarded annually to an individual chosen by the Teaching Committee whose career reflects dedicated and creative teaching.

This prize is named for two long-standing SHAFR members who are well-known for their commitment to teaching. Walter LaFeber (Cornell) is widely recognized for his teaching excellence. He was the first-ever recipient of Cornell's John M. Clark Teaching Award and the recipient of the university's Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellowship in 1994 for excellence in undergraduate teaching, as well as the much-beloved mentor for a significant number of graduate students. Molly Wood (Wittenberg) is similarly admired for her commitment to undergraduate teaching. She is currently the co-chair of the SHAFR Teaching Committee, a committee that she has served on for three terms, and is the first person elected to the teaching seat on SHAFR Council. She is also the recipient of Wittenberg's Edith B. & Frank C. Matthies Teaching Award in 2005 and has served on multiple teaching panels at the annual conference and penned numerous teaching-related articles for *Passport*.

SHAFR hopes to build the endowment to a level that will support a $1,000 prize. Help us reach our goal by donating at the SHAFR webpage here: https://www.shafr.org/donate .

How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love (Teaching) the Bomb

Lori Clune and Connor Naylor

"U.S. Fears Russia Might Put a Nuclear Weapon in Space"

"North Korea Says Its New Submarine Can Launch Nuclear Missiles"

"U.S. to Build New Nuclear Gravity Bomb"

Headlines from the 1950s? 1960s? No, they're from 2023 and 2024.

In the fall of 2023, appropriately in a 1950s-era classroom with tiered seats, we took students on a cinematic, nuclear-fueled journey. For fifteen weeks, thirty-five undergraduates and a handful of graduate students met for three hours each Wednesday evening to explore nuclear history. Lori Clune was the instructor of record, and graduate student Connor Naylor audited the class to observe both the course's content and its approach, in preparation for being Lori's teaching assistant in spring 2024.

In 2022, Lori wrote a chapter on teaching the history of nuclear activism using cultural sources.[1] On a lark, she decided to craft an upper division course that grappled with nuclear history, using sources in music, games, comic books, articles, and films as a foundation. While Lori remembers ducking and covering, Connor and the students are too young. Within a week into the semester it became clear that this class was more essential and meaningful than originally envisioned. In this article, we would like to share what we learned.

The Students Don't Know Much

This is not a criticism, but more of an observation. Many students thought that nuclear bombs were only a threat in (for them) the ancient, black and white footage history of the Cold War. Many students were unaware that the United States still possesses nuclear weapons, and were shocked to learn we store thousands. In the list of dangers to humanity, many students rightly ranked climate change or other phenomena among the most significant. In exploring a chronological history of the bomb through the lens of film and other media, however, we were able to reframe and recenter the threat these weapons of mass destruction still represent.

This class provided necessary historical context for understanding a variety of twenty-first century events, including the discovery that U.S. nuclear power plants were on the target list for the September 11th attacks, the 2011 earthquake/tsunami-caused accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in Japan, the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, and the threat of accidents and stolen nuclear materials. These and others continue to keep the world on the brink of madness.

Dark Humor Can Be Therapeutic

The class began with a viewing of the classic dark documentary, *Atomic Cafe* (1982). As students giggled awkwardly at outtakes of Truman and duck and cover footage, they learned that laughter can be a great release for the absurdity and horror involved with nuclear weapons. Over Thanksgiving the students read a short piece from the Office of Nuclear Energy on "How Many Turkeys Can a Reactor Cook on Thanksgiving Day?" (2020). "Weird Al" Yankovic's "Christmas at Ground Zero" exposed the hysterical absurdity of Reagan's nuclear weapon policy. John Oliver, in his 2014 *Last Week Tonight* episode on "Nuclear Weapons," used his muckraker style to satirize the current state of our nation's stockpile.

To highlight the dark humor of the classic *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (1964), students first viewed *Fail-Safe* (2000). The immediacy and horror of the live television broadcast helped to highlight the absurdity and dark comedy behind *Dr. Strangelove* in an effective way. Pairing these two films together threw the terror and senselessness involved with nuclear weapons into sharp relief for students.

Students Enjoyed(?) It

The class itself was well-received; students responded positively in evaluations and gifted the professor a first edition of Heinz Haber's *Our Friend the Atom* (1956), to show how much the class meant to them. Some of their written comments highlighted what they had learned, as well as their enjoyment of the course:



Button in Lori's collection (1982)

"Thank you for the wonderful and terrifying semester."

"This class was an eye-opening experience that I will not be forgetting anytime soon."

"Honestly, [I] loved this course and it really gave me an insight into something I had very little knowledge of."

"Let's hope for no more close calls!"

Students also chose from a list of twenty-six nuclear close calls (1956-2010) from Neil Halloran's *The Shadow Peace*, "Part 1: The Nuclear Threat, Estimating Deaths in a Nuclear War" (2017). In Close Call Presentations, groups shared crucial moments in American history when the possibility of nuclear annihilation nearly became reality. As Eric Schlosser notes in *Command and Control*, however, there have been hundreds of close calls caused by accident, mistake, or miscalculation; a future class could spend much more time on these terrifying near misses.[2]

Students also appreciated the reflective and therapeutic nature of the Final Exam, where each student wrote to a chosen government representative to explain what they had learned (referencing at least six of the films), and advise the official on nuclear policy.

What We Read and Watched

Documentaries used included: *A Time Lapse of Every Nuclear Explosion Since 1945* (Isao Hashimoto, YouTube); *To End All War: Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb* (NBC, 2023); *Our Friend the Atom* (Disney, 1957); *Three Men Go to War* (2012); *The Movement and the "Madman"* (2023); *Meltdown: Three Mile Island* (2022); Helen Caldicott's *If You Love This Planet* (198, 2022); *Chernobyl: The Lost Tapes* (2022); and *Command & Control* (2016).

Films included: *Fail-Safe* (2000); *Dr. Strangelove* (1964); *WarGames* (1983); *Thirteen Days* (2001); *The Day After* (1983); and the *Butter Battle Book* (1989 animated television film).

Students read **book chapter**s from Paul Boyer's *Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (1985). Articles included discussions of Artificial Intelligence and nukes, the Cuban Missile Crisis origins of the holiday song "Do You Hear What I Hear?," and whether Nixon ordered a nuclear strike while drunk. Primary sources encompassed speeches by President Eisenhower, National Security Archive documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the nuclear football, the Able Archer test, Operation Teapot (testing effects of nuclear explosions on beer and soda), comic books on the A-Bomb and the H-Bomb, and an online exhibit from the Museum of the City of New York "A Danger Unlike Any Danger": Nuclear Disarmament Campaigns 1957-1985.





Heinz Haber, The Walt Disney Story of Our Friend the Atom *(New York: Dell, 1956)*

Future offerings may replace some of the shorter readings with important new works, such as Annie Jacobsen's *Nuclear War: A Scenario* (Dutton, 2024) and Ananyo Bhattacharya's *The Man From the Future: The Visionary Life of John von Neumann* (Norton, 2022). While students did have the opportunity to process these readings via weekly online Reflections, next time, we may view fewer films to allow for more in-class time to discuss and grapple with students' intellectual and emotional responses.

If Not Now, When?

Since 1947, the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* has been measuring the minutes until midnight on its Doomsday Clock, functioning as a metaphor for humanity's proximity to the apocalypse. It began at seven minutes before midnight, marking the atomic-fueled strains of the Cold War. Due to battling American and Soviet hydrogen bombs, the closest to midnight was 1953, with two minutes before midnight. In the heady, post-Soviet days of 1991 we

Navy Cake to Celebrate Operation Crossroads, 1946

luxuriated in a full seventeen minutes.

Then came the twenty-first century, with the dual threats of nuclear armageddon and climate change. We're dealing in seconds now. In 2020, the clock was set to 100 seconds until midnight. It moved to 90 seconds before Doomsday in 2023, where it remains today. As of spring 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense confirmed the U.S. maintains a stockpile of approximately 3,708 nuclear warheads which can be delivered by ballistic missile and aircraft.

In April 2024, the UN Security Council voted on a resolution to prohibit, among other things, nuclear weapons in space. Russia vetoed it. As of 2024, the *New York Times* opinion series declared, "It's Time to Protest Nuclear War Again". This course is an urgently needed corrective for students coming of age in a world with a proliferating nuclear arsenal, and an increasing ambivalence towards its use.

Notes:
1. Kimber Quinney and Amy L. Sayward, eds., *Understanding and Teaching Contemporary American History since 1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2022).
2. Eric Schlosser, *Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).

CALL FOR APPLICATIONS:

"Writing the History of U.S. Foreign Relations in an Age of Crisis"
2025 SHAFR Summer Institute, June 21-25, 2025
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Faculty Directors: Alvita Akiboh and Michael Brenes (Yale University)

The largest land war in Europe since World War II, looming conflict with China, war in Gaza, and instability in states such as Haiti, Syria, and Afghanistan have fundamentally reshaped global affairs. These conflicts exist alongside unprecedented rates of economic and racial inequality, the escalating havoc wrought by climate change, and the reemergence of autocratic figures in the United States and around the world. Indeed, the world is currently embroiled in what commentators have called a "polycrisis." These crises present challenges and opportunities for historians of U.S. foreign relations to explore the origins of our current moment, to offer scholars and the public nuanced perspectives on how to understand our world. Yet the historical profession—and the humanities broadly—is in the throes of its own crisis. Decades of austerity, neglect, and precarity have eroded the historical discipline—and the ranks of historians—with many scholars of U.S. foreign relations unable to secure tenure-track positions or produce enduring scholarship in alternative careers.

In this light, we ask crucial questions about the role of historians of the United States and the world at this critical juncture. What role can history serve to inform in our age of crisis? How should historians of U.S. foreign relations write history in an age of crisis? What key themes and subjects should be the focus of the field given the turbulence of our age? How can we situate and comprehend our professional crisis within the context of a global "polycrisis?" We will seek to answer these questions and others, while also helping a cohort of young scholars to develop sophisticated and nuanced perspectives that will shape their work on the inevitable crises of the future.

The theme of "crisis" informs the revived Summer Institute of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, which will take place June 21-June 25, 2025, at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. The Institute will be co-directed by historians Alvita Akiboh and Michael Brenes, and will include a range of guests from within the historical profession.

Geared toward advanced Ph.D. students in history, the institute will feature seminar-style discussions and meetings with leading scholars. The Summer Institute will also provide a forum for participants to present their research and participate in workshops on professional development, teaching, and publishing. Each participant will be reimbursed for travel to New Haven and to a return destination, will be provided with accommodation and meals, and will receive a modest honorarium.

The deadline for applications is December 15, 2024. The 2025 SHAFR Summer Institute is open to advanced Ph.D. students with ABD status. If interested in participating, please submit a c.v., a brief cover letter (stating why the summer institute would further the applicant's career goals and dissertation project), a 250-word abstract of the dissertation project, and a letter of recommendation from a dissertation supervisor or committee member. These materials should be submitted as a PDF or Word document to Alvita Akiboh (alvita.akiboh@yale.edu) and Michael Brenes (michael.brenes@yale.edu). Please send all questions to the faculty directors.

Review of Steve Coll, *The Achilles Trap*

Daniel Chardell

Saddam Hussein once warned his inner circle that "America has two faces."[1] Never had that been clearer to the Iraqi leadership than in November 1986. That month, Ronald Reagan admitted that his administration had secretly sold weapons to Iran and illegally funneled the proceeds to the right-wing Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Reagan cast the Iran-Contra scandal as an ill-conceived but well-intentioned ploy to leverage the release of Americans held hostage by Iranian-linked militants in Lebanon. That pretext rang hollow in Saddam's ears. For the previous four years, Washington had passed vital military intelligence to the Baathists in Baghdad, then in the throes of their grisly war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Saddam had warily accepted Reagan's help, yet he never shed his suspicions that the Americans were playing both sides. "Irangate," as the Iraqis called Iran-Contra, appeared to bear out those misgivings. The revelation was like a "stab in the back," Saddam privately told his advisors.[2] Whenever a smiling American extended them a helping hand, the Iraqis could bet that the other was clutching a poisoned dagger, poised to strike.

Such is the portrait of Saddam Hussein that emerges from Steve Coll's captivating new book, *The Achilles Trap,* which profiles a leader unfailingly leery of American duplicity—but perhaps not entirely without cause. For decades, the man who ran Iraq baffled onlookers in the United States. When Washington "tilted" toward Baghdad in the early 1980s to prevent revolutionary Iran from overrunning the Persian Gulf, Saddam refused to fit the "moderate" mold into which the Reagan administration desperately tried to squeeze him. In August 1990, any lingering hopes for U.S.-Iraqi friendship melted away when, seemingly out of the blue, Saddam invaded neighboring Kuwait. In the years that followed, the Iraqi president attempted to deceive United Nations weapons inspectors, leaving the world to wonder whether or not he possessed weapons of mass destruction. After 2003, when the American search for WMD came up empty, observers confronted yet another enigma: Why did Saddam not tell the truth? As George W. Bush privately mused on the eve of the U.S. invasion, "If Saddam doesn't actually have WMD, why on earth would he subject himself to a war he will almost certainly lose?"[3]

The Achilles Trap sets out to answer that question. Though poorly understood by U.S. officials at the time—and still little appreciated outside specialized academic circles today—Saddam's decades of experience confronting American treachery (both real and perceived) seemed to corroborate his preconceived suspicions of the United States.[4] After 1991, when U.N. weapons inspections proved more thorough than Saddam anticipated, the regime secretly dismantled its WMD programs. Because "Saddam thought of the CIA as all-knowing," however, he "assumed that the CIA knew that he had no WMD, and so he interpreted American and British accusations about his supposed arsenal of nukes and germ bombs as merely propaganda lines in a long-running conspiracy to get rid of him" (4). Ultimately, Coll explains, the Iraqi president "saw no reason to play their game or deal with their prying inspectors" (365).

Few are better equipped than Coll to tell this story. An intrepid investigative journalist and gifted storyteller, Coll has spent his career throwing light on America's shadow wars in the greater Middle East. His books—including *The Bin Ladens, Directorate S*, and the Pulitzer Prize-winning *Ghost Wars*—are essential reading for any student of the War on Terror. With *The Achilles Trap,* Coll now sets his sights on the history of America's misadventures in Iraq. More than twenty years after Bush launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, the debate over the origins of the unilateral war to topple Saddam Hussein remains as fraught as ever.[5] The American side of the story—the regime change consensus that crystallized in the 1990s, the intoxicating cocktail of fear and hubris that suffused the White House after 9/11, the intelligence failures and fabrications that Bush and his associates used to justify war—is well-trodden territory.[6]

What sets *The Achilles Trap* apart is its ambitious scope. Coll does not confine himself to the perspectives of those perched in Washington. This is a bidirectional story of U.S.-Iraqi encounters, and Coll amplifies voices from both sides—even, and especially, when they talk past each other. More than any prior American journalistic account, *The Achilles Trap* takes seriously Saddam Hussein's worldview, grappling with his atrocities as well as his aspirations, his delusions as well as his logic. To paint that portrait in all its complexity, Coll, backed by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, sued the U.S. government to release a trove of Iraqi records seized by American forces in 2003. A small portion of that archive was previously available to researchers at the National Defense University's Conflict Records Research Center, which shuttered in 2015 for lack of funding. Through his settlement with the Justice Department, Coll won access to a large subset of the Iraqi records, including more than a hundred transcripts of Saddam's tape-recorded meetings with his advisors. After *The Achilles Trap* went to press, Coll shared these records with the Wilson Center, which is now making them available to researchers online.[7]

Glowing reviews of *The Achilles Trap* are already pouring in, and deservedly so.[8] It is a triumph—to date, the most thorough, accessible, and incisive exegesis of Saddam Hussein's turbulent relationship with the United States. The book is also a testament to the exciting possibilities for collaboration between investigate journalists and academic specialists. Coll recognized that he was wading into a crowded field. Joseph Sassoon, Dina Rizk Khoury, Kevin Woods, Lisa Blaydes, Samuel Helfont, Hal Brands—these are just a handful of the many scholars who have spent years poring over the available Iraqi records.[9] Coll did not merely immerse himself in their scholarship. He also sought their counsel. Ibrahim al-Marashi, whose study of Kuwait under Iraqi occupation remains the gold standard, lent Coll a hand improving the English translations of the Iraqi sources on which *The Achilles Trap* relies.[10] Coll also

engages fruitfully with the political scientist Målfrid Braut-Heghammer's concept of the "cheater's dilemma": every time Saddam disclosed new facets of his WMD programs, he invited fresh allegations of malfeasance, further delaying the sanctions relief that prompted the disclosures in the first place.[11] And Michael Brill, a leading scholar of the Baathist archives, helped broker the deal to bring the newly released Iraqi records to the Wilson Center.[12] Coll has placed himself in excellent company, and it shows.

The Achilles Trap was almost half the book that it turned out to be. When Coll set out to write it, he planned to open the narrative in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the U.S.-led military campaign to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in early 1991. But one of Coll's interview subjects, the American weapons inspector and head of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, persuaded him to cast his gaze further back in time—specifically to 1979, the year Saddam ascended to the pinnacle of the Iraqi Baath Party.

That was not only the correct narrative choice, but a necessary one. As far as Saddam was concerned, the struggle with the Americans began long before their warplanes pummeled Iraq in 1991. Like so many of his generation, a young Saddam cut his teeth in the Arab nationalist politics that swept the Middle East in the 1950s. He joined the Baath Party, a revolutionary movement guided by the principles of anti-imperialism, socialism, and Arab unity. Baathism was not merely a vehicle through which to effect radical political change. It was also a worldview—one premised on the Arabs' lost glory at the hands of devious imperialists bent on perpetuating their backwardness, subjugation, and humiliation.

No sooner had Iraqi Baathists seized power in 1968 than the United States, Israel, and Iran appeared to corroborate that narrative. In the early 1970s, Richard Nixon, blinkered by Cold War exigencies, joined Israel and Iran in providing covert support to a Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq.[13] Then, in 1981, Israel attacked the French-built Osirak nuclear reactor outside Baghdad—a humiliating setback that spurred Saddam to double down on his furtive quest for the bomb. The Iraqis presumed that Reagan had given the Israeli operation his blessing. He had not. But the subsequent disclosure of secret U.S. and Israeli arms sales to Iran only cemented Saddam's certitude that the three continued to conspire against him.[14] This history continued to color his perceptions of the United States for the rest of his life.

That is not to say Iraq and the United States were destined for war. One of Coll's greatest strengths is his sensitivity to historical contingency. Nothing had to turn out the way it did. As Coll explains, American and Iraqi officials were plagued by imperfect information—or, to be less generous, ineptitude—throughout their thirty-year tangle. Whereas "many Americans understood [Iran-Contra] as staggering incompetence," for instance, Saddam "interpreted [it] as manipulative genius" (102). The Iraqi government, too, was "hobbled by confusion across the highest levels." As late as 2001, Saddam himself was unsure whether Iraq still had WMD, asking one advisor, "Do you have any programs going on that I don't know about?" (435). Sometimes the incompetence verged on the farcical. "Do we have WMD?" Ali Hassan al-Majid, architect of the genocidal Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the 1980s, once asked Saddam. "Don't you know?" Saddam countered. Majid: "No." Saddam: "No" (436).

Misperception, miscalculation, miscommunication—these and similar words pervade *The Achilles Trap*, reflecting Coll's argument that mutual misunderstanding, more than anything else, greased the skids to war in 2003. That explanation is an important part of the story, but it fails to account for America's single-minded pursuit of regime change. As the historian Joseph Stieb has aptly written, the "idea of the Iraq War as a tragedy stemming from misperception…risks letting [American] leaders off the hook for rigid thinking, arrogance, and unrealistic goals."[15] After the Gulf War, the H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations—riding high on unipolarity, but humiliated by Saddam's survival in power—led the charge in the Security Council to maintain ironclad sanctions on Iraq despite their astronomical human toll.[16] By chalking up U.S. policy to misunderstanding, *The Achilles Trap* skirts the ideological proclivities and domestic political exigencies that made Saddam's downfall not only palatable, but necessary to a wide swath of the American political establishment.

Coll's misunderstanding-cum-tragedy narrative has its limits on the Iraqi side of the ledger too. At one level, there is no question that Saddam misunderstood American politics, media, and culture. Dig a little deeper, however, and it becomes clear that shortsighted U.S. policies inadvertently gave Saddam reason to believe that many of his ideas were grounded in truth. Baathist ideology may have predisposed him to view the United States with suspicion, yet Saddam's experience grappling with real-life American duplicity persuaded him that it would be foolish not to expect the worst from the "conspiring bastards" in Washington. Nixon's covert support for Kurdish rebels, Reagan's secret arms sales to Iran, Clinton's ill-fated coup plots, and the CIA's infiltration of U.N. weapons inspections all offered Saddam ample evidence that the America of his nightmares—hypocritical, conniving, conspiratorial—was America as it really existed.[17]

To understand how this dynamic played out in ways the Americans failed to foresee, consider the crux of Coll's story—that "catastrophic turning point" in U.S.-Iraqi relations, the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (474). In the decades since, scholars have contended that Reagan and H. W. Bush unwittingly encouraged Saddam's aggression against Kuwait by condoning his atrocities in the 1980s.[18] Some take that argument a step further, claiming that, in her meeting with Saddam on July 25, the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, gave Saddam a "green light" to seize his tiny neighbor.[19] Coll rightly refutes the green light canard, but he is sympathetic to the argument that Bush could have deterred Saddam from seizing his neighbor. "It seems likely that if the United States had been able, in the spring and summer of 1990, to clearly describe for Saddam what would happen to his regime if he invaded Kuwait, he would not have done it" (475).

Perhaps. But this fixation on whether Bush could have prevented the invasion of Kuwait through some tougher talk misunderstands Saddam's view of American intentions that fateful summer. As I have argued elsewhere, Saddam and his advisors understood by late 1989 that Soviet retrenchment portended a new era of unchecked U.S. hegemony on the world stage, or what American commentators would soon dub the "unipolar moment." The Iraqi president feared that Washington would exploit unipolarity to destabilize his regime in pursuit of its longstanding designs on the Persian Gulf. As 1989 turned to 1990, those fears comingled with ominous intelligence reports that Israel, at America's bidding, was preparing to attack Iraq, as it had done in 1981. Throughout the first half of 1990, it was this ostensible American-Israeli "conspiracy," not Kuwait, that preoccupied Saddam.[20] Iraqi, U.S., and British archives, alongside the memoirs of Iraqi officials who defected throughout the 1990s—Saad al-Bazzaz, Raad Majid al-Hamdani, Wafiq al-Samarrai, and Mohamed al-Mashat, among others—testify to the sincerity of those fears.[21] (These memoirs are absent from Coll's bibliography.)

This was the context in which Kuwait insisted on producing oil in excess of its OPEC quota in the summer of 1990, depressing oil prices and depriving Baghdad of the revenues it needed to rebuild its war-ravaged economy. Saddam interpreted Kuwaiti intransigence as evidence

of the royal family's complicity in American-Israeli machinations. By the time Saddam sat down with Glaspie in late July, then, he had already concluded that the United States and Israel were orchestrating a plot to subvert his regime. He did not seek or need American permission to invade Kuwait, which he considered the linchpin of that very conspiracy. If the idea of an American-Israeli-Kuwaiti plot sounds farfetched, so did the American-Israeli scheme to sell weapons to revolutionary Iran—until it turned out to be true.

Coll suggests that American diplomats and intelligence operatives "had no way to influence Saddam or his inner circle" in the months preceding the invasion of Kuwait. "The plan to coax Saddam toward moderation suffered from a void of access and understanding" (146). A void of understanding, yes. But it can hardly be said that the Bush administration suffered a void of access. On multiple occasions from late 1989 through the summer of 1990, Saddam and his advisors conveyed their fears of U.S. and Israeli treachery directly to their American interlocutors, including embassy staff, members of Congress, and State Department officials. Decision-makers in Washington hardly needed CIA assets to tell them that Saddam felt backed into a corner. They needed only to appreciate the Iraqi dictator's interpretation of recent history. Bazzaz, a prominent state media figure and confidant to the Iraqi leadership, suggests in his 1992 memoir that Secretary of State James Baker, whom the Iraqis apparently trusted, might have visited Baghdad and assuaged Saddam's apprehensions. ("Baghdad would have preferred to deal with the master rather than the subordinate on the subject of Kuwait and Israel," Bazzaz writes.) But in the absence of Baker's assurances, Saddam concluded that the United States did not want to defuse the crisis. It wanted war.[22]

Despite Coll's lawsuit, the Iraqi records currently available to researchers represent only a fraction of those seized by U.S. forces in 2003. The lion's share remains under lock and key at the Pentagon. As Coll writes, "It is long past time for the White House and the Defense Department to release the full [Iraqi] archive and make it accessible to global researchers" (490).

Still, the abundance of Iraqi documents at Coll's fingertips throws into sharp relief the relative paucity of U.S. archival materials currently available to historians of the post-Cold War era. A cursory glance at *The Achilles Trap's* endnotes reveals that, with some exceptions, Coll relies overwhelmingly on interviews, memoirs, and unclassified government investigations to reconstruct the American side of the story. To be sure, he uses these sources well. Yet it is a painful irony that the unfiltered documentary record of Saddam Hussein's decision-making—obtained through a unilateral American war, no less—is arguably more accessible than that of H. W. Bush, Clinton, and W. Bush.

That imbalance is symptomatic of a wider problem: the crisis of declassification in the United States.[23] As the historian Matthew Connelly points out in his pathbreaking book, *The Declassification Engine,* the U.S. government's declassification procedures have utterly failed to keep pace with the times. "Historians today are no more likely to study the 1970s than the 1950s or 1960s. The 1980s and 1990s… are—with few exceptions—an undiscovered country." At this rate, Connelly reckons, "the full historical record of the immediate post-Cold War era" will not be available until 2060.[24] Those who study this period are all too familiar with the challenge. Rummaging through archival boxes in the H. W. Bush, Clinton, or W. Bush presidential libraries, one encounters row after row of redacted text or withdrawn documents as frequently as fully declassified records. To work around the dearth of declassified documents, some historians of contemporary U.S. foreign relations history have come to rely on memoirs and interviews. When the eminent diplomatic historian Melvyn Leffler recently set out to write a new book on the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for instance, he drew heavily from his interviews with major players in the Bush administration.[25] Some critics took Leffler to task for taking his interview subjects' reminiscences at face value.[26] Dialogue with historical actors can serve a vital purpose, and Coll puts his hundred-plus interviews with American, Iraqi, and other figures to excellent use. But ultimately, there is no substitute for that critical ingredient, the archival record.

Already, one distinguished historian has predicted that Coll's "is likely to be the best account…we will ever have" of the events that led up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.[27] It is certainly the best account currently available. But it will not be the last. By donating the newly available Iraqi records to the Wilson Center and calling on the Pentagon to release the rest, Coll himself seems to recognize that, unlike the search for Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, the search for new perspectives on the past never ends.

Notes:

1. SH-SHTP-A-000-561, "Saddam and His Inner Circle Discussing the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the United States," c. April 1988, Conflict Records Research Center, National Defense University.
2. Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark Stout, *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 19.
3. George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown, 2011), 242.
4. Hal Brands, "Making the Conspiracy Theorist a Prophet: Covert Action and the Contours of United States-Iraq Relations," *The International History Review* 33:3 (2011): 381–408, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.595169.
5. Joseph Stieb, "Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? The Debate at 20 Years," *Texas National Security Review* 6:3 (Summer 2023): 11–28.
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New SHAFR Executive Director!

SHAFR is thrilled to announce the appointment of Dr. Richard Immerman as the organization's new executive director! Richard, of course, is well-known to everyone who has been part of our field and our organization. His scholarly record––which includes 13 books authored, edited, or co-edited, and many years of leadership as Professor and Edward J. Buthusiem Family Distinguished Faculty Fellow in History and Director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy at Temple University––has few equals. His record of service to SHAFR, however, is just as outstanding. In addition to being a former SHAFR president, Richard has served on council, chaired the Ways and Means Committee, the conference program committee, and the Committee on Historical Documentation. He has won the Stuart Bernath Book Prize and the Stuart Bernath Lecture Prize, the Peter L. Hahn Award for Distinguished Service, and, most recently, the 2024 Norman and Laura Graebner Award for Lifetime Achievement. Richard will begin serving a one-year term as executive director-designate on August 1, 2024, and will become executive director on August 1, 2025. SHAFR is lucky to have such a dedicated and experienced member willing to serve in this important role. Congratulations, Richard!

Photo by Morgan Immerman

Seven Questions on...
Public Diplomacy

Nicholas Cull, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Autumn Lass,
Elisabeth Piller, Gilles Schott-Smith,

Editor's note: *"Seven Questions On..." is a regular feature in* Passport *that asks scholars in a particular field to respond to seven questions about their field's historiography, key publications, influences, etc. It is designed to introduce the broader SHAFR community to a variety of perspectives for a given field, as well as serving as a literature and pedagogical primer for graduate students and non-specialists.* **AJ**

1. What drew you to this field and inspired you to focus on your specific area of public diplomacy?

Nicholas Cull: I was drawn to the field of public diplomacy because it sits at the convergence of my two great academic enthusiasms: international history and media/cultural history. My initial specialization was in Anglo-American relations largely because my foreign languages were not strong enough for primary research (I'm dyslexic and turns out that isn't just a problem in English) so I worked on the role of propaganda and public diplomacy in the transatlantic Special Relationship. I've especially enjoyed working on the films and images created for the campaigns I've studied. The oral history dimension of my work has also been very rewarding, although sadly that methodology has run its course for scholars of the mid-Twentieth Century.

I've broadened my interests from a Ph.D. focused on British public diplomacy in the US during the early stages of World War Two to work on the history of US public diplomacy around the world, on the theory of public diplomacy and, for the past decade or so, on the public diplomacy battle over Apartheid in South Africa. My idea with this last project was to do something in which NGOs and international organizations took a lead, and the case of Apartheid delivers on that. I also hoped that I'd be looking at an issue separate from the Cold War but I have found that Cold War politics is central to Apartheid and its end should be considered in some measure a posthumous victory for Eastern Bloc foreign policy.

Jessica Gienow-Hecht: First off, I do not consider myself a scholar of public diplomacy. "Public Diplomacy" is the term that the US foreign service most commonly uses for its activities. That job is typically performed by specific divisions staffed by people trained for the job, located in or outside of foreign offices, including the U.S. state department. It entails a government's communication to people–as opposed to political decision makers–in foreign lands. It's an Anglophone word creation and does not even translate easily in many other languages, including my own.

While part of that description does appear in my work and research, I feel that this is, really, a conceptual limitation to agents on the state's payroll when, in fact, their domestic interaction with, outsourcing to and confrontation with nongovernmental actors does not allow for such line. Rather, there is a high degree of osmosis between the public and the private sector–and it is precisely that osmosis which brought me to the field. I am, originally, a cultural historian who recognized, at one point, that I could not write the story I wanted to write–about Jewish émigrés in the U.S. military government in Germany during and after World War II–without resorting to the ideas, discussions, literature, and methodologies provided by diplomatic historians. I then turned to the history of cultural diplomacy because Mel Leffler–who did not work in the field–along with pioneers in the study of culture and diplomacy such as Akira Iriye, Frank Ninkovich, Emily Rosenberg, encouraged me to do so.

In those days (read: the early 1990s), there was not much talk about "public diplomacy" in the jargon of diplomatic history yet; the more common term was "cultural diplomacy" and even that was, for the most part, relegated to a minority of scholars, many of them young like myself. To this day, I feel that for all the efforts to delineate and provide workable definitions the terminology of cultural and public diplomacy, along with competing terms such as soft power and more recent conceptual forays such as reputational security (Nick Cull), nation branding or image management remains malleable. Not because we have not done our homework but because, as countless scholars laboring in the vineyard of literature and cultural studies remind us, definitions relating to culture, notably cultural change, do not lend themselves easily to normativity. Nick Cull and I have been amiably squabbling over definitions for years. Still, I do like that term better than "public diplomacy," at least when it comes to my own work. Thus, please do allow me to use that term in our conversation.

Autumn Lass: I come from a family of teachers and veterans/civil servants. Those two influences merged and brought me to public diplomacy. When I started college, I wanted to continue that legacy of public service. So, I double majored in political science/history. I took political science classes primarily focused on politics, public affairs, campaigning, and foreign/international relations. And, for the history degree, I gravitated toward classes that focused on diplomacy and military history because I was naturally more interested in them. By the time I was a senior, I had grown frustrated with my nonhistory political science colleagues. There appeared to be little historical understanding of their approach to politics and the government. By the time I graduated, I was firmly camped in the history of diplomacy and domestic politics. During my graduate coursework, I was fascinated with how governments "teach" their citizens to agree/support their policies especially foreign policy since Americans have so little understanding of global affairs. The use of truth and facts to craft particular domestic campaigns to garner support for foreign policy intrigued me.

Since I come from a family of teachers, I've always been interested in teaching and its influence on individuals and

their opinions. So, because of my background in politics and public opinion, I was captivated by how hard the government worked to subtly craft, control, and change public opinion on diplomacy-related issues, especially during the Cold War. The more I studied and researched the government's attempts to create an "educated public" on matters related to diplomacy the more I realized this was where my intellectual passions lay.

Ultimately, a teacher knows the best techniques to shape the minds of their students. A teacher knows the images, stories, and best approaches to reach their students. A teacher knows when to push hard and when to go easy. Teachers must learn and adapt methods and messaging as time passes and students change. As I studied and researched more, I came to see governments as a type of teacher and citizens as a type of student.

Elisabeth Piller: Growing up in Germany, I was always very interested in the culture of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933). As a teenager, I read all the major literary works of the period as well as the published diaries and memoirs of many of its most important authors and politicians. My sister, who is seven years younger than me, claims that she did not know she had a sister until she was about ten. That's obviously an exaggeration but I did spend a lot of time reading in my room. When I went to college in the United States, I added the U.S. dimension and became very interested in transatlantic relations–and it's a fascination that has never left me. I first started writing about the intersection of transatlantic culture and politics in my B.A. thesis, which was about the German writer Klaus Mann and an émigré literary magazine he edited in New York City in 1940-41. Back in Germany, I wrote my M.A. thesis on U.S. humanitarian aid to Germany immediately after the World War I and then wrote my Ph.D. dissertation, which became my first book, on Weimar Germany's public diplomacy toward the United States. I wanted to know how Weimar Germany used its remaining cultural assets to revive U.S. sympathies after World War I, and I focused on academic relations, tourism, and ties to German Americans, among other things.

Apart from an interest in Weimar culture and transatlantic relations, what ultimately drew me to the field of public diplomacy is the range of different historical actors involved: tourists, students, authors, musicians and many others. For me, public diplomacy stands out as a historical subject because it is not only directed at an international public but also, at least in large part, made by the public. Public diplomacy allows us to study foreign policy elites as well as a range of other actors such as tourists or students, who often get short shrift in "traditional" diplomatic histories. The informal foreign policy of non-state actors is endlessly fascinating to me, and public diplomacy is a wonderful way to study it.

Giles Scott-Smith: I think it was for various reasons. Firstly, looking at it from the perspective of neo-Gramscian IR, it came from an interest in the connections between ideas and power, culture and politics (hegemony etc). Secondly, from becoming intrigued by the ways in which the study of public diplomacy can change your views on international relations (and international history) in general. Thirdly, my entry into public diplomacy was through studying exchange programmes, not through so-called "fast media" (radio/tv/social media etc). Studying public diplomacy–and particularly the function and influence of exchange programmes–was a way for me to escape the abstractness of IR theory and get back to the everyday stories of people, which is what I wanted.

2. Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of public diplomacy?

NC: Public diplomacy began life in its modern meaning as an American euphemism for international propaganda in the context of the mid-1960s. I personally believe it has evolved its own democratic characteristics and approaches, but suspect Congress just wants a cheap and effective global advertising campaign. Just as the practice of public diplomacy grew from propaganda so its scholarship grew from the foundational work done by historians of propaganda. Both my bachelor's and doctoral degrees are from the University of Leeds (UK) in the 1980s where Nicholas Pronay and Philip M. Taylor were doing pioneering work on the history of propaganda. Taylor was especially important for producing institutional histories of British propaganda campaigns in the Great War and interwar periods, and a wonderful overview of the whole history of propaganda in wartime called *Munitions of the Mind*, which remains a standard starting point in the field. Pronay and Taylor were affiliated with a wonderful organization called the International Association for Media and History (IAMHIST) where I found a wider intellectual home. My mentors within that organization included David Culbert and David Ellwood, and I often published in IAMHIST's *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*.

Considering the US Cold War experience specifically, key work was done by retired practitioners themselves who wrote about public diplomacy, partly out of an awareness that mainstream scholarship was neglecting it. Hans N. Tuch's book *Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas from 1990* was especially influential. Richard Arndt, Alan Heil and Wilson Dizard also did invaluable work. Both the practice and scholarship of public diplomacy came to be dominated by Joseph Nye's work on Soft Power, for better or worse.

There was a reason why the US scholarship of public diplomacy was underdeveloped. Its chief agency in the US–the United States Information Agency (1953-1999)–operated under the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which was eventually read as preventing the domestic distribution of USIA materials, lest they interfere with domestic American politics. This made it difficult to access USIA archives and films. George H. W. Bush corrected some of this and work could begin. It is also worth saying that because USIA was an independent agency the State Department Historical Branch initially saw most of its work as beyond the scope of the *FRUS* series. Since the State Department assumed control of public diplomacy in 1999 this has been retroactively corrected with helpful companion volumes on public diplomacy appearing for each Cold War presidency.

The usual march of the thirty-year+ frontier in diplomatic studies produced some excellent work on the 1940s and 1950s. Jessica Gienow-Hecht showed the way working on media in the US occupation of Germany. I think that the work of Walter Hixson, Ken Osgood and Laura Belmonte on the Eisenhower years has help up especially well. I decided not to focus on the beginning phase but to work on a history of the entirety of USIA. My 2008 book *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency* was explicitly intended to provide a big picture map that others could fill

in as archives and interests broadened. It is wonderful to see that happening.

JGH: When it comes to the restricted meaning of public diplomacy and its academic study, I think among the most notable ones were and continue to be, above all, Frank Ninkovich, Akira Iriye, plus, in the next generation, Nick Cull, Louis Clerc, and Giles Scott-Smith, as well as all those listed below under (6).

AL: It is hard to pick just a few of the Mount Rushmore-type scholars of public diplomacy. In the broader of sense of public diplomacy, I would identify Melvin Small's *Democracy and Diplomacy*; Frank Ninkovich's *The Diplomacy of Ideas*; Emily Rosenberg's *Spreading the American Dream*; Alan Winkler's *The Politics of Propaganda*; and Nicholas Cull's, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency* as scholars who pioneered the way for public diplomacy.

Within my narrower field of propaganda and public diplomacy, many excellent scholars have paved the way. Some of the scholars I relied on as the starting points for much of my research and writing include Walter Hixson, Wilson Dizard, Michael Hogan, David Krugler, Kenneth Osgood, Steven Casey, Laura Belmonte, and Nancy Bernard.

EP: One of my pet peeves is people who roundly condemn the "old" diplomatic history. A lot of older scholarship contains more public diplomacy and pays more attention to the public than we give it credit for.

But in terms of really being ahead of their time and giving public diplomacy a prominent place, I would point to Emily Rosenberg's *Spreading the American Dream*, Frank Costigliola's *Awkward Dominion*, and Frank Ninkovich's *Diplomacy of Ideas*, all written in the 1980s. This period also saw new and more sophisticated studies of propaganda, including Philip Taylor's influential *Projection of Britain* (1981).

GSS: I think a distinction is here needed between the history of public diplomacy and more theoretical approaches that came out of Communications and PolSci early on. For US history, the classics were written largely by practitioners, with authors such as Hans Tuch, Richard Arndt, and Wilson Dizard coming to mind, with historians Susan Brewer, Nick Cull, and Ken Osgood providing excellent contributions. For British public diplomacy (British Council), historian Alice Byrne has produced a lot of valuable work. For theory, I would say the groundwork was laid back in the 1940s and 1950s when the likes of Harold Laswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Ithiel de Sola Pool established foundational principles that linked communications, social psychology, and technology. More recently, Eytan Gilboa and James Pamment have been influential. There is also the seminal *The Cultural Approach* by Ruth McMurray and Muna Lee published in 1947, an excellent foundation for comparative analysis.

3. Discuss how the field has evolved to include different approaches to analyzing public diplomacy.

NC: Public diplomacy as an activity uses many approaches–broadcasting, education, film and so forth–and as one might expect there are many disciplinary approaches to its study. While bibliometrics suggest that history still leads the way, the IR and communication studies approaches run a close behind. Scholars in cultural studies, psychology, management/branding and other fields are also contributing. The historical field has a number of conversations. There is output around the presentation of race and gender by the US, work on specific regions and bilateral relationships (I've been involved in US-Spanish as well as US-South African); there is scholarship on particular methods such as radio/TV, film, expos/world's fairs and exchange. There is work around particular eras. Gregory Tomlinson wrote well on the golden era of USIA under Edward R. Murrow.

JGH: The answer to this question very much depends on the country under consideration. Since our audience here will mostly focus on the United States, I shall do the same but hasten to add that stories vary greatly among other states.

When research on cultural and public diplomacy took off in the 1990s, culture still featured very much as a tool of state power. Scholars studied governmental programs, agencies, statements, bureaucratic infighting and considered culture, for the most part, as an instrument of power. Decentralizing the narrative conceptually, spatially and temporally has, in my opinion, offered some of the most exciting vistas in the field of diplomatic history, for at least three reasons:

For one thing, learning from cultural studies and integrating race, gender, religion, psychology and many other conceptual lenses into the scholarship, has shown us just how little state policy crafted in Washington, D.C., mattered to teams and agents on the ground between Baghdad and Berlin, Copenhagen and Cape Town. It has also demonstrated the vast gap between original intentions, the implementation of policy, and the final outcome or results. Perhaps more so than trade agreements and political treaties, cultural policy has a way of changing shape, often starkly so, as it meanders from top officials' vision of, say, information, reeducation, or "winning the hearts and minds" to a group of school teachers and students in Central Africa, journalists in southeastern Europe, or religious congregations in the Middle East.

For another, the decentralization of the state as a variable of analysis has revealed that culture does not echo policy and that, in fact, the job profile of a "diplomat" is far broader than we have previously known (leading Karen Ahlquist to ask, in a 2010 *Diplomatic History* review, "Who Is a Diplomat?"). Instead, we have come to realize that culture and actors in charge of its projection/consumption at that, can really take a life on their own, can hail from any field. There are moments in U.S. history in the 19th and 20th centuries, where political relations with one or more other nation states were reserved, strained, perhaps dormant or even nonexistent–while cultural relations thrived. The Anglo-American relationship in the 19th century or escalating super power tensions in the 1960s testify to the viability of culture's independent course, far from the power houses in Moscow and Washington (see Dana Cooper's marvelous study on the 500+ transatlantic marriages after 1840 or Peter Schmelz' fascinating work on informal musical exchanges between German and Soviet composers at the height of the Cold War).

Third, the gaze has broadened quite considerably. While much of the early literature focused on the United States and the cold war state, today scholars study the U.S. cultural diplomacy across the centuries and in comparison, with other states. In the process, they have noted how late the U.S. state and its bureaucracy came engage with public/cultural diplomacy abroad. And they have uncovered the extent to which U.S. Cold War cultural diplomacy was, both in temporal as well as in regional comparison, really, an exception rather than the norm–late, reactive, unilateral and for all the obsession with "dialogue" perpetually obsessed with coming out on top.

AL: Public diplomacy has evolved into a type of multiverse. Instead of a singular line of analysis on overseas propaganda or information campaigns of one government to the citizens of another, PD now has multiple lines of analysis and inquiry. It is the blending of studying public affairs and foreign affairs. It has moved beyond exploring official infrastructures of public diplomacy and now studies the exportation of culture and values, unofficial infrastructures of PD like citizen groups and NGOs, nontraditional messaging, and various mediums like art, film, music, architecture, sports, museums, comic books, and even religion. The evolution of the study of public diplomacy highlights the complex approaches governments use to shape the minds of citizens and mold their opinions. Governments go to great lengths–both officially and unofficially–to control the messaging and the relationships it makes to influence the public. Now, it not only examines "national" populations but also "global" populations.

EP: I think the field has evolved quite a bit, especially away from state actors. Much of the early scholarship began by looking at official institutions, particularly the relevant sections of the U.S. State Department and European foreign offices, and tried to assess their efforts to reach foreign publics. Indeed, at this early point, in the 1980s, the main interest was in propaganda in the narrow sense. This focus was then broadened to include large semiofficial organizations that were either state-funded or had very close ties to the foreign policy establishment, including the Institute of International Education, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Alliance Française, the Goethe Institut, and many others. The scholarship on national representations at the World's Fair, especially in the 1990s and 2000s, also provided important impetus for thinking public diplomacy more broadly.

In recent decades, scholars have increasingly begun to consider actors quite apart from official or officious foreign policymakers. As far as U.S.-German relations are concerned, Jessica Gienow-Hecht does this incredibly well in *Sound Diplomacy*. In essence, she writes a history of German public diplomacy in the nineteenth century United States that gives little weight to official actors but instead emphasizes the agency and interest of conductors and musicians themselves. She shows that there is considerable public diplomacy outside of "public diplomacy" and offers a model for how to write about public diplomacy beyond state actors (and the twentieth century).

However, I also enjoy scholarship that brings together state and nonstate actors and explores their relationship. For example, Charlotte Lerg's book on University Diplomacy traces the competition and cooperation between state and nonstate actors (ministries, university presidents, monarchs, professors) in U.S.-German university relations. I also greatly enjoy the work of Liping Bu and Whitney Walton, who place students and universities at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy but also detail the involvement of American officials.

GSS: Hard question, because of its scope. Do we include soft power, cultural diplomacy, nation branding here? For some, public diplomacy (active) can be considered as the operationalisation of soft power (passive), which is a simplistic but useful categorisation. Soft power is of course also motivational and has an influence on behaviour, but the point is that public diplomacy is often about the actors and their techniques for carrying out influence operations. Joseph Nye introduced the soft power concept around 1990 and it became a classic term for the US-led post-Cold War era. Nation branding, which was a way to cash in on the "soft power boom" by making it internationally competitive, followed in the late 1990s mainly through consultants Wally Olins and Simon Anholt. Nation branding is about generating soft power through a merger of public diplomacy and commercial advertising techniques. Public diplomacy as a term has been around since the mid-1960s, and Nick Cull has provided a useful taxonomy that maintains the distinction with soft power and nation branding but includes the following: listening; advocacy; international broadcasting; exchanges; and cultural diplomacy. Again, some would argue that cultural diplomacy is a separate distinct space of activity and not a subfield because culture–file under "slow media"–allows for multiple fields of interpretation and does not fit the less nuanced approaches of media/communications research (focused on "fast media").

4. What are some of the challenges faced by scholars working in the field?

NC: The archives of USIA–RG 306–have not been well maintained perhaps because of the long years sheltered by the Smith-Mundt Act, but each new work moved things forward. An ideal public diplomacy text should have material from both archives in the sending country and in the receiving country too, to chart impact. Such works are doubly complex to write. A wholly separate issue is that despite the centrality of issues of propaganda and disinformation to our lives today, scholarship has lagged and other subfields of US foreign relations such as secret intelligence make a bigger splash. Scholars working across disciplines can find that they are welcome until resources run short and then they are no one's baby.

JGH: This question puzzles me since it seems to imply that there are challenges unique to scholars working in the field of public/cultural diplomacy. Most challenges I can think of–learning new languages, grappling with recognition, or the interdisciplinary balance act–are difficult to assign squarely to this field exclusively. I can think of two things that appeared, for some time, to affect students of diplomatic history focusing on cultural/public diplomacy to a greater extent: One is the job market. Hiring for a position in diplomatic history used to entail an expectation that the successful candidate would be able to both teach and research hard power or at least sound state leadership. That pressure seems to have eased somewhat.

The second point may be coined, in a gesture to Perry Miller, "The Historian's Dilemma": The subfield of public/cultural has been enormously successful. We have come a long way since that 1994 SHAFR convention where an attendee (my age, my peer, no less), conceded, in a somewhat jovial style, that as long as us culturalists would get "two to three panels" each year, we'd be fine, happy, and marginal. Twenty-five years later, the program of the annual convention reveals a burgeoning amount of papers dedicated to the role of culture, milieu, and identity, both formal and informal, in U.S. foreign relations.

I don't think that's a challenge per se. But I do believe that the study and teaching of policymaking–how to develop a strategy, how to craft a policy–continues to be important, indeed vital, and, also, at the core of what we, as diplomatic historians need to provide. This applies, in particular at a time where international crises and confrontations, coupled with a general public inertia regarding the world beyond Daniel Immerwahr's "logo map," let us perceive and worry about a lack of leadership, a sense of political insecurity, a reluctance to make decisions, be they tough, smart or simply overdue.

AL: One challenge we face as public diplomacy scholars is the growing belief that public diplomacy may be a concept/tactic of the past. With the increasing role of NGOs, world organizations, and supranational organizations, some believe public diplomacy is no longer as relevant or powerful. For the United States–especially after 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror–the role of public diplomacy has been questioned. The belief or disbelief in public diplomacy relevancy and power is vital to our field.

Another challenge public diplomacy scholars face transitioning into the 21st century figuring out how to truly decipher the power of social media and the Internet, analyze its uses, and assess its influences in public diplomacy. While social media has made the world a smaller place and information more readily accessible, it has also created an incredibly fragmented public. As diplomacy plays out live on YouTube, Instagram, and even TikTok, historians must grapple with how to properly and accurately incorporate social media into our field.

Finally, with the growing trends in internationalism/globalism and comparative studies, there has been a decline in those who study the intersection of public opinion, foreign policy, and American domestic politics. While these newer trends add depth and complexity to the study of public diplomacy, there is still a need to interrogate the various ways the American government uses its public diplomacy tactics on its citizens. I would argue that the current diplomatic landscape, growing concerns about disinformation and "fake news" (both official and unofficial), and the role of social media in diplomacy, studies analyzing domestic politics, and public diplomacy are incredibly relevant and still leave a lot to be explored.

EP: For a long time, I would say, one of the biggest difficulties was archival material. Not that there is a lack of archival resources in general, but in terms of official document collections, which are often the first step in thinking about a new research project, the subject is comparatively little covered, especially for the pre-1945 period. For example, neither the official German foreign policy documents (*Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik*) nor the American documents (*Foreign Relations of the United States/FRUS*) traditionally contain much on public diplomacy. At the time they were compiled, the subject did not seem important enough or high enough on the political agenda to warrant inclusion . It was assumed not to be on the "official mind," even if a deep dive into the diplomatic archives showed this to be untrue. Indeed, it has happened to me that records that looked absolutely spectacular in a finding aid from the 1960s had been culled in the 1970s or 1980s because they were considered of little political relevance at the time. The release of *FRUS* volumes on public diplomacy, 1917 to 1972, from 2014 onward truly marks a new era in this regard.

Still, there's so much to discover and so much archival material to unearth. For example, while writing my own book, I was able to consult the records of the German Tourist Office at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park. There are hundreds and hundreds of boxes on German tourism promotion from 1925 through the 1940s, which were confiscated by the United States when it entered the war in 1941. In addition, and as a sort of insider tip to the loyal readers of *Passport*, the records of the Institute of International Education–the chosen instrument for U.S. student exchanges since 1919–have recently become available at the Rockefeller Archive Center (which also has a very attractive fellowship program). As many scholars have shown, American student relations are an incredible resource for understanding America in the world.

A second challenge is that the study of public diplomacy is often seen as a softer kind of diplomatic history. This is obviously much less true today than it was, say, thirty years ago, but one still often finds oneself having to explain the relevance of one's project, especially if one is working not on "propaganda" (which has the aura of importance and effectiveness) but on cultural diplomacy. So I think this continues to be a challenge, especially for early career researchers who have to position themselves in the field and make a convincing case for the relevance of their subject.

GSS: If I'd been asked this 15+ years ago I might still have said that relevance was an issue, but I think we are past that now. It used to be the case that research had to ensure its relevance in the eyes of skeptics by proving that public diplomacy actually achieved definable outcomes. Some saw it as a field empty of worth and a hype that needed puncturing, but that was because judgement was based on identifiable outcomes alone, rather than on the examination of processes. If you view international relations through public diplomacy, instead of seeing public diplomacy as no more than a disposable addition to international relations, there is no need any more to have to argue for relevance. There is now widespread acceptance across international history and IR that ideas and images are important, that public-private partnerships lie at the heart of most foreign relations activities, and that social networks can influence outcomes. The "practice turn" of IR has brought the two fields together in a way that allows for the detailed study of behaviour in all areas of diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is still the challenge to link public diplomacy research to broader trends in international history, to ensure that it engages with current questions and does not become self-referential.

5. What are some of the significant questions in the field that you feel need to be addressed in greater detail or, alternatively, which questions need to be reconsidered by contemporary scholars?

NC: The obvious challenge for the study of public diplomacy is the overemphasis on the US experience and especially the Cold War. I think we need to push back into the first half of the twentieth century and move forward into the post-Cold War period. In my own teaching I now spend more time on World War One as I see key features like the use of atrocity stories as very relevant to our world today. Bilateral and micro studies are especially welcome. In my own work I am trying to break out of the idea of Soft Power as commonly understood, with its emphasis on promotion by the most successful countries, and instead I am positing an enduring connection between reputation and security. My idea of Reputational Security draws attention to the ways in which a country's reputation has helped and hurt in international relations, and points to how nations have not only sought to project the best possible image but also to engineer the best possible reality, through reforms driven by foreign opinion. The best US case of this dimension of Reputational Security is the way in which Eisenhower and Kennedy responded to Soviet propaganda about American racism not just by sending out the jazz bands documented by Penny Von Eschen but by using federal muscle to make the US less racist. This is what Mary Dudziak called the Cold War imperative behind federal civil rights. There are so many cases of Reputational Securitythinking to explore right back through history to the ancient world. I was thrilled in the fall of 2023 to be able to compare notes at a conference in Amsterdam for historians of early

modern public diplomacy and learned that the Dutch of the Golden Age most certainly had a concept of reputation as a dimension of international success or failure.

JGH: I think we need to ask our sources and ourselves more systematically and honestly, what strategies, visions, concepts, and goals related to cultural and public diplomacy "work"–and what does not work. Here, I am not merely referring to intentions that make sense on paper but implementation and reactions, as difficult as they may be to measure.

As historians, I believe, we can make a significant contribution to the discussion pertaining to the current recession of liberal regimes. One common attitude among liberal public diplomats is the expectation that if you drop specific key words couched in dialogue–liberty, equality, self-determination etc.–people will somehow "get it." Liberalism's core values shine by example and who can argue with that? But if we are to believe the numerous political indexes–Economist Democracy, Bertelsmann Transformation, Freedom House etc.–the fact of the matter is that globally, the number of full democracies and with it, liberalism at large (not capitalism) is in decline. Most democracies grapple with the challenge of populism, waning acceptance, or outside threat.

The question we need to ask, then, is if liberalism is such a great idea, why is it such a tough sell? Something is evidently not working out in liberal public/cultural diplomacy and we need to ask ourselves what and why that is. Either, there is something wrong with the product of the liberal state itself. Or, there is something wrong with the "selling" of the product, at home and abroad. My hunch is that for a variety of reasons, liberal states fail to market themselves well in the long run. Historians can peruse and assess long-term and past strategies of public diplomacy, in the United States and beyond. They can ask questions relating to the implementation and reaction, operation and feasibility. Comparative history, more knowledge about more countries, both liberal and illiberal, will help us find better answers to what works–and what does not.

AL: What is the relationship between civics, education, and public diplomacy?

How was public diplomacy used and developed in early modern times? While we traditionally associate PD with the 20th century and beyond, it has existed for much longer. How was it developed and used before the 20th century?

Continued and deeper examination of citizen groups, religious organizations, and the works of nonprofits as domestic agents or liaisons for the governments.

What is the relationship between public diplomacy and social media/Internet? How has PD changed as the Internet/social media has made information more readily available? What problems does the unfiltered growth of information pose to public diplomacy?

How has public diplomacy used and/or combated disinformation and fake news–both domestically and overseas?

What is the relationship between public diplomacy and influencers/celebrity diplomacy?

As the world becomes increasingly smaller and more interconnected, what role does public diplomacy play in international or supranational organizations like NATO, the United Nations, the European Union, or the World Economic Forum? In other words, how do these organizations approach public diplomacy since they often view large portions of the world as their public?

EP: I think this continues to be the question of whether and how public diplomacy actually "works" and how to trace its success or failure. Of course, public diplomacy does not matter only when it is effective, but we cannot simply ignore the question either. In particular, I think we need to pay more attention to the failure of achieving desired results, e.g. when exchange students start resenting the United States, and to leave more room for nuance. In a Cold War mindset, for example, public diplomacy often appeared as a zero-sum game. International audiences could either like the United States and embrace freedom, or they could like the Soviets/Communism–but people don't work that way. I recently wrote an article on German students who studied in the United States in the late 1920s and 1930s. Back then, Americans hoped (and believed) that these German students would return from the United States with a more democratic and "American" mindset, but they usually did not. Most of them ended up sincere and devoted fans of the United States–and convinced National Socialists. There needs to be more nuance in how we tell these stories.

I also think there could be more scholarship on U.S. soldiers as public diplomats. While there has been important work on this, the "new" military history and the "new" diplomatic history remain, at least to my mind, more separate than they should. Since diplomatic history has grown more interested in informal actors and military history has opened up to cultural and social history this seems a great opportunity.

GSS: The first concerns US-centricity. The field has expanded its geographical scope a lot in the past decade or so, but as studies of the historiography have shown, the bulk of the research is still US-based or US-focused. Over the past ten years Chinese and other scholars have produced many studies of public diplomacy "with Chinese characteristics." While some of this work can be rather dry statistically-driven analysis, the most interesting work has been critiquing how public diplomacy/soft power have basically developed as US fields and are heavily infused with US cultural assumptions of how international relations should work. In particular, public diplomacy and soft power have had a heavy democratic ethos baked in, with a focus on open societies, freedom of movement and exchange, and equality of opportunity. This has been changing as others come to the party, diluting the connections with a liberal world order. Nation branding, on the other hand, does not seem to have any evident built-in moral compass, reflecting its more commercial origins. But in general the Asia-Pacific has become a very interesting region for research on public diplomacy/cultural diplomacy/soft power/nation branding, with studies of Japan and South Korea in particular at the centre of that.

A second has to be the impact of technology. There has been a running debate on to what extent, if at all, new forms of information communications technology have changed the precepts and/or practices of public diplomacy. Has technology, though primarily the internet and social media, changed the very basis for what public diplomacy is about, and who is carrying it out? Certainly social media has "democratised" the sharing of information (I say this with some caution), making it harder to control the message. But technology has also revolutionised the cultural sphere as well, as Natalia Grincheva's work on museums has shown.

6. For someone wanting to start out in public diplomacy, what 5-8 books do you consider to be of seminal

importance–either the "best" or the most influential titles?

NC: I wrote my book *Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age* (Polity, 2019) explicitly to provide a short and inexpensive one-stop introduction to the field. It is historically grounded. There are a number of valuable handbooks on the field. Eytan Gilboa's *A Research Agenda for Public Diplomacy* for Edward Elgar might be of especial interest to historians seeking a pathway into the field. For those looking to chart the overall evolution of US public diplomacy the best starting point is certainly Jack Hamilton's *Manipulating the Masses: Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of American Propaganda* (LSU, 2020) which covers the Great War. On the interwar reentry of the US into cultural diplomacy we have Frank Ninkovich's *The Diplomacy of Ideas* and the more recent Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas* explore the Second World War and its aftermath. My own two volumes on USIA–*The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* and *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001*–cover the USIA era. Historians working on post-9/11 should begin with Rhonda Zaharna's *Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11*. The authors mentioned in previous answers will also spark fresh approaches.

JGH: That's a tough call since there is so much great material out there but I'll try. My top titles are: Nick Cull's masterful *The Cold War and the U.S. Information Agency* (2009), Laura Belmonte's great read, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (2010), Neil Rosendorf's *Franco Sells Spain to America* (2014), Justin Hart's *Empire of Liberty*, Michael Krenn's eminent *The History of United States Cultural Diplomacy: 1770 to the Present Day* (2017). For the diversity of approaches, consider Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge's systematic edited volume, *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (2010). By all means, do peek at non-U.S.-centric examinations, e.g. the edited volumes by Johannes Paulmann, *Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (2005); and Louis Clerk, Nicolas Glover, Paul Jordan, *Histories of Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding in the Nordic and Baltic Countries* (2015), as well as early modern studies such as Helmer Helmers' essay, "Public Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe" (*Media History*, 2016). Finally, consider yourself invited to the impending convention of the symposium cycle, "Culture and International History," specifically designed for younger scholars, in 1999 (https://www.scriptsberlin.eu/newseventsmedia/news/2024_Conference_UncertainBoundaries.html). If you can't make it to Berlin, in December 2024, consider the resulting publication series at Berghahn Books, since 2003, *Explorations in Culture and International History*, https://www.berghahnbooks.com/series/explorationsincultureandinternationalhistory

AL: There are so many great historians in the field of public diplomacy. It is hard to choose just a few. I've included:

Laura Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War*.

Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Politics, Propaganda, and Public Opinion, 1950-1953*.

Penny von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War*.

Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955*.

Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy*.

Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*.

Marc Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950*.

EP: Again, I can speak mostly to transatlantic relations and to cultural diplomacy and would recommend the following to get started:

Christopher Endy. *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

Jessica Gienow-Hecht. *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009).

Justin Hart. *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Reinhold Wagnleitner. *CocaColonization and the Cold War. The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

Robert Young. *Marketing Marianne. French Propaganda in America, 1900-1940* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004).

GSS: Difficult question! I think I'd want the following:

Nick Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age* (Polity, 2019)

Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lexington, 2012)

Ilan Manor, *The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy* (Palgrave, 2019)

Caitlin Schindler, *The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft: Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition* (Springer, 2018)

Xin Liu, *China's Cultural Diplomacy: A Great Leap Forward?* (Routledge, 2020)

7. For someone wanting to teach a course on public diplomacy or add public diplomacy elements to an existing course on U.S. foreign relations, what core readings and/or media would you suggest?

NC: I think that the key is not to feel limited to written sources. Many of USIA's short films are already on YouTube and the National Archives, in collaboration with an NEH grant funded team at Dartmouth, are adding more all the time. It is also possible to access USIA materials via some of the presidential libraries and as supplements to *FRUS* volumes. I've found some of the most productive for class discussion are the Oscar nominated *Five Cities of June* from 1963 and Oscar-winning *Nine From Little Rock* from 1964. The great USIA film on the March on Washington *The March* is now restored and easy to access but sadly the family of MLK have removed the scenes of Dr. King's

speech in order to protect their intellectual property. If teaching the bicentennial why not take a couple of minutes to view the Vincent Collins psychedelic animation *200* from 1975 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ3EdI5mz08]. Psychedelia in the nation's service!

JGH: My foremost advice to teachers of the history of public diplomacy would be to focus on both theory and practice. Feel free to pick from the list of volumes listed above or assign any other essay or volume from the rich literature in the field. More importantly still, and in line with my post under (4), invite practitioners on location or by Zoom, either from the State Department, from anyone of the U.S. (or even other) embassies around the world, or from nongovernmental organizations and foundations labouring in the field of U.S. foreign relations. They can be retired (typically more talkative) or active (typically more up to snuff with what's going on right now). At the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, I once invited Dr. Martina Kohl who was the cultural affairs specialist at the U.S. embassy in Germany and for nearly 30 years in charge of public diplomacy. Martina started out by telling students "how an embassy works"–something students had no clue about–then proceeded to demonstrate the significance of that operational chart for the planning and limitations of her division. At Freie Universität Berlin, we repeatedly host, next to the usual suspects, ambassadors and their staff from countries as diverse as Burundi, Romania, Iraq, and Oman, to simply get a feeling of how much, for all the strategic plans and pamphlets, cultural communication and representation mattered and continues to matter to them (or not) in their daily routine. We also plan team assignments such as the preparation of a program, a campaign or an event in order to craft a public diplomacy strategy for a specific country and discuss the same at mock-conventions. If none of this works for you, do assign at least Yale Richmond's insightful recollection, *Practicing Public Diplomacy* (2008). All of this is another way of saying: The history of public diplomacy is, among other things, very much about talking to people in foreign lands but, also, about the limits of its realization and transformations in the process of implementation. To grasp this dilemma, it pays off to combine academic analysis and hands-on practice introspection.

AL: *Core Readings:*

Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US foreign policy and cultural relations, 1938-1950*.

Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge, eds., *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History*.

Michael Krenn, *The History of United States Cultural Diplomacy, 1700-Present*.

Melvin Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994*.

Nancy Snow and Nicholas Cull, *Routledge Handbook on Public Diplomacy*, 2nd edition.

Andrew Johnstone & Helen LaVille, *The US Public and American Foreign Policy*.

Media/Other Sources:

The National Museum on American Diplomacy

EP: I have a few favorite articles that work well with students, often asking them to think not only about public diplomacy but about transatlantic cultural relations more generally. This includes Christopher Endy's article on Travel and World Power (1998), Whitney Walton's article on Internationalism and the Junior Year Abroad (2005), and Paul Kramer's article on International Students and U.S. Global Power (2009); all of them published in *Diplomatic History*. In terms of primary sources, scholars should definitely use the *FRUS* volumes I was referring to earlier, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917-1972, Public Diplomacy*.

Finally, I would like to recommend one primary source from the 1920s that simply blew me away. It is an early and really brilliant reflection of the foreign policy impact of American tourism:

Hiram Motherwell, "The American Tourist Makes History," *Harper's Magazine* (Dec. 1929): 70-76.

GSS: For books I'd go with the list above! But if you are looking for other media, I'd recommend delving into the history of the World Fairs/Expos, there are plenty of good documentaries available on YouTube that explore some of the earlier Expos in detail. Expos are a fantastic example of everything coming together in one site, for a single period of time, with numerous participants. Great case studies for explaining the importance of public/cultural diplomacy/soft power/nation branding to students. For instance, Montreal's Expo '67: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P40N4hnHpsE.

Elizabeth Morrison Diary—UN 1945

Frank Costigliola and Kathryn Allamong Jacob

Editor's note: *Passport* gratefully acknowledges the generosity of the Schlesinger Library and the deed of gift of the Morrison collection for permission to reproduce the documents and images that follow. ***AJ***

Elizabeth Morrison

Kathryn Allamong Jacob

In the fall of 1941, Elizabeth Gibson Morrison, 26, was "a happy stay-at-home faculty wife" in Baton Rouge, where her husband, Don Morrison, taught government at Louisiana State University. Born and raised in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and a graduate of Oberlin College, she had been a secretary at Miss Fine's School for Girls in New Jersey when she met and married Morrison, a graduate student at Princeton, in 1938. Their lives were upended on December 7, when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor: "...we immediately knew, as did many other young people, that we had to go to Washington to help our government in any way we could." They packed up their car, headed North, and, within weeks, her husband was at work at the Bureau of the Budget, and she had joined the typing pool at the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. After aceing a typing test, she moved up to become personal secretary to the head of the agency, Edward R. Stettinius, the former chairman of U.S. Steel. A white telephone on her desk was only for calls from the White House. [1]

Don and Elizabeth Morrison, Louisiana, summer, 1941. Elizabeth Morrison Hunter Papers, 1945-2004. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

When Stettinius moved to the Department of State in 1943, first as Under Secretary and then as Secretary of State, Morrison moved with him. Throughout the winter of 1944-1945, she was swept up in the planning for the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), the San Francisco Conference, where 50 nations would come together to create an organization dedicated to maintaining international peace in the post-war world. Stettinius would be its chairman. Via telephone calls, telegrams, and letters, Morrison and other Department of State staff corralled fleets of cars and an army of translators, organized huge banquets, and requisitioned the Opera House, the Veterans Building, and entire hotels to become offices, conference centers, and housing for delegates and their staff, all before the conference opened on April 25. All told, a total of 850 delegates, along with advisors, employees and staff of the secretariat, totalling about 3,500 attendees, plus more than 2,000 representatives of the media and observers from numerous organizations would pour into San Francisco that spring. [2]

Morrison's conference badge and the photograph from the reverse side.

Beneath all of the bustle, Morrison recalled, there was a sense of the grave responsibility that the United States and the world was taking on *and* a sense of the great adventure about to unfold. She would be Stettinius's personal secretary in San Francisco, and she hit the ground running. She and another secretary shared a small, dark room overlooking the fire escape in the Plaza Hotel. Early each morning, she either walked up Nob Hill to offices on the fifth floor of the Fairmont Hotel or paid seven cents to take a cable car. Just beyond her office was a private elevator run by the FBI that went up to the penthouse, where Stettinius lived and held private meetings. Outside on the roof, she watched armed soldiers pace the parapets day and night. [3]

Morrison was Stettinius's gatekeeper and more. There were delegations for the Secretary to meet, unwelcome visitors to shoo away, news conferences to schedule, appointments to juggle, ruffled feathers to smooth. She worked long hours, but she and the staff found time for fun, too--gin fizzes ($.60 at La Fiesta) at waterfront restaurants, movie nights, a ship's christening. Morrison also found time to keep a diary of those heady days. In its pages, written in Gregg shorthand and transcribed when she returned home, she chronicled moments playful (British

COMPLIMENTARY PROGRAM EXCLUSIVELY FOR HOLDERS OF OFFICIAL CONFERENCE CREDENTIALS, DELEGATES AND STAFFS

MONDAY, MAY 7 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Studio preview of Rhapsody in Blue
Warner Bros. dramatization of the life and music of George Gershwin, including The Rhapsody, Concerto in F, An American in Paris, Cuban Overture, etc. Jack L. Warner, Executive Producer.

11:15 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

TUESDAY, MAY 8 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Valley of Decision
Marcia Davenport's novel of a Pennsylvania family, in a lavish Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer production starring Greer Garson and Gregory Peck.

10:55 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Studio preview of Love Letters
Jennifer Jones and Joseph Cotten in the new Hal Wallis production for Paramount.

10:45 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

THURSDAY, MAY 10 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Studio preview of The Great John L.
Crosby production for United Artists of the life and times of the colorful heavyweight champion.

11:00 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

FRIDAY, MAY 11 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Studio preview of Wonder Man
Samuel Goldwyn's Technicolor production starring Danny Kaye, released by RKO-Radio Pictures

10:25 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

SATURDAY, MAY 12 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Studio preview of Billy Rose's Diamond Horseshoe
Twentieth Century-Fox Musical with Betty Grable and Dick Haymes.

11:00 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

SUNDAY, MAY 13 . . . AT 8:45 P.M. ONLY

8:45 P.M. United Nations Conference Newsreel

9:05 P.M. Short Documentary—Liberation of Budapest

9:20 P.M. Ivan The Terrible
Central Cinema Studio, U.S.S.R. Directed by Sergei Eisenstein. Title role played by Cherkassov. World premiere showing outside U.S.S.R.

11:05 P.M. Repeat showing of Conference Newsreel

NOTE TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS
It will be appreciated if these showings are not considered for reviewing purposes.

Morrison saved three programs--this one for May 7-13--listing movies offered each week to conference delegates and staff in the United Nations Theatre by the American Motion Picture Industry. Cartoons, such as Walt Disney Productions' "Donald Duck's Crime," shown on June 21, were also featured. Morrison Hunter Papers.

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden winked at her in the hallway) and profound (she held in her hands the ticker tape announcing Germany's surrender). Her concern for "Mr. Stet.," whom she admired, the rapidly-changing news from Europe, delegates and staff like Eden, Alger Hiss, and Vyacheslav Molotov, emerge with vivid immediacy. [4]

Elizabeth Morrison's diary begins late at night on a flood-lit runway at the Washington, DC, airport on April 23, 1945.

Introduction to Elizabeth Morrison Diary

Frank Costigliola

President Franklin D. Roosevelt died only thirteen days before the San Francisco Conference opened on April 25, 1945. This first meeting of the United Nations turned into a squabble pitting the Great Powers against the smaller nations and, ominously, the United States and Britain against the Soviet Union. This is not at all how FDR had planned things.

Less than three weeks before he died, FDR explained to the journalist Anne O'Hare McCormick that he was rushing the start of the San Francisco meeting. It was not because of his health, Roosevelt claimed. Having adopted a healthier life style, he expected to live out his fourth term as president. What FDR was focused instead was making sure that "the forge of war was still hot enough to forge the nations together." With the war in Europe nearly won, Roosevelt wanted McCormick to publicize his determination to "project into the picture of victory a design for peace." He had resolved to succeed where Woodrow Wilson had failed. He would make the United States the fulcrum of a peaceful postwar order based on continuing, even if not always easy collaboration by the victor powers, including the Soviet Union. Roosevelt planned to go to San Francisco to launch the conference, give a unifying speech, and then engage in the schmoozing and diplomacy needed to soothe the acrimony that had festered since Yalta. He was working on that inaugural speech when he died.

Roosevelt was adamant that the San Francisco conference not get bogged down, and American opinion not allowed to sour, over divisive issues. He understood the need to agree with the Russians on the composition of the Polish government and to decide whether to allow the fascist government of Argentina to join the United Nations. Nevertheless, those hot issues should not be the focus at San Francisco. "'We must strike while the iron is hot,'" he stressed to McCormick. "'We can't afford to let disappointment over specific solutions pull us back again from the course we have to take, however hard it is. If we all go our own ways, there will be no guarantee of peace or justice for any nation.'" FDR had picked as the location of this crucial get together America's gateway to the Pacific. He wanted to dramatize both the global interests of the United States and the U.S. commitment to a strong China. As delegates, Roosevelt chose prominent Congressmen, Republican foreign policy experts, and others who could prove useful in making his vision a political reality.

~~MAY $, !($%~~
MAY 4, 1945

What a day! innumerable changes on the calendar. Mr. Bohlen dictated to me very top secret memo of conversation with Molotov ABOUT the missing Poles - 15, not 16. While I was writing up this memo the news came over the telephone from the press section that Eisenhower was announcing the surrender of forces in Denmark and Holland and ... later in the day. I telephoned the news up to the pent house while a meeting of the subcommittee was going on in our office with Molotov (he said good morning to me in English), Pasvolski an Eden and the Chinese on war criminals . Mr. Stet came down immediately, entered the meeting and accounced the news to them - we could hear it through the open door. There was general laughter and then Mr. Stet asked Mr. McCloy if He would phone Marshall to really confirm this news - that there had been rumors, laughter again. Then they came out of their meeting, Stet went into the next room with Connally, Molotov left. Then the ticker tape (memo ?) came up announcing the surrender. I held it in my my hand outside the reception door for a minute or two and then the two of them came out and I handed it to Stet. He ahook my hand and said. "Congratulations" to me for some unknown reason, just Stet I guess. At that point an OWI photographer arrived and Stet said to Connally " Oh come on, this is one of our own OWI boys, don't mind" so they stood outside my office and had their pictures taken. I was at the desk immediately behind them. I hope my picture is in that photo. Then everyone went up to the penthouse for lunch (the delegates) and the hall immediately filled with news reporters trying to get up but only a favored few were allowed up. The FBI men certainly had their hands full handling all that crowd - not letting unauthorized ones up. General comment in the hall " I am important, let me up" etc. . . very jolly. In the afternoon at 2:40 Eden arrived again to go out to Berkeley with Stet. Margaret and I were having lunch at the Mark Hopkins across the street when all the waiters rushed to the windows to see Eden arrive and the pair of them leave with motorcycles in tow whisking them off to the campus Then about 5:30 while the sub-committee was meeting again in our adjoining office with Molotov, Pasvolsky, Vandenberg, etc. out on the street came the motor-cade again screaming up the street - Stet had arrived from Berkeley and not more than 5 minutes later in came George Conn, breathless, bearing on his arm the hood just conferred on Stet and he dictated to M.S. a letter to Mrs. STet saying "DEar Jinia - here is the hood just received at University of California - you can add it to the others. Devotedly"

Then up to the penthouse went Molotov and others for another meeting of the Big 4 on Poland. tonight all of the,..... to the D.O. will be meeting tonight. It will be interesting to see by the calendar just what happened in the morning. I stumbled in at Hiss' office by mistake with a memo which I meant to take to Dunn and they were opening bottles of something or other. Mr. Hiss asked me if I wanted a drink and I refused saying I would fall flat on my face if I did I was so weary and he said he would fall flat on his back if he didn't after today. What a day! (p.s) - a message came in during the afternoon meeting of the sub-committee that Vandenberg had seen the papers and didn't like them and was coming to the meeting immediately. I PASSED IN THE MESSAGE AMONG MANY OTHERS AND PRESENTLY Vandenberg appeared - what a conflagration - Molotov, Pasvolsky, Vandenberg. I understood from a calendar note that Pas objected to meeting wiith Mol but was persuaded to do so and Van didn't want to attend because of his reputation with the Russians. Mol's secretary came out Tuesday and talked french to me and Rus over the telephone. Mr. Molotov's translator's name is Pavlov - Walnut 9394! I talked French to him and he understood me.

Sat. May 5

Molotov asked for a sudden appointment this evening - said he had something very important to take up with the Secretary and could he come over for a few minutes. No-one could find Bohlen, the interpreter and so finally the FBI man had to find one of his men to act as interpreter. Molotov agreed to the 2 issues that were causing a stalemate and then Stet called a meeting with State people, Eden, etc and told them that everything was all settled. This is very encouraging news and everyone seems very pleased. Molotov is going to make his own announcement.

May 7,1945

At Molotov's press conference the doors were locked so no one could get the jump on news releases. Great many changes on the calendar today. At 11:25 the press section called to say that the British Minister of Information was announcing May 8 as VE Day and that the king and the PM were speaking tomorrow. Churchill will come on the air at 3 o'clock EWT. 6 o'clock in California is too early to hear the PM so we will read about it in the papers. Had my hair done at the Mark Hopkins today. Mr. Stet came in to see the calendar and seemed to have a worried look. Lee tells me he expects him to have a nervous breakdown any minute

May 11th

Arranged to let the medium, a Mrs. A.R. MILLS UP TO SEE ERS and he talked to her about religion and clairvoyance. She presented me with flowers. I had thought she was Mrs. Ogden Mills'. (Goof!) (My notes here are unreadable -- something about making arrangements for a party at the Omar Khayam and being in touch with Eden's office about arrangements .. I went to a concert to hear Lily Pons and I wore a long dress.)

May 16, 1945

I heard today that 3 big things had been accomplished:
1- South American ...?.. appointment. 2. official confirmation of VE Day. 3. First peace feelers from Japan from the same sources from which came the peace feelers from Germany

May 18, 1945

(This day I apparently went down to the coast with some other secretaries driven there by one of th many volunteer drivers - this one named Gordon - we saw some big beautiful houses, seals on the rocks at Cliff House - had a gin fizz for Sunday morning breakfast! Went on down the coast to Palo Alto

May 18, 1945

LAST NIGHT WE HEARD THAT much was accomplished at the sessions at tje Opera House - things were happening in the last couple of days. LAST NIGHT SOME POOR INSPIRED HISTORY TEACHER CALLED amd said she thought now was the time to teach all our children all over the country about their country's heritage because such important things were happening here at San Fransisco and she wanted to get in touch with somebody in the State DEpartment who could help her get out her thoughts to inform the young people about the Conference, etc. I referred her to MacLeish Today an old lady 70 years old came in to say she wanted very much to shake hands with ERS because she had prayed that Truman would get into office instead of (? [illegible] yles ?)

May 18 - con't.
Today I had lunch at a very nice French restaurant called Jack's just blocks down the hill. I had shrimp and green salad and (something) in wine. We saw Lily Pons and Andre .
Today someone called to say that Fulton Lewis ought not to say such thinga ABOUT THE Conference - that it was going very well and Mr. Stet ought to know that Fulton was not saying the right things over the radio
After the meeting with the Big Five was called off suddenly because Gromyko hadn't heard from his government yet on the (?)
This morning he called to say that he now had heard and he was ready to give a report. He came over at 2:30 to talk with ERS and Dunn and Pasvolsky and everybody expected the Big Five to be called in later in the afternoon. The press kept calling but there was no meeting called.

May 28
Mr. Stet is in Washington conferring with the President. At noon M.S. and I went down to the Veterans Building and had our pictures taken by the official cameraman who said that he was delighted to take some pictures of pretty girls as a change from big shots. We had lunch in the Opera House where the AWVS women serve $1.00 lunch every noon. ...... We made plans for our week-end in Carmel - came home to find a note from m.s. in the box telling me to find her and Mary at the St. Francis coctail lounge - from there we went to Solaris for dinner and then to the movies to see The Corn is Green.

May 24 (?)
Discussed today with Art Ward and Mr. Raynor the possibility of Mr. Stet being put out of office. Mr. Raynor thought the announcements of the cabinet changes would dispel any rumors about a change in the State Department post and .... thought Mr. Stet's comment at the door of the White House and afterward at the press conference - implying that he and the President had discussed his future but that he wasn't allowed to say anything about it.
I went shopping at noon and bought a black and white print and a play suit.
After work I went to the Indian cocktail party at the Mark. Met Sir Rami Sami - a high caste Hindu with a red mark down his forehead and he joined us and ..... in the ______ Garden of the Mark where we had a delicious dinner. (Here is something about a Panamanian newspaper woman and something about Jean Cawthorne from Australis who politely asked her to leave which she did). The Indian said he was sick of being interesting and intelligent and wanted to go to a "local yokel" party). Everyone seems to be sick of the social functions and anxious to get home to normal living. With the President's scheduled visit in June it looks as if the Conference will last until the middle of June. The Indian said to me that he admired Mr. Stet when he Made the statement that the Conference shouldn't be speeded up at the expense of anyone not being able to speak his views. He talked to me about Indian food and bread - we tried to show him the Top of the Mark but it was too late so he went off to bed.

Don took me to the aairport on Mon. night April 23 at 10:45. We saw the big C54 silver plane four motored job and I suddenly felt very awed to know that that ship was going to carry us across the country. The flood lights were on it and the press people were setting up their equipment for the arrival of the Secretary. We were checked in and Mary McDonald, Catherine, Margaret and myself chatted for a few minutes and then decided we had better get on board since we were to be out of sight when the Secretary arrived. We waved to Don from the boarding platform. We settled ourselves in the fro front with the crew helping us get organized - fed us sandwiches and told us the trip usually took fifteen hours. About midnight the Secretary and his party showed up- had their pictures taken. Mr. Stet came by to shake hands and invited Margaret and me to go into the cockpit and watch the take off. We were placed just behind the engineer and the pilot and the co-pilot. The radio operator wanted to explain everything to us. They checked their instru= ments and talked to the radio tower asking for instructions which we tried to listen to but only heard "roger". We watched the white lines and as we moved forward they gradually got further away and we knew we were in the air - smooth as glass. The lights of Washington were beautiful especially as they were reflected in the Potomac. As the view began to fade below us we went back to our seats and got settled for the night with blankets and pillows. Dr. Tyson came by and offered us some sleeping pills which we took and soon the roar of the engines gave us a good feeling to go to sleep. About 7:30 Washington time we gradually got awake and discovered that we were over Wyoming and "would we like some scrambled eggs, sausages and coffee?" ~~when we began to gain altitude~~ Then we walked down to the wash room to comb our hair, etc. and on the way back I began to feel very very peculiar indeed. Someone told us we were 14,500 feet in the air and that probably we would feel short of breath, etc. So we just sat for a few minutes and wondered what was going to happen when down the aisle came the steward with oxygen masks which were plugged in at an outlet in the side of the plane. It certainly felt good to breathe in that gas . We passed the mask around among the four of us at frequent intervals all during the morning. Very few sights, lots of clouds, but every once in a while you could look down and see drifts of white snow on the ledges of the mountains. We all snoozed for the rest of the morning but when we came to the .... and the Sacramento valley I glued my nose to the window. The mountains became .... and the trees no longer looked like pock marks on the moon but real shapes. They are pine and the snow seemed very deep -- frozen lakes every once in a while and bare patches of mountains. The clouds formed black moving patches on the snow. We were getting lower and lower and pretty soon the S valley came in sight between high ledges of mountains. Those ....are amazing and I wished I had someone at my side to answer my questions . Now there were patches of green fields and little patches of bright yellow which someone said were poppies. Then came the airport and the landing with bands and welcoming groups, flowers, The press waiting on the edge of the field. We had arrived.

Over the week-end went to Carmel-By-The-Sea.

May 29

Prince Faisal, the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Egyptains, the Iraquis came in today to protest the actions of the French in the Levant. The report that came down to us was that it was a "good meeting" They gathered in our immediate office and then were sent up to see Mr. Stet.

May 30
Today I am going to a ship launching at the Kaiser Yards

June 6

Today at noon the news of the break of the Russian deadlock came and ERS was as elated as I have ever seen him. He almost literally danced with joy. Called Gromyko in give him the news ! And then another Big Five meeting was called in the afternoon at the Soviets' request.

The 20th Century Fox Skouras dinner party was given tonight. Charles Spyros is giving it in honor of the American Delegation and ERS. There were about 150 people there and a very gala occasion it was. We were presented with orchids (3 in one bunch) at the door, cocktails before dinner. We had soup and fish and steak (filet mignon) and red wine and white wine and champagne and cordials. We were entertained with a stage show, chief attraction being Dr. Giovanni who got ERS, Vandenberg, Gov. Warren, the FBI man Bill Porser, Stasson, Gen. Pratt and several others up on the stage and ~~pretended~~ proceeded to lift their wallets and watches and other valuables from them without their knowledge. We thoroughly enjoyed the fun. He was extremely clever. My dinner partner was Sam ...(?) with Mrs. Pratt, wife of the west coast army commander and Nelson Rockefeller. We danced after dinner until 2 o'clock and had a night cap in Mr.Drew's room until 2:30. Home with Bill Porser and Bob Lynch and to bed at 3:15 a.m.

June 7th
Today was a day of general jubilation. The delegation meeting was called off . ERS didn't attend the executive meeting at 10:30 and had Soong preside in his place and in the afternoon a BIG Five meeting was held at the Soviets' request and then there was a Steering Committee meeting called at 4:30 Everyone was very, very happy and ERS was most of all. After the Steering Committee meeting the press conference, and the announcement was made. When he came back from the press conference he told me on the telephone that everything went beautifully - that he got a tremendous ovation and that the Conference was really instigated now and that I was to keep up my confidence. Then he said "Get the President for me on the phone and you listen to every word and keep up your confidence". The details of the President's trip out were discussed.

Elizabeth Morrison Diary Notes

Page 1

1. The Douglas C54 Skymaster was the military version of the DC-4 four engine commercial transport. This particular plane, dubbed the "Sacred Cow, had been specially designed with an elevator behind the passenger cabin to lift President Roosevelt in his wheelchair in and out of the plane for the trip to Yalta. The machine could carry up to fifty passengers and boasted a cruising speed of 190 mph and a maximum speed of 230 mph. Not pressurized, the C54 usually flew at a height of 10,000 to 15,000 feet.[5]
2. Edward R. Stettinius (1900-1949) served as secretary of state from December 1, 1944 to June 27, 1945. After he was replaced by Truman's friend, James F. Byrnes, Stettinius became the first U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He resigned that post in June 1946 over protest that Truman was needlessly worsening tensions with the Soviet Union. He would die of a coronary thrombosis at the age of 49 in 1949.
3. Stettinius's party included, as conference delegates, Texas Democratic Senator Tom Connally (1877-1963); Michigan Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg (1884-1951); Dean of Barnard College Virginia Gildersleeve (1877-1965); New Jersey Republican Representative Charles Eaton (1868-1953); and New York Democratic Representative, former song-writer, and commercial promoter of the "hootchy-kootchy" belly dance Sol Bloom (1870-1949).

Notes for Page 2

4. Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen (1904-1974) was a leading expert on the Soviet Union. He served in Moscow in the early 1930s with Ambassador William C. Bullitt and with his friend George F. Kennan. Bohlen was FDR's interpreter at the Tehran and Yalta summit conferences. He would become ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1953 and then to France in 1961.
5. Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986) was Soviet minister of foreign affairs from 1939 to 1949 and again from 1953 to 1956. He was the chief Soviet delegate to the San Francisco conference. A close associate of Stalin, he had in his early days as a Bolshevik revolutionary supported himself by playing the mandolin in restaurants.
6. Born in Russia, Leo Pasvolsky (1893-1953) was an economist and journalist before he became a key technical adviser in the State Department. He designed much of the United Nations Charter.
7. Anthony Eden (1897-1977) was a long time adviser to Winston S. Churchill and Foreign Secretary. He was the chief British delegate to the San Francisco Conference. Eden would serve as British prime minister from 1955-57.
8. John J. McCloy (1895-1989), the assistant secretary of war, would later become one of the most of most influential U.S. leaders in the post-World War II era.
9. The Cold-War pattern of Americans and Russians trading a punch for a punch as they escalated an issue was on early display in San Francisco. Shortly after Truman's tough talk with Molotov that underscored U.S. opposition to Soviet domination of Poland, Stalin ordered the arrest of sixteen Polish underground leaders who had been invited by the Kremlin to Moscow to discuss participating in the pro-Soviet Lublin Polish government. The Soviets saw these independent-minded leaders of the wartime underground as a threat to Russian control. The secret memorandum of conversation that Bohlen dictated to Morrison on May 4th included these passages:

> Molotov said that the "sixteen had been arrested by the Soviet military authorities and would stand trial for diversionist acts committed against the Red Army which had led to the death of more than one hundred officers and men. He said that many English newspapers had published very one-sided information concerning this matter and had not mentioned General [Leopold] Okulicki. He said this man was the principal figure in the group and was well known to the Soviet authorities as an open enemy of the Soviet Union.
>
> Mr. Eden repeated that he wished again to state that he knew nothing of General Okulicki and for all he knew he might be guilty but as to the others it was a different matter. He said that he knew the arrest of these democratic leaders would create a most disturbing impression in England and he believed also in the U. S. This action on the part of the Soviet Government would certainly not help a solution of the Polish matter."[6]

10. General Dwight D. Eisenhower's announcement of German surrenders in Denmark and Holland foreshadowed the end of the war in Europe on May 8, 1945.
The record of a May 4th meeting on war criminals is not included in the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945* volume 1, which contains records of the San Francisco Conference. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v01
11. Stettinius received an honorary degree from the University of California at Berkeley. "Jinia" was Stettinius's wife, Virginia Gordon Wallace Stettinius.

Notes for Page 3

12. A key issue at the 6:30 pm meeting on May 4th, and indeed at the entire San Francisco Conference, was the degree to which the United Nations would actually become the fulcrum of global diplomacy, assume responsibility for preventing further aggression by Germany and other nations, and thereby supercede bilateral and other multilateral treaties. As the conference proceeded, the United States, under pressure from the Latin American nations and with the connivance of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs Nelson Rockefeller, carved out a proviso for regional pacts only nominally associated with the United Nations. This measure would later become the basis for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and other Cold-War era blocs.
13. At the meeting Molotov expressed Soviet reservations at relying solely on the new United Nations:

> "While the Soviet Delegation was prepared to support any measures for establishing the proposed international organization, he was not yet prepared to say when the responsibility for dealing with the enemy states should be transferred to that organization. He said that the Soviet Government believed that Germany would do everything in its power to restore its strength, and for that reason his Government was trying to be cautious and farsighted, and to that end had concluded the Anglo-Soviet and the French-Soviet Treaties. When, however, the proposed international organization has gained enough strength and prestige to deal with Germany, the need for the Soviet treaties above mentioned would probably lapse."[7]

14. A champion of the primacy of global rather than regional pacts, Pasvolsky warned that "if we open the way anywhere to regional action the world organization is finished . . . . There will be four or five armed camps consisting of groups of nations . . . and another world war."[8]

15. Although later accused of having spied for the Soviet Union in the 1930s, Alger Hiss (1904-1996) was in the 1940s an important and apparently loyal official in the State Department. In his memoir, he credited himself with having prevented a medical emergency. One morning just before Molotov sat down at his table, Hiss noticed that the water thermos in front of the Russian's seat contained broken glass that looked like ice. He replaced the thermos.[9]

As Secretary-General of the San Francisco Conference, Hiss was responsible for bringing the signed United Nations Charter safely back from San Francisco. On the flight to Washington, the Charter had its own parachute. Hiss was directed that if anything went wrong with the airplane, his first responsibility was to save the Charter by throwing it out the door.[10]

16. Never a fan of Roosevelt's efforts to collaborate with the Russians, Senator Vandenberg from the start of the conference focused on contesting Molotov. He penned in is diary: "*This* is the point at which to line up our votes . . . and *win* and *end this appeasement of the Reds now before it is too late.*"[11]

17. At the evening meeting on May 5th with Stettinius, Molotov agreed to two U.S. concerns: "(1) Authorization to the [UN General] Assembly to recommend the adjustment of any situation whatever may be its origin likely to impair the general welfare and (2) the association of regional pacts having to do with aggressive states in the present war."[12]

Notes for Page 4

18. Molotov gave three press conference in the first two weeks of the San Francisco meeting. Russell Porter in the *New York Times* noted that Molotov's discussions with the press benefitted both the Americans, who received valuable information, and the Russians, who gained a sounding board for their point of view. Indeed, these press conferences offered a glimpse into what-might-have-been, the continuing U.S.-Soviet collaboration and cultural exchange envisioned by Roosevelt. As Porter noted, although press conferences were a typical American institution with no Russian equivalent, "the short stocky man from Moscow with the Teddy Roosevelt smile handles himself with the adroitness and humor that . . . would do credit to the late Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, the master of the press conference art." Dropping his dour persona, the Russian "smiles, beams all around, gestures disarmingly, and answers right to the point – when he wants to." If Molotov was "doing his bit to 'Sovietize' the thinking of millions of Americans," Porter observed, he was "also becoming 'Americanized' himself." Nevertheless, despite the long term potential of adaptive showmanship, in the short run it could go only so far. Molotov parried an embarrassing question about the fate of the sixteen Poles arrested in Moscow. Porter noted the widespread feeling that while Molotov had "made a very good diplomatic record here," the Soviet position had been "marred somewhat by Moscow's handling of the Polish issue."[13]

19. Opened by George Mardikian in 1938, the Omar Khayam Armenian restaurant helped introduce shish kebab to the American palate. Eleanor Roosevelt was a regular at the eatery, at which service members and refugees ate for free.

20. Lily Pons was a French-born American soprano opera singer associated with the Metropolitan Opera in New York City.

21. The first listed "big thing accomplished" on May 15-16 was that the U.S. delegation secured permission from President Truman to resist pressure from the South American nations, which sought a clear cut prioritizing of hemispheric unity over the United Nations. Stettinius noted in his diary that "in spite of the obvious hazards to the world organization, Mr. Rockefeller kept tenaciously and exclusively advocating the limited Latin American viewpoint." Rockefeller explained that the Latin Americans "feared the Russians, and they felt bewildered by the death of President Roosevelt and felt fearful that his Good Neighbor policy might not be vigorously followed."[14]

22. The editors, and apparently Morrison herself, could not decipher the short hand representing the last word or words on page 4.

Notes for Page 5

23. Fulton Lewis, Jr. was a conservative radio broadcaster who had attacked Roosevelt's New Deal, and who would later also assail Truman's Fair Deal while associating himself with the red-baiting Republican Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy.

24. From May 18 to June 7, the conference remained deadlocked over the complex issue of the precise limits of the permanent members' (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and France) veto in the UN Security Council. At first, the big powers stood united against the criticism of the forty-five smaller nations, who submitted twenty-three questions probing every possible parameter of the veto. Then the Americans and British divided with the Russians over the latter's insistence that at Yalta, they had agreed that the veto would extend not only to deciding issues in the Security Council, but also to whether even to discuss certain issues. Getting into thick weeds, the great powers debated whether deciding whether a certain point was 1) a procedural matter or 2) a substantive question subject to the veto, was itself a procedural or a substantive issue.

25. Lippmann observed that "the death of Roosevelt has had a profound effect on this conference . . . . Nothing was further from the original intention" than public showdowns over difficult issues. With the Americans leaning toward the British, "the loss of Roosevelt has upset the delicate balance within the councils of the Big Three."[15]

26. As frustration mounted on all sides, Molotov insisted that "the Yalta agreement was a firm commitment made by a dead president." In private meeting amongst the Americans, someone asked Stettinius whether the Yalta agreement "would continue to bind us into the indefinite future." Stettinius "emphatically" replied that "After we get this organization started and we are off to the races, then Roosevelt's commitments come to an end."[16]

27. The American Women's Voluntary Services (AWVS), with over 325,000 participants, was the largest women's service organization in the United States during World War II. The AWVS assisted with spotting aircraft, sending messages, and setting up emergency kitchens, including the $1.00 lunch served to the multitude at the San Francisco Conference.

28. Rumors continued to proliferate that Stettinius would soon be ousted as secretary of state in favor of Truman's friend, Jimmy Byrnes.

Notes for Page 7 (no page 6)[17]

29. Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1906-75) of Saudi Arabia served as minister of foreign affairs from 1930-60. He was king of Saudi Arabia from 1964 until he was assassinated in 1975. Roosevelt had encouraged such manifestations of Arab unity and resistance to French imperialism. The founding of Israel in 1948 would complicate U.S. policy in the Middle East.

30. The "break of the Russian deadlock" on June 6 resulted from the personal appeal of Harry Hopkins to Stalin in Moscow. The Soviet dictator agreed to limit the veto in the Security Council to making decisions, but not to discussing issues.

31. At the advice of Harriman and Bohlen who worried that tensions with Russia were spiraling out of control, Truman

had sent Hopkins and Bohlen to talk with Stalin. After this Moscow meeting, Bohlen reported that "Stalin has shown genuine desire for continued co-operation." Bohlen's "one major deduction" was the Russians' "feeling of weakness." The Soviets seemed daunted by the challenge of running "half [of] Europe whilst at the same time reconstructing the very great devastation" at home.[18]

32. Andrei A. Gromyko (1909-89) was ambassador to the United States. He would later become Soviet foreign minister during much of the Cold War.

33. Charles Spyros (1889-1954), along with his brothers George and Spyros, were sons of a Greek sheep herder who built 20th Century Fox into one of Hollywood most powerful movie studios.

34. Earl Warren (1891-1974) was governor of California. He would later become Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

35. "Dr." John Giovanni (1887-1977), "King of the Pickpockets," was born in Budapest and named Adolph Herczog. He entertained Roosevelt, Churchill, and other famous figures with his sleight of hand magic.

While her diary ends on June 7, 1945, Morrison stayed on the job in San Francisco until the conference ended on June 26, then flew back to Washington on a special United Airlines flight with the U. S. delegation and many of its staff. When President Truman named Edward R. Stettinius the United States' first Ambassador to the United Nations (James Byrnes was named the new Secretary of State), Morrison moved with him to an office in the East Wing of the White House. After Stettinius left for London and the first United Nations General Assembly, the Morrisons left Washington for Hanover, New Hampshire. Don Morrison began his new position as an assistant professor of government, later dean of the faculty and provost, at Dartmouth College, and Elizabeth Morrison returned to life as a faculty wife. After her husband died suddenly in 1959, she married physician Ralph Hunter, a widower, adding his five children to her three. She was active in the League of Women Voters and enjoyed traveling the world. A life-long advocate of the United Nations, she was proud of her own small part in its creation. Morrison Hunter saved her mementoes from San Francisco--her diary, her hotel laundry slip (girdle, $.30; cotton pajamas, $.50), menus, invitations, time and work sheets, the red, white, and blue menu from the flight back to Washington, the office appointment log, a letter of appreciation from Stettinius, and more--for six decades and donated the collection to the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America at the Radcliffe Institute at Harvard University in 2004. Elizabeth Morrison Hunter, almost 100, died in 2014 in New Hampshire.[19]

Notes:

1. Elizabeth Morrison Hunter, "The Birth of the United Nations," in *World War II Remembered,* Residents of Kendal at Hanover (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2012), 174-175; text and illustrations for a talk given by Morrison Hunter for the League of Women Voters of the Upper Valley, Hanover, NH, January 13, 2004, plus miscellaneous biographical material, Elizabeth Morrison Hunter Papers, 1945-2004. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

2. Morrison Hunter, "Birth of the United Nations," 176; League of Women Voters talk, Morrison Hunter Papers; *Insignia: Special Conference Issue* (Armed Service Magazine), vol. 6, no. 1945, Morrison Hunter Papers.

3. Morrison Hunter, "Birth of the United Nations," 176-178; League of Women Voters talk, Morrison Hunter Papers.

4. Morrison Hunter, "Birth of the United Nations," 177. Stenographer's notebook (written in Gregg shorthand) and typed transcript of the diary Morrison kept at the San Francisco Conference, April 23, 1945-June 7, 1945, Morrison Hunter Papers.

5.https://amcmuseum.org/at-the-museum/aircraft/c-54m-skymaster/

6. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr, Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, San Francisco, May 4, 1945, 10 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v05/d208

7.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v01/d208

8. Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (eds.), The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946 (New York: New Viewpoints 1975), 352.

9. Alger Hiss, Recollections of a Life (New York: Seaver Books, 1988), 134-35.

10.https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2019/09/10/the-second-original-united-nations-charter/

11. Henrik Meijer, *Arthur Vandenberg* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 248 (emphasis in original).

12.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v01/d211

13. Russell Porter, "Molotoff 'Charms' at Press Meetings," *The New York Times*, May 8, 1945, p. 15.

14. Campbell and Herring (eds.), *Diaries of Stettinius*, 367-72; 351.

15. Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 342.

16. Campbell and Herrring (eds.), *Diaries of Stettinius,* 380.

17. Morrison transcribed her diary written in a steno book in Gregg shorthand after returning home. Page six, which described a weekend trip to Carmel-By-The-Sea, was not included when the original diary and the transcription were donated. Morrison Hunter Papers.

18. Bohlen had spoken to his British friends. Archibald Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, May 28, 1945, F. O. 371/47882; John W. Russell to Lord Halifax, June 19, 1945, F. O. 371/47883, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.

19. Morrison Hunter, "Birth of the United Nations," 176-180; League of Women Voters talk, Morrison Hunter Papers; "Losses: 1936." Oberlin Alumni Magazine, vol. 110, no. 2, Spring 2015, 42; "Donald Harvard Morrison, 1914-1959." *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, April, 1959, 15.

Costigliola and Jacob would like to thank David Langbart, mutual friend and archivist at the U.S. National Archives, whose introduction made their collaboration possible.

SHAFR Recognizes Outstanding Scholarship and Service at the 2024 Annual Meeting

The **Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History** Committee–Karine Walther (chair), Nicole Anslover, and Samantha Payne--has awarded the 2024 prize to **Taylor Zajicek** for his dissertation "Black Sea, Cold War: An Environmental History of the Black Sea Region, 1930-2005." It was completed at Princeton University under the direction of Stephen Kotkin.

Zajicek's dissertation analyzes the role played by the natural environment in connecting Black Sea states through the lens of scientific research, conservation and resource management. To tell this story, Zajicek relied on sources in multiple languages from foreign archives located in Russia, Armenia, Turkey, Italy, the United States, the Netherlands, and Ukraine, delivering a truly international history of the region.

Congratulations also go to **Carl Kubler** for receiving Honorable Mention for his dissertation, "Barbarians on the Shore: Global Trade and Everyday Life on the South China Coast, 1780-1860." Completed at the University of Chicago under the direction of Kenneth Pomeranz, this study offers a fascinating lens into the stories of multiple actors from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. As he notes, his dissertation offers a "bottom-up reexamination of the daily lives and incentives of Chinese, Europeans, and Americans on the South China Coast in the years before and after the first Opium War--including merchants, sailors, interpreters, coolies, cooks, laundrywomen, prostitutes, and pirates, among others." In order to tell this story, Kubler relied on a wide variety of multilingual sources from archives in Portugal, Taiwan, Brazil, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the Netherlands, Singapore, Germany, and St. Helena.

The winner of the 2024 **Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship** is **Jethro Calacday**, a Doctoral Candidate in History at Trinity College, Cambridge. His dissertation--"A Catholic Empire: American Imperialism and the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines"—is being directed by Andrew Preston. The prize committee—Monica Kim (chair), Kate Burlingham, and Aaron Coy Moulton—lauded his work's original and compelling challenge to the long-standing historiographical characterization of the United States as an Anglo-American Protestant empire that is patently anti-Catholic. Drawing upon an impressive range of transnational archival materials in English, Tagalog, Spanish, Latin--and also Bikol, Cebuano, Hiligaynon, Italian, and French--Calacday demonstrates how the United States and the Holy See forged a close working relationship in the Philippines that was integral, in fact, to the rise of U.S. imperial power in 1898. With an innovative methodology that brings together liturgical and ecclesiastical studies, Vatican diplomacy, financial ledgers, and U.S. military history, Calacday's dissertation promises to be groundbreaking scholarship that will force us to re-examine not only 1898 differently, but also the bounds and definitions of U.S. foreign relations history.

Ana G. Calderón of Yale University received Honorable Mention for the Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship. She is working on her dissertation--"La Gran Sociedad: The Colonial War on Poverty, Empire and the Remaking of Development in Puerto Rico after WWII"—with David Engerman. It provides a crucial and compelling history of how local politicians, volunteer corps, and shantytown residents forged alternatives to U.S. modernization projects at the crossroads of deferred decolonization and the American Civil Rights Movement. Utilizing state archives, community collections, and oral histories, Calderón has created a multi-dimensional portrait of the emergence of a colonial welfare state in Puerto Rico under Cold War liberalism, and situates Puerto Rico rightfully at the convergence of U.S., Latin American, and global histories. Calderón's dissertation innovatively places the on-the-ground, transnational struggles over modernization in Puerto Rico in the crucible of the Civil Rights Movement, Cold War liberalism, and colonialism.

This year, SHAFR has partnered with Gale to offer a set of summer fellowships in digital history. The Committee on Digital Resources and Archival Sharing—James Stocker (chair), Philip Nash, Lydia Walker, Zoe LeBlanc, and Ian Seavey--selected the first class of three summer fellows: **Harris Ford** of the University of Saskatchewan, **Theresa Keeley** of the University of Louisville, and **Ann Ngoc Tran** of the University of Southern California.

Harris Ford *(left)* is a PhD candidate in history at the University of Saskatchewan. He plans to undertake a survey of English-language newspapers and the U.S. Declassified Documents Database to better understand the media discussions regarding the Third World and Global South. **Theresa Keeley** (*right, with James Stocker*) is an associate professor of history at the University of Louisville. She will conduct research for her second book project, entitled *Confrontational Humanitarians: Doctors, Children's Health, & U.S. Harm in Vietnam.* She plans to use Gale resources to help tell the story of wounded Vietnamese children, particularly those wounded in napalm attacks, as well as the international reaction to their plight. **Ann Ngoc Tran** *(lower right)* is a PhD candidate in American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California. She will use the Gale fellowship to pursue her dissertation research on Vietnamese "boat people" and other instances of oceanic migration during the Cold War, using media reports, U.S. Information Agency files, and global document repositories.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee—Theresa Keeley (chair), Mattias Fibiger, and Oli Charbonneau—is pleased to announce that **Sarah Sears** (University of California, Berkeley) is this year's recipient of the Bernath Article Prize. Her article, entitled "Beyond the River's Violence: Reconsidering the Chamizal Border Dispute," appeared in the June 2023 issue of *Diplomatic History*. In it, Sears explores how flooding in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries impacted Americans' and Mexicans' land claims and influenced diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States. Sears employs a variety of sources in English and Spanish to illustrate how the Mexican-American War did not result in a static, permanent boundary; instead, environmental changes allowed for the contestation of political borders. While Sears's article is geographically limited to a small, contested zone, it is temporally ambitious and provides a vivid portrait of how the ebbs and flows of nonhuman nature were mobilized by individuals, businesses, and nations to remap landscapes. In making her case, she innovatively combines the fields of environmental, borderlands, legal, and foreign relations history. She highlights how the U.S. government used environmental changes, not just military force, to facilitate the displacement of Mexicans from their lands after the Mexican-American War. In the process, Sears makes a compelling case for highlighting the role of the environment as an actor in foreign relations history.

The committee also recognized **Kazushi Minami's** "Perpetual Foreigners: Chinese Americans and the U.S. Opening to China" with Honorable Mention for the Bernath Article Prize. This recent *Diplomatic History* article argues that Sino-American rapprochement inaugurated a "diaspora moment." For the first time in a generation, Chinese Americans could travel to the People's Republic in large numbers. They were afforded opportunities to ponder the trajectory of the Chinese Revolution—and to reconsider their own identities as overseas Chinese and as Americans in a period of social and diplomatic ferment. Drawing on a remarkable corpus of archival sources from the United States and China, "Perpetual Foreigners" reveals in crisp prose the variegated, sometimes ambivalent experiences of ethnic Chinese Americans as they returned to China. Some came away transfixed by the achievements of the Mao period and swelled with ethnic pride, while others left with a sense of alienation from their ancestral home and the efforts at socialist indoctrination to which they were subjected. Minami's article represents a remarkable integration of social and diplomatic history and a thoughtful analysis of what it means to go "home" for a minoritized diasporic population.

Sheyda Jahanbani of the University of Kansas is this year's recipient of the **Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize** for the best first book in the field, awarded by David Milne (chair), Colleen Woods, and Tessa Winkelmann. Her book**--***The Poverty of the World: Rediscovering the Poor at Home and Abroad, 1941-1968*--combines intellectual history, political history, and the history of U.S. foreign relations to insightful and propulsive effect. In charting the efforts of Cold War liberals to combat global poverty, Jahanbani reveals hubris and misdiagnoses but also an ambition that jars with the parochialism of today's politics. Deeply researched, compelling in argument, and elegantly written, *The Poverty of the World* makes a major contribution to our understanding of the Global Cold War and the idiosyncratic shape of U.S. Empire.

The committee also recognized **Chris Suh** with Honorable Mention for his book, *The Allure of Empire: American Encounters with Asians in the Age of Transpacific Expansion and Exclusion*. It weaves together a masterful account of the Pacific empires–the U.S. and Japan–to highlight how, in the early twentieth century, they both often chose to pursue national policies of imperialism--rather than racial solidarity--as pathways to global power. Through rigorous multilingual and multi-sited research, Suh highlights how the "allure of empire" forged bonds of alliance, as both powers imagined themselves as champions of progressive empire and pursued Pacific colonies in the Philippines and Korea. Scholars of transnational U.S. and Asian American history will find particularly important Suh's close attention to how American and Japanese discussions of Korea played an important role in the sustaining and eventual breakdown of the Pacific alliance and how colonized populations seized on these discussions to advocate for their own freedom.

The **Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize** recognizes excellence by women, non-binary, and/or trans scholars in U.S. foreign relations history. This year's committee—Kimber Quinney (chair), Carol Chin, and Megan Black—selected **Alvita Akiboh** as the winner (*on right in photo, receiving prize from Carol Chin*). The committee found her book—*Imperial Material: National Symbols in the US Colonial Empire*—to make a singular contribution to diplomatic history through its insistence that material culture was a key and critical site of contest over the fate of empire. Not only does the book provide stories about people's lives and the things they make and hold, but it also makes us think differently about colonialism, national identity, and who has the privilege of defining "Americanness." We were unanimous in our recommendation of the award.

The committee also awarded Honorable Mention to **Rebecca Herman's** *Cooperating with the Colossus: A Social and Political History of US Military Bases in World War II Latin America*. The book makes an innovative contribution to diplomatic history by providing a fascinating comparative history that moves between hemispheric, regional, national, and local contexts with ease. *Cooperating with the Colossus* illuminates the shifting nature of sovereignty in Latin America before and after the war and reminds us how informal, unwritten arrangements can be surprisingly durable in the history of transnational relations and international cooperation.

Brooke Blower also won Honorable Mention for her most recent book, *Americans in a World at War: Intimate Histories from the Crash of Pan Am's Yankee Clipper.* The book makes a major contribution to diplomatic history by offering a monumental wartime story scaled to the intimate lives of strangers and insisting on the importance of worldly civilians to transnational U.S. power. The role of noncombatants in World War II offers an important corrective to the narrative of "why we fought" and to the historical explanations offered for why and how the United States mobilized for war. *(Blower, right, receiving the award from Carol Chin.)*

The **Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History** goes to the best first book on international or global history since the mid-nineteenth century that makes substantial use of historical records in more than one language. This year's winner is for *Suharto's Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World* (in photo, Mattias—on right—receives award from Amy Sayward). The prize committee of Katharina Rietzler, Jeremy Rich, and Nathan Citino found Dr. Fibiger's book to be a deeply researched and lucidly written analysis of political agency, strategy, and counterrevolution in the global Cold War. The committee was impressed with Dr. Fibiger's excellent use of multiple archives to highlight the independent development of Indonesia's anti-Communist diplomacy under Suharto. Dr. Fibiger shows that rather than merely responding to the exigencies and pressures of a binary Cold War, Suharto was an agent of change who marshalled international investment and aid for the purpose of domestic stabilization and the promotion of a counter-revolutionary internationale in Southeast Asia. While Dr. Fibiger acknowledges the impact of anti-Communist politicide, his focus on the importance of political economy provides an invaluable complement to existing studies, as does his attention to Suharto's active shaping of policy in a constantly shifting context, from decolonization to the 1970s when the rise of human rights, political Islam, and the oil bonanza presented new challenges and opportunities. The result is not only a new history of the global Cold War that centers Indonesia but a compelling and effective examination of the origins of contemporary Asian geopolitics. The book provides a model for future research on counter-revolutionary, postcolonial nation-building in a variety of geographical contexts and opens avenues for further work on the role of ideology. The committee congratulates Dr. Fibiger on his achievement.

The **Robert H. Ferrell Prize** rewards distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined, for a book beyond the author's first monograph. This year's prize committee—Mario Del Pero (chair), Marc Gallicchio, and Amanda McVety--is pleased to announce that this year's winner is **Erik R. Scott** for *Defectors: How the Illicit Flight of Soviet Citizens Built the Borders of the Cold War World* (Oxford University Press). It is an original and persuasive study that examines how the flight of a small number of Soviet citizens led to a system of border policing and migration control that has persisted beyond the Cold War. This comprehensive analysis sheds light on the interactions between defectors, government agencies, and non-governmental groups--as well as the connections between decolonization, migration, and the evolution of international law. One of Scott's key achievements is demonstrating how individual actions shaped the current international regime governing the movement of migrants and refugees. Drawing on a wide range of archival sources, Scott skillfully explains the origin of the political category "defector" in the early Cold War. He illustrates how the dubious link between ideological motivation and the act of defecting gave rise to the concept of asylum that exists today. Scott vividly depicts the Cold War competition between the U.S. and USSR over these highly prized individuals, while also highlighting the level of superpower cooperation in controlling and regulating the migration of less "desirable" refugees across state borders. The movement of defectors across land, sea, and air sparked international discussions about various types of borders, usually resulting in new laws that prioritized state sovereignty over migrant rights. As the world became more interconnected, borders solidified in ways that ultimately benefited both Moscow and Washington.

The **Peter L. Hahn SHAFR Distinguished Service Award** recognizes a senior historian who, over a career, has shown a deep commitment to the growth and development of our organization. The award committee—Frank Costigliola (chair), Kristin Hoganson, and Andrew Preston—selected **Naoko Shibusawa** of Brown University as the 2024 recipient. *(from l-r, Preston, Shibusawa, Costigliola, and Hoganson.)* Professor Shibusawa has made significant contributions to SHAFR's ideals of scholarship, service, and mentorship. Her scholarship, including her prize-winning book—*America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy*—is noted for its rigorous analysis of gender, race, and sexuality. Two forthcoming monographs—*Ideologies of U.S. Empire* and *Queer Betrayals: The Treason Trial of John David Provoo*—both explore the intersections of ideology, queerness, loyalty, and national security in U.S. history. Naoko Shibusawa has played a vital role in fostering the growth of a new generation of scholars in SHAFR by nurturing emerging scholars and by elevating previously marginalized voices. She has served as a member of the Committee on Minority Historians and has co-chaired the Program Committee for SHAFR's Annual Meeting. She has also served on the committees choosing the winners of the Bernath Lecture Prize, the Myrna Bernath Book Prize, and the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship.

An example of Naoko Shibusawa's sustained dedication to mentorship within and beyond SHAFR is a group she founded at Brown University in 2011, known as the "K Team." K-Team has functioned as a platform for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and contingent faculty within the Brown community who share a common interest in exploring the complex relationship between race, empire, and power. Shibusawa has cultivated this as a space for cross-disciplinary exchange. This inclusive approach has meant that members of K-Team have incorporated "U.S. in the World" scholarship, sources, and methodologies into a wide range of academic disciplines, including American Studies, Asian

American Studies, Food Studies, Immigration History, and Military History. Simultaneously, it has broadened the horizons of diplomatic history in ways that have enriched SHAFR's intellectual landscape. The far-reaching impact of Professor Shibusawa's mentorship is evident in the subsequent career paths of K-Team members, many of whom have accepted positions at universities and colleges in the United States and around the world.

The **2024 Norman and Laura Graebner Award for Lifetime Achievement,** was awarded to **Richard Immerman,** Professor Emeritus at Temple University. The prize committee—Andrew Rotter (chair), Judy Wu, and Barbara Keys—noted that Richard's scholarly record is extraordinary, from his Bernath Prize-winning first book on the CIA in Guatemala four decades ago and his pathbreaking work in the 1990s on John Foster Dulles to his more recent histories of the CIA (*The Hidden Hand*) and U.S. expansionism (*Empire for Liberty*). Along the way, he has published articles in top-tier journals, including the *Journal of American History*, *Diplomatic History*, and the *Political Science Quarterly*. Well before it was fashionable in the field, Richard collaborated with other scholars—among them George Herring and Fred Greenstein—producing scholarship of great scope and insight.

A brilliant teacher, Richard taught a generation of undergraduates at Temple University about how foreign policy works—and doesn't—enthralling them with his insightful and humorous lectures and dismaying them with his close attention to their writing. To his graduate students, he was a guide and a mentor—cajoling, encouraging, allowing them to be themselves, and doing everything humanly possible to place them in academic jobs, with enormous success. At Temple, Richard also established the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy. For three decades now, CENFAD has been at the forefront of interdisciplinary work on international affairs, bringing scholars from every corner of the world together to trade ideas and share their research.

And Richard is a SHAFR institution. As one of his recommenders wrote, "It is not hyperbole to state that Richard Immerman ranks as one of the most dedicated members of SHAFR in the entire six decades of the organization's history." As vice-president and then as president of SHAFR in 2006-07, Richard served on the negotiating team that won a substantial increase in the payment made by Oxford University Press for *Diplomatic History*—with some of the funds going to prizes and awards to promote the scholarship of graduate students and junior faculty. Richard also helped to create the Committee on Women, which did vitally important work to address the glaring gender imbalance in the Society. *(In photo, Andrew Rotter on left makes award to Richard Immerman, right.)*

There is perhaps nothing more awe-inspiring, or frustrating, than to try to have a conversation with Richard in the lobby of a SHAFR hotel during the conference. One is constantly interrupted by members—young and old—coming up to him, checking in about Society business, exchanging gossip, thanking him for good advice or comments made on a manuscript or a letter of recommendation, or just clapping him on the shoulder or giving him a hug. It is a measure of the respect and affection that everyone feels for him. And it is reassuring to know that, with Richard taking on the duties of executive director, the organization will remain in the best of hands.

SHAFR SPOTLIGHTS

I was born and raised in Sulphur Springs, Texas, to parents who both love history – museums wherever we traveled, watching late-night war movies on TV with my Dad (*Zulu* was his favorite), so I was into history from an early age. I earned my PhD at Bowling Green (in 1995, almost 30 years ago, which is nuts!), working under former SHAFR president Gary R. Hess. As for areas of interest, I'm all over the place—Russian Revolution and Civil War, Vietnam, 20th-century American military, war commemoration and memory, the 1960s—one of those "knows a little about a lot" people. I've held positions at St. Francis College (Indiana), Weber State University, and now at Georgia Southern University, with visiting positions at the Air War College, the USAF School for Advanced Air and Space Studies, and the Army War College. My good friend and colleague at Georgia Southern Brian K. Feltman and I host a podcast called "Military Historians are People, Too," in which we prove that any idiot can do a podcast. My life partner and minder Jennifer is the Registrar at Wofford College in Spartanburg, South Carolina, where we live with our black lab Tucker.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?
Oh my, this is a tough one. I'll go with things I watch whenever they're on. TV first – *Black Adder* (duh!), *Deadwood* (Shakespearean swearing – you'll know if I've been watching), *Jeeves and Wooster* (brilliant!), *The Detectorists* (laugh, cry – all in a half hour). Movies – *Once Upon a Time in the West* (Robards, Fonda, Bronson – and Claudia Cardinale), *Paths of Glory* (Kirk Douglas at his finest), *The Shop around the Corner* (go-to for the Holiday Season), *Casablanca* (the story behind the film – amazing), all of the Myrna Loy-William Powell *Thin Man* films (cocktails anyone?), *The Big Lebowski* (Over the line!). Dang it – that's 10! I could easily throw in 10 more.

Bill Allison

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
There are too many to count, BUT I am awful with names and constantly mix up people, especially at conferences. It is maddeningly embarrassing, and I lose sleep over it.

3. You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?
In no particular order – *A Very Good Year*, by Peter Mayle; *Lonesome Dove*, by Larry McMurtry (read three or four times over the years); P.G. Wodehouse omnibus and one for Georges Simenon; Cormac McCarthy's *Blood Meridian* (so violent, so beautifully written).

4. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Tough one. Giap, Langlais, and de Castries – I have many questions about Dien Bien Phu.

5. What would you do if you won the $750 million Powerball?
If you're expecting altruism, prepare to be disappointed. After several personal and purely materialistic items (Wrensilva Hi-Fi console, Gibson ES 355 guitar, Herman Miller Eames chair – a vintage one, 1970 Range Rover Defender – retrofitted with a hybrid engine, etc., etc.), a cottage in the Cotswolds, say in Blockley, an apartment in Copenhagen, and a custom-built home in the nearby North Carolina mountains oddly based upon classic Mid-Century Modern architects (Eames brothers, Greta Grossman, Pierre Koenig, Lina Bo Bardi, Richard Neutra, Stewart Williams, et al.). OK—some "giving" that is nevertheless self-serving: trusts for my nieces and nephews; endowed professorships for history departments where I went to school; scholarships for all history majors in my current department; does that help make me appear a little less selfish?

6. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Phew – OK. The Jam, Kinks, Clash, Robert Earl Keen and Lyle Lovett (playing together), Shed Seven, Echo Belly, Old 97's, Marty Stuart, AC-DC, Joe Bonamassa, Charley Crockett, Gary Clark, Jr. (this is a two-day festival, right?) Pink Martini, Hurray for the Riff Raff, Chris Isaak, and, of course, Stevie Ray Vaughn (I could go all day on this one, but then some readers may think I'm showing off, which I would be).

7. What are five things on your bucket list?
Another tough one. F1 at Spa-Francorchamps, walk the Hadrian's Wall Path coast-to-coast, see a Six Nation's rugby match at each home stadium, drive the Nürburgring, attend a Forest Green Rovers football match.

8. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
Easy—an architect (who is also an accomplished mixologist).

I became interested in history in high school thanks to a wonderful history teacher (shoutout to Mr. Symeonides) who just made it so much fun. I think I also became interested in history because I had always been interested in writing (my first "publication" was winning a library contest when I was eleven), and the academic form was my favourite, and I found that there was nothing more interesting to write about than history.

I am a graduate student at the University of Toronto, nearing the completion of a master's degree in history with a concentration in Contemporary International History, a specialization newly offered in collaboration with the Bill Graham Centre. I recently won a grant to conduct research at the Eisenhower Library and will be presenting that research as part of a panel at the upcoming SHAFR conference in Toronto.

I am also an avid traveller and spent several months in France last year while working on an exhibition renewal for the Juno Beach Centre, Canada's Second World War museum.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?
It is so hard to pick just a couple movies (I am a big movie fan overall) but I would say all-time favourites would have to be Ridley Scott's *Bladerunner*, Denis Villeneuve's *Arrival*, Orson Welles' *Touch of Evil*, Richard Linklater's *Dazed and Confused*, and, recently, Christopher Nolan's *Oppenheimer*.

I'm a big science fiction fan overall, which is potentially part of the reason why I am so interested in science even though I have no real training in it. Although not a science fiction film, *Oppenheimer* in particular was so much fun for me as it really brought a lot of the figures and ideas I am interested in researching into the mainstream – now I can talk with friends outside of history about Lewis Strauss or the debate about the H Bomb, and they'll have at least some idea of what I mean.
I watch a lot less television, but I am a huge fan of *Mad Men*. Apart from *Mad Men* and a couple other standouts, I usually only watch trashy, soapy television, like the *Real Housewives* franchise or *Grey's Anatomy*.

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
I did the latter half of my undergraduate degree during the pandemic, when a lot of academic events were moved online. I was invited to speak at a conference, which was an opportunity I was hugely excited about, but the entire thing was moved online. It ended up being sort of a blessing, because I had planned a three-week road trip across the Rocky Mountains at the same time as the conference, so it enabled me to do both – but since I was camping in Jasper, I had to drive to the nearest Tim Hortons and give my first ever academic presentation from a tourist town coffee shop.

Zoe Mason

3. You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?
Maybe this is embarrassing to admit, but I really don't spend as much time as I should reading fiction. It's a goal of mine to read more fiction this year, but I am not off to the strongest start. I'll cheat on this question, then, and provide a couple non-novels as well.
I think the first novel I would take would be *The Sun Also Rises* by Ernest Hemingway, because it's just a classic that I don't get sick of, and one of the few books I have read more than once. Next, I'll say *The Goldfinch* by Donna Tart, because that was the last novel I read and loved – it was so riveting and descriptive it was like watching a movie, and I imagine that kind of entertainment would be hard to come by on the island.
Then I'll start cheating and take some memoirs and essay collections, because that's typically what I read for fun. The first would be *All About Love* by bell hooks, because it is a book I like to return to piece by piece and always feel comforted by, and I imagine I would want to feel comforted as a castaway. Next, I would take *Funny Weather* by Olivia Laing, to simulate seeing concerts and visiting art museums and overall cultural engagement. And lastly, I'd take *The Year of Magical Thinking* by Joan Didion, because it's my favourite book, and I imagine alone on the island, one might feel more than a little grief.

4. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Orson Welles: I have always been sort of enamoured with Orson Welles. I am a huge fan of his movies, deeply charmed by his charisma and intelligence, and fascinated by his unorthodox path in Hollywood and in life. I think he would be a great conversationalist and a lot of fun.

Dwight Eisenhower: Most of my research to this point has been during the Eisenhower presidency, and a lot has been about the President himself. I have spent countless hours reading his correspondences, memos, and recollections. I am sure many people feel this way, but after spending so much time getting to know an individual through the sources, you can't help but wonder how accurate of an image you are receiving. It would be really neat to find out. He was also President in what I believe to be the most interesting period of American history, and I would love to learn more right from the source himself.

My grandfather: My father's father was born in India, enlisted in the Second World War at age seventeen, served and never went home, moving to and marrying in England and ultimately ending up in Canada. Apart from the broad strokes, we know very little about his life, he didn't speak much of his upbringing or his time in the war or anything else. My father believes he was in the Gurkha Rifles. He died when I was a young child, so I never had a chance to ask him about any of it myself, but I would love to know more about that side of my family's history. He might not be a historical figure, but he's a mystery in my own history I would very much have liked to solve.

5. What would you do if you won the $750 million Powerball?
I imagine I would go on some extravagant trip, and pay for all my favourite people to join. I'd probably do it annually. But truthfully, I really think not all that much would change. Superficial things, mostly. I would travel, which I already do; continue my studies, pursue a PhD, which I hope to do with or without the lottery; and live in a great city, which I am currently doing here in Toronto, a city I really love. I think I would do a lot of the same things, but at a higher level. I would worry about money a lot less, stay at nicer places, eat at pricier restaurants, and have a bigger apartment, with a better view. Or more likely a few apartments, around the world. Certainly, I would buy a home in Canada and a home somewhere abroad. I would put a lot more into my hobbies, like painting and camping. And, importantly, I would pay my parents back for all the years of education they helped me with and set them up for retirement. And probably buy my younger brother a cool car, a house, and an education. After everyone is all set, I suppose I'd donate large sums to charity, and then probably, go back to the books.

6. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
The Velvet Underground would be my headliner, for sure, and it would be a pretty classic rock heavy lineup overall: Led Zeppelin, Jimi Hendrix, and Janis Joplin would have to be there. The Doors, David Bowie, Television. The Rolling Stones in their earlier years; the Beatles in their later years. Bob Dylan somewhere in his middle years. Maybe we'd split it into two days – the first day with the classic rock acts, and a second day for soul, with Otis Redding, Sam Cooke, Nina Simone, Etta James, and James Brown. And a few acts who don't fit neatly into either category would be invited, too, maybe for a miscellaneous third day. Acts in this category would include the Strokes, the Talking Heads, and Elliott Smith.

7. What are five things on your bucket list?
I recently checked one off, when my roommate was generous enough to treat me to a birthday dinner at a Michelin star restaurant here in Toronto (it was called Quetzal, and I definitely recommend making a reservation if you plan on visiting Toronto).
There's a mountain in Banff National Park called Cirque Peak which has become a bucket list summit for me after I failed to have the right conditions to climb it on my last two visits.
Maybe a reach, but I want to write something that gets published in the *New Yorker*.
I want to visit India, where my grandfather was born and raised.
I want to live abroad, for at least a semi-permanent stretch – I feel like you can only get to know a place so much if you do not live there, and I would like to get to know a place other than my home country.

8. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
I always joke that I have really only ever been good at one thing – some people, like my little brother for example, can pick up whatever they put their mind to. He's a natural athlete, has an eye for math, and is good at fixing things with his hands. I am none of those things. But I have always been good at reading and writing, so I think I've known forever that I would do something where I read and I wrote. In undergrad, I thought maybe that would be journalism. There's still a piece of me that finds that path enticing. But history has really always been where my heart was. That said, I wouldn't necessarily say I'm an academic yet, either, so maybe there's still time for both.

I cannot remember a time when I wasn't interested in history. My family traveled for several weeks to a different European country or Canadian province every year, and in preparation for this, my mother had me read (or read to me) about the places we might go. On the trips, I created an illustrated diary of every place we visited. This explains my eclectic interests in Canadian history, Acadia, indigenous history, urban history, architecture, the Habsburg empire, and my ancestors from the Bloodlands and Argentina, and of course British imperial history, among other themes. When I was in college, I felt limited by the idea of just being a history major so created own degree in Victorian and Edwardian Studies, with an emphasis on women's history, literary, and urban history, which included completing the third year of a degree in history at St. Hugh's College, Oxford.

My family consists of my mom, my sister, and my beloved 16-1/2 year old Yorkshire Terrier, Olive.

I am not a professional writer but my most recent publications is "Graduate School Is a Foreign Country: One Editor's Path to Finding a Career in Other People's Books" in *Perspectives on History.*

I'm especially proud of: "Of Monographs and Magnum Opuses: Editing Works of Scholarship" in What Editors Do: The Art, Craft, and Business of Book Editing edited by Peter Ginna (University of Chicago Press, 2017)

& "Turning 'Plan B' Into a 'Plan A' Life" in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*.



1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Broadcast News
ER
Remains of the Day
The West Wing
A Room with a View
Upstairs, Downstairs
A Town Like Alice
The Hours
The Restaurant (Swedish TV show)
Masterpiece Theatre and Mystery- every week, no matter what season

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

The first conference I ever presented at was in Sydney, Australia, with a paper on Australian feminist history and a phenomenon called tall poppy syndrome. I had no idea what the norms of an academic conference were in the United States, let alone Australia, and I was extremely jetlagged and knew no one. But no matter how much experience I have with public presentations now, pretty much every panel I do is anxiety-producing since I am naturally very introverted.

3. You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

This is impossible!! Even with more spots I feel like I'm killing my darlings.

Junichiro Tanizaki, *The Makioka Sisters*
Kazuo Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day*
Stella Gibbons, *Cold Comfort Farm*
Nevil Shute, *A Town Like Alice*
Alice Munro, *Friend of My Youth* (or any of her collections of short stories)
Muriel Spark, *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*
Jane Austen, the collected works
James Herriot, all of the volumes of *All Creatures Great and Small*
Colin Dexter, all of the *Morse* novels

4. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Eleanor Roosevelt, Anne Morrow Lindbergh, Virginia Woolf

In their own way, each of them was an incredibly inspirational feminist thinker and writer, and I would love to hear what their interactions would be like.

5. What would you do if you won the $750 million Powerball?

I'm going to avoid answering this because I edited a book by Jonathan Cohen titled *For a Dollar and a Dream: State Lotteries in Modern America*, so I know way more about lotto than the average person. I never play and you gotta be in it to win it (the old New York State Lotto slogan).

6. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Can this be a mix of popular music and classical? (I used to perform in wind symphonies and orchestra so I realize my musical festival might be something like Tanglewood.)

Beatles (early- to mid-1960s)
Cowboy Junkies
Cornshed Sisters
Kate and Anna McGarrigle
Indigo Girls
Joni Mitchell
Simon and Garfunkle
Keane
Everything But the Girl
Sam Way
Pet Shop Boys
The Waterboys
Ella Fitzgerald
Ralph von Williams
Simon Rattle and the London Symphony Orchestra
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart

Susan Ferber

7. What are five things on your bucket list?

Visiting Hong Kong
Traveling in South Africa
Spending time in Vietnam
Learning Swedish and visiting all of Scandinavia (not just the countries I've been to)
Writing a history book of my own in retirement

8. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Well, I'm not an academic; I pursued a different career as a history editor who occasionally does professional education in publishing at the Columbia Publishing Course, New York University, and on campuses and at conferences. If I were an academic, I hope I'd be employed, which seemed very unlikely when I was in grad school. In my alternate universe, I could make a living as a professional scone baker or cross stitcher.

I am a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Texas at Austin, where I specialize in US foreign and national security policy since 1945, especially toward the Middle East and Russia. I also study terrorism. My dissertation explores relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and a group of Arab states known as the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (*Jabhat al-Sumud wa-al-Tassadi*) from 1977 to 1984. In addition to numerous public-facing pieces, book reviews, and encyclopedia entries, I've published three scholarly articles with *Perspectives on Terrorism* (2021), the International Centre for Counter-terrorism (2022), and *Cold War History* (2024). I became interested in history largely because I loved reading the historical fiction of G. A. Henty and Douglas Bond in middle school, and then in high school I was blessed to have a truly great history teacher, and an English teacher who taught me a lot about writing. After a religious experience convinced me that I was not supposed to go into film but education, I majored in history with minors in Bible and national security at Grove City College, followed by my MA at Kent State University. I have a big family, as I'm the oldest of six, and will marry my fiancée Hannah this autumn. We have an Aussiedoodle, Charlie, who keeps us on our toes.

1. What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
In no particular order, my favorite series of all time are *Breaking Bad*, *The West Wing*, *The Patient*, *How to Change Your Mind*, and *Narcos*. As for films, that's hard, but not counting Christmas movies, I'd say *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy (that counts as one), *Gladiator*, *Anchorman*, *Se7en*, and *The Private Navy of Sgt. O'Farrell.*

2. What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
Oh that's easy. In May 2020 I wrote a smart-aleck tweet: "Telling a historian 'I'm something of a history buff too' upon learning their profession is the equivalent of telling an engineer 'Oh yeah I love building LEGO sets in my free time.' We appreciate the sentiment. But please—it's not a hobby." That, predictably, turned into the third rail of History Twitter™ for the next day or two, as a lot of folks took turns accusing me of gatekeeping, even though a good number of historians appreciated the bit. My explanatory thread of 13 or so tweets definitely didn't help matters…

3. You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?
J. R. R. Tolkien, *The Lord of the Rings*; G. A. Henty, *In Freedom's Cause*; Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August*; George Orwell, *Animal Farm*; and William Golding, *Lord of the Flies* (the last two are perhaps a bit too on the nose).

4. If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Andrei Gromyko—the former Soviet foreign minister was notoriously cantankerous, and his memoirs are practically useless for my research, so I'd love to get inside his head. The Apostle Paul—the author of most of the New Testament is one of my favorite thinkers of all time. Abraham Lincoln—I recognize how vanilla this is, but he was such a complex figure who guided the US through the worst of our history, that I'd love to just talk to him.

Benjamin Allison

5. What would you do if you won the $750 million Powerball?
If this is a question of how I'd spend it: $150 million to various charitable organizations/churches, $50 million to Veritas Christian Academy, $100 million to Grove City College, $100 million to Kent State University, $100 million to a trust fund, and the rest to assisting relatives/friends and investing in the community wherever my fiancée and I lay down roots. If the question is about how I'd react, I'd do some breathing exercises, call my fiancée, and get in touch with a proper financial advisor and probably a lawyer.

6. You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?
Rush, Led Zeppelin, Jimi Hendrix, Stevie Ray Vaughan, Eric Clapton, Creedence Clearwater Revival, Steely Dan, The Police, Van Halen, Guns 'N Roses, Nirvana, Red Hot Chili Peppers, Tool, Primus, Creed, Foo Fighters, Alter Bridge, The Devil Wears Prada, Wage War, Beartooth, and Fit for an Autopsy.

7. What are five things on your bucket list?
Writing at least one great tome like what Christopher Clark or Robert Cato would write—something thick enough to kill a man but well-written enough that people would actually want to read it rather than using it as a weapon; raising a loving family; serving those less fortunate than me; holding a position of influence in the US government; doing standup in front of a sizable crowd and not absolutely bombing.

8. What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
I'd likely have gone into film (acting/production) or would be working for a professional sports team. When we were 18, my best friend and I precociously wrote to Donald Trump, who at the time was trying to buy the Buffalo Bills; we tried to sell him on the idea of appointing us as co-GMs as a publicity stunt because, at the time, the Bills couldn't get much worse, so what did he have to lose? Sadly he didn't buy the team and ran for president instead, and we know how that wound up… I'd like to think my friend and I could have prevented all that had we just been given the opportunity to flex our *Madden* team-building skills in real life.

The National Archives Unveils Enhanced Guidance for Research

To help researchers better prepare for visiting National Archives research rooms, Research Services recently issued a revised and enhanced set of frequently asked questions (FAQ) entitled "How can I make my visit more successful?" Building on existing guidance, this FAQ answers eight questions covering topics including research appointments, the importance of making early contact as you plan your research and visits to the research rooms, how to frame an effective inquiry, the availability of records, hints for identifying records of interest in other sources, and links to National Archives online resources. The FAQ is printed below or you can access it at: https://www.archives.gov/research/start/research-visit-faqs.

Following this guidance will help researchers have a more successful visit to National Archives research rooms. By making contact as you plan a visit, the staff will be able to assist in determining if the records of interest are declassified and available, that they are at the location you intend to visit, and that they have been accessioned by the National Archives. You will also learn if records have been digitized and are now available online, potentially obviating the need to visit the National Archives.

For SHAFRites, the most important organizational point of contact is the Archives II Reference Branch, since that is where National Archives foreign affairs-related federal holdings are located.

Nevertheless, here are the email contact addresses for all the Research Services reference units in the Washington, DC, area, as well as the Center for Legislative Archives.

NARA FAQ

- Moving Image and Sound Branch = mopix@nara.gov
- Archives II Reference Branch = archives2reference@nara.gov
- Archives I Reference Branch = archives1reference@nara.gov
- Moving Image and Sound Branch = mopix@nara.gov
- Still Picture Branch = stillpix@nara.gov
- Cartographic Branch = carto@nara.gov
- Electronic Records Division = cer@nara.gov
- Center for Legislative Archives = legislative.archives@nara.gov
- Picture Branch = stillpix@nara.gov
- Cartographic Branch = carto@nara.gov

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) reference staff are committed to giving researchers the best possible assistance. The following questions and answers are provided to help researchers have a good onsite experience and take full advantage of their limited time at the National Archives.

Do I need to contact the Archives before I arrive?

- We strongly encourage researchers to schedule a research appointment prior to visiting the National Archives in Washington, DC (A1) or the National Archives at College Park (A2).
- Appointments are required for visiting all other National Archives field facilities and the National Archives at St. Louis.
- Learn more by visiting the website for the facility you are seeking to visit. Links for each facility website are found on our Visit Us webpage <https://www.archives.gov/locations>.

Do I need to submit a research question/reference inquiry before I arrive?

- Submitting a reference inquiry is a part of the appointment scheduling process for the archival units outside the Washington, DC area.
- While it is not required for DC area research rooms, we strongly encourage researchers to contact the appropriate reference branch before making a research visit.
- Please send your reference inquiry to only one address to avoid confusion and duplication of work. Making contact before arrival can help prepare researchers for what they will find and help smooth the process when they arrive. If you do not know in which facility the records are located, please contact the main inquiry box (Contact Us) <https://www.archives.gov/contact>.
- Researchers should make contact far enough in advance to allow the NARA reference staff sufficient time to respond. A good rule of thumb is to write a minimum of 4 weeks before you plan to arrive. This allows time for the staff to log requests, to conduct necessary background work, and to prepare and send a response.
- If researchers have complex questions that require an in-depth consultation that might require an ongoing exchange, they should write even sooner. Please note, however, that NARA staff cannot undertake research for you. The staff assists researchers with their work by providing information about the records, but it does not undertake substantive research on behalf of researchers.

How does a prospective researcher prepare an effective inquiry?

Researchers should make contact far enough in advance to provide National Archives staff sufficient time to respond before arriving. At a minimum you should submit inquiries at least 4 weeks prior to your onsite research visit. All inquiries are registered in a tracking system and answered in turn. Allow a few days for your inquiry to be registered and processed. A knowledgeable staff member will receive your inquiry and has 10 business days to prepare and submit your response. An effective inquiry consists of:

- A succinct description of your research interest. Narrowly describe your research topic. Requests along the lines of "everything you have" on a given topic will not lead to a useful response.
- Limit requests to one agency or a group of closely related agencies. This will help the reference staff prepare informative responses. This approach may lead to multiple inquiries, but you will receive more complete information about the records of interest.

• Specific dates of interest for your topic. Records change over time. What we tell you about 19th century records is very different from what we tell you about those of the 20th.
• Information about specific individuals. At a minimum this includes first and last names, relationship with the federal government, and relevant dates. If you are interested in a number of individuals, alphabetize your list, although we generally can only respond to a very limited number at one time. Include date of birth if that information is available, especially if it will assist in identifying the individuals within the records.
• If you have specific questions about the records, list them.
• If you are interested in specific records, please identify them by record group, entry number, and series title. National Archives Identification Numbers (NAID Numbers) are useful for linking to record series within the Catalog <https://catalog.archives.gov/>. Include NAID links to the Catalog if you want to refer to records you discovered while researching within the Catalog.

Please remember that it may take a few weeks for NARA to respond.

Do some records need more advanced notice to be available?

Making contact ahead of time is especially necessary if a researcher is interested in:

• more recent records (1960s and later);
• records of agencies that deal with more sensitive government functions (such as State, Defense, Justice, the FBI, and the intelligence agencies);
• records for which you have incomplete or partial identification (records center accession numbers or agency-assigned numbers, such as Department of State "Lot File" numbers, that do not always carry over into use by the National Archives);
• records that have only recently been transferred to the National Archives.
• records that are potentially stored in cold storage;
• records that are potentially stored at an off-site storage facility

Are the records well described for easy use?

Some are and others are not. While it is our ultimate goal, not all records are fully processed, with full descriptions and complete finding aids. Until the goal is met, locating specific bodies of records transferred to the National Archives, especially those transferred recently, can often involve a time-consuming, multi-step process involving both researchers and NARA staff. This cannot be done effectively on an ad hoc basis while researchers wait in a research room. Researchers may have to request additional information from the agency of origin, and NARA staff may have to consult transfer documentation, printouts, preliminary finding aids, and classified indexes to assist in locating files of interest. In some cases, we may have to contact the agency of origin. The same is true for locating files relating to esoteric topics. NARA understands that the absence of complete finding aids can be frustrating to researchers, but by writing in advance, some of the problems may be overcome.

What are some of the other reasons to contact the National Archives in advance?

• We can provide information about hours of operation and holidays. Hours of operation are established by each facility.
• We can provide you with information about NARA procedures. For example, scheduling an appointment and registering in advance.
• We can identify records that are available on-line or on National Archives Microfilm Publications, thus saving a trip to the National Archives. Researchers must use microfilm and online resources when those options are available.
• We can identify records that will not be transferred to the National Archives. Only a small percentage of all Federal records are designated as permanent. All others are scheduled for destruction under the authority of approved records control schedules.
• We can identify permanent records that are not yet in the National Archives. In those cases you must contact the agency of origin.
• We can let you know if the records in which you are interested are temporarily unavailable to researchers because of various reasons (the records are undergoing preservation work, are being imaged or digitized, or for some other reason).
• We can identify records that have been moved to another location, such as a Presidential Library or a NARA field facility.
• We can let you know if the records have been sent to remote off-site storage and thus require advance special arrangements to use or a visit to another NARA facility.
• We can let you know if the records in which you are interested are available for use. Before some records are made available to researchers, they must be reviewed for documents containing security classified information and information that is otherwise restricted. In addition, other records may require special preservation treatment before they can be made available.

What official sources are available for consultation before visiting the National Archives that will assist in identifying records relevant to my research?

Other resources such as published agency annual reports, official histories, and official documentary publications often cite records or provide examples of records now in the National Archives. These can provide entry points for starting research on a particular topic. Be sure to take note of records descriptions and file citations and note those in your reference inquiries and bring your notes with you when you visit.

What online resources are available from NARA that will assist in identifying records relevant to my research?

The National Archives' online Catalog provides various levels of description and detail about specific record series within the holdings of the National Archives. If you are unfamiliar with the holdings of the National Archives begin your exploration by visiting the

• Record Group Explorer <https://www.archives.gov/findingaid/record-group-explorer>
• Presidential Library Explorer <https://www.archives.gov/findingaid/presidential-library-explorer>
• Donated Collections Explorer <https://www.archives.gov/findingaid/donated-collection-explorer>

The *History Hub* <https://historyhub.history.gov/> is a National Archives hosted community for researchers, historians, and archivists. Researchers of all levels of experience are invited to post their inquiries on History Hub, review responses to similar questions, and read informative blogs written for *History Hub.*

SHAFR Council Agenda
June 3, 2024
via Zoom, 10:00am-1:00pm (U.S. Eastern)

Present: *Mitch Lerner (chair), Megan Black, Brooke Blower, Gretchen Heefner, Mary Ann Heiss, Chris Hulshof, Melanie McAlister, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Christopher McKnight Nichols, Vanessa Walker, Molly Wood, Kelsey Zavelo*

Attending: *Amy Sayward (ex officio), Faith Bagley, Michael Brenes, Elizabeth Ferguson, Justin Hart, Kaete O'Connell, Tom Zeiler*

Introductory matters:

SHAFR President Mitch Lerner opened the meeting by welcoming and thanking all present for their participation. He then turned to an affirmation of the votes taken electronically since the last Council meeting: approval of the minutes of the January and April Council meetings and the sign-on to the American Historical Association's statement on campus protests. Council then turned to a vote of thanks to retiring committee, task force, and editorial board members:

Christopher Fisher, Program Committee co-chair

Jason Colby, Program Committee member

Wang Tao, Program Committee member

E. Kyle Romero, Program Committee member

Benjamin Montoya, Program Committee member

Brian Etheridge, Program Committee member

Rob Rakove, Program Committee member

Manna Duah, Program Committee member

Julia Irwin, Development Committee co-chair

Kelsey Zavelo, Graduate Student Committee co-chair

Steven Rodriguez, Graduate Student Committee member

Grace Song, Graduate Student Committee member

Theresa Keeley, Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee chair

Andrew Rotter, Norman & Laura Graebner Award Committee chair

Frank Costigliola, Peter L. Hahn Distinguished Service Committee chair

Kimber Quinney, Myrna Bernath Book & Fellowship Awards for International History Committee chair

Meredith Oyen, Program Committee co-chair

Steve Brady, Program Committee member

Se Yong Jang, Program Committee member

Carly Goodman, Program Committee member

Amy Fedeski, Program Committee member

David Atkinson, Program Committee member

James Stocker, Program Committee member

Mary Ann Heiss, Ways & Means Committee chair

Salim Yaqub, Development Committee member

Grant Golub, Graduate Student Committee member

Amin Esmaeilzadeh Aghjeh, Graduate Student Committee member

David Milne, Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee chair

Karine Walther, Dissertation Prize Committee chair

Mario Del Pero, Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize Committee chair

Katharina Rietzler, Michael H. Hunt Prize Awards Committee chair

Monica Kim, Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship Committee chair

Council also passed a special resolution of thanks to Andrew Johns:

> "SHAFR Council offers its sincere thanks and appreciation to Andy Johns for his years of service as *Passport* editor. Over the course of 14 years and 41 issues––which included, amongst other things, 76 roundtables, 14 teaching columns, and 12 pieces about *FRUS*––Andy has worked tirelessly to provide SHAFR members with invaluable information about the profession. He has made *Passport* what it is today: a critical part of the diplomatic history field. His commitment to the publication and to SHAFR has been extraordinary, and the entire organization owes him a debt of gratitude. SHAFR Council thanks him for his many years of service."

Conference matters:

Kaete O'Connell, SHAFR's Conference Consultant, joined the meeting and reported on conference matters. As of that morning, 324 people had registered for the conference, which was 75 more than the 2022 conference in New Orleans but 100 less than the 2023 conference at Arlington, Virginia. She did note, however, that there had been a 16% attrition rate of people accepted onto the program who ended up not attending; additionally, there were far fewer exhibitors, mostly because of budgetary and sales constraints. Because of the small number of exhibitors, she had created an orphan table for recent books by members whose publishers were absent. She then summarized the hurdles posed by having an on-campus conference, including the conflicts between campus convocation and the conference as well as delays in completing the program. Asked about the lower number of registrants, O'Connell pointed to passport/visa issues, rising airfares, and the small number of graduate students who had applied for travel funding. Asked about how to address some of the issues that had arisen with the 2024 conference, O'Connell and Amy Sayward, SHAFR's Executive Director, discussed the deadlines they had established for the incoming Program Committee as well as offering that committee greater support via Faith Bagley, whose skill set and years-long experience with SHAFR have equipped her very well to serve as the Program Committee assistant. They also had suggested changing the deadline for travel grant applicants from December 1st to January 1st to address the low number of travel-grant applications.

O'Connell then shifted to updates for upcoming conferences. For the 2025 conference in Arlington, she described the off-site welcome reception/social event organized for the Spy Museum, which will also host a plenary or keynote lecture. She described the professionalism of the staff and the easy access to the museum via Metro and bus. The 2025 registration form will include boxes to select no-cost attendance and to select no-cost bus transportation to assist in conference planning. For the 2026 conference, she reminded Council that the contract had already been signed with the Blackwell Conference Center at Ohio State University, which should provide an excellent venue. For the 2027 conference scheduled for the DC area, O'Connell has been exploring other venue options (including George Mason University's Arlington campus), given the high costs at the Arlington Renaissance; Council also highlighted the new Virginia Tech and

Northeastern campuses as potential options. For 2028, she suggested that a Texas conference could draw sponsorships from the three presidential libraries (given the relevant anniversaries of 1968, 1998, and 2008) as well as engaging our many Texas-based members. It was also an opportunity to host a conference west of the Mississippi that might also engage Caribbean and Latin American members.

Council then turned to the question of the diversity statement to be included in future conference calls for papers, which had been discussed in the previous Council meeting. There was a lively discussion of several elements of the proposed statement. Lerner moved, Sarah Miller-Davenport seconded, and Council unanimously approved the following statement:

> "SHAFR is committed to the values of equity, access, and representation. The organization invites proposals from all, especially scholars of color; those who identify as women, trans, and non-binary; individuals residing outside of the United States; untenured and contingent faculty; scholars working in other fields and disciplines, and those who work in less commonly studied chronological periods or who engage with unusual methodological approaches. The Program Committee welcomes—but does not require—proposals that include a brief statement detailing how their submission advances SHAFR's commitment to these values."

Summer Institute proposal:

Michael Brenes of Yale University joined the meeting to support a proposal to revive SHAFR's Summer Institutes. Lerner reviewed the proposal he had provided to Council, which included four years of institutes in partnership with Yale University and Ohio State University. The proposal requested an allocation of $19,520 from SHAFR over the four years; he noted that less might ultimately be required. Conversation then turned to the ways in which the Summer Institutes had created lasting communities, especially as graduate programs shrink at universities. There were questions about how the themes had been selected and how the selection processes will work. The host universities will choose the themes, but Council encouraged the organizers to define these themes broadly and to develop a selection process in order to attract a diverse cross-section of graduate students. Lerner and Brenes were very receptive to these suggestions. There was also a discussion about how and when future summer institutes might be organized, including ideas about bringing in additional universities and/or not hosting summer institutes every single year after this initial period. Brenes left the meeting ahead of the vote to approve the proposal with SHAFR's financial contribution. The motion was made by Lerner, seconded by Gretchen Heffner, and passed unanimously.

Teaching award:

Justin Hart, co-chair of the Teaching Committee, joined the meeting to discuss creation of LaFeber-Wood Teaching Award. Molly Wood recused herself from the conversation due to a conflict of interest (the proposed naming of the award after her, which she was not aware of until she received the proposal). Lerner reviewed the proposal developed with the Teaching Committee to establish a $500/year award with seed money from SHAFR and begin a campaign after the conference to fully fund a $1,000 annual award. He indicated that there were a number of donors ready to contribute and explained that the Development Committee was ready to begin.

Council provided significant feedback on the application and selection process outlined in the Teaching Committee proposal, including discussion of the page limit of applications and clarification that SHAFR's Bernath Lecture Prize is--in part--a teaching prize. The majority of the discussion focused on the proposed alternation between R1 (or equivalent) and teaching-centered positions and the definition of both types of institutions. Asked about the context of the Teaching Committee discussion that led to this proposal for rotation, Hart stated that the sense of the committee members was that many of the awards made by SHAFR go to R1s and that the committee members wanted to make sure everyone had access to the opportunities provided by SHAFR. Given this context, some suggested that the committee might want to revisit the idea of alternating, which could actually lead to an over-representation of winners from R1-type institutions. There was support for preferring nominees who did not come from R1-type institutions. Lerner then suggested that Council vote to approve creation of the award, so that fundraising could begin, and that the Teaching Committee refine the application proposal in line with the discussion that had occurred in Council. Hart agreed and left the meeting ahead of the vote. Mary Ann Heiss moved to approve creation of the award, Brooke Blower seconded, and Council voted unanimously in favor.

Lerner noted that the Ways & Means Committee had recommended that if the award raised more money than was needed for the $1,000 annual prize that the original $5,000 seed money from SHAFR could be returned to the budget from the endowment account.

Publication matters:

Elizabeth Ferguson from Oxford University Press (OUP) joined the meeting to highlight items from the publisher's report. She emphasized that traditional subscriptions are declining but that consortia subscriptions have remained more stable; and increasingly, OUP is including in these consortia deals reduced rates for open access. She emphasized that production had gone smoothly in 2024, with all issues being published on time. Conversation then moved to the Oxford contract, which had been corrected. After Ferguson left the meeting, Lerner noted that the one-year notice of termination meant that Council would have to decide on renewal in year three of the contract (2027) and therefore would have to issue a call for proposals in year two of the contract (2026) and create a task force to investigate the various proposals.

Sayward provided a tentative update about the projected cost of print copies of *Passport* and *Diplomatic History* based on a proposal from Sheridan (the current printer of SHAFR publications). It appears that it would cost approximately $50 per person for 300-400 copies. Sayward indicated that she was happy to seek additional bids from other printers, if desired; the benefit of staying with Sheridan is consistency, but there was no way to know if it was a competitive bid without seeking additional bids. She sought direction from Council regarding whether members desiring paper copies of these publications should pay all, part, or none of the associated costs. She reminded Council that in the last membership cycle SHAFR had asked for donations to cover the cost of paper copies and had received about $2,000. The Ways and Means Committee had had a robust discussion about this issue and had not reached consensus. There was a suggestion of receiving paper copies of Passport with a $50/year donation and both with a $100/year donation. There was discussion about the need to inquire of those currently receiving print copies about the level of their commitment to that decision, especially for life members who do not make a choice between print and digital every year as part of the renewal process. Sayward was instructed to seek additional bids and to draft a letter that would also explain the technical assistance available for those accessing digital copies for the first time. She reminded Council that a final decision would be needed before the renewal cycle begins on November 1st.

Conversation then turned to the suggested additions to the *Diplomatic History e*ditorial board that had been suggested by the editors. Lerner moved to approve the three suggestions, Megan Black seconded, and Council voted unanimously in favor. Council also considered the draft memorandum of agreement for the Diplomatic History editors, which was drafted to comply with SHAFR's legal obligations based on the new contract with OUP. Lerner suggested creating separate agreements for each of the editors, as opposed to the joint agreement in the draft.

Financial matters:

Council then turned to the financial matters on the agenda. Sayward reviewed the financial reports provided in the conference packet, which showed that the current fiscal year was projected to show a small surplus. The upcoming fiscal year showed a small deficit, primarily because SHAFR has to pay Oxford for last year's memberships (under the terms of our current contract) as well as this coming year's publication costs under the new contract. Melani McAlister raised the question of not having AV at the upcoming conference, except for the luncheons that required amplification. Lerner summarized that Council had made this decision in the fall due to the high cost of the Arlington Renaissance AV services in the previous conference ($37,000). Sayward pointed out that this phenomenon was not unique to SHAFR; the American Historical Association had recently notified affiliates of the rising cost of AV at the upcoming New York conference, which was higher than the previous year, which in turn had been higher than any of their rates prior to COVID. She also pointed to Council's suggestion of purchasing table-top podia and considering the purchase of a portable speaker and microphone if any SHAFR members requested this accommodation on their SHAFR registration form. Council also supported a 3% raise for the Conference Consultant and the IT Director. Chris Hulshof moved to accept the proposed budget with the amendments required by the teaching award, Summer Institute votes, and raises; McAlister seconded the motion, which passed unanimously.

Lerner commented that he had met with the endowment manager; he was not concerned with his work but also was not thrilled, so Council will probably revisit the guidance and targets provided to the manager moving forward.

Tom Zeiler then joined the meeting to discuss his role as SHAFR's representative in the National Coalition for History (NCH). He pointed to the working group report and the fact that NCH is restructuring as rationales to revisit Council's decision to end its membership in September. Instead, he suggested that—if the working group report was endorsed and the restructuring was positive—Council consider continuing its membership at the lowest ($600) level. Council members indicated support for a fall email vote on whether to continue membership at the $600 rate or to end SHAFR's membership, as per the earlier fall vote.

Personnel matters:

Council did not offer any suggestions for revising the MOA with Richard Immerman to cover the executive director transition.

Lerner provided updates on the search process for the *Passport* editor. As the past editor, he is chairing the committee. He explained that Ohio State might make an application, which does not involve him; if so, he will recuse himself from committee discussions of that proposal. So far, the committee has received indications of interest from 2-3 sources. The deadline for applications is July 15th. Sayward will draft a memorandum of agreement for the new editor(s).

In terms of the stipends to be paid to the section editors for *The SHAFR Guid*e, Sayward noted that these had originally been allocated for the coming fiscal year but were now being postponed and are reflected in the long-range projections report.

Council matters:

Council reviewed the IT Director's report, which included a recommendation to assess cyber security. Lerner requested some specific recommendations and George Fujii's attendance at the January meeting.

Council then turned to the proposal to make the by-laws more inclusive through removal of gendered language, which had been discussed previously. Following input from CARE (Committee on Access, Representation, and Equity), the proposed language follows the Modern Language Association (MLA) approach of removing pronouns. Gretchen Heefner moved to approve the included version, Chris Nichols seconded, and Council voted unanimously. The new language will be included in the fall ballot for membership approval, and there will be a linked red-line version for members to examine before the vote.

The other by-law amendment under consideration—also previously discussed—was inclusion of an international member on the Nominating Committee. There was a question about whether a sufficient number of international members were interested in such a position and also a statement that the time of meetings might have to be adjusted to accommodate an international member. Sayward pointed out that when Council first moved to Zoom that it had accommodated members from Qatar to California. Hulshof moved to approve the proposed language, Vanessa Walker seconded, and Council voted unanimously in favor.

Sayward then spoke of the need for an organizational conflict-of-interest policy. There is a scattering of such policies for book prize committees and for the endowment, but our contract with Oxford University Press requires us to have an overarching policy. Ferguson has promised to provide Sayward with some examples from similar organizations. Sayward will work on a draft for Council discussion in January.

Committee matters:

There were many committee reports that did not require action and generated no Council concerns or questions. Hulshof gave an update based on his written report that connected his email membership drive to a double-digit increase in graduate student membership. He also pointed out that several Graduate Student Committee members were rotating off and that he was actively seeking new members. Sayward stated that the graduate student breakfast would be integrated into the conference food & drink budget in line with what we do for the *Diplomatic History* editorial board, for example.

Sayward highlighted that the Gale Digital History Fellowship applications were with Digital Resources and Archival Sharing Committee for decision; Gale will sponsor a session at the 2025 conference and provide travel funding to the selected fellows.
The Development Committee had recommended DropBox for donations, which allows both recurring and one-time donations. Sayward explained that the costs would be folded into existing budget line-items. Lerner made a motion to approve this expenditure, Miller-Davenport seconded, and Council voted unanimously in favor.

Sayward highlighted that the Committee on Women in SHAFR's Second Book Workshop was shifting in time (from June to January) and format (in-person to virtual); the money already approved by Council for this year was to be rolled to next fiscal year. Lerner highlighted the need for a regular rotation for the Historical Documentation Committee, and Sarah Snyder would have to be replaced as chair after November 1st.

Council adjourned at 12:12pm.



Professional Notes

Roham Alvandi (London School of Economics) has been named founding Director of the Iranian History Initiative at LSE. For more information on the new program, please see https://www.lse.ac.uk/International-History/IranianHistoryInitiative/Iranian-History-Initiative.

Carolyn Eisenberg (Hofstra University) received the 2024 Bancroft Prize in American History and Diplomacy for her book, *Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Wars in Southeast Asia* (2023).

Sheyda Jahanbani (University of Kansas) received the 2024 Center for Presidential History Book Prize for her book, *The Poverty of the World: Rediscovering the Poor at Home and Abroad, 1941- 1968* (2023).

Erik Scott (University of Kansas) received the 2024 Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award from the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association for his book, *Defectors: How the Illicit Flight of Soviet Citizens Built the Borders of the Cold War World* (2023).

Recent Books of Interest

Adelman, Jeremy and Gyan Prakash, eds. *Inventing the Third World: In Search of Freedom for the Postwar Global South.* (Bloomsbury, 2024).

Alam, Eram, Dorothy Roberts, and Natalie Shibley. *Ordering the Human: The Global Spread of Racial Science.* (Columbia, 2024).

Aleinikoff, T. Alexander and Alexandra Délano Alonso. *New Narratives on the Peopling of America: Immigration, Race, and Dispossession.* (JHU, 2024).

Amar, Tarik Cyril. *James Bond's Socialist Rivals: Television Spy Heroes and Popular Culture in the Cold War East.* (Oxford, 2024).

Bakich, Spencer D. *The Gulf War: George H.W. Bush and American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era.* (Kansas, 2024).

Barrett, Marsha E. *Nelson Rockefeller's Dilemma: The Fight to Save Moderate Republicanism.* (Cornell, 2024).

Baumann, Roger. *Black Visions of the Holy Land: African American Engagement with Israel and Palestine.* (Columbia, 2024).

Bentley, Michelle and Adam Lerner, eds. *A Trump Doctrine? Unpredictability and Foreign Policy.* (Routledge, 2024).

Bhagavan, Manu, ed. *India and the Cold War.* (UNC, 2024).

Bolton, Charles C. *Home Front Battles: World War II Mobilization and Race in the Deep South.* (Oxford, 2024).

Brooks, Stephen. *National Images and United States-Canada Relations.* (Routledge, 2024).

Brown, Nicole M. *We Are Each Other's Business: Black Women's Intersectional Political Consumerism During the Chicago Welfare Rights Movement.* (Columbia, 2024).

Calvert, Jane E. *Penman of the Founding: A Biography of John Dickinson.* (Oxford, 2024).

Campbell, Joel R. *Politics Go to the Movies: International Relations and Politics in Genre Films and Television.* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).

Chen, Kuan-Jen. *Charting America's Cold War Waters in East Asia.* (Cambridge, 2024).

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. *Making the Presidency: John Adams and the Precedents that Forged the Republic.* (Oxford, 2024).

Deaton, Angus. *Economics in America: An Immigrant Economist Explores the Land of Inequality.* (Princeton, 2024).

Denoël, Yvonnick. *Vatican Spies: From the Second World War to Pope Francis.* (Oxford, 2024).

Dimbleby, Jonathan. *Endgame 1944: How Stalin Won the War.* (Oxford, 2024).

Eizenstat, Stuart E. *The Art of Diplomacy: How American Negotiators Reached Historic Agreements that Changed the World.* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).

Emerson, Barbara. *The First Cold War: Anglo-Russian Relations in the 19th Century.* (Oxford, 2024).

Green, Nathaniel C. *The Man of the People: Political Dissent and the Making of the American Presidency.* (Kansas, 2024).

Greenbaum, Eli. *Hell, No, We Didn't Go! Firsthand Accounts of Vietnam War Protest and Resistance.* (Kansas, 2024).

Grey, Mirian Nyhan, ed. *Ireland's Allies: America and the 1916 Easter Rising.* (Chicago, 2024).

Golding, David and Christopher Cannon Jones. *Missionary Interests: Protestant and Mormon Missions in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.* (Cornell, 2024).

Gow, William. *Performing Chinatown: Hollywood, Tourism, and the Making of a Chinese American Community.* (Stanford, 2024).

Guglielmo, Thomas A. *Divisions: A New History of Racism and Resistance in America's World War II Military.* (Oxford, 2024).

Green, Robert K. *Jimmy Carter in the White House: A Captain with No Compass.* (Bloomsbury, 2024).

Havers, Grant N. *Leo Strauss and Anglo-American Democracy: A Conservative Critique.* (Cornell, 2024).

Herspring, Dale R. *The Kremlin and the High Command: Presidential Impact on the Russian Military from Gorbachev to Putin.* (Kansas, 2024).

Jarquín, Mateo. *The Sandinista Revolution: A Global Latin American History* (UNC, 2024).

Kastner, Jill and William C. Wohlforth. *A Measure Short of War: A Brief History of Great Power Subversion.* (Oxford, 2024).

Khalil, Osamah F. *A World of Enemies: America's Wars at Home and Abroad from Kennedy to Biden.* (Harvard, 2024).

Li, Hongshan. *Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War.* (Columbia, 2024).

Liu, Glory M. *Adam Smith's America: How a Scottish Philosopher Became an Icon of American Capitalism.* (Princeton, 2024).

Martin, Lerone A. *The Gospel of J. Edgar Hoover: How the FBI Aided and Abetted the Rise of White Christian Nationalism.* (Princeton, 2024).

McCurdy, John Gilbert. *Vicious and Immoral: Homosexuality, the American Revolution, and the Trials of Robert Newburgh.* (JHU, 2024).

Meléndez-Badillo, Juan. *Puerto Rico: A National History.* (Princeton, 2024).

Meyer, Thomas and José Luis de Sales Marques, eds. *The EU and China: Avoiding a New Cold War.* (Routledge, 2024).

Michel, Gregg L. *Spying on Students: The FBI, Red Squads, and Student Activists in the 1960s South.* (LSU, 2024).

Morgan, Iwan. *FDR: Transforming the Presidency and Renewing America.* (Bloomsbury, 2024).

Morris Michael F. *Corps Competency? III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters in Vietnam.* (Kansas, 2024).

Mullen, Abigail G. *To Fix a National Character: The United States in the First Barbary War, 1800-1805.* (JHU, 2024).

Nickerson, Michelle M. *Spiritual Criminals: How the Camden 28 Put the Vietnam War on Trial.* (Chicago, 2024).

Offiler, Ben and Rachel Williams, eds. *American Philanthropy at Home and Abroad: New Directions in the History of Giving.* (Bloomsbury, 2024).

Riley, Nancy E. Chinatown, *Honolulu: Place, Race, and Empire*. (Columbia, 2024).

Sedgwick, Ellery Jr. *My Experiences in World War II: Observations and Insights of a Naval Intelligence Officer.* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024).

Seidenfaden, Emil Eiby. *Informing Interwar Internationalism: The Information Strategies of the League of Nations.* (Bloomsbury, 2024).

Shannon, Matthew K. *Mission Manifest: American Evangelicals and Iran in the Twentieth Century.* (Cornell, 2024).

Sheen, Erica. *Geopolitical Shakespeare: Western Entanglements from Internationalism to Cold War.* (Oxford, 2024).

Slonimsky, Nora, Mark Boonshoft, and Ben Wright. *American Revolutions in the Digital Age*. (Cornell, 2024).

Symonds, Craig L. *Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay.* (Oxford, 2024).

Thompson, Joseph M. *Cold War Country: How Nashville's Music Row and the Pentagon Created the Sound of American Patriotism.* (UNC, 2024).

Wagner, Steve. *Eisenhower for Our Time*. (Cornell, 2024).

Watson, Blake A. *Kansas and Kansans in World War I: Service at Home and Abroad.* (Kansas, 2024).

Weddle, Kevin J. *The Compleat Victory: Saratoga and the American Revolution.* (Oxford, 2024).

Wilber, Tom. *Vanishing Point: The Search for a B-24 Bomber Crew Lost on the World War II Homefront.* (Cornell, 2024).

Wilson, James Graham. *America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan.* (Cornell, 2024).

Woodiwiss, Michael. *Organized Crime and American Power: A History, Second Edition.* (Toronto, 2024).

Yasutake, Rumi. *The Feminist Pacific: International Women's Networks in Hawai'i, 1820-1940.* (Columbia, 2024).

Yordanov, Radoslav. *Our Comrades in Havana: Cuba, the Soviet Union & Eastern Europe, 1959-1991.* (Stanford, 2024).

SHAFR By-Laws
(amended October 2022)

ARTICLE I: MEMBERSHIP

Section 1: Any person interested in furthering the objects of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation shall become a member upon submitting an acceptable application and paying the dues herein provided.

Section 2: The following are the classes of membership in the Society: Regular, Student, Life, and Institutional. The specific qualifications of each class of membership shall be established by the Council.

Section 3: Annual dues for Regular, Student, and Institutional members shall be established by the Council.

Section 4

(a) All members in good standing, except institutional members, shall have the right to attend, participate in, and vote in all of the Society's meetings and to vote in its elections. Each member shall be supplied without additional charge one copy of each issue of Diplomatic History and the newsletter while a member, and shall have such other privileges as may be prescribed by the Council.

(b) Membership in good standing is defined as paid membership certified by the Executive Director at least thirty days before participating in an election or in a Membership Meeting.

Section 5: Any member whose dues become three months in arrears shall be automatically suspended.

Section 6: Dues are payable in advance of the first day of each year. New membership shall become effective at the beginning of the calendar year in which application is received and dues are paid except that dues paid after August 31 shall be applied for the following year.

ARTICLE II: OFFICERS, ELECTIONS, AND TERMS OF OFFICE

Section 1: The officers of the Society shall consist of a President, a Vice President/President-Elect, and an Executive Director.

Section 2: The President and Vice President/President-Elect shall be elected for terms of one year each, beginning on November 1. The Vice President/President-Elect shall be an automatic nominee for the office of President the following year, although contesting nominees may be offered in accordance with provisions of the By Laws.

Section 3: The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Council to serve at the pleasure of the Council.

Section 4: In the event of the death, resignation or disability of the President, the last to be determined by a majority vote of the Council, the Vice President/President-Elect shall succeed to the Presidency until the following November 1. Since the office of Vice President/President-Elect will then be vacant, the Council by majority vote may designate one of its own members to act as chair of meetings in the President's absence. A Vice President/President-Elect who succeeds to the Presidency under the provisions of this section shall still be an automatic nominee for the next year's Presidency. If the Presidency, while filled by the elected Vice President/President-Elect under the terms of this section, shall again become vacant, the Council, by majority vote, shall designate a President ad interim to act until the office is filled by an annual election.

Section 5:

(a) Elections shall be held annually by mail or electronic ballot. The candidate for each office who receives the highest number of votes is elected. When more than two nominees are slated for a particular office and no candidate receives a majority vote, a run-off election will be held between the candidates with the two highest vote totals.

(b) The Nominating Committee shall present the name of the outgoing Vice President/President-Elect as an automatic nominee for the office of President.

(c) The Nominating Committee shall also present a slate of two candidates for each of the following offices: Vice President/President-Elect, members of the Council, graduate student member of Council (in appropriate years), teaching-centered member of Council (in appropriate years), and member of the Nominating Committee.

(d) Additional nominees for any office shall be placed on the ballot when proposed by petition signed by twenty-five members in good standing; but such additional nominations, to be placed on the ballot, must reach the Chair of the Nominating Committee by July 1.

(e) The Chair of the Nominating Committee shall certify the names to be placed on the ballot to the Executive Director by July 15. The Executive Director shall mail the completed election ballot to the membership not later than August 15 for return by September 30. The election results, certified by the Nominating Committee, shall be announced as expeditiously as possible. In the event of a tie, the current Council, with the exception of the President, will vote to elect one of the candidates. This vote will take place by electronic means, by secret ballot, and within one week of the conclusion of the regular election.

(f) If a SHAFR member is nominated and placed on the ballot, but fails to win election, he or she shall wait one year before being nominated again for the same or a different office.

(g) Following the expiration of their tenure, Council members must wait three years before seeking nomination again.

(h) The President and Vice President/President-Elect shall not submit nominations while holding office. SHAFR officers should not sit in on Nominating Committee meetings or have contact with Nominating Committee members regarding nominees.

(i) The authority for administering the election rests with the Nominating Committee. In addition to soliciting nominations and constructing the ballot, the Nominating Committee shall acquire from the candidates statements and biographical data; enforce all election guidelines; respond to all questions; work with the SHAFR Business Office to circulate the ballot, reminders, and other notifications; receive from the webmaster the electronic results; and transmit the results to the SHAFR Business Office. The Nominating Committee shall refer all disputes to the Council.

(j) SHAFR endows the Nominating Committee with full responsibility and authority for constructing the ballot and both the nominating and election process.

ARTICLE III: POWERS AND DUTIES

Section 1: The President shall supervise the work of all committees, formulate policies for presentation to the Council, and execute its decisions. He or she shall appoint the members of the Program Committee and of special committees, commissions, and boards. He or she shall sign all documents requiring official certification. The President shall be ex officio a member of the Council and shall preside at all Membership and Council meetings at which he or she is present. A retiring President shall retain membership on the Council for two years after the expiration of his or her term of Office as President. The President and Vice President/President-Elect shall be limited to one term in office.

Section 2: The Vice President/President-Elect shall preside at Membership and Council meetings in the absence of the President and shall perform other duties as assigned by the Council. The Vice President/President-Elect shall be ex officio a member of the Council.

Section 3: The Executive Director shall have charge of all Society correspondence, and shall give notice of all Council meetings. He or she shall keep accurate minutes of all such meetings, using recording devices when deemed necessary. He or she shall keep an accurate and up to date roll of the members of the Society in good standing and shall issue a notification of membership to each new member. He or she shall see that the By Laws are printed periodically in the newsletter. He or she shall submit all mail ballots to the membership and shall tabulate the results. He or she shall retain those ballots, for possible inspection, for a period of one month. He or she shall give instructions of the Council to the new members of committees when necessary. Under the direction of the Council, he or she shall manage all funds

and securities in the name of the Society. He or she shall submit bills for dues to the members and deliver an itemized financial report annually to the membership. He or she shall have custody of all records and documents pertaining to the Society and be responsible for their preservation, and shall prepare an annual budget for approval by the Council. The Executive Director shall be ex officio a member of the Council, but without vote.

ARTICLE IV: THE COUNCIL

Section 1: The Council of the Society shall consist of

(a) those officers or former officers of the Society who, in accordance with Article III of the By Laws, serve ex officio as members of the Council;

(b) seven members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society;

(c) two graduate student members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society; and

(d) one member (three year term) in a teaching-centered position, elected by the members of the Society.

(e) Additionally, at least one member of Council, including the President and Vice President/President-Elect, shall reside outside of the United States (at time of election), thereby requiring the Nominating Committee to put forth a pair of qualifying Council candidates if necessary to meet this minimum number.

In the event of a vacancy on the Council caused by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled at the next annual election.

Section 2: The Council shall have power to employ and pay necessary staff members; to accept and oversee funds donated to the Society for any of the objects of the Society stated in the Certificate of Incorporation; to appoint the Executive Director; to arrange for meetings of the Society; to create, in addition to committees named in the By Laws, as many standing or ad hoc committees as it deems necessary to fulfill its responsibilities; and to transact other business normally assigned to such a body.

Section 3: The Council may reach decisions either at meetings or through correspondence filed with the Executive Director, provided that such decisions have the concurrence of two thirds of the voting members of the Council.

ARTICLE V: COMMITTEES

Section 1: The Nominating Committee shall consist of three members in good standing who hold no other office in the Society and shall be elected for a term of three years, except that members of the first Nominating Committee shall be appointed by the President to terms of one, two, and three years, respectively. The Chair shall be held by the member with the longest years of service, except that when two or more members have equal length of service the President shall designate which of them shall serve as Chair. If a post on the Nominating Committee becomes vacant through death, resignation, or ineligibility through acceptance of an office in the Society, the President shall appoint a member to fill the post until the next annual election, when a replacement shall be chosen for the unexpired term.

Section 2: The Program Committee shall consist of members in good standing appointed by the President for a term of one year. The Program Committee may include the Local Arrangements Chair (but not as chair or co-chair).

Section 3: The Ways & Means Committee shall have responsibility for (1) recommending investment management and policy to Council; (2) serving as SHAFR's advisory board to the investment management firm approved by Council; (3) monitoring the endowment investments; (4) reporting regularly (at least twice a year) to Council on the status of the endowment investments; (5) monitoring and evaluating all ongoing programs; (6) soliciting and assessing proposals for new programs; (7) making recommendations to Council regarding funding and programs; and (8) consulting with the SHAFR accountant as necessary. The membership of the Committee will consist of the immediate past president (chair), the President, the Vice President/President-Elect, and two members-at-large. The President shall appoint the two at-large members to reflect the breadth of the Society's interests and membership, and they shall serve staggered, three-year terms. The Endowment Liaison and the Executive Director shall serve ex officio.

ARTICLE VI: *DIPLOMATIC HISTORY*

Section 1: The Editor of *Diplomatic History* shall be appointed by the President with the approval of the Council for a term of at least three years and not exceeding five years.

Section 2: The Editorial Board shall consist of the Editor and nine members nominated by the Editor and appointed by the Council. Members shall serve three years except that for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a regular rotation members may be appointed for a term of shorter than three years.

ARTICLE VII: AMENDMENT

Section 1: Amendments to the By Laws may be proposed by twenty-five members in good standing or by any member of the Council.

Section 2: Once proposed, amendments must be approved by a majority vote of Council and a concurring majority vote of those participating in a mail ballot.

ARTICLE VIII: MEMBERSHIP MEETING

Section 1: Council shall schedule a Membership Meeting, to be held during the SHAFR annual conference, upon presentation of an appropriate petition signed by at least 25 members of SHAFR in good standing. Notice of the final time, place, and agenda of the Membership Meeting shall be mailed by the Executive Director to each member of the Society at least six months prior to that meeting.

Section 2: Resolutions tentatively approved at a Membership Meeting shall be submitted by the Executive Director directly to the full membership of the Society by mail ballot for final approval.

ARTICLE IX: ADVOCACY

Section 1: This Section establishes two methods by which SHAFR may take a public stand on an issue:

SHAFR's membership may take a public stand on an issue by following these steps:

First, a petition proposing a resolution must be signed by ten members in good standing;

Second, such a resolution must be submitted by SHAFR by electronic means to the full SHAFR membership;

Third, the resolution must be voted on by at least 30% of the SHAFR membership within seven calendar days following an electronic announcement to the membership that voting has begun;

Fourth, the resolution must receive a majority of the votes cast;

Fifth, the resolution must then be submitted to the SHAFR Council. Council may pass the resolution through a 2/3 vote, with 80% of Council Members voting.

Alternatively, SHAFR Council may take a public stand on an issue by following these steps:

If Council votes unanimously on a motion with no abstentions and at least 80% of Council members present, then SHAFR may take a public stand.

If the Council vote is not unanimous, but Council approves a resolution by a 2/3 vote of the Council members, with 80% of Council Members voting, then such a resolution must be submitted by SHAFR by electronic means to the full SHAFR membership; then the resolution must be voted on by at least 30% of the SHAFR membership within seven calendar days following an electronic announcement to the membership that voting has begun; and the resolution must receive a simple majority of the votes cast for SHAFR to take a public stand.

Section 2: SHAFR's President is authorized to speak publicly on issues of vital interest to the organization in her/his capacity as SHAFR President without broader consultation of the Council or membership, but not as representing the opinions of the members of the organization.

DISPATCHES

2023 Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Report

I am very grateful to have been awarded the 2023 Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship, which supported research for my dissertation "Asylum Archipelago: Migration in the Borders of Empire in the Pacific and Caribbean." My dissertation analyzes refugee and asylum policy in sites of U.S. empire between 1938 and 2001 and considers unincorporated territories, commonwealths, military bases and ships, and sovereign states that were nonetheless affected by U.S. hegemony. I examine how the U.S. has historically formulated and employed legal regimes, such as partial territorial autonomy and exclusion from "mainland" legislation, to implement migration policy that determined resettlement possibilities while infringing upon migrant and territorial rights.

I relied on the Bernath Fellowship to conduct a few weeks of research in Guam. My trip was originally scheduled for May, but the powerful Typhoon Mawar delayed my travel to September. Once in Guam, I visited the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam and Andersen Air Force Base in Yigo. I concentrated on two MARC collections: The Papers of Governor Ricardo Jerome Bordallo and the Papers of U.S. Congressman Robert A. Underwood. The reports, memoranda, letters, and photographs within these collections helped me understand how Guamanian policymakers contributed to or resisted federal migration policy or advanced their own migration agendas. Particularly interesting were my findings about how control over migration featured in negotiations for formal territorial status adjustment. At Andersen Air Force Base, I toured locations where refugees once lived while waiting for processing to the United States. I also examined U.S. military after action reports and base newspapers. These documents elucidated how military officials responded to being assigned responsibility for refugee camp operations as well as the perspectives of the individual service men and women who worked with migrants.

I will use this research in at least three dissertation chapters. The first focuses on Operation New Life (1975) during which time more than one hundred thousand Vietnamese refugees transited to and through Guam to the U.S. and other countries. The second and third chapters will turn to 1990s migrant processing operations. I will examine Operation Pacific Haven (1996-1997) and the experiences of Kurdish and Iraqi asylum seekers in Guam. My final chapter will address attempts to police Chinese migration in the Pacific between Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Wake Island.

I would like to thank SHAFR for their support as well as Jeffrey Meyer (Andersen Air Force Base) and Mrs. Dorathina P. Herrero (MARC) for their research expertise, time, and warm welcome.

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In Memoriam: John McNay

John T. McNay
1957–2023
Historian of US Diplomacy

John T. McNay, professor of history, passed away on October 27, 2023.

John McNay was a child of Montana's blue skies and rocky ridges. Born in 1957, he attended the University of Montana, launching a career as a journalist addressing community wrongs. He transferred his passion for speaking truth to power to a career in education, earning his PhD at Temple University in 1997. Since 2000, he worked for UC Blue Ash, a regional open access college of the University of Cincinnati. It is not hard to say that he was the best hiring choice we ever made.

John McNay was a scholar of Cold War diplomatic history with an interest in how an individual's background contributed to diplomatic decisions. Starting with a reinterpretation of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's career, John illuminated how diplomats created policy. He ultimately authored or contributed to five books, in addition to articles, reviews, and multiple manuscripts still in development at his death. For his research on presidential decisions for peace, he was an invited speaker at the Nobel Peace Institute in Oslo, Norway.

John McNay, born of a union family, was a champion of labor and education. As president of the University of Cincinnati's AAUP chapter, he was sufficiently vocal that administrators visibly sighed when they spotted him and braced to be grilled on budgeting choices. He was four-time president of the state of Ohio's AAUP, then joined the national AAUP Governing Council. John's advocacy made him a frequent visitor at the statehouse, testifying often against anti-education legislation. He was there when the doors were barred against crowds protesting the union busting bill SB5, inspiring his book *Collective Bargaining and the Battle of Ohio: The Defeat of Senate Bill 5 and the Struggle to Defend the Middle Class*. For this and throughout his career, he used his journalist background to submit op-eds statewide in support of education. In recent years, John was a central contributor to the AHA's ongoing work promoting the integrity of history education in the Ohio state legislature.

John McNay was a professor who took pride in his students, whom he called his "young scholars." He maintained folders of prized students' past work and postgraduation publications, and he attended their graduations and weddings. He was an enthusiastic proponent of Study Abroad and would do anything to ensure his students, often new to travel, had a positive experience of the world—even once sharing clothing with a student who lost his luggage. He inspired students to pursue a variety of careers; as one put it, "he's why I'm the teacher I am today."

John McNay was a firm believer in faculty service and never stopped giving to his university. He co-directed UC's Institute for the Advanced Study of Culture and Democracy. He was part of the planning committee for UC's Press and chaired its Faculty Advisory Board. Among his lengthy list of service, he was a department chair, a five-time faculty senator, and twice a member of committees vetting provost candidates. (As he said, with mixed regret and pride, he never lost an election.) For all of his work, the UC Board of Trustees voted to grant him the rank of professor emeritus posthumously.

John McNay was the first to invite his colleagues to "seminars" at local pubs and the first to accept similar invitations. (There are many, many stories that start, "I met John over a beer!") His office shelves incorporated the books of younger colleagues, purchased to support their careers; on his desk was a colleague's dissertation that he was reading for the fun of it. Quietly generous, he was swift to pick up the tab for a colleague being honored.

John McNay was a person who maintained active social circles outside of academia—friends who met to discuss current affairs, fellow motorcyclists who rode together (although John hid his motorcycle from his sisters), family from whom he unsuccessfully attempted to hide his uneven housekeeping (and, yes, the motorcycle), and even a black cat who bullied his way into John's home (and stayed, of course). He was a person who found friends wherever he went, bound to others by a mutual curiosity in the world. Whether it was a person in the National Archives or a senior citizen student who became a frequent dinner companion, John was someone who did not make acquaintances, but friends. (Or, as he would refer to them, "a buddy of mine.") We were all his buddies, and he was ours.

Krista Sigler
University of Cincinnati Blue Ash College

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John McNay—A Personal Reminiscence

On October 27, 2023, we lost John McNay. I lost a friend of over 30 years. John was my first Ph.D. student at Temple. Actually, he was more than that, and for a variety of reasons. His MA advisor at the University of Montana, Michael Mayer, had been a graduate student at Princeton when I was there. A native of Montana and

one-time journalist in his home state, during his time in Missoula, John had developed an interest in the history of US foreign policy. Mike, who knew me because we both worked on the Eisenhower years and also masqueraded as basketball players, recommended that John work with me. I was at the University of Hawaii at that time, and sure enough, John flew out to speak with me (not exactly a hardship, except for the cost). That must have been 1990, perhaps 1991. I told John that I liked everything about him, but that there was a very good chance that I would be leaving Hawaii for Temple following the next year (that's another story). John came anyway.

So we spent a year together in Manoa Valley, a very good year. But sure enough, I decided to move to Temple. John had a difficult decision to make. He liked me, and he liked the coursework he had done with me. But he'd fallen in love with Hawaii, and as anyone who knew him would predict, he had made lots of friends. For these reasons, he opted to remain at least one more year in paradise to determine whether he could come up with a satisfying program under the direction of other faculty.

He couldn't, or he didn't. Therefore, he wrote me sometime in the spring of 1993 that he now wanted to join me at Temple. I had to do a bit of fast talking to get him funding. I had been promised two teaching assistantships as an inducement to leave Hawaii for Temple. That way I could bring two Ph.D. students of my choice with me. I only wanted to bring John, but the offer had expired as the department went about selecting its graduate class. But the chair and director of graduate studies were very generous and resurrected it. The upshot was that a year later after I moved to Philadelphia, so did John.

I don't recall where John lived that first year. There was little housing for grad students near campus—just a dorm building—maybe two (this despite the unconscionably large size of the graduate program, at least in history). Knowing John, he probably chose to live in a dorm. He was easy that way. And I don't think it mattered much. John almost immediately immersed himself in the department, earning the respect of faculty and the friendship of his cohort—and the one after that. In common with many Temple graduate students he moved around a lot until he ultimately found a home with a bunch of graduate students on Oregon Avenue, not far from the sports arenas. To the surprise of no one, his peers elected him president of the Barnes Club, the History graduate organization. I'm not positive, but I think that it was during his presidency that the Barnes Club organized its first conference. Held annually each year since, that conference remains a great venue for students, nationally and internationally, to go public with their research. Many SHAFR presentations originated as Barnes Club presentations.

John also immersed himself in his coursework, and he excelled at it. The same goes for his work as a teaching assistant. I remember so well, and so fondly, John's assisting Dieu Nguyen and myself when we developed and launched our team-taught course on the Vietnam War. What a wild and rewarding ride that was. At the time, TA-ing in an elective as opposed to a survey was a treat for Temple history graduate students (the department held fast against allowing graduate students to teach their own courses before completing their comps), and both Dieu and I lobbied for John. He did a magnificent job, and in the process added the Vietnam War to his menu of interests, and later publications. (I need to interject that during his last year at the University of Hawaii, John studied and became close with Gary Hess. Gary was at UH as a visiting chair. He sparked John's interest in the Vietnam, and together they wrote a chapter on Bernard Fall for David Anderson's edited volume, *The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era*.

John wrote a paper in my seminar on Dean Acheson (he may have started it in a class in Hawaii—I forget such details), for which I introduced him to political psychology. He drew on a variety of theories about cognition to emphasize the influence of Acheson's Anglophilia and his attendant affection for the British Empire on his policy prescriptions and inclinations. That grew into his dissertation. For his outside reader we recruited Bob Jervis from Columbia, the dean of political psychologists. John's dissertation became his first book: *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy*. It's a great if unconventional book, not unlike John himself.

I could go on and on, dipping into such matters as John's filiopietistic affection for the Irish, which led him to study Ambassador Henry Brady and in fact edit his memoir, but I provide just a rough sketch of John and our continuing relationship over the decades to signal what he meant to me, and why he was so special. After a couple of one-year appointments and a stint house sitting for our family, John moved to Cincinnati for a tenure-track position at the University of Cincinnati's Blue Ash campus. He remained there for over twenty years, rising through the ranks to full professor. John matured into an outstanding teacher-scholar, and I was honored that he consulted me every step of the way (over beers whenever geography allowed).

He didn't always take my advice, however. After several years John became increasingly involved in the professors' union, first at Cincinnati, then throughout Ohio, and ultimately nationally. Union organizing ran in his family. He told me of his intentions, and I told him to be careful. I was not supportive. It would take time away from his teaching and, perhaps even more so, his research. I reminded him that there were never enough hours in the day for us to get done what we needed to get done. That is the cross that committed faculty must bear. He conceded that I was right, but he went ahead anyway. John had values, and he stuck to them. Those values included putting others' interests above his own. In seemingly no time at all he became a leader of the union movement, serving as president of both the University of Cincinnati's and state of Ohio's AAUP.

John squared the circle, however. He wrote a book about it, *Collective Bargaining and the Battle of Ohio: The Defeat of Senate Bill 5 and the Struggle to Defend the Middle Class*. It proudly sits on my bookshelf. And I always took delight in receiving word from all my friends who taught at universities across Ohio about how much they treasured John. They could not adequately express how much they appreciated his service to them, to all of them. I won't go so far as to claim that John proved me wrong. He simply did things his way.

When Temple's Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy and the Department of History organized a symposium to mark my retirement, John was probably the first graduate student whom I put on the invitation list to give a paper. He accepted, of course, and put together a presentation that focused on Truman's foreign policy. This was the beginning of his last project, a book-length exploration of presidential decisions for peace inspired by Gary's book, *Presidential Decisions for War*, and even at this point his argument was sufficiently original and challenging to provoke lively discussion from the audience, which included Mel Leffler. As he always did, John took on board Mel's thoughtful critique. He was a vacuum for constructive criticism. On my computer I have three draft chapters that John sent to me for review and comment after he returned from conducting research in Europe. John passed away before he could complete the book. But especially in the aftermath of his kidney transplant, when he felt better than he had in years, he enthusiastically and I must add joyfully responded to my suggestions and let me know that he was already undertaking the revisions. I will never delete those files or those emails.

Everyone who knew John will attest that he was a gentle

soul. Yet he was fierce in his determination. He overcame kidney stones and a kidney transplant. He overcame his advisor moving 6000 miles away. He showed all that he could be a teacher, a scholar, and a union organizer, activist, and lobbyist. He led by example, not histrionics, and he gave real meaning to the concept of the collective good. Moreover, he did this all while manifesting the greatest humanity—and humility.

John was only 66 when he passed away, but what a legacy he leaves. And what a model for us all to follow. John would frequently talk about how much he learned from me. I should have told him more frequently how much I learned from him. What a tragedy that I, that none of us, had more time with him.

Richard H. Immerman

In Memoriam: Lloyd Ambrosius

Lloyd Eugene Ambrosius, historian and noted scholar on the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, died unexpectedly in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, on May 7, 2024. He was 82 years old.

Lloyd was born on August 21, 1941, to Sterling and Grace (Baxter) Ambrosius. He grew up in Huntsville, Illinois and attended school in nearby Augusta, graduating from Augusta High School in 1959. He entered the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in the fall of 1959 as a pre-med major but later switched his major to history and minor to philosophy. Lloyd completed his B.A. with honors in Liberal Arts and Sciences and High Distinction in History in January 1963. He married Margery Marzahn on August 24, 1963, while working on his M.A. in history at UIUC, which he completed in August 1964. Marge earned her B.A. and M.A. degrees in history while Lloyd began his doctoral studies under the direction of Professor Norman Graebner and would work for Professor Graebner for 2 years as his research assistant; Marge would complete a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Nebraska in 1986 and was hired as a professor of Political Science at Kansas State University. Lloyd earned his doctorate in August 1967, with a dissertation entitled "The United States and the Weimar Republic, 1918-1923: From the Armistice to the Ruhr Occupation."

Lloyd was the Samuel Clark Waugh Distinguished Professor of International Relations and Professor of History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where he taught from 1967 until his retirement in 2015. He was a Fulbright Research Professor at the University of Cologne from 1972 until 1973. During the 1977-1978 academic year, he held the Mary Ball Washington Chair of American History at University College Dublin. Lloyd received a second Fulbright and served as a Teaching and Research Professor at the University of Heidelberg during the spring of 1996. At Nebraska, he taught the U.S. history and diplomatic history surveys, as well as upper division and graduate classes on U.S.-German relations, international politics, European politics, and the U.S. presidency. While senior scholars might opt to teach only upper division undergraduates or graduate students, he readily agreed to teach the U.S. history survey and develop a recitation component based on thematic and topical readings that explored the concept of an American identity or identities and the U.S. role in an increasingly interdependent and pluralistic world.

Lloyd's influence at the University of Nebraska reached beyond the UNL History Department. He was the founding coordinator and chief adviser for the university's International Affairs program. In a January 1980 article in the *Daily Nebraskan*, Lloyd quipped that "interest in the major 'runs counter to the observation that Nebraskans aren't interested in foreign relations.'" He also served as chair of the program committee for the university's E.N. Thompson Forum on World Issues, working tirelessly to bring national and international figures such as Shirin Ebadi, Mikhail Gorbachev, Desmond Tutu, Charlayne Hunter-Gault, George McGovern, and Bono to Lincoln. Upon his retirement, he received the university's Louise Pound-George Howard Distinguished Career Award.

He was a prolific author, writing four books on Woodrow Wilson published during a 30-year span: *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition* (1987), *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism* (1991), *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (2002), and *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism* (2017). In these four works, as well as in countless book chapters and journal articles, Lloyd offered his trenchant assessment of Wilson's diplomacy and how Wilson's liberal internationalism influenced any number of 20th and 21st century policymakers as they pursued ill-conceived and misguided policies in the name of democracy. In his later writings, Lloyd would assert that Wilson's Protestant Christianity and his racism shaped Wilson's world view and influenced both his domestic and foreign policies.

An enthusiastic and early supporter of SHAFR, Lloyd literally was present at the creation of the organization in the spring of 1967. He served on the Program Committee (1981-1983), Norman and Laura Graebner Prize Committee (1986-1992 and 1999-2003), Nominating Committee (1989-1991), the Editorial Board of *Diplomatic History* (1991-1993), and Council (1993-1995). He organized a session for the first SHAFR conference in 1975 and published an article entitled "The Orthodoxy of Revisionism: Woodrow Wilson and the New Left," in the first issue of *Diplomatic History* in 1977. Lloyd looked forward to attending the SHAFR annual meeting each summer and socializing with old and new friends. He was especially interested in welcoming international scholars into the organization, as well as making time to talk to younger scholars about their research. Lloyd had similar enthusiasm for the Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (SHGAPE). He served on Council (2002-2005), the Editorial Board of the *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* (2007-2010), Vice President (2013-2014), and President (2015-2017).

Lloyd was preceded in death by his wife Margery Marzahn Ambrosius. He is survived by his sons and daughters-in-law Walter Ambrosius and Leslie Underwood and Paul Ambrosius and Valerie Daugherty; his grandchildren Michael Ambrosius and Em Ambrosius; and his brother and sister-in-law John Ambrosius and Margaret Adams.

This essay cannot adequately convey the important role Lloyd Ambrosius played in my life as professor, adviser, mentor, and friend. I'll just end with a line from Leonard Cohen's *Hallelujah* (1984), which suggests that hope exists, both in solemnity and sorrow:

"There's a blaze of light in every word;
it doesn't matter which you heard,
the holy or the broken Hallelujah."

Kristin L. Ahlberg
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